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The research and analysis regarding compelled commercial speech utilized the 
theoretical perspectives of: 1) "hegemony" as theorized by Antonio Gramsci and 2) 
"countervailing power" as outlined by political economist, John Kenneth Galbraith. 
Gramsci maintained that hegemony occurs when a dominant class or alliance of classes 
or social groups assert a unifying world view and successfully gain political and 
economic control over subordinate society through consent rather than direct force. 
Galbraith's theory of countervailing power asserts that modern capitalistic society breeds 
centers of industrial concentration that become monopolies or oligopolies. He views this 
as a positive formula for growth if the monopolistic power systems induce countervailing 
institutions that wield sufficient power to prevent potential abuse and exploitation by the 
dominant groups. 
This dual theoretical perspective offered the means to analyze the agricultural 
climate and players involved in the compelled commercial speech conflict by examining 
which entities or individuals have the economic power, which parties are vulnerable to 
abuse or exploitation, which ones are induced to build centers of countervailing power 
and what will be needed for success as a countervailing institution. 
The goal of this study was to obtain evidence and to perform an economic, 
political and legal analysis that would show the relationship between the law on 
compelled commercial speech and the underlying interests of key entities seeking to 
maximize their positions. Further, this analysis sought to identify the consequences, 
including the role of speech and communications in the industrial, economic and political 
environment, occasioned by different legal resolutions on compelled commercial speech. 
Research methods included analysis of primary documents such as case law, 
briefs, transcripts, Congressional testimony, published federal and state agency materials, 
and statements by commodity promotion boards and commissions; review of generic 
advertising; analysis of secondary evidence on checkoffs in print or electronic format; 
and telephone interviews with individuals knowledgeable about the checkoff programs or 
involved in the legal challenges. Two investigative frames were used as tools to collect 
and analyze evidence, along with traditional legal analysis and a critical approach to all 
evidentiary materials. Gramsci's ideas on hegemony and Galbraith's theory of 
countervailing power provided a framework for interpreting the evidence 
This study showed a climate ripe for hegemonic change in the agricultural 
industry driven by economic and political changes that are creating a profound "season of 
discontent" much broader than the First Amendment free speech issue. Parallel winds of 
change in First Amendment doctrine have coincided to elevate this particular issue as a 
platform for the challengers. Resolution of the government speech defense issue and the 
First Amendment issue regarding the appropriate level of protection for compelled 
commercial speech will have ripples on economic, political and social institutions that are 
affected by the way in which commercial speech may be compelled and regulated. 
vi 
ABSTRACT 
A major battle in First Amendment free speech rights is raging over the 
constitutionality of mandatory commodity assessments for generic product advertising 
(called "commodity checkoffs"). Such advertising features slogans such as "Got Milk?" 
"The Other White Meat" and "Beef, It's What's for Dinner." More than $750 tpillion per 
year is collected in commodity checkoffs on the basis of stand-alone legislation or 
marketing orders that have their genesis in legislation dating back to 1937. This income 
directly supports generic advertising, administrative salaries, research and educational 
activities and indirectly supports other functions. The rationale for commodity checkoffs 
is to maintain and expand the market for commodities. 
The First Amendment challengers claim that forced payment of such fees to fund 
commercial speech with which they disagree is a violation of their free speech rights. 
The courts have addressed these arguments in a line of cases, including the 2001 
Supreme Court case, United States v. United Foods. In United Foods, the Court struck 
down mushroom checkoffs by applying a First Amendment doctrine regarding freedom 
from compelled speech or compelled association, as first established in the union dues 
case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. In doing so, it avoided applying the 
commercial speech doctrine set forth in the Central Hudson test, a standard followed by 
lower courts in deciding earlier checkoff cases. 
United Foods triggered a spate of hotly contested cases involving challenges to 
commodity checkoffs, with the USDA and dominant leadership in the agricultural 
industry vigorously defending the checkoff programs on the grounds that the generic 
advertising constitutes "government speech." The decisions indicate a judicial trend 
toward recognizing the First Amendment rights of the challengers by holding commodity 
checkoffs unconstitutional unless they are part of a complex regulatory scheme. The 
lower courts are divided in regard to the "government speech" defense, and the issue has 
yet to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The legal conflict constitutes only one layer of a broader political, economic and 
social picture. The research revealed that the agricultural industry is experiencing 
dramatic shifts from competitive industry models to industry structures characterized by 
concentration, vertical integration, and powerful control by meat packers, dairy and meat 
processors and other entities higher in the "food chain." A network of close relationships 
among the USDA, trade associations and giant agribusiness organizations suggests the 
possibility of a deeply imbedded hegemony thriving off checkoff fee wealth. 
The central thesis of this dissertation is that the line of compelled commercial 
speech cases represents a fundamental hegemonic conflict within the agricultural industry 
in which the challengers are using the courts and the First Amendment as a mechanism to 
break the current hegemony of commodity checkoffs and establish countervailing power. 
If successful, the resulting changes will impact both the hegemony of the agricultural 
industry and the development of First Amendment doctrine. 
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CHAPTER l 
INTRODUCTION Constitutional challenges to the laws and regulations promulgated by governmental institutions (or institutions of "the State") never arise in a vacuum in the United States. A targeted law or regulation is always associated with its own lineage of direct and indirect enforcement by legal, economic, cultural and political institutions that interact to produce a dominant approach. Every constitutional challenge is launched within the context of a complex social and political environment populated by players with contradictory private and public agendas. The challengers seek to change the dominant approach and shift the balance of power by asserting an argument grounded in constitutional theory. A powerful example of a challenge representing a struggle of epic proportion can be found in the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In that conflict, the vested interests and historic actions of government, society and African American citizens and others who believed in equal justice under law (individually and collectively) were involved in the legal battle for equal rights as interpreted under the Constitution of the United States and its Amendments. While the civil rights conflict today is not evidenced as openly in strident clashes between individuals and State authority, people of color, gays and other minorities still advance constitutional challenges to seek the equality that will allow them to achieve economic, political and cultural goals. Studying the court cases and the legal issues affords only a partial understanding of any conflict since such an approach does not illuminate the nature of the social and political forces that surrounded these legal 
1 
developments in the past and continue to provide context for the legal conflicts today. A 
fuller understanding can be gained only by a careful analysis of the players involved in 
the battle for power, the interests at stake, the platforms or principles being espoused and 
the underlying values that may not be openly expressed. 
In a parallel fashion, notable struggles have occurred during the second half of the 
Twentieth Century and early years of the Twenty-first Century in the realm of First 
Amendment rights. The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of 
America says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances." 1 As might be expected in a republic such as the United States, 
protection of political speech has been a primary and critical focal point of First 
Amendment jurisprudence. But standards of protection for other types of speech have 
also generated First Amendment doctrine, including a body of case law and legal 
rationale regarding Amendment protection for: 1 )  commercial speech, and 2) speakers 
seeking protection from compelled speech and compelled association. 
In a 1942 case, Valentine v. Christensen,2 the Supreme Court of the United States 
denied protected status to commercial speech. The court held against the plaintiff who 
challenged a New York city ordinance preventing citizens from distributing commercial 
leaflets. In the opinion of the court, the city was entitled to regulate commercial use of 
the streets. The Christensen case and a later case denying protection to door-to-door 
1 
U.S. Const., amend. I. 
2_ Valentine v. Christensen, 3 16 U.S. 52 (1942). 
salesmen, Breard v. Alexandria, 3 established the doctrine that commercial speech 
warranted no First Amendment protection. However, the Court's failure to provide a 
well-reasoned rationale and a definition of commercial speech made this doctrine the 
target of critical commentators.4 
Legal scholars got a first glimpse of change in the commercial speech doctrine in 
a 1964 libel case, New York Times v. Sullivan.5 This landmark case was of seminal 
importance in libel law development, establishing that public officials must show actual 
malice in order to prevail in a claim for libel. However, the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Sullivan also recognized limited First Amendment protection for "editorial advertise­
ments." The case arose when the New York Times ran an advertisement in 1960 on 
behalf of black clergymen seeking to combat a wave of terror taking place in the South in 
police actions directed toward nonviolent demonstrators in various cities, including 
Montgomery, Alabama. Sullivan, a city commissioner in Alabama who was not 
identified in the ad, successfully convinced an Alabama state court that he was damaged 
in the amount of $500,000 as a result of minor inaccuracies in the ad that he claimed had 
harmed his reputation. Under state defamation law, the paper was liable for defamation 
and could not defend based on truth because of such factual inaccuracies. 
Justice William J. Brennan's opinion provided a new federal rule that First 
Amendment protection will be afforded to criticism leveled against government or public 
officials unless they show that that the alleged defamatory speech was made with actual 
malice, i.e., "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
3 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (195 1). 4 Daniel F. Farber, The First Amendment (New York: The Foundation Press, 1998), 150. 
5New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
false or not."6 The ruling made clear that falsity and defamatory nature of the speech 
aimed at public officials, without more, would not prohibit First Amendment protection. 
Equally clear was the fact that the publication of speech in an "editorial advertisement" 
did not prevent such speech from receiving First Amendment protection, since the ad 
"communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed 
abuses and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and 
objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern."7 
The Supreme Court made another significant move toward First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia. 8 A university newspaper in the 
state of Virginia, a state where abortion was illegal, published an advertisement for 
abortion services in New York, a state that permitted legal abortion. The Court 
overturned the newspaper' s conviction for violating a Virginia statute prohibiting 
publications that encouraged abortion. Holding that the statute was unconstitutional, the 
Court observed that the ad included information of interest to many readers who should 
not be denied access to such speech simply because the information appeared in 
commercial advertising. 
In 1976, the Supreme Court provided an unequivocal message that its First 
Amendment doctrine on commercial speech was changing in Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 9 The opinion fashioned a new 
doctrine that governs this area of First Amendment law today despite strong criticism by 
its detractors over the years. In holding a ban on advertising of drugs by pharmacists 
6 Ibid. at 280. 
7 Ibid. at 266. 
8 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 ( 1975). 
9 Va. State Board of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 ( 1976). 
unconstitutional, the Court outlined its position that the free flow of commercial 
information serves the interests of the individual consumer and the public interest in 
making decisions that are well informed in the aggregate. While the decision clarified 
that the free speech language in the First Amendment affords a degree of protection to 
commercial speech or advertising, it did not define the level of protection. 
The Court addressed that open question four years later by establishing an 
intermediate level of protection for commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York. 10 The standard the Supreme Court 
outlined in this case provides that truthful, non-misleading commercial speech that is not 
illegal will receive First Amendment protection if the government proves that it has a 
substantial interest that warrants the restriction, that the speech restriction directly 
advances the government' s interest, and that the restriction on speech is no more 
extensive than necessary This standard has served as a legal foundation for challenges 
by a wide range of professional groups and industries seeking to avoid government 
regulation of their advertising. Among such groups are private liquor and tobacco 
companies, 1 1  members of the legal profession seeking to advertise their services without 
government restriction, 12 and pharmacists seeking to advertise their services in 
compounding specified drugs. 13 Each legal conflict represents an effort by challengers to 
utilize the First Amendment to attack regulations by the State and to trigger shifts in 
political, economic and social power. Acquiring more market power is typically the 
10 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
1 1  See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 ( 1995); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 
( 1996); and Lorillard Tobacco Company, et al. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
12 See z:auderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 47 1 U.S. 626 (1985) ; Shapero 
v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466 (1988); and Florida Bar v. Went-For-It, 5 15 U.S. 618 (1995). 
13  See Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002). 
overriding goal. The commercial speech doctrine has become a mechanism to facilitate 
this quest. 
A threshold question in every case is whether the speech at issue is commercial 
speech entitled to an intermediate level of First Amendment protection or political speech 
that is afforded the highest level of protection under a strict scrutiny standard. This issue 
was squarely before the U.S. Supreme Court in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 14 a case that invited 
the high court to consider whether a new definition of commercial speech was warranted. 
This case arose when a private individual sued Nike under a California statue that 
allowed him to seek to enforce California unfair competition and false advertising law on 
behalf of California citizens as a "private attorney general." 15 He claimed that Nike's 
communications to the public during the 1990s about working conditions in its overseas 
factories were false and misleading. The issue at the heart of the case is whether Nike's 
speech qualifies as political speech that furthers open debate on global labor practices or 
whether it constitutes commercial messages about Nike's business activities and sales of 
its shoes. In an environment saturated with commercial messages, the lines between 
commercial and political speech have blurred, compounding the thorny issue of how to 
define commercial speech. The California Supreme Court held that the Nike statements 
constituted commercial speech and were subject to state false advertising laws. Nike 
sought review of this decision by the United States Supreme Court. 
The U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments on April 23, 2003, but then dismissed 
the case on June 26, 2003, in a per curiam decision ( opinion of the court without an 
identified author) on the grounds that the writ of certiorari was "improvidently 
14 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939 (2002). 15 Ibid. 
granted." 16 In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens Goined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice David Souter in part) listed three reasons why the case warranted dismissal: 1) the California Supreme Court never entered final judgment, 2) both parties lacked standing to claim federal jurisdiction, and 3) the U.S. Supreme Court should avoid addressing novel constitutional questions prematurely. 17 Justice Stephen Breyer Goined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) wrote a dissent opinion finding no reason for the Supreme Court to delay hearing the case. Justice Anthony Kennedy dissented without opinion. If the Supreme Court would choose to overrule its decision in Central Hudson and afford commercial speech the same level of protection as private speech or define commercial speech strictly as "speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction," 18  then the issue raised in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky would disappear.19 Many thought that the Supreme Court would use the Nike case as an opportunity to take a fresh look at the commercial speech doctrine, but it was clear that procedural issues could provide the Court with grounds to dispense with the case on procedural grounds if it wished to avoid reaching the merits.20 The Court's dismissal of the case indicated that it 
16 See Nike, Inc. v Kasky, 539 U.S. _ (2003), 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5015,  No. 02-575 (2003). 
17 Ibid. ,  2003 U.S. LEXIS at 4-5. 
18 Va. State Board of Pharmacy at 762. 
19 The Supreme Court has indicated its discomfort with the Central Hudson test in several cases during the 
last few years. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (citing Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504 ( 1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)); 44 Liquormart v. 
Rhode Island, 5 17 U.S. 484, 5 18  ( 1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); and 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 5 14 U.S. 476, 493 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
20 Two procedural issues that were debated during the oral argument were whether the plaintiff, Marc 
Kasky, had standing to sue for false advertising and whether a case that had not gone to trial was ripe for 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court. See "Supreme Court considers Nike commercial speech challenge," 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (April 23, 2003); available from 
http://www.rcfp.org/news/2003/0423nikein.html; Internet; accessed 6 May 2003; and "Justices to review 
Nike commercial speech decision," The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (January 14, 2003); 
available from http://www.rcfp.org/news/2003/0l 14nikein.htm1; Internet; accessed 6 May 2003. 
is not eager to tackle the difficult issue of whether the intermediate level of protection for 
commercial speech under the Central Hudson test should be replaced with the higher 
level of protection afforded to political and ideological speech. 
Freedom of speech is a right expressly enumerated in the Bill of Rights while 
freedom of association is an implied right. (Although it can be argued that the "right of 
the people peaceably to assemble" is an express enumeration of the freedom of 
association, many scholars feel that they can be distinguished.) A compelled association 
claim is frequently joined with a compelled free speech claim, and courts often find 
themselves analyzing the two claims together. 
The 1977 benchmark case of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 21 was 
instrumental in developing the First Amendment principle that free speech rights under 
the Constitution encompass the right to be free from compelled speech and from 
compelled association. The Supreme Court had to decide whether "agency shop" 
arrangements were constitutional in school systems where employees were represented 
by unions. These arrangements required all union and non-union members to pay the 
same amount to the union as a condition for employment. The payment by union 
members was identified as union dues while the same amount paid by non-union 
members was characterized as a "service fee" for the activities taken by the union to 
represent them as their agent. 
In Abood, a teachers union (the Detroit Federation of Teachers) and the Detroit 
Board of Education entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included shop 
agency terms. Teachers challenging the arrangements contended that they opposed 
21See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
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collective bargaining by public employees and objected to the use of their fees for 
ideological and political causes with which they disagreed. They based their legal 
challenge on a claim that the compulsory service charges violated their First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
In reaching its decision in Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on two of its 
earlier union shop agreement cases as precedent, Railway Employes ' Dept. v. Hanson, 22 
decided in 1956, and the 1961  case of Machinists v. Street. 23 The Court in Hanson 
upheld the constitutionality of union-shop contracts that required all employees to 
financially support a union that legally represented them as an agent in collective 
bargaining. Union members were required to pay dues and non-union members had to 
pay "service fees." 
The constitutionality of the union shop agreement was an issue five years later in 
the Street case, but dissatisfied non-union employees in that case added the claim that the 
service fees they paid to the union were being used for political speech in violation of 
their First Amendment rights. The U.S .  Supreme Court acknowledged that there were 
constitutional issues "of the utmost gravity," but sidestepped them with its statutory 
interpretation that the relevant federal statute (the Railway Labor Act)24 prohibited a 
union from spending money that had been exacted for collective bargaining purposes on 
political activities.25 The Supreme Court is entitled and, indeed, bound to exercise such 
judicial discretion to refrain from deciding a case on constitutional grounds if there is 
another means available through careful interpretation of a statute. Because Machinist v. 
22 Railway Employes ' Dept. v. Hanson, 35 1 U.S. 225 (1956). 
23 Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 ( 1961). 
24 Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. 
25 See Street at 749-750. 
Street avoided a decision on constitutional grounds, First Amendment issues remained 
unresolved. The Abood case brought them to the forefront sixteen years later. 
In Abood, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the agency shop arrangements as 
"constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of 
the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress"26 but 
conditioned its decision by holding that the use of the service fees for purposes other than 
collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustments would be 
unconstitutional. The Court stated: "Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity 
that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and 
ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."27 It expanded this principle 
by stating: 
The fact that the appellants are compelled to make, rather than prohibited from 
making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their 
constitutional rights. For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion than an 
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's 
beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by 
the State. 28 
This decision stands for the principle that while a union may compel payment of 
fees, it must use the fees only for limited purposes which may not include ideological and 
political activities. The Abood case has served as the general starting point for courts to 
analyze compelled speech and compelled association cases . 
At the time Abood was decided in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court had already 
taken a position in the 1974 case of Miami Herald Publishing v. Tomillo against 
compelling newspapers to print certain speech. In Tomillo, the Court struck down a 
26 Abood at 222. 
27 Ibid. at 233. 
28 Ibid. at 234-235. 
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Florida statute requiring newspapers to provide a "right of reply" to political candidates. 
The statute required that political candidates be given equal space to reply to newspaper 
attacks on their official record or personal character. The Supreme Court held that the 
guarantee of a free press protects a newspaper editor or publisher from being compelled 
to print a reply. While the Abood and Tomillo decisions both address issues of 
compelled speech, Tomillo focused on the right of the press to be free from government 
compelled political or ideological speech and Abood addressed the right of non-union 
employees to be free from political or ideological speech. The Abood Court did not cite 
Tomillo or otherwise join these two consistent threads of First Amendment doctrine, 
choosing instead to expand on its Hanson and Street decisions that were narrowly 
focused on agency shop issues. 
Abood served as a signal that the courts would scrutinize government's efforts to 
force individuals to speak or to be publicly associated with a message. A series of 
significant cases reinforced this position. Wooley v. Maynard,29 also decided in 1977, 
involved a married couple living in New Hampshire that objected to the words "Live Free 
or Die" on their license plates and covered that portion of the plates. The Court 
analogized this case to an earlier case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Bamette,30 in which it held that a compulsory flag salute implicated freedom of speech. 
In his majority opinion in Wooley, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger held that an individual 
does not have to use his private property as a "mobile billboard" and does not have to "be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
29 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 ( 1977). 
30 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319  U.S. 624 (1943). 
1 1  
unacceptable."31  He reinforced the key concept that First Amendment freedoms include 
"both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all."32 
In Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utility Commission,33 the Supreme Court in 
1986 sustained a public utilities claim that its First Amendment rights were violated by 
the requirement that it include written speech of a private advocacy group in the 
envelopes in which it mailed its bills. 
An example of a case focused primarily on freedom of association is Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 34 decided in 1984. This case arose when the Minnesota 
Department of Human Rights issued an order to the Jaycees compelling them to admit 
women into their local chapters. The Jaycees took umbrage and refused to comply. 
Although the Supreme Court upheld the order on the grounds that the constitutional 
rights of the Jaycees were not sufficiently violated, the opinion by Justice William H. 
Brennan established several important points of doctrine for future compelled association 
cases. He recognized that freedom of association was "constitutionally protected" and 
that "freedom of association . . .  plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."35 Most 
importantly, although the Court declined to perform a First Amendment analysis of the 
state's order, it clearly indicated that the appropriate standard would be strict scrutiny: 
"Infringements on that right [of association] may be justified by 
regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less 
restrictive of associational freedoms." 36 
31 Wooley at 715, 7 17. 
32 Ibid. at 714. 
33 See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
34 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 ( 1984). 
35 Ibid. at 623 (citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education at 234-35). 
36 Ibid. at 623. 
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Justice Sandra Day O'Connor' s concurring opinion provided an example of 
judicial tension and inconsistency that has occurred when the facts of a compelled speech 
case include elements of commercial speech. She held that the case should have been 
analyzed under the commercial speech doctrine since the Jaycees were involved in 
commercial activity. In her view, the commercial nature of the Jaycees foreclosed them 
from claiming First Amendment protection in controlling their membership. Under her 
analysis, freedom of commercial association should only be afforded minimal 
constitutional protection. 37 
Other cases that have advanced the body of law addressing freedom from 
compelled speech and freedom from compelled association include: Ellis v. Brotherhood 
of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks38 (holding that compelled union dues may be 
used for nonpolitical social activities); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson39 (requiring 
unions to set up and maintain escrow accounts and systems for reimbursement to ensure 
that no disputed fees are used for political purposes while a resolution procedure is 
pending); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association4-0 (holding based on Abood and Hudson 
cases that fees used for lobbying activities are not sufficiently connected to collective 
bargaining to compel employees to comply); Keller v. State Bar41 (holding based on 
Abood analogy that mandatory bar dues cannot be used by state bar associations for 
"activities having political or ideological coloration"42 and that use of mandatory dues 
37 Ibid. at 633-635. 
38 Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984). 
39 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 ( 1986). 
40 Lehnert v. Ferris F acuity Association, 500 U.S. 507 ( 1991 ). 
41 Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
42 Ibid. at 15 .  
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must be " 'germane' to the purpose for which compelled speech was justified"43);  and 
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth44 (holding that as long as mandatory student fees are distributed in a viewpoint-neutral manner to groups with various political, ideological and expressive positions, the compelled funding does not violate students' First Amendment rights). In Southworth, the Supreme Court sought to apply the Abood case to the compelled-expression issues in the university setting, but had to modify it by substituting the "viewpoint-neutral" standard in place of the "gennaneness" standard. Beginning in the late 1980s, factions within the agricultural industry have launched constitutional challenges against programs that impose mandatory assessments on commodity producers (referred to as "commodity checkoffs") for purposes of generic advertising of the commodities. Those opposed to the programs disagree with a regulatory scheme that forces commodity producers to contribute payments toward advertising that does not represent their preferred positions. They assert that commodity checkoffs create an unconstitutional restriction on the free speech rights of commodity producers by compelling them to fund generic advertising that they feel does not provide them with benefits or undercuts their own marketing efforts or delivers messages contrary to their ideological and political beliefs. This is the crux of the compelled commercial speech legal challenge. However, those opposing and those defending checkoff programs in legal actions have vacillated between using First Amendment arguments based on the commercial speech doctrine or based on the doctrines governing freedom from compelled speech and compelled association to support their claims. 
43 Ibid. at 13. 
44 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 14 
The collision of First Amendment doctrines in a compelled commercial speech case can first be seen in United States v. Frame,45 a 1989 case involving a challenge to mandatory beef checkoffs under the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985. The beef producer advanced a First Amendment argument based on compelled association. In an opinion written by Circuit Judge Anthony J. Scirica, a panel of three judges on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals accepted this argument under the Abood precedent and applied a strict scrutiny standard in accordance with the Roberts case. Nevertheless, the opinion found that the government's interests were sufficient to withstand the First Amendment challenge. The dissenting judge in the Frame case, Circuit Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, correctly observed: "Because ... there is no precedent for the kind of compelled commercial speech at issue here, it is difficult to find the right framework for analysis."46 She asserted that a standard of First Amendment review less stringent than the test applied by the majority was warranted because the case involved commercial speech. Judge Sloviter concluded that, under this intermediate standard, the commodity checkoffs were unconstitutional, noting that the government's interests in beef ads were not sufficiently substantial to allow the infringement of producer's First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech. 47 In the controversial case of Glickman v. Wileman,48 the U.S. Supreme Court chose to ignore the claims of First Amendment speech violations by characterizing the checkoff programs as mere economic regulatory programs that did not implicate the First 
45 United States v. Frame, 885 F. 2d 1 1 19 (3d Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 ( 1990). 
46 
Ibid. at 1 146. 
47 Ibid. at 1 147. 
48 
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 15 
Amendment. The majority opinion held that if free speech rights had been raised, 
however, the correct test would have been an Abood/Keller analysis. In his dissent, 
Justice David Souter argued that the compelled funding for generic advertising did, 
indeed, raise First Amendment free speech issues and that the correct test to apply was 
the Central Hudson test. Justice Souter concluded that the marketing orders imposing 
mandatory assessments for commercial speech did not pass muster under the Central 
Hudson test and should be held unconstitutional. Many scholars and courts joined Justice 
Souter in disagreeing with the majority opinion in Glickman. An example of critical 
commentary is found in a 2002 law review article in which the authors state: 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wileman Bros. is troubling: it sidestepped 
the opportunity to append First Amendment protections against compelled speech 
and compelled financing of speech to commercial speech, and by lumping 
advertising into the broader arena of economic regulation, it appeared to have 
established a precedent curtailing those protections to political and ideological 
speech, and permitting the government to surreptitiously communicate its 
message through the pocketbooks of private enterprises.49 
Disagreement with the Glickman case prompted the California State Supreme 
Court to resort to state activism in concluding that compelled funding of generic 
advertising implicated the rights of fruit growers under the free speech clause of the 
California State Constitution. In Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons,50 a checkoff case 
involving fruit growers, the California Supreme Court objected strongly to the U.S. 
Supreme Court's failure to recognize First Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution and its conclusion in Glickman that the programs were solely economic 
49 Edward I.Schoen, Margaret M. Hogan and Joseph Falchek, "United Foods and Wileman Bros. : 
Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech-Now You See It, Now You Don't," American 
Business Law Journal 39 (2002): 467-520, 5 19. 
50 See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Ca. 4th 468 (2000). 
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regulatory schemes. The California high court held that the free speech clause of its state 
constitution was broader than the First Amendment and protected the commercial speech 
rights of the commodity producers. Since free speech issues at issue, it overturned the 
lower court decision granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the 
case to the appellate court with instructions for the lower court to decide: 1) the level of 
protection afforded commercial speech by the California State Constitution, and 2) what 
test should be used. The appellate court in 2001 held that an intermediate level 
"balancing test," should apply and struck down the California State Plum Checkoff and 
Promotion Program as unconstitutional.5 1 
In other cases in which the courts have recognized First Amendment speech 
rights, there has been tension between whether the commercial nature of the generic 
advertising should require an intermediate standard of scrutiny under commercial speech 
doctrine or whether the forced funding and forced association should trigger a strict 
scrutiny analysis under the doctrines of compelled speech and compelled association. 
While the Supreme Court has developed separate First Amendment doctrine relevant to 
both commercial speech and compelled speech, it has not developed a roadmap to follow 
when the doctrines converge in a single case. 
In a 2001 decision addressing commodity checkoffs, United States, v. United 
Foods, Inc. ,52 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a mushroom checkoff program by 
using a two-point analysis to determine whether the commercial speech involved was 
protected against compulsory commodity fees. First, it determined that the regulation 
involved did not fall within the comprehensive regulatory scheme defined by the court in 
51 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, No. F031 142 (5th Appellate Dist., State of Cal., 2001). 
52 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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the Glickman case. Second, relying upon the doctrine regarding freedom from compelled 
speech and compelled association, the court determined the degree to which the 
compelled checkoff program was germane to the core purpose of the regulatory program. 
It dismissed the issue of whether to apply the intermediate commercial speech standard 
by noting that the government did not rely upon Central Hudson in its appeal.53 
Some commentators felt that the U.S. Supreme Court erred in not performing a 
Central Hudson analysis in United Foods. The perceived seriousness of the failure to 
apply the Central Hudson test is pointed out by Schoen, Hogan and Falchek: 
The absence of the heightened Central Hudson analysis in United Foods 
may permit courts to review government regulations restricting or compelling 
commercial speech without any regard to the nature of the governmental interest 
underlying the regulation, the coherence of the regulatory scheme, the efficacy of 
the regulation in achieving its stated purpose, or the consideration of whether less 
intrusive means might accomplish the policy's objective . . . . Commercial speech 
protections, it seems, might be better served by the heightened Central Hudson 
analysis than by the obfuscating United Foods analysis. 54 
As noted in the example of the civil rights cases, the legal conflict and its 
complexities constitute only one layer of the broader political and economic issues. The 
commodity checkoff programs operate within a dense framework of regulations, power 
and industry conditions in which major participants include: 1) federal or state 
legislators who adopt enabling legislation and subsequently enact implementing 
legislation that creates councils or Commissions, 2) federal and state departments of 
agriculture that promulgate regulations, 3) secretaries of the departments of agriculture 
who appoint members of implementing boards, 4) boards, commissions and councils that 
manage the checkoff programs and determine how monies are used, 5) industry trade 
53 Ibid. at 415. 
54 Schoen, Hogan and Falcheck, 5 12. 
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associations, 6) commodity producers supporting checkoffs, 7) commodity producers 
against checkoffs, 8) agribusiness corporations, 9) key players in the production chain, 
i.e., processors and retailers, 10) external activist groups such as environmental protec­
tion groups, 11) ad agencies and consulting firms, 12) the media, and 13) the courts. 
The interwoven roles of all of these entities support a condition of hegemony or 
consensual acceptance of power. This occurs when a social group exercises political and 
moral direction in society and other groups support this leading group with "a relatively 
wide political consensus" of its policy goals. 55 Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist and 
social and political theorist, is recognized for his contributions in developing the concept 
of hegemony. 56 The following description of Gramsci' s concept of hegemony is 
outlined by Benedetto Fontana in his book, Hegemony and Power: 
Hegemony is defined by Gramsci as intellectual and moral 
leadership . . .  whose principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion. A 
social group or class can be said to assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it 
articulates and proliferates throughout society cultural and ideological belief 
systems whose teachings are accepted as universally valid by the general 
population. Ideology, culture, philosophy, and their 'organizers'-the 
intellectuals-are thus intrinsic to the notion of hegemony.57 
An alliance between social groups creates a consensus, which "makes the power 
of the dominant group appear both natural and legitimate."58 Hegemony may undergo 
55 Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy, "Gramsci and International Relations: A General Perspective and 
Example From Recent US Policy Toward the Third World," in Gram.sci, Historical Materialism and 
International Relations, ed., Stephen Gill (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1993), 130. 
56 Antonio Gramsci developed his theory of hegemony in The Prison Notebooks, which he painstakingly 
authored during the years 1928 to 1937 while imprisoned by the fascist regime in Italy. See Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans. ,  Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). 
57 Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony and Power: On the Relation Between Gram.sci and Machiavelli 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 140. 
58 James Watson and Anne Hill, Dictionary of Media & Communication Studies, 5th ed., s.v. "hegemony." . 19 
change, renegotiation or actual displacement by counter-hegemony if the dominant group 
is unable to accommodate new ideologies introduced by subordinates.59 
Gramsci asserted that hegemony occurs when an existing political system is 
maintained through the consensual support of civil society and its many institutions rather 
than through means of domination. Intellectual and moral leadership are integral to 
maintaining a powerful state of hegemony since society at large must identify underlying 
principles and causes worthy of their support. Minority groups can build alternative 
counter-hegemony within society, but such efforts must also be supported by a 
combination of intellectual, ideological and moral leadership that generates the consensus 
necessary for the power base of a new hegemony. 
Gramsci theorized that a strong hegemony with interlocking relations between 
dominant groups in government and ci vii society will not require tactics founded on force 
or coercion to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, a weak or vulnerable 
hegemony will be more likely to use domination strategies. Hegemony thus raises the 
specter of an iron fist concealed within a velvet glove of rhetoric and moral authority. In 
the context of this study, the velvet glove of rhetoric and moral authority is evident in the 
public justifications for the checkoff programs while the iron fist can be glimpsed in the 
USDA's "government speech" argument. 
The genesis for these ideas is found in Gramsci' s fundamental premise that a 
matrix of social, intellectual, political and ideological forces coalesce at a given time in 
history to form a "historic bloc." The historic bloc exercises civil, cultural and political 
leadership. Gramsci incorporated Marx's ideas on base and superstructure to explain that 
59 Ibid. 
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the relations of production or the social means for creating value and culture through human labor (the base) f orm a foundation on which an institutional and civil framework is constituted.60 Referred to as "superstructure," this is a fluid domain where civil, social, political, legal and intellectual elements interact, state institutions assert authority, conflicting ideologies emerge and coercion is directly or indirectly applied. The "historic bloc" of the Twenty-First Century has been described as " .. . one of capitalist democracy, characterized by private ownership of the means of production and wage labor, and ideologically organized by a discourse of parliamentary and electoral politics. "61 In the hegemonic conflict over mandatory commodity assessments, the challengers have employed the courts and First Amendment arguments against compelled commercial speech as their mechanism of choice in attempting to break the current hegemony in the agricultural industry or at least achieve meaningful change. The agricultural industry (especially the pork and cattle sectors) is experiencing dramatic shifts from more competitive industry models to industry structures characterized by concentration, vertical integration, powerful control by meat packers, processors and other entities higher in the "food chain."62 The commodity producers are experiencing all-time low profits while at the same time they are paying mandatory fees for generic advertising to promote their products in ways in which many do not approve. Numerous publications, testimony, activist materials and other resources have provided a picture of 
60 See Douglas Raber, "Librarians as Organic Intellectuals: A Gramscian Approach to Blind Spots and 
Tunnel Vision," The Library Quarterly 73, no. 1 (January 2003): 33-53, 35. 
61 Ibid., 35, citing Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans., Q. Hoare and G. 
Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). 
62 See Daniel I. Padberg and Charles Hall, ''The Economic Rationale for Marketing Orders," San Joaquin 
Agricultural Law Review 5 ( 1995): 73-87. 21 
a network of close relationships among the United States Department of Agriculture, the 
large trade associations and the giant concentrated agribusiness organizations. 63 This 
suggests the possibility of a deeply embedded hegemony that is thriving on the checkoff 
fee wealth. 
Efforts by commodity producers to pursue more autonomy and independent 
practices have been squelched by the dominant groups, including deliberate inactivity on 
the part of the USDA by declining to follow referendum practices for voting on the 
continuation of beef checkoffs. The intense resistance to change by the government and 
industry factions in favor of commodity checkoffs, strongly suggests that the interests of 
the State and the dominant industry groups supporting checkoffs are closely aligned. 
The State can assume the role of neutral referee by taking independent action 
based on what is best for the public interest and by avoiding alliances with the dominant 
hegemony or the minority challengers in the agricultural industry. In keeping with this 
approach, the legislature and regulatory agencies (such as the USDA) could follow 
rational policies beneficial to the industry, the environment and consumer interests, 
although possibly in opposition to all particular regulated interests. The "referee 
approach" is characterized by a balancing of a plurality of interests (e.g., private versus 
private and public versus private). Consumer advocacy groups often promote this role of 
the State in order to further their interests in protecting the public and the environment. 
Such groups have posed serious questions regarding the government's interest in 
independently protecting the public interest of taxpayers and consumers in the field of 
·63 See, e.g. , William Heffernan, "Report to the National Farmers Union: Consolidation in the Food and 
Agriculture System," National Farmers Union (February 5, 1999), available from 
http://www.nfu.org/images/heffeman_l999.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 May 2003. 
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agriculture after the recent passage of the latest farm bill, The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. 64 This legislation was seen by many as a quintessential example of political agendas unleashed during an election year. Many argue that the result represents missed opportunities for the government to change course in its agricultural policies by adopting more environmentally conscious laws that curtail large federal farm subsidies, especially limiting those subsidies that benefit the agribusiness behemoths and exacerbate consolidation. 65 The new support programs also reverse many of the reforms initiated under the 1996 Freedom to Farm Act66 and increase subsidies by an additional $82 billion over the next ten years. 67 In short, this legislation suggests that, rather than a referee, the State is joined in hegemonic relationships with dominant interests in agriculture, and this has become one more example of a regulatory authority captured by the regulated. Another conceptual approach that illuminates the economic aspects of the commodities checkoff power struggle is John Kenneth Galbraith's concept of countervailing power outlined in his American Capitalism: The Concept of 
64 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171 ,  §§ 1001-10910 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C). 
65 See Richard E. Cohen and Corine Hegland, "Farm Bill Winners and Losers," National Journal 34, no. 19 
(May 1 1 , 2002): 1389-1390; and "How Conservation Measures Up in the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002," Soil and Water Conservation Society (June 20 2002); available from 
http://www.swcs.org/t_media_background.htm; Internet; accessed 1 8  November 2002. For a contrary 
view, see Thomas M. Franklin and Caitlin A. Burke, ''The 2002 Farm Bill: A Conservation Victory," 
Wildlife Society Bulletin 30, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 600-601 .  Comments on agricultural policy issues 
related to the farm bill, including the threats agricultural consolidation pose with regard to environment and 
the existing system of food production, can be found in Chuck Hassebrook, ''For American Farms, a 
Harvest of Change," New York Times, 20 April 2002, A16. 
66 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 127, 1 10 Stat. 888 (codified 
as amended at 7 U.S.C. 7201). 
67Barbara Rippel, "Farm Bill Undermines Open Trade - and Consumer Welfare, Consumer's Research 
Magazine 85, no. 6 (June 2002), 34-35. 
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Countervailing Power.68 Although Galbraith's approach was developed outside the neo­
Marxist tradition, it nevertheless remains highly consistent with Gramsci' s hegemony 
framework. Galbraith argued: 
" . . .  [P]rivate economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of 
those who are subject to it. The first begets the second. The long trend toward 
concentration of industrial enterprise in the hands of relatively few firms has 
brought into existence not only strong sellers, as economists have supposed, but 
also strong buyers as they have failed to see."69 
Galbraith believed that when a seller gains a monopoly (or several firms develop 
an oligopoly), an incentive develops for the seller's suppliers and those to whom it sells 
to "develop the power with which they cari defend themselves against exploitation."70 
He provided the following clarification of how this concept differs from the traditional · 
notion of competition within a capitalist economy: 
Competition which, at least since the time of Adam Smith, has been 
viewed as the autonomous regulator of economic activity and as the only 
available regulatory mechanism apart from the state, has, in fact, been superseded. 
Not entirely, to be sure. There are still important markets where the power of the 
firm as (say) a seller is checked or circumscribed by those who provide a similar 
or a substitute power or service. This in the broadest sense that can be 
meaningful, is the meaning of competition . . . .  The active constraint is provided by 
the competitor who offers, or threatens to offer, a better bargain. By contrast, in 
the typical modem market of few sellers, the active restraint is provided not by 
competitors but from the other side of the market by strong buyers.71 
In a nutshell, Galbraith asserted " . . .  power on one side of a market creates both 
the need for, and the prospect of reward to, the exercise of countervailing power from the 
other side."72 However, a certain amount of organization and minimum opportunity must 
68 John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952) . 
69 Ibid., 1 18. 
70 Ibid., 1 19. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 120. 
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exist for countervailing power to operate. Given the difficulties inherent in developing 
countervailing power, subordinates seeking change have often turned to the government 
and the courts for assistance. If countervailing power is valued as a necessary regulatory 
function, then it is incumbent upon these State institutions to "give it freedom to develop 
and to determine how it may best do so. The government also faces the question of 
where and how it will affirmatively support the development of countervailing power."73 
It may choose to support countervailing power with an affirmative role or block it with a 
negative role. 
Statement of Thesis 
The Supreme Court and other lower federal and state courts have been active in 
adjudicating compelled commercial speech cases involving First Amendment challenges 
to mandatory commodity assessments or checkoffs.74 A number of these have been filed 
since the United Foods decision in 2001 as anti-checkoff groups determined that the 
holding in that case offered them renewed hope for success in legal forums. The 
challenges launched by the subordinate groups have been contested hotly in key cases, 
with appeals in 2003 before five different federal appellate courts and one state appellate 
court.75 (Only days before subrrtjssion of this dissertation, the Eighth Circuit Court of 
73 Ibid., 143. 
74 See listing of cases at Appendix B. 
75 See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. S. Dakota, 2002) and Livestock 
Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(decided July 8, 2003); Jean Charter and Steve Charter v. USDA, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1 121 (D. Montana 
2002) (on appeal before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals); Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for 
Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772 (W.D. Mich. 2002), as corrected on October 3 1 ,  2002; (on appeal 
before the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, the tribunal that held mushroom checkoffs were unconstitutional 
in the United Foods case, affirmed by the U.S .  Supreme Court in United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 
U.S. 405 (2001); Delano Farms v. Ca. Table Grape Commission, No. 00-16778 (9th Cir. 2003) (the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a dismissal by finding First Amendment issues were raised so case has 
returned to trial court); Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. Ann Veneman, No. 4:CV-01-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4361 ,  (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003) (on appeal before the 3n1 Circuit Court of Appeals); State of Fla., 
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Appeals rendered an opinion in the Livestock Marketing Association case holding the 
federal beef checkoff program unconstitutional.)76 
The central thesis of this paper is directly related to such litigation, past and 
present. The thesis is stated as follows: 
The line of compelled commercial speech cases challenging commodity 
checkoffs on First Amendment grounds represents a fundamental hegemonic 
conflict within the agricultural industry in which the challengers are using 
the courts and the First Amendment in an attempt to break the current 
hegemony of commodity checkoffs and establish countervailing power. 
The thesis is based on the assumption that decisions of the courts on constitutional 
issues are signifiers of underlying political, social and economic contests that have 
moved to the courts as the parties strategically sought to use the judicial system in their 
struggles. It is also based on a second theoretical assumption that political struggles over 
constitutional issues arise from a condition of hegemony characterized by a dominant 
group exercising hegemony to maintain control and minority challengers seeking to build 
counter-hegemony to change the balance of power. The assumptions noted above would 
support similar studies of cases dealing with other constitutional issues arising from 
political contests in which the participants have recognized the courts as a viable terrain 
for battle. 
If the challengers in the checkoff cases are successful, the resulting changes 
would significantly affect both the hegemony of the agricultural industry (and the related 
commercial and governmental groups that are within its hegemonic sphere) and the 
Dept. of Citrus v. Graves Brothers Company, Tampa Juice Services, et al. , No. 2DO03-2276, iix1 Dist. Ct. 
of Appeal, Florida (on appeal before Florida state appellate court) ; and Pelts & Skins, LL C. v. Jenkins, Jr., 
No. 02-384-A (Middle Dist. La. 2003) (on appeal before the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals). 
76 See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13630 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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development of First Amendment doctrine related to compelled commercial speech. 
Changes in the hegemony of the agricultural industry could change the relative balance of 
commercial and political power among the commodity producers, processors and 
dominant trade associations. 
The defenders of the existing commodity checkoffs are supported staunchly by 
the USDA. In fact, the USDA has become an industry apologist. Therefore, both sides 
in the conflict are utilizing powerful institutions of the State, pitting the Courts and First 
Amendment doctrine against the USDA. 
Overview of Study 
This study relies upon an historical approach to gather evidence to perform a 
combined political and legal analysis. The interests at stake for each of the participating 
entities are investigated in order to provide a context for understanding why factions 
within the agricultural industry are using the compelled commercial speech argument as 
leverage to acquire countervailing power or challenge hegemony. This includes a study 
of the economic and political interests and the inducements and deterrents experienced by 
all entities involved in the current checkoff programs. As a foundation for political 
analysis, this study identifies major changes in the agricultural industry that are 
influencing the positions of key participants in the programs. Background is provided for 
legal analysis by reviewing changes and trends that have occurred in the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of First Amendment doctrines related to protection of commercial speech 
and freedom from compelled speech and compelled association. 
The diagram identified as Figure 1 shows changes that a preliminary analysis has 
disclosed may be at work in influencing the hegemony in agricultural commodity 
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Figure 1 Changes Creating Climate for Hegemonic Challenge 
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checkoffs and the two areas of First Amendment doctrine relevant to the commodity 
checkoff litigation. These respective changes have created a climate for the hegemonic 
challenge that is the focus of this study. (However, it is expected that further research 
may indicate that not all of the elements of change identified are equally important in 
creating a climate for hegemonic challenge.) 
As shown by the diagram identified as Figure 2, changes have spawned key issues 
in each sphere. The diagram illustrates how the overlapping of developments in the 
agricultural industry and First Amendment law has generated a zone of conflict. The 
following core issue emerging from the zone of conflict will impact both the commercial 
sphere and the legal sphere: "Should mandatory assessments on commodities used for 
generic advertising be deemed a violation of First Amendment rights?" Additional 
critical issues found within the zone of conflict include: which First Amendment 
doctrine should be applied to compelled commercial speech cases, whether Glickman v. 
Wileman was correct in concluding that no First Amendment rights are implicated if the 
court finds "collectivization" within a "broader regulatory scheme" and whether the 
"government speech defense" asserted by defenders of the checkoff program should 
immunize the checkoff programs from First Amendment scrutiny. 
In the realm of private politics, this study analyzes the power dynamics within 
five segments of the agricultural commodities industry by investigating how the major 
industry associations representing the producers of each commodity are constituted and 
who attempts to speak on behalf of each commodity to the press, to government agencies, 
to Congress, to and through external entities such as ad agencies, and to the public 
( especially with regard to any claims regarding how the associations are representing the 
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Key issues prompted by changes: 
1 .  Should the Central Hudson 
intermediate level of 
protection for commercial 
speech be replaced by a strict 
scrutiny standard? 
2. lfso, should commercial 
speech regulations be limited 
to mandatory disclosure of 
information that prevents 
consumer deception? 
1 .  Should mandatory assessments on  commodities used for generic advertising be  deemed a 
violation of First Amendment rights? 
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a. Central Hudson commercial speech doctrine - Uses a 4-point test requiring a "substantial" ' 
government interest. (Intermediate scrutiny) 
b. Abood compe11ed speech/compelled association analysis - Government must show an 
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achieving the regulatory purpose. (Intermediate scrutiny) 
c. Standard in Roberts v. U.S, Jqycees - Infringement on right of association may be justified 
only by ·•compelling state interests." (Strict scrutiny) 
3. Is it correct for the First Amendment analysis to be circumvented by a showing of 
"collectivization" within a "broader regulatory scheme" as mandated by Glickman? 
4. Should the "government speech" defense immunize the checkoff programs from First 
Amendment scrutiny? 
Figure 2 Intersecting Spheres of Agricultural Hegemony and First 
Amendment Doctrines 
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public good). The research also identities the characteristics of the members comprising 
the respective factions, and the contradictory positions that are held within each 
commodity group. Gramsci' s concept of hegemony is used in examining the hegemonic 
matrix of people and institutions supporting the mandatory commodity assessment 
programs and the nature of the counter-hegemony advanced by the challengers. 
Additionally, Galbraith' s  theory of countervailing power is applied to study whether 
subordinate factions are seeking to generate countervailing power to defend themselves 
against economic exploitation. 
In exploring the public politics of compelled commercial speech, a critical 
theoretical perspective (utilizing assumptions found in Gramsci' s  hegemony concept) is 
used to examine the evolution and rationale for the mandatory commodity checkoff 
programs, which had their genesis in two pieces of legislation 77 that were central to the 
New Deal policies of the 1930s.78 The negative manner in which the government (the 
USDA in particular) has responded to the various political and legal actions of the 
77 Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12,1933, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 3 1  (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 
601-605, 607-623 ( 1994)) and Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of June 3, 1937, Pub. L.  No. 137, 50 
Stat. 246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
78See Olan D. Forker and Ronald W. Ward, Commodity Advertising: The Economics and Measurement of 
Generic Programs (New York. :  Lexington Books, 1993) (noting the role of the federal government in the 
marketing of products since the 1930s); Daniel Bensing, ''The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal 
Marketing Orders Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
of 1937," San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review 5, no. 1 ( 1995): 3-47, 5 (identifying the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1937 (AMAA) as a "direct statutory descendent of President Roosevelt's Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA), a centerpiece of the New Deal's  first 100 days"); Brian C. Leighton, ''The 
Socialization of Agricultural Advertising: What Perestroika Didn't Do The First Amendment Will," San 
Joaquin Agricultural Law Review 5, no. 1 ( 1995): 49-65, 49 (referencing the AMAA as a "'short term fix' 
to pull farmers out of the Depression,"); Laura Jackson, "Commercial Speech: The Constitution-It's 
What's For Dinner. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001)," Wyoming Law Review 2 
(2002): 617-640, 620 (noting that the AMAA was enacted as part of the New Deal to advance "orderly 
marketing conditions and fair prices," quoting Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 
(1997)); and Jon Lauck, "After Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of 'Freedom to 
Farm,"' Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 5 (Spring 2002) : 3-54, 4 and n. 1 (asserting that the sweeping 
government agricultural programs of the 1930s were prompted by "economic misery in rural America" and 
continued into the l 990s long after public support for New Deal economic policies had waned). 
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challengers who have sought to establish countervailing power against the dominant commodity producers, trade organizations and government players is of keen interest in analyzing the underlying framework of political, economic and social forces that are clashing in the public arena of the compelled commercial speech cases. It can be linked to Gramsci' s idea of hegemony and suggests that the scope of this study include a critique of the role of the government in the current agricultural hegemony of the commodity checkoff programs. The legal component of this study includes a review of how the Central Hudson test and/or the Abood analysis has been applied to compelled commercial speech cases decided by the Supreme Court and lower courts to determine, among other things, whether a doctrinal test has been applied consistently to such cases and to assess whether the Supreme Court has adopted a standard approach with any predictive value for future cases on compelled commercial speech. This review of the checkoff cases involving the commercial speech doctrine and freedom from compelled speech and compelled association will evaluate how the courts have handled the convergence of the First Amendment doctrine with the Central Hudson commercial speech analysis. Attached as Appendix B is a comprehensive annotated list of compelled commercial speech cases. Appendix C sets forth a list of criteria for analyzing compelled commercial speech cases. This study seeks to identify the legal consequences (regarding First Amendment doctrine on compelled commercial speech as well as the broader commercial speech doctrine) and the political consequences (probable shifts in political or economic power) that are likely to occur with respect to alternative actions that may be taken by the Supreme Court with regard to compelled commercial speech. The Supreme Court is 32 
uniquely poised in these cases to become either a "catalyst" or a "brake" in recognizing 
broader protection for commercial speech or extending the scope of protection against 
compelled speech or compelled association, thereby providing legitimacy to the counter­
hegemony movement that is occurring in the agricultural industry. 
Objectives 
This study has the following objectives: 
1) To examine the historical evolution and legislative rationale of the mandatory 
commodity checkoff programs for the five industries that are currently involved 
in First Amendment compelled commercial speech conflicts (fruit growers, 
mushroom growers, beef industry, pork industry and dairy industry); 
2) To identify through collection and analysis of evidence the economic and political 
interests of the following key participants in five commodity checkoff programs: 
a) federal and state legislators ; 
b) federal and state departments of agriculture that promulgate regulations 
(USDA and comparable state agencies); 
c) secretaries of the departments of agriculture who appoint members of 
implementing boards; 
d) boards, commissions and councils that manage the checkoff programs and 
determine how monies are used; 
e) industry trade associations; 
t) commodity producers in favor of checkoffs; 
g) commodity producers against commodity checkoffs ("the challengers"); 
h) agribusiness corporations; 
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i) other key players in the production chain such as processors and retailers; 
j) external activist groups such as environmental protection groups; 
k) ad agencies and consulting firms; 
1) the media, and 
k) the Supreme Courts and lower courts. 
3) To identify and clarify current agricultural industry trends and/or broader conflicts 
that are exerting an influence on the positions of the key participants in the 
hegemonic struggle regarding compelled commercial speech; 
4) To analyze, identify, and clarify, within the theoretical perspectives of hegemony 
and countervailing power, the relationships among the key participants in the 
commodity checkoff programs (see list of participants set forth in objective two), 
especially with regard to which entities exert control and dominance; 
5) To explore in general terms the history and use by the U.S. Supreme Court of the 
First Amendment doctrine for protection of commercial speech as set forth in the 
Central Hudson test and the First Amendment standards for freedom from 
compelled speech and from compelled association based on the Abood case; 
6) To examine critically the scholarly literature and federal and state cases related to 
the application of First Amendment doctrines to the area of compelled 
commercial speech to detennine, among other things, whether a standard 
approach has been developed and consistently applied over time and to judge 
whether such approach has any predictive value; 
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7) To critically examine the scholarly literature and federal and state cases relating to the "government speech principle" to determine its viability as a defense against the compelled commercial speech challenge; 8) To explore whether there is a hegemonic relationship between the decisions of the federal judiciary on compelled commercial speech and the economic and political interests of the dominant groups involved in the commodity checkoff programs; and 9) To assess the legal and political consequences of the various legal outcomes on compelled commercial speech issues, with attention to how the public interest will be served by such outcomes. Analysis of the evidence will be guided by the following research questions: RQ 1: Do the existing policy goals of the respective external entities (including the USDA and powerful trade organizations) remain in direct conflict with First Amendment speech rights f or compelled commercial speech? RQ 2: Have the Supreme Court and other federal courts failed to recognize the First Amendment constitutional right not to participate in compelled commercial speech by privileging the economic and political interests of the dominant parties in the agricultural hegemony? RQ 3:  Do government's efforts to use "government speech" as a justification for mandatory commodity assessments create a heightened risk that the government may displace or monopolize private speech or interfere with the gatekeeping function of private speakers? 
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The final objective set forth above notes that this research will seek to obtain 
evidence to assess the legal and political consequences of the potential legal resolutions 
on the compelled commercial speech issue. In resolving the legal conflict, the Supreme 
Court could find that mandatory assessments are: 
1) constitutional when they are part of a broader regulatory scheme (such as the 
regulatory framework governing the fruit growers in Glickman v. Wileman), 79 but 
unconstitutional when they are imposed as stand-alone orders like those assessed 
against the mushroom growers in United States v. United Foods,80 or 
2) unconstitutional and a violation of First Amendment rights regardless of the 
regulatory scheme in which they reside, because they do not pass scrutiny under 
First Amendment analysis ( either through application of the Central Hudson test 
or an analysis based on Abood principles); 
3) constitutional regulations not protected by the First Amendment; or 
4) constitutional under a "government speech" exception to the First Amendment. 
The consequences will be evaluated in terms of the potential for creating change 
in the agricultural industry hegemony, the impact of such decisions on the dual legal 
doctrines involved (the doctrine regarding First Amendment protection for commercial 
speech and the doctrine of government speech) and, finally, with respect to the way in 
which the public interest will be served. 
A Tempest Brewing: Political, Economic and Legal Significance of the Problem 
A web of private and public organizations performing a myriad of roles currently 
drives the system of collecting, managing, coordinating and spending an immense stream 
79 See Glickman, 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
80 See United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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of money generated by commodities checkoffs. Estimates put the annual dollar figure at 
$750 million.81 The mandatory assessments provide the basis for a dominant hegemonic 
culture that derives influence, credibility and ongoing employment from the commodity 
checkoff schemes. Discontinuing or modifying the continuous flow of checkoff money 
that supports these activities will have political implications regarding who can wield 
influence and power as well as economic implications for those who financially benefit 
from the income. The threat to such hegemony can be observed by evaluating the 
relentless and extensive efforts of the government and the groups supporting the 
checkoffs to fight the challengers. Success in the courts will lead to shifts in who 
exercises power in the commodity production chain and the way in which the minority 
group is able to independently conduct its business and achieve a greater market share. 
On a broader scale, this hegemonic conflict can be viewed as a stepping-stone in 
addressing the "crisis in competitiveness" that arguably exists because of a lack of 
competitiveness in agricultural markets. The challengers in the compelled commercial 
speech cases are seeking the ability to promote their products and compete as individual 
producers rather than as part of an industry bloc lacking any internal level of competition. 
John Ikerd, professor emeritus at the University of Missouri Department of Agricultural 
Economics, referred to the current industry model as an obsolete organizational 
paradigm.82 The description Ikerd offered is highly reminiscent of Gramsci's concept of 
81 Jackson, 617. 
82 John Ikerd, "Alternative Organizational Structures : Implications for Competitiveness of Markets," in A 
Food and Agriculture Policy for the 21st Century, 78, Michael C. Stumo, ed. ;  compilation of papers 
presented at the Organization for Competitive Markets Food Policy Retreat on April 29 - May 1 ,  2000; 
available from http://www.competitivemarkets.com/1ibrary/academic/2 1stcentury; Internet; accessed 1 
November 2002. 
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hegemony. Ikerd observed the following about the lack of competitiveness in the 
agricultural industry: 
Under current conditions, no one is capable of wresting control of 
agricultural markets from corporate agribusiness - not even the top managers of 
agribusiness firms themselves. Stockholders demand profits and growth, not just 
over the long run, but quarter after quarter . . .  83 
According to Ikerd, political institutions and institutions of the State have become major 
contributors to the problem. He declared: 
Government can't stop the corporations, because politicians too have 
come under their power. Politicians are strongly influenced, if not controlled, by 
the agribusiness corporations through their large contributions to political 
campaigns. Agricultural constituencies are influenced, if not controlled, by the 
general farm organizations and commodity groups. These groups are far more 
concerned with maintaining production and profits for agriculture as an industry 
than in maintaining competitive markets or viable family farms and rural 
communities. The USDA and the rest of the government bureaucracy has an 
organizational structure much like industry that responds far more to agribusiness 
interests than to the needs of family farmer. Consequently, government either 
supports or at least offers no meaningful resistance to corporate consolidation and 
ultimate corporate control of agricultural markets. Thus, American agricultural 
[sic] is dominated by an obsolete organizational structure that is essentially out of 
control. 
The crisis of competitiveness in agricultural markets will not pass unless 
or until the current industrial organizational structure is replaced with an 
alternative self-regenerating, post-industrial organizational paradigm.84 
Ikerd' s description of a troubled industry is highly revealing, because it identifies 
a number of effects of the hegemony that exist in the agricultural industry. While others 
may not fully support Ikerd' s ultimate conclusion that American agriculture is dominated 
by an "obsolete organizational structure that is essentially out of control," there is ample 




encourage or tolerate competition by minority factions. Fred Stokes, president of the 
Organization for Competitive Markets contended in 2000: 
"While farmers are driven from their lands, food processors and retailers 
use their market power to depress commodity prices and expand their 
margins . . . . Family farms are giving way to mega farms under control of giant 
corporations. Open and competitive markets are being replaced by 'supply 
chains' and production contracts. More and more we depend on foreign sources 
for our food needs."85 
The commodity checkoff challenges represent a small-scale effort to change this 
model (or break the hegemony) and, as such, may be significant in demonstrating 
incremental movement toward a different paradigm with broad implications for the 
agricultural industry. 
On the other hand, those supporting the checkoffs have argued that generic 
advertising is critical for increasing domestic sales as well as ensuring that commodity 
producers are able to compete in a global market. 86 They contend that commodity 
checkoffs used for research and development are a key factor in allowing all commodity 
growers to benefit from new technical advancements. 87 Commodity checkoff defenders 
have argued that the elimination of commodity checkoffs will seriously jeopardize the 
ability of industries to speak with one voice in promoting and marketing commodity 
85 Thomas F. Stokes, forward to A Food and Agriculture Policy for the 21st Century, ed. Michael C. Stumo; 
compilation of papers presented at the Organization for Competitive Markets Food Policy Retreat on April 
29 - May 1 ,  2000; available from http ://www.competitivemarkets.com/library/academic/2lstcentury; 
Internet; accessed 1 November 2002. 
86 Padberg and Hall, 82. 
87 "Farm Bureau Continues Support for Checkoff Programs," The Voice of Agriculture Newsroom (March 
9, 1999); available from http://www.tb.org/news/nr/nr99/nr0309.html; Internet; accessed 12 November 
2002. 
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products, particularly in foreign markets, and will greatly restrict technological 
innovation that can be realized through collective funding of progressive research. 88 
The amount of checkoff fees dedicated to research varies by industry. The use of 
checkoff fees for research raises another area of free speech concerns for the challengers, 
who frequently object on philosophical and legal grounds to the focus and goals of the 
research. For example, beef producers may object to use of their mandatory fees for 
research on irradiated beef procedures and growth hormones. Similarly, fruit growers 
may object to the use of their fees for research to develop genetically altered fruits or 
fruits to meet the requirements of a foreign market. 
The research addresses how potentially different legal frameworks for compelled 
commercial speech may influence the exchange of ideas and the economic and political 
environment in which the entities identified in this research participate. In the 
commercial free speech arena, the future ability of commercial entities in the United 
States to exchange ideas freely via advertising of their own design and choosing is at 
stake. This could have a broad impact on communication strategies of industry and 
government By looking at potential outcomes of the compelled speech issues, this 
dissertation identifies characteristics of the role of free speech and unrestricted 
communication in the industrial, economic and political structure of the United States. 
If the courts hold mandatory assessments to be unconstitutional in pending and 
future cases under the approach provided in United Foods, such decisions could mean 
that, in all but the most highly regulated industries, commercial speakers would enjoy 
First Amendment rights similar to those afforded to political and cultural speakers. The 
88 George H. Soares, "Agriculture in Crisis: What California Must Do to Protect its Most Precious 
Industry," San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review 1 1  (2001): 19-65, 34-36. 
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line between standards governing commercial speech and standards for political speech 
may become increasingly blurred, creating a communications environment in which the 
audience would be unable to distinguish among different types of speech and to evaluate 
the motives and interests of the speaker. (This highlights the need to consider how the 
public interest is best served in addressing the compelled commercial speech issue.) 
The opposite action by the Supreme Court in holding that mandatory assessments 
are not protected by the First Amendment could lead to further compulsory assessments 
to pay for generic industry speech regardless of the level of controversy or support for 
such commercial messages in the industry. Troubling conflicts may continue to brew 
within commodity industries that are not unified and are dominated by trade associations 
that disregard a minority faction of the industry ( or eventually even fail to represent the 
majority faction). If the mandatory assessments continue to be deemed constitutional 
within a highly regulated framework such as that in the Glickman case, then the 
groundwork is laid for increased governmental regulatory schemes for commodities. 
Why would this result prevail over the alternative of abolishing the checkoffs? In the 
words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, this approach would avert "the 
danger that a federal statute would turn into a toothless scarecrow. "89 
Expected Contributions to Research 
Existing research on compelled commercial speech reflects an emphas-is on 
studying developments using a traditional legal analysis. This generates an 
understanding of the end result of the legal battle, but does not provide knowledge 
regarding the underlying political, economic and social factors that are prompting 
89 U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, ''The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction," The 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140 (1992): 1373- 1387, 1387. 
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challengers to resort to court action. No researcher has yet performed a "holistic" 
analysis on compelled commercial speech.90 It is the goal of this research to perform an 
integrated political, legal and economic analysis of compelled commercial speech in five 
commodity areas: the beef, pork, dairy, mushroom and tree fruit industries. 
This research is also expected to make a contribution to political theory by 
extending Antonio Gramsci' s theoretical conceptualization of an historic bloc that 
exercises hegemony in capitalist societies to the socio-economic domain of agricultural 
commodity production. 
The broad applicability of the research method utilized in this dissertation is 
expected to give rise to a third area of scholarly contribution. The study will use a highly 
structured approach to examine underlying political, economic and social conflicts that 
are signified by a line of legal cases involving constitutional challenges. This method, 
referred to as the "Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis," can be applied to gain 
insight into other major constitutional conflicts that represent complex political interests 
and issues between a dominant hegemony responding to challenges from groups and 
individuals with unequal power. 
Limitations of the Study 
The United States Department of Agriculture is involved in the operations and 
oversight of fourteen generic agricultural commodity programs that require fees for 
promotion of commodities to increase consumer markets. These include: honey, 
90 Olan D. Forker and Ronald W. Ward provided a thorough overview of advertising for agricultural 
commodities in their 1993 book, Commodity Advertising: The Economics and Measurement of Generic 
Programs. However, they devoted only two paragraphs to the constitutionality of commodity promotion 
programs (an indication that the First Amendment compelled commercial speech issue had not yet emerged 
as a predominate area of conflict.) See Olan D. Forker and Ronald W. Ward, Commodity Advertising: the 
Economics and Measurement a/Generic Programs (N.Y. :  Lexington Books, 1993), 256-257. 
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mushrooms, popcorn, watermelons, potatoes, beef, pork, soybeans, dairy, fluid milk, 
cotton, eggs, peanuts and blueberries.91 The compelled commercial speech litigation 
initially involved challenges to commodity checkoff programs for tree fruit, mushrooms, 
beef, pork, dairy products and almonds. Since the United Foods case in 2001 ,  other 
commodity checkoff programs have also been challenged, including programs for grapes, 
alligators and citrus fruit. 
The research and analysis in this study will focus on five representative 
industries-tree fruits, mushrooms, beef, pork and dairy. However, certain aspects of 
the study may apply to all commodity producers. In addition, the legal analyses required 
by this study will be based on the full line of compelled commercial speech cases. 
91 See listing of national checkoff programs and website for each commodity board or council at "Straight 
Answers to the Most Frequently Asked Questions About National Checkoff Programs," Cattlemen's Beef 
Board (2002); available from http://www.beefboard.com/dsp/dsp_locationContent.cfm?locationID=l062; 
Internet; accessed 15 June 2003. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THEORY AND AGRICULTURAL THEMES This literature review will address the following areas of importance in this dissertation's study of how competing interests in the agricultural industry overlap with the development of First Amendment doctrine and create a zone.of conflict related to commodity checkoffs and compelled commercial speech: 1) a dual theoretical framework for viewing the operations of the State and other principal actors in this conflict by applying Gramscian hegemonic theory and Galbraith countervailing power analysis; 2) counter-hegemony in the agricultural industry; 3) the history and rationale for mandatory assessment programs, 4) major players involved in the checkoff programs; 5) areas of change influencing the agricultural industry; 6) two First Amendment standards of review; 7) the compelled commercial speech cases; 8) the government speech doctrine (major legal defense being proffered by those supporting the commodity checkoffs); and 9) the representations inherent in First Amendment compelled commercial speech cases. The areas outlined above represent component parts of the overall scope and thrust of this dissertation research and are, therefore, considered pertinent to this literature review. 
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Theoretical Perspective 
The research and analysis regarding compelled commercial speech are analyzed 
within the theoretical perspectives of hegemony and countervailing power. Both of these 
concepts offer a means to interpret and understand the action being taken by individuals 
or groups in a subordinate position who have organized their resources to challenge the 
dominant private and public groups via First Amendment litigation. However, the two 
concepts of hegemony and countervailing power owe their origins to contrasting social 
theories of the State. 
Antonio Gramsci developed his ideas on hegemony as an extension of his Marxist 
political orientation while John Kenneth Galbraith's countervailing power argument is 
aligned with the Neo-Pluralist view of the State. Hegemony, as envisioned by Gramsci, 
is a condition that includes both political and social dimensions. Countervailing power, 
on the other hand, has explanatory value in the compelled speech analysis primarily as an 
economic theory. 
The use of the compelled commercial speech argument by the minority group to 
challenge the dominant scheme of commodity checkoffs can, therefore, be understood on 
a broader scale by considering it within the framework of Marxism (the underlying 
framework for Gramsci's theory) as well as within the neo-pluralist State theory (related 
to Galbraith's concept of countervailing power). The brief overviews of the Marxist and 
neo-pluralist theories of the State set forth below will provide a basic foundation for 
understanding the key theoretical concepts of hegemony and countervailing power that 
are employed in this study. 
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This portion of the literature review addressing the theoretical framework will be 
presented in five sections consisting of: 1)  a general introduction to the concept of "the 
State," 2) a background on the Marxist theory of the State, 3) a summary of Gramsci '  s 
hegemonic paradigm, 4) a background on Neo-pluralist theory of the State, and 5) an 
overview of Galbraith' s  concept of countervailing power. 
Concept of ''the State." A definition of the state that has been widely respected 
by scholars is offered by Max Weber, a sociologist who produced a body of work in the 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. He defined the state as: "a human 
community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
violence within a given territory."92 Contemporary author John Hoffman restated the 
Weber formula as follows: "The state is an institution claiming to exercise a monopoly 
of legitimate force within a particular territory."93 The four interrelated elements of 
monopoly, territory, legitimacy and force formed the foundation for an understanding of 
the state based on Weber's political sociology. The attribute of force emerged, however, 
as a primary focus in this definition, balanced by its counterpart, legitimacy. 
Weber argued that force is a central criteria for the existence of a state, even 
though he qualifies this by stating: " . . .  of course, force is not the normal or the only 
means of the state . . . . "94 Methods such as persuasion, promised rewards, appeal to duty 
are alternatives, but they co-exist with the state's  potential and actual exercise of force. 
92 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 
93 John Hoffman, Beyond the State: An Introductory Critique (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
Inc., 1995), 3 .  
94 Gerth and Mills, 78. Also see Hoffmann, 3. 
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Weber presented legitimacy as the concept underpinning force. A state must 
achieve a monopoly of legitimate force in order to function as a state. Individuals living 
within the territory of the state confer a degree of legitimacy on the use of coercion and 
force by simply complying with the legal norms or obeying the rules, whether through 
respect, fear or apathy. In contrast, the modern liberal view of legitimacy is normative in 
its assertion that "free and equal individuals must consent to the laws they obey. 
Legitimacy excludes the use of force."95 (The word "liberal" is used here in the context 
of classical liberal theory that recognizes autonomous citizens have the capacity to 
rationally decide how to ensure freedom for all members of their society and to choose 
the acceptable limits that will be imposed on their individual freedom by endorsing 
political institutions and their rules.) Assuming at least a minimum level of consent, 
Andrew Haywood described legitimacy as "the quality which transforms naked power 
into rightful authority; it confers upon an order or command an authoritative or binding 
character, ensuring that it is obeyed out of duty rather than because of fear."96 
As a generalization, it appears that all contemporary theories of the state in 
current Western political systems (e.g., pluralism, neo-pluralism, the New Right, elite 
theory, Marxism, and neo-Marxism) assume the existence of a "system of rules whereby 
mutual expectations are established between people. "97 As noted, Max Weber was 
willing to accept the legitimacy of a state when its citizens acknowledge the command of 
95 Hoffman, 7. 
96 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideas and Concepts (New York: St. Martin' s Press, 1994), 95. 
97 Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds., The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), 2. 
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those in authority and believe that the laws of the state must be obeyed.98 On the other 
hand, Dave Beetham argued that power is legitimate only if three conditions are present: 
"First, power must be exercised according to established rules, whether embodied 
in formal legal codes or informal conventions. Secondly, these rules must be 
justified in terms of the shared beliefs of the government and the governed. 
Thirdly, legitimaci must be demonstrated by the expression of consent on the part 
of the governed." 
All states engage in the "legitimization process" when they undertake activities 
that are designed to legitimize power. This can occur by following principles of popular 
consent or, in a more controversial way, by attempting to manufacture legitimacy by 
manipulating the ideas and symbols delivered to the public. (This may be viewed as 
ideological hegemony.)100 A "legitimization crisis" occurs when a political system loses 
the confidence and voluntary consent of its citizens and becomes vulnerable to a change 
in regime. 101 
In a modem liberal state, legislative power determines what the rules will be and 
the sorts of rights allocated, the executive power oversees administration and compliance 
with the rules, and the judicial power adjudicates cases of dispute and passes judgment. 1 02 
This understanding of a state does not presuppose a certain political system; the powers 
can be manifested differently (i .e. , powers can be separated or combined in function) in 
states with liberal democratic, sovereign or authoritarian political systems. 
The state may be seen as both an apparatus of rules and an agent. It performs as 
an agent when individuals engage in actions on behalf of the state and their identities 
98 See Frank Parkin, Max Weber (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1982), 76. Parkin observed that this 
approach does not accommodate the "hegemony" concept. "If subordinate groups accept the commands of 
their masters as valid norms, the domination of the masters is legitimate, and that is the end of it." Ibid. 
99 Ibid., 96. 
100 See Heywood, 96-97. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hamlin and Pettit, 2. 
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become an abstraction, so that the state itself does the acting. The image of the state is 
passive when it is understood as merely an apparatus of rules, but active and self­
directing when it is interpreted as an agent. 103 
During the 1980s, social scientists, political scientists and historians were 
particularly focused on studying the modem state and its characteristics. They agreed 
that the following characteristics were inherent in the government of a modem state: 
1) The state is a recognizable separate institution or set of institutions, so 
differentiated from the rest of its society as to create identifiable public and 
private spheres. 
2) The state is sovereign, or the supreme power, within its territory, and by 
definition the ultimate authority for all law, i.e. binding rules supported by 
coercive sanctions. Public law is made by state officials and backed by a 
formal monopoly of force. 
3) The state's sovereignty extends to all individuals within a given territory, and 
applies equally, even to those in formal positions of government or rule­
making. Thus sovereignty is distinct from the personnel who at any given 
time occupy a particular role within the state. 
4) The modem state' s  personnel are mostly recruited and trained for 
management in a bureaucratic manner. 
5) The state has the capacity to extract monetary revenue (taxation) to finance its 
activities from its subject population. 104 
The Marxist Theory of the State. Karl Marx believed that the capitalistic 
economy invariably produces systematic inequality and massive restrictions on real 
freedom. The State reinforces social order in the interest of dominant social groups, the 
primary one being the capitalist class. John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry summarized 
the focus of Marxist theory as follows: 
What mattered more than the universal right to vote was the inequality established 
between those who owned the means of production and those who, without such 
means, were forced to labor for them . . .  The state is not at any time a neutral force, 
representing the general interest. On the contrary, the state embodies the interests 
103 Ibid., 3. 104 Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy 
(London: MacMillan Education, 1987), 2. 
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of the dominant class; the rules that it produces corresponding! y serve the 
interests of some rather than all of the people. 105 
Marx argued that the working class (or the class of proletariat wage-laborers) will 
be in a position to realize its interests only if it successfully mounts a revolution against 
those who control the means of production (the elite ruling class or the bourgeoisie). 
Marx saw these two classes as the essential components of capitalism. He stated: ''The 
essential condition for the existence and for the sway of the bourgeois class is the 
formation and augmentation of capital; the condition for capital is wage labor." 106 A 
crisis can create the stimulus for class-based political action by yielding a class-
consciousness. 
Marx's understanding of capitalism is captured by the authors of The Dictionary 
of Social Sciences (who endorse Marxism) in the following definition: 
A system that separates workers from any true property 
rights . . . .  Capitalism transforms the social means of subsistence (i.e., work) into 
capital on the one hand and the immediate producers into wage laborers on the 
other hand. Most of the time, capitalism is defined as the private ownership of the 
means of production, but that definition does not encompass the great harm done 
to humanity by the system. By claiming all (or most) of the means to produce 
culture as private property, a small class of owners preempts material culture for 
their own comfort while denying the vast majority the means to subsistence as 
well as the means to produce ideological culture when they are not working." 107 
According to Marx, the system of capitalism has inherent flaws that will 
eventually cause it to disintegrate. Marx referred to them as the "weapons" that the 
bourgeoisie have created that will create a crisis in capitalism and a climate for a social 
105 John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, The State (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 7. 
The authors note: ''This view was expressed most forcefully in 1848 in The Manifesto of the Communist 
Party . .. Hall and Ikenberry, 102, n. 15. 
106 Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, in Birth of the Communist 
Manifesto, ed., Dirk J .  Stroik (New York: International Publishers, 197 1), 101 .  
107 T. R. Young and Bruce A. Arrigo, The Dictionary of Critical Social Sciences, 1 st ed., c.v. "capitalism." 
It should be noted that this dictionary is not neutral. Rather, it defines concepts and ideas under a critical 
approach that questions conventional terms, especially those related to all forms of elitism. 
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revolution. 108 The proletariat will recognize common class interests and be able to make 
the sacrifices necessary for revolution. The wage-laborer will ultimately be able to 
demonstrate a capability for "democratic control of a modem economy."1� 
Marx emphasized the concept of exploitation in his assertion that the wage­
laborer is exploited by the bourgeoisie due to the inferior bargaining power of the 
proletariat. This theme is prevalent in his use of words such as "oppression," 
"subjugation," "force" and "slavery" to characterize the wage-laborer. 1 10 The 
relationship of inequality will be remedied when, as a result of the proletarian movement 
of the "immense majority," 1 1 1  the worker' s control of production replaces capitalism and 
"all the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly."1 12 
To Marx, the bourgeoisie, the ruling class under capitalism has "conquered for 
itself, in the modem representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the 
modem State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie." 1 1 3  In his discussion of Marx's legacy, Richard Miller summarized Marx's 
central claims as follows: 
108 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, 96. Young and Arrigo summarized the weapons (or general laws) within 
the system of capitalism that will cause its demise as follows: "( l) the tendency of the rate of profit to fall; 
(2) the tendency of large firms to buy out or destroy small firms; (3) the tendency to transform all goods 
and services into commodities; (4) the tendency to transfer (externalize) costs of production to workers, 
consumers, or the environment; (5) the tendency to disemploy production; (6) the tendency to dominate the 
political process; (7) the tendency to control the production of ideological culture (art, science, music, 
literature, and religion); (8) the tendency toward economic imperialism; (9) the tendency to abandon low­
profit but essential lines of production . . .  ; and (10) the tendency toward revolution." Young and Arrigo, 
c.v. "capitalism." 
109 Richard W. Miller, "Marx's Legacy," in The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy, ed., 
Robert L. Simon (Malden, Mass. Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 133. 
uo See Miller, 1 34. 
l l l  Marx and Engels, Manifesto, 101 . 
u2 Miller, 1 33, quoting K. Marx and F. Engels, Critique of the Gotha Programme ( 1 875). 
u3 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, 91 . 
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1 .  Government actions serve the long-term interests of the bourgeoisie as a 
whole, even if those interests conflict with those of the rest of society. 1 14 
2. This bias in interests served is sustained by mechanisms that are part of the 
social context of political choice, sufficient mechanisms which will exist, in one 
form or other, so long as capitalism endures . . .  Marx ascribes the pattern of choice 
on the part of successful elected officials to underlying relations of economic 
power rather than bribery or conspiracy. 1 15 
3.  If a social movement threatens to end the bias toward bourgeois interests, the 
old connection between class and government will be defended through violence 
which mobilizes residual bourgeois political resources, violence which can only 
be defeated by organized counter-violence, rooted, in part, in non-electoral 
activity. 1 16 
A primary theme of the Marxist view of the capitalist State is that the State will 
always be biased toward the interests of the bourgeoisie. 
Antonio Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony. Antonio Gramsci introduced the 
idea of hegemony as an alternative to the strict Marxist approach which he felt over­
emphasized the economic sphere and class analysis. Gramsci took the position that Marx 
was mistaken in concluding that a change simply in the ownership of production would 
result in a truly democratic and free society because power was also exercised in political 
arenas and civil society. 1 17 Gramsci offered the concept of hegemony as a more complete 
explanation of the way in which power is exercised. 
Hegemony occurs when a dominant class or alliance of classes or other social 
groups asserts a unifying world view and successfully gains political and economic 
control over subordinate society by using active consent (knowingly or not) rather than 
direct force. Law, religion, art, sciences, politics, the media, private industry and 
1 14 Miller, 141 .  
1 15 Ibid. 
1 16  Ibid., 142. 
1 17 Robert Bocock, Hegemony (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1986), 35. 
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government all become relevant forces in bolstering the world view of the dominant class 
and its approach to human and social relationships. 1 18 However, elements of dissension 
in this social structure create the need for negotiation and compromise, or, in the 
alternative, the need to use coercion. Leadership must develop consent at the 
intellectual, moral and philosophical level in order to create and maintain hegemony. 
Gramsci asserted that "there can, and indeed must, be hegemonic activity even before the 
rise to power, and that one should not count only on the material force which power gives 
in order to exercise an effective leadership." 1 19 
Challenges to the legitimacy of the dominant hegemony create the potential for 
change in the dominant ideology, relationships, economics and political institutions. The 
Harper Dictionary of Modem Thought asserted that "the struggle for hegemony is seen 
as a primary and even decisive factor in radical change, including change in the economic 
base itself." 120 
Gramsci's interpretation of hegemony recognized that three areas of a social 
structure form the basis for hegemony: the economic (modes of material production), the 
state (state-supported bureaucracies, agencies, legal institutions and apparatus for 
coercion, such as the police and armed forces) and civil society (other private institutions 
existing within society in the areas of religion, culture, etc.). 121 The line that separates 
the state and civil society is not boldly defined and may change or be re-negotiated. 
Gramsci recognized that certain historical periods are characterized by unstable 
1 18 See Young and Arrigo, c.v. "Gramsci, Antonio ( 1891-1937)" and c.v. "hegemony," ideological." Also 
see The Harper Dictionary of Modem Thought, eds., Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, 1 st ed., c.v. 
"hegemony." 
1 19 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 59. 120 See The Harper Dictionary of Modem Thought, l st ed., c.v. "hegemony." 
121 See Bocock, 33-34. 
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equilibrium between the classes, leading to close associations and specific alignments of 
state and civil society. 122 These have been identified as "historic blocs." 123 Bob Jessop 
interpreted this key concept in Gramsci'  s paradigm as follows: "the weight of various 
particular interests is continually re-negotiated in the 'unstable equilibrium of 
. ' h d . h ,,124 comproffilse t at un erpms egemony. 
Gramsci emphasized the role of "organic intellectuals." As used by Gramsci, this 
term encompassed intellectual thinkers within the dominant group who may be 
bureaucrats, politicians, academics, corporate specialists, trade industry researchers, etc. 
These are the individuals involved in "directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to 
which they organically belong." 125 In order to create environments favorable to their 
ideology, the organizers of society or elite leaders within a social group seeking 
dominance facilitate and maintain a circle of organic intellectuals whose purpose is to 
provide the social group with "homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not 
only in the economic but also in the social and political fields." 126 This occurs when 
"[T]he capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the 
122 See Gramsci, 108, 210-21 1 ,  245. 
123 See Bocock, 77-78, 104. The terms "base,, and "superstructure" as used by Marx are integral to 
Gramsci' s concept of "historic bloc." Marx used the term "base" to refer to forms of production. These 
modes of production are the determinants of social culture, which influences how people think and behave 
(their "consciousness" and their ideology). Their attitudes and actions shape the social world of art, 
religion, science, politics, law, etc. It is this social world that Marx characterized as "superstructure." (See 
D. A. Drennen, Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto, (Woodbury, N.Y.: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 
1972), 60 and Young and Arrigo, c.v. "superstructure." Gramsci would argue that a 'historic bloc" results 
when there are mutually supportive relationships between the elements of base and superstructure. See 
Jessop, 1 5 1 .  
124 Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 245-246. 
125 Gramsci, 3. Gramsci drew a distinction between "organic intellectuals" and "traditional intellectuals." 
Traditional intellectuals are distinguished by their fundamental detachment from the dominant social group. 
They ''put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group" and retain a 
degree of "uninterrupted historical continuity." Gramsci used the ecclesiastics as an example. Ibid., 7. For 
further interpretation of Gramsci' s distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals, see Richard 
Bellamy and Darrow Schecter, Gram.sci and the Italian State (New York: Manchester University Press, 
1993), 130- 13 1 .  
126 Ibid., 5-6. 
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specialist in political economy, the organizers of a new culture, of a new legal system, 
etc_,, 121 
Bob Jessop has credited Gramsci with introducing a major theoretical break 
within Marxist theory by focusing on the intellectual and moral aspects of the State 
machinery. Instead of viewing the state as a strictly coercive apparatus, Gramsci focused 
on the "relative weight of coercion, fraud-conuption, and active consent." 128 This 
theoretical shift allowed Gramsci to examine a wider gamut of economic, ideological, 
political and social factors that influence how political hegemony is supported or 
undermined by the dominant and subordinate groups. According to Jessop, Gramsci' s 
approach also "implies a concern with the hegemonic apparatuses of state power and the 
role of intellectuals in organizing the hegemony of the dominant class and forming a 
'historic bloc' .. . " 129 The state can, therefore, serve as a battleground for hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic social forces. 
Those in disagreement with existing hegemony must find methods by which to 
respond. Gramsci maintained that the hegemonic paradigm must include a search for 
transformation (or counter-hegemony) and not be limited simply to anti-hegemony. 130 
He developed the idea of a "war of position" to describe the process by which a 
subordinate group (the proletariat) tries to build hegemony in civil society before 
engaging in an effort to capture state power from the bourgeoisie.13 1 It is a concept that 
refers to the strategic activities of opposing forces in a capitalist society-the dominant 
121 Ibid., 5. 128 Jessop, 15 1 .  
129 Ibid. 
130 See Stefan Kipfer, "Urbanization, everyday life and the survival of capitalism: Lefebvre, Gramsci and 
the problematic of Hegemony," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 2, no. 2 (June 2002): 1 17-149. 
131 See Bocock, 76-77. 
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group is engaged in a war of position to maintain its hegemony in an environment where 
challenges are always taking place. The subordinate group engages in a war of position 
to organize its organic intellectuals and other allies aligned with it into a more powerful 
bloc and also to challenge the hegemony of the dominant group, preferably in more than 
one terrain at a time (i.e., through State agencies or judicial systems, the media, lobbying 
efforts, the educational system, and so forth.) If a subordinate group desires change, it 
must engage in a hegemonic struggle. 
Gramsci' s work on hegemony was expanded by several theorists in the neo­
Gramscian school in the 1970s and 1980s, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe." 132 
Mouffe argued that Gramsci initiated a break with the strict model of "economism" (the 
base-superstructure model) and the class reductionist view (the belief that class endows 
economic, political and ideological pre-determination). Her description of Gramsci's 
ideas on social relations are found in the following: 
1) Gramsci adopted a concept of political forces as "' inter-class' . . .  collective wills in 
and through ideological struggle," 133 refusing to recognize them as class subjects. 
2) He rejected the assumption that different classes exhibit class ideologies, opting 
instead for "a pluralistic universe of ideological elements" that can be selectively 
articulated and synthesized into new ideologies. Hegemony, in Gramsci's view, 
was not adequately explained by a "paradigmatic class ideology" imposed by a 
dominant class on other classes. Instead, hegemony involved "the articulation of 
132 See generally Jessop 191-2 10. Jessop draws liberally on the individual and collaborative writings of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in outlining the "discourse-theoretical" approach. For original source 
information, see Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: New Left Books, 
1977); Ernesto Laclau, ''Togliatti and Politics," Politics and Power 2 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980) ; Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, "Socialist Strategy-Where Next?" Marxism Today (January 
1981). 133Jessop, 193. 
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elements from different ideological discourses around a specific hegemonic 
principle to create a relatively unified but syncratic ideological system." 134 
3) Gramsci recognized a category of 'national-popular' ideological elements having 
no class connotations that gave rise to the "par excellence of ideological class 
struggle," 135 a situation that arose when: 
" . . .  two fundamental classes compete to articulate these elements into their own 
class discourse so that it becomes a 'popular religion' or organic expression of the 
national interest with the active consent of the people. The agents of this 
ideological struggle are the intellectuals and it is mediated through an ensemble of 
hegemonic apparatuses." 136 
Mouffe and Laclau developed these ideas one step further by introducing a 
"general theory of the discursive constitution of hegemony. 137 In their "discourse­
theoretical' approach, they emphasize that discourse is synonymous with social relations 
which leads them to conclude that the Marxist metaphor of base and superstructure as it 
is used to define social relations must be modified to reflect that both elements are 
discursive in nature. (Under the Marxist model, the base was seen as "extra-discursive" 
and the superstructure was discursive.) The national-popular ideological elements 
identified in point three above become as important to the formation of social relations 
and political hegemony as the class struggles. 
Jessop referred to "discursive ensembles" and "ideological ensembles" as 
important aspects of the formation of political hegemony in a framework not dictated by 
the class paradigm. He offered this description: ''The struggle for hegemony is re­
interpreted in terms of intervention to articulate different discursive elements into more or 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., 193 .  
13.7 Ibid., 195. 
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less discrete ideological ensembles." Jessop argued that this can occur because 
discursive elements 'have common nuclei of meaning which are not fully determinate in 
denotation and can be connotatively linked to other elements or produce the specific 
. h 1 . d'ffi di . bl ,,13s meanmgs t ey revea m 1 erent scurs1ve ensem es. 
Gramsi's  ideas, along with the interpretations of Jessop and the Neo-Gramicians, 
Mouffe and Laclau, provided this study with a point of reference for understanding the 
way in which hegemony operates in the realm of agricultural commodity production. A 
theoretical assumption underlying this study is that the socio-economic relations existing 
within agricultural commodity production that give rise to the dominant checkoff 
hegemony and, on another level, that give rise to an industrial agriculture hegemony, are 
eminently suitable for interpretation under the same principles that Gramsci formulated 
for examining and explaining political hegemony. 
The Neo-Pluralist Theory of the State. A review of the neo-pluralist theory of 
the state must begin with a brief consideration of its predecessor, the pluralist theory. A 
basic tenet of the pluralist theory is that it recognizes the existence of group:; as 
meaningful participants in the political process. Early in the Twentieth Century, political 
scientists such as Albert Bentley identified pluralism as the most accurate description of 
an American political system that included many active interest groups and pressure 
groups. 139 The pluralist view assumes that actions of the State occur through a process 
of deliberative democracy that incorporates the following assertion: 
While I may take my preferences as a sufficient reason for advancing a proposal, 
deliberation under conditions of pluralism requires that I find reasons that make 
138 Ibid., 196. 
139 See Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 183. 
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the proposal acceptable to others who cannot be expected to regard my 
preferences as sufficient reasons for agreeing. 140 
Robert Dahl's early works in the 1960s and 1970s presented his view of the 
pluralist theory. He pictured the state as a "neutral mediator of conflict" that operated as 
an intermediary between "multiple centers of power." It acted in the best interest of all in 
the midst of constant negotiations among different centers of power. , He asserted that the 
diverse competing strategies will ensure over time that no interest group or faction will 
systematically win and coercion will be "reduced to a minimum."141 This theory is 
inconsistent with Gramsci' s hegemony paradigm, which recognizes that the state at times 
may not be neutral when it becomes a location of conflict for hegemonic forces. The 
state may align itself with one of the competing groups or various state institutions may 
engage in hegemonic conflict between themselves (e.g., the courts versus the executive). 
Murray Knuttila, professor of sociology and social studies at the University of 
Regina in Saskatchewan, Canada, summarized the pluralist view by declaring that " ... the 
state is not an institution capable of eliminating conflict but rather the arena of legitimate 
political conflict." 142 This idea cuts across the theoretical schools of thought, fitting also 
within the theories of both Gramsci and Dahl. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, pluralist political science theorists embraced the 
image of "stable democracies" functioning by means of interaction and negotiation 
among power centers. However, political and social unrest during the 1960s and the 
subsequent expansion of corporate power and commercialism into everyday life 
140 Hamlin and Pettit, 24. 
141 Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1967), 24. 
142 Murray Knuttila, State Theories: From Liberalism to the Challenge of Feminism (Toronto: Garamond 
Press, 1987), 78. 
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highlighted the interconnections between the economic power centers and the political 
choices available to U.S. citizens. Conventional pluralists found their assumption about 
the autonomous nature of politics being questioned by the New Right, the elite theorists 
and Marxists. In response, the neo-pluralist theorists emerged. These were a group of 
liberal thinkers, many of whom were formerly instrumental in developing the orthodox 
pluralist theory. Authors in the group that began questioning the harmony of democracy 
in a pluralist state included: Charles Lindblom, Robert Dahl, Albert Hirschman, and John 
Kenneth Galbraith. 143 
In his Politics and Markets, Lindblom focused on the weaknesses in the pluralist 
paradigm, with special attention to the relationship between the market and government. 
The power of business resources are recognized by government officials who anticipate 
and prepare policies to expressly address commercial profitability issues. 144 Lindblom 
concluded that modem liberal democracies afford business a privileged position and, in a 
perceptive final chapter of his book stated: 
In short, in any private enterprise system, a large category of major decisions is 
turned over to businessmen, both small and larger. They are taken off the agenda 
of government. Businessmen thus become a kind of public official and exercise 
what, on a broad view of their role, are public functions.145 
Robert Dahl, a former collaborator with Lindblom, also noted the defects in the 
conventional pluralist theory Representative political mechanisms were insufficient to 
guide policy-makers in the complex issues facing the modem state so a new model of the 
"professionalized state" was needed to meet the technological and social changes. While 
143 Dunleavy and O'Leary, 27 1 .  
144 Ibid., 294. 
145 Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 172. Also see discussion of 
Lindblorn's work in Knuttila, infra, n. 63, 70. 
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neo-pluralists accept an extended apparatus for collective decision-making as a realistic 
way to effectuate decision-making, they still retain conventional pluralist values, such as 
participation by diverse groups and accountability of political representatives to satisfy 
the wishes of ordinary citizens. 
Neo-pluralist theorists are united in their conclusion that modern social, economic 
and political policies cannot be premised on models that are grossly outdated, such as a 
model of economics that is premised on the centrality of markets and consumer 
preferences, but fails to acknowledge the reality that the economic priorities further the 
objectives of large corporations rather than the individual or collective choices of 
citizens. In their overview of theories of state, the authors Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan 
O'Leary, summarized the following common characteristics of neo-pluralism: 
The major problems of liberal democracies concern the possibility that some 
power centres (especially large corporations) may be able to persuade citizens 
what they should want. Most neo-pluralists also acknowledge that the 
development of an advanced industrial state is not directly controlled by citizens, 
and recognize the existence of a good deal of sub-technocratic government. But 
however much they assert a need for reform (which varies between different 
authors), they all see the existing political and social systems of Western 
democracy as the best attainable form of social organization. Power in society is 
fragmented between economic and political authority systems, but in such a way 
as to preserve a very substantial capability for reforming the undeniable social 
problems, economic strains and political dilemmas which must inevitably 
remain. 146 
The first sentence of this quotation suggests the importance of the role of 
· commercial communication and the tools of persuasion (including commercial speech) in 
the allocation of power between corporations, government and citizens. John Kenneth 
Galbraith took this idea one step farther, arguing that the dominance of large corporations 
in economic markets requires that the government accommodate their interests first and 
146 Dunleavy and O'Leary, 284-285. 
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foremost by providing stability in the regulation of the business environment that will 
allow the corporations to capitalize on long-term investments. 147 Any substantial market 
sector not dominated by large corporations will have a nominal impact on the market and 
the shaping of economic policy. 
Peter Self argued that a shift has occurred in political thought regarding the role of 
the State from the benevolent to the malevolent State. He illustrated this by referring to 
changes in theories of pluralism from a benign view to a distinctly malevolent approach: 
Theories of pluralism, developed initially in and about the American environment, 
started out with an optimistic view of the consequences of the rise of organized 
groups for democratic stability and balance, veered towards a stress upon the 
capture of government by powerful private interests, and contributed finally (in 
Europe particularly) towards a concept of 'corporate pluralism' in which 
integrated private and public interests dominate government to the exclusion of 
other groups. 148 
John Kenneth Galbraith's Concept of Countervailing Power. In his book, 
American Capitalism, the Canadian-born political economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, 
advanced his theory that modem capitalistic society breeds centers of industrial 
concentration that become monopolies or oligopolies. He believed that this is a positive 
formula for growth, if the monopolistic power systems induced countervailing 
institutions that wield sufficient power to prevent potential abuse and exploitation by the 
monopolistic group. Galbraith offered examples of how "countervailing power" can arise 
with large retailing groups balancing the power of large manufacturers, trade unions 
balancing the power of large employers, supplier and consumer organizations balancing 
the power of dominant sellers and government regulation balancing the power of private 
147 Ibid., 295. 
148 Peter Self, Political Theories of Modem Government, Its Role and Reform (Boston: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1985), 17. 
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monopolies and oligopolies. Although giant firms have replaced small firms to the point 
where the competitive model is no longer applicable, Galbraith concluded that this is not 
a problem provided that centers of countervailing power emerge to protect consumers and 
smaller players. A system of economic checks and balances is more likely to occur 
when competing centers of monopolistic and oligopolistic power interact with 
countervailing institutions. 149 
This theoretical perspective offers the means to expand this study' s analysis of the 
agricultural climate and players that are involved in the compelled commercial speech 
conflict by examining which entities (most likely monopolistic or oligopolistic) or 
individuals have economic power, which parties are currently vulnerable to abuse or 
exploitation, which ones are currently induced to build centers of countervailing power 
and what will be needed to be successful as a countervailing institution. 
Summary. This dissertation uses a dual theoretical framework for viewing the 
operations of the State and other principal actors in this conflict: Gramscian hegemonic 
theory + Galbraith countervailing power analysis. All evidence will be analyzed within 
the Gramsci hegemonic framework and the Galbraith countervailing power analysis will 
be selectively applied when appropriate to evidence dealing more directly with economic 
aspects of the struggle over commodity checkoffs and compelled commercial speech. 
The theories will not be combined or modified; all original assumptions and assertions 
for each theory will be retained in the analysis. 
149 See generally Galbraith, American Capitalism, 1 19 -1 31 .  
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Power Blocs and Hegemony in Agriculture 
Gramsci recognized that close associations and alignments between state and civil 
society create "historic blocs" comprised of bourgeoisie and organic intellectuals from 
various parts of civil society and the state engaged in discourse and activities necessary to 
build and maintain hegemony. The historic bloc is integral in organizing entire social 
formations. While the bourgeoisie was the initial class around which a ruling historic 
bloc organized, later Gramsci theorists understood Gramsci' s ideas to mean that such 
blocs are not as closely bound to class organization. Instead, power blocs can articulate 
discursive elements containing nuclei of meaning to produce ideological ensembles that 
form the central foundation for the hegemonic activities of the power bloc. 
This dissertation advances the notion that organic intellectuals within the 
agricultural industry have aligned themselves around agribusiness. In its exercise of 
hegemony, agribusiness has created certain nuclei of meaning that have formed widely 
accepted ideological ensembles. The nuclei of meaning are linked to the industrial 
agriculture model and to the programs for mandatory assessments on commodities. 
The power blocs involved are the "industrial agriculture bloc" and separate 
"commodity industry blocs" for each of the five commodities covered by this study. 
While interrelated to some measure, they are formulated on different nuclei of meaning 
and represent different ideological ensembles. The power blocs also are subject to 
different historical conditions that have been instrumental in developing the social 
relations necessary to achieve hegemony. A challenge to the hegemony in one of these 
power blocs and resulting reform or renegotiation of power may influence the other, but 
they each remain autonomous. 
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The industrial agriculture bloc exercises hegemony and power over the entire 
agricultural industry based on its need to reinforce and maintain the industrial agriculture 
model, a key ideological element in its discursive ensemble. The central organizers for 
this bloc are the large concentrated and highly integrated agricultural business 
organizations. Allied with them are other groups and organic intellectuals from within 
civil society and the state, including the USDA. 
The concentration and vertical integration that has occurred in the agricultural 
industry in the last decade has combined with biotechnology developments to create a 
climate for a few powerful groups to exercise hegemony by owning, controlling or 
partnering with companies that provide each necessary function in the food chain. Of 
particular importance is ownership of intellectual property rights in genetically 
engineered organisms (seeds, crops, livestock DNA, etc.). 
Dr. William Heffernan of the University of Missouri Department of Rural 
Sociology has identified "food chain clusters" or vertically integrated food systems that 
cross internati�nal boundaries. 150 The industrial agriculture bloc will take on a new 
character as these food chain clusters become the primary organizers for the agricultural 
industry in the future. In a report he prepared for the National Farmer's Union, 
Heffernan touches on how the decision making process will become more complex and 
more important. There will be a hegemonic dialogue within each food cluster chain and 
between the clusters of firms. Other participants in the industrial agriculture model will 
need to negotiate their place in the industry by allying themselves with the food chain 
150 See Heffernan, 3-4. 
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clusters. The organic intellectuals in academia, the USDA, trade associations, etc. will 
have to do the same. 
Will it be possible to build an effective counter-hegemony to attack the industrial 
agriculture bloc with these powerful food chain clusters? That remains to be seen. 
However, from the literature and activities of several of the major coalitions aligned with 
the agricultural counter-hegemony (Organization for Competitive Markets and National 
Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture), it appears that there are leaders in the counter­
hegemony who are astute about the reorganizing taking place in the industrial agriculture 
bloc. The strategies and resources will need to be well-coordinated and sophisticated to 
be effective in dealing with the emerging industrial agriculture power bloc. 
A commodity industry bloc exists for each of the five commodities covered by 
this dissertation: beef, pork, mushrooms, tree fruit and dairy products. In each case, the 
commodity industry bloc has a history of relations between different segments of the 
industry and external forces combined with an "ideological ensemble" that have worked 
together to generate the consensus of the commodity industry itself (albeit sometimes by 
coercive means), and has achieved public consensus through discourse or by default 
through public apathy or lack of public awareness. The central organizers for each 
commodity industry bloc differ as well as the agents they use to exercise hegemony. 
However, in each commodity industry, the US�A has aligned itself with the dominant 
power bloc. 
While operating in an autonomous manner, the industrial agriculture bloc and the 
respective commodity industry blocs are linked to Gramsci's  historic bloc, the primary 
bloc that organizes capitalist society and accommodates the masses through 
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parliamentary democracy. Some of the same agents align themselves with the dominant 
forces in each bloc (such as various arms of the state apparatus) and some of the 
discursive and ideological elements are present in each power bloc, but they are still 
relatively separate in terms of the way they exercise hegemony and influence society. As 
shown by the model in Figure 3, this phenomenon of power blocs operating within a 
capitalist state can be conceptualized as a cascading set of power blocs, each formed 
around a central organizer, each articulating discursive meaning, each assimilating its 
own ideological ensemble, and each making concessions and negotiating with 
challengers to maintain and strengthen its hegemony. 
One power bloc may experience radical change without imposing change on other 
power blocs, but often they observe and assimilate new economic, political and social 
elements that appear successful for other blocs. For example, the complete vertical 
integration of the poultry industry has set the stage for other commodity industry blocs to 
consider how vertical integration can be incorporated into their hegemonic strategies. 
Certainly, the power bloc that adopted the ideological ensemble for the industrial 
agriculture model was cognizant of the hugely successful use of similar business models 
over which that bloc exercises hegemony leads to the conclusion that a discrete "checkoff 
hegemony" can be recognized for each industry. It contributes significantly to the overall 
hegemony wielded by each power bloc. The legal termination of the commodity 
checkoff program in an industry would force the commodity industry bloc to re-formulate 
its ideological ensemble and re-negotiate relations within the industry to re-establish 
hegemonic control forfeited through loss of the checkoff programs. Other consequences 
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GRAMSCIAN POWER BLOCS 
IDSTORIC BLOC 
• Organizes capitalist societies 
• Central organizers = Bourgeoisie 
• The bourgeoisie and its allies organize 
social formation through hegemony. 
INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE BLOC 
• Organizes agricultural industry 
• Central organizers = Agribusiness ("Food Chain Clusters',) 
• Agribusiness and its allies (USDA, trade associations and 
academia) organize food commodity production through 
















* The tree fruit industry has multiple blocs based on state and type of fruit. 
Figure 3 Gramscian Power Blocs 
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outside of agriculture would result as well. This study will analyze the consequences of 
different legal outcomes on First Amendment doctrine and public interest as well as on 
agriculture. 
As noted earlier in this dissertation, the struggle for hegemony is intrinsically 
related to the fact that discursive elements "have common nuclei of meaning which are 
not fully determinate in denotation and can be connotatively linked to other elements or 
produce the specific meanings they reveal in different discursive elements." 151  This idea 
is instructive in examining the counter-hegemony that has arisen to challenge the 
checkoff hegemony in each commodity industry. Programs for mandatory commodity 
assessments in each industry were adopted based on certain understandings of the 
meanings and justifications for such programs, how they would function within the 
industry structure and how they fit with dominant ideology. 
This consensus became strained as both the dominant power bloc and critical 
segments of the industry developed different meanings for the checkoff programs which 
were connotatively and literally linked to other elements. An agent of the dominant 
hegemony, the USDA, even developed its own discursive ensemble around the idea that 
the generic advertising generated by the checkoff programs is "government speech. " 
This position was not only sharply opposed by those challenging the checkoff hegemony, 
but was also at odds with the ideological ensemble of the commodity industry bloc. The 
commodity industry bloc has grudgingly made a concession to the USDA on this point, a 
move that has imposed a new thread in the ideological ensemble of the dominant bloc 
and a source of ongoing tension within that bloc. 
151 Jessop, 196. 
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An assumption is made in this dissertation that the industrial agriculture bloc has organized the commodity production system in much the same manner as the bourgeoisie has organized capitalist society under the historic bloc. The evidence indicated that agribusiness has captured the key government agency (the USDA), a major portion of the media, the land grant educational institutions and the major trade associations. There are minority fractions within media, academia and the farming community that are building their own alternative trade association and coalitions f or lobbying and legal purposes. The idea ensembles they develop and the strategies they use (such as the First Amendment challenges to the commodity checkoffs) will allow them to engage in a war of position. Each of these groups will be analyzed in detail in chapter seven which presents the investigative frame. 
Failed Counter-Hegemony Serves as Legal Catalyst As noted earlier, the central thesis underlying this research is that the legal developments concerning the constitutionality of compelled commercial speech signify a fundamental hegemonic conflict within the agricultural industry. The challengers, individuals and groups who object to mandatory payment of commodity fees, are now using the Courts as a means to achieve change. However, there is evidence that the challengers initially sought to achieve change by using routine mechanisms within the current hegemony, namely, the referendum procedure. This occurred in the pork industry when the pork producers followed procedures set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 48 12(b)(l)(A) for voting on whether the pork checkoffs should continue. The Campaign for Family Farms took the lead in May 1999 by submitting petitions to the USDA with signatures of at least fifteen per cent of the hog producers as 70 
required. After completing a verification review, the USDA concluded that the petitions 
did not represent fifteen percent of the hog producers. However, this conclusion was 
viewed with suspicion, especially when the USDA admitted that the "verification process 
was vulnerable to criticism." 152 
Recognizing the problems and seeking to preserve the legitimacy of the USDA's 
role, then Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman (a Democrat) decided to conduct a 
"fairness" referendum in 2000 to allow the pork producers to vote on whether to 
terminate the checkoff program. The results showed 15,95 1 votes against the program 
and 14,396 votes in favor of the program. Accordingly, Secretary Glickman announced 
that the pork checkoff program would be terminated. In immediate response, the 
Michigan Pork Producers Association (MPPA) filed suit to challenge the counting of the 
votes and the "voluntary" referendum and obtained a Temporary Restraining Order to 
prevent termination of the program while the action for a preliminary injunction was 
pending. 
At this key juncture, a new Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman (a 
Republican), took office. Despite the votes indicating that more than half of the industry 
was against the checkoffs, she decided to discount the referendum and continue the pork 
checkoff program. In an effort to conclude the matter, she entered into an agreement with 
the MPPA to transfer responsibility for managing the checkoff funds from the National 
Pork Producers Council to the National Pork Board, a panel of individuals appointed by 
the Secretary. This prompted the Campaign for Family Farms to cross-claim challenging 
the settlement and to add a new claim that the pork checkoffs violated the pork 
152 Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, 174 F. Supp. 2d 637, 639 (2001), citing 
Glickman Memorandum of February 25, 2000. 
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producers' First Amendment rights in commercial speech.1 53 In a surprising move, U.S. 
District Court Judge Richard Enslen ruled on November 1, 2002, that the pork checkoffs 
were unconstitutional and that collection of all mandatory checkoff fees must cease on 
November 24, 2002. 154 The USDA and other defendants successfully persuaded the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to allow the checkoff payments to continue while the 
lawsuit was pending. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in this 
case on March 14, 2003. 
In a parallel development, the Livestock Marketing Association (LMA) submitted 
petitions to the USDA on November 12, 1999, to drive a referendum for a vote on 
whether beef checkoffs should continue. The Secretary of Agriculture provided no 
response. In light of her failure to validate the petitions and schedule a referendum, the 
LMA and other plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action. They sought: 1) a ruling 
that the Secretary's action (or inaction) was unconstitutional and violative of their due 
process and equal protection rights; 2) an injunction prohibiting further collections of 
checkoffs; 3) an injunction regarding the required actions on the referendum, and 4) an 
order requiring the Cattlemen's Beef Board to cease using checkoff fees to publicize anti­
referendum messages in its producer communications. (Such inappropriate use of 
checkoff fees demonstrated a strong hegemony controlling the cattle industry.) The 
plaintiffs then amended their complaint, adding a claim that beef checkoffs violated their 
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. 
153 This claim was based on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in United States v. United Foods holding that 
the mushroom checkoffs were unconstitutional. See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
154 See Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign/or Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772, 791-792 
(W.D.Mich. 2002), as corrected October 31 ,  2002. 
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The LMA was successful in obtaining a court order in 2001 to enjoin the use of 
checkoff fees by the Cattlemen's Beef Board for communications designed to block or 
discourage a beef checkoff referendum or to influence government action or policy with 
regard to keeping the beef checkoff and the beef board or to influence beef producers on 
these subjects. 155 The USDA's failure to participate in the referendum process also led to 
another district court victory. On June 21, 2002, District Court Judge Charles B. 
Kommann held that beef checkoffs were unconstitutional as a violation of the First 
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs and ordered that collection of all beef checkoffs 
cease.156 The USDA and the other defendants prevailed, however, in their vigorous effort 
to have the order lifted so that the checkoff program could continue while the litigation 
was pending. Their appeal with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals seeking a reversal of 
the district court decision met with unfavorable results on July 8, 2003, when the 
appellate court upheld Judge Kommann's finding that the beef checkoff programs were 
unconstitutional. 157 
These two scenarios demonstrate how the challengers' original strategy for 
counter-hegemony was unsuccessful due to the powerful hegemony in place. The 
minority group simply did not have the market power or political capital to overcome the 
tactics of the USDA and the groups aligned with it. However, the favorable Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. United Foods was an unexpected boon that 
155 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, 132 F. Supp. 2d 817, 832 (2001). The district court also 
enjoined the Cattlemen's Beef Board from using descriptive words such as "fair," "accountable," 
"effective" and "it's working" to refer to the beef checkoff program. It expressly recognized that checkoff 
funds should be used solely "to promote and fund research to promote the consumption of beef' and to 
'�romote and advertise beef products and the consumption of beef." Ibid. 1 6 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, 207 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1007 (D. S. Dakota 2002). 157 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 
(8th Cir. 2003). 
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dramatically shifted power. From a strictly economic standpoint, the challengers' 
success in their free speech legal claims was seen as being likely to cause a disruption in 
the flow of millions of dollars in checkoff revenues in the pork and beef industries. 
The government is fighting to maintain the legitimacy of the current hegemonic 
framework. The USDA' s handling of this situation and a similar referendum vote in the 
beef industry suggests that the USDA is situated squarely within the historic bloc of 
political and social institutions that form the hegemony. However, the outcomes of the 
recent legal battles in favor of the challenger indicate that the USDA's dominant position 
may need to be re-negotiated, a process that Gramsci predicted will occur when the 
relationship between the State and civil society become unstable. Re-negotiation could 
also be prompted by unstable relationships between classes or between competing 
interests within civil society. 
History and Rationale for Mandatory Assessment Programs and Major Players 
Commodity marketing programs are regulated by federal and state governments 
through a variety of institutional mechanisms. 158 The federal government employs: 1)  
stand-alone statutory programs or 2) "marketing orders" as authorized under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA). 159 The stand-alone programs 
arise when Congress passes an Act providing for the advertising, joint promotion, and 
education of a commodity, and the relevant industry affirms the legislation with a super 
majority vote. 160 
158 See Forker and Ward, 78-99. This book provides an informative overview of the federal and state 
regulatory mechanisms as well as an in-depth look at how major commodity programs operate. 
159 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of June 3, 1937, Pub. L. No. 137, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
160 See Soares, 19-66. 
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The AMAA vests significant authority in the Secretary of the USDA to adopt 
regulations for commodities ( or marketing orders) in the Code of Federal Regulations. 161 
The scope of such marketing orders covers joint promotion, advertising, marketing 
research, production research, designation of unfair trade practices, and minimum pricing 
and supply controls. 162 In deference to the expertise and preferences of a particular 
industry, the statute also requires a vote of approval by two-thirds of the relevant 
producers or by those producers who market at least two thirds of the output of the 
relevant commodity. 163 (It is clear that the second condition would privilege the interests 
of the large producers.) Federal marketing orders may be imposed on both domestic and 
foreign producers of beef sold in the United States. The free speech controversy arises 
out of further provisions in the AMAA that permit a commodity program to collect 
mandatory fees from all producers in an industry to be used for funding of its authorized 
activities, including generic advertising and promotion of the industry' s key commodity. 
State agricultural commodities programs are created through the enactment of 
state legislation that authorizes the secretary of a state department of agriculture to adopt 
marketing orders to regulate an industry. Other statutory vehicles for commodity 
regulations are state councils and state commissions. Both are created by stand-alone 
legislation and can be modified only through further legislation. State councils are 
generally viewed as providing certainty and reducing the vulnerability of producers to a 
scenario where one small faction in an industry imposes its agenda on the entire industry. 
For this reason, state councils have become the preferred vehicle in states where 
161 7 U.S.C., § 608c (2001). 
162 Ibid., §602a. 
163 Ibid., § 608c(9)(b). 
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industries with competing interests seek to address complex issues, often related to 
technology or environmental issues. 164 
The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA) was a reenactment 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. 165 It was a strategic move by Congress to 
clarify that all sections of the 1933 Act that had not been amended in 1935 remained in 
effect. 166 The overwhelming rationale for this legislation was the need to respond to 
agricultural marketing conditions created by the Depression. 
Today the rationale for commodity promotion programs is primarily based on the 
argument that commodity producers will realize greater benefits through collective 
action, especially in regard to competing on an international market. Secretary of 
Agriculture Ann M. Veneman, in 20002 endorsed commodity checkoffs by stating: 
''The U.S . Department of Agriculture regards such programs, when properly 
administered, as effective tools for market enhancement." 167 Likewise, the U.S .  Congress 
expressed its resounding support for generic commodity promotion programs in statutory 
findings it codified in 1996: 
It is in the national public interest and vital to the welfare of the 
agricultural economy of the United States to maintain and expand existing 
markets and develop new markets and uses for agricultural commodities through 
industry-funded, Government-supervised, generic commodity promotion 
programs established under commodity promotion laws. 168 
The statute specifies that the congressional intent "has always been to maintain 
and expand markets for the agricultural commodity covered by the law, rather than to 
164 See Soares, 38. 
165 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 10, 48 Stat. 3 1 ,  amended in 1935, S. Rep. No 74-101 1 
(1935). 
166 See Soares, 36-37. 
167 "Pork Checkoff is Dealt a Blow," The Farmer's Exchange, 78, no. 1 ,  1 November 2002, 1 .  
168Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996, 7 U.S.C. § 7401 (b)( l) (Supp. V 2000) . 
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maintain or expand the share of those markets held by any individual producer or 
processor." 169 Finally, the Congressional findings recognize the value of the generic 
commodity programs to small producers "who often lack the resources or market power 
to advertise on their own and who are otherwise often unable to benefit from the 
economies of scale available in promotion and advertising." 170 
It is noteworthy that Congress issued these laudatory statements about the 
commodity checkoff programs after the Ninth Circuit had delivered the second of two 
opinions striking down checkoffs as unconstitutional. 171 This raised a general sense of 
alarm by the industrial agriculture bloc, resulting in pressure on legislators to clarify the 
benefits of the programs in a way that would help strengthen the government's  case in the 
next checkoff lawsuit. 
California fruit growers supporting mandatory assessments have stated their 
rationale for the checkoff programs as follows: 
Though created under the auspices of various federal and state statutory 
schemes, these programs serve the same general purpose-building, maintaining 
and expanding markets for key agricultural products. The need for collective 
action in these markets has long been recognized by both state and federal 
legislatures. In today's global economy and world market, commodity 
promotional programs help to promote, position, and organize an industry so that 
it can compete in the international marketplace. It enables producers/handlers to 
join together and reach markets otherwise out of reach to all but the biggest 
players in an industry.172 
An extension of this rationale can be seen in an effort in California to organize 
support for an "Ag Alliance." In the course of this initiative, industry representatives 
169 Ibid., § 7401 (b)(3) (Supp V 2000). 
170 Ibid., § 740 1 (b)(lO) (Supp V 2000). 
171 The two cases were Cal-Almond v. USDA, 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993) and Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. 
v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1995). 
172 Soares, 39. 
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argued that commodity producers can no longer act on behalf of individual interests since 
the public now views agriculture collectively and not as industry segments. 173 
Government and Multiple-Industry Players. The USDA is the key 
governmental agency that oversees the fourteen federal commodity checkoff programs. 
It derives its authority from the Agriculture Marketing Act of 1937. It has been a named 
defendant in all challenges to federal commodity checkoffs and receives its legal support 
from the U.S. Department of Justice. 
A number of legal and activist groups have supported the challengers and 
represented their interests in Court and in the public arena. These include groups such as 
the Farmers' Legal Action Group (FLAG), a non-profit law center founded in 1986 and 
based in St. Paul Minnesota. 174 This legal group is dedicated to providing legal services 
to help sustain and preserve the family farm system of agriculture and provide social and 
economic justice to American farmers. The Center for Individual Freedom (CFIF) is a 
non-profit First Amendment rights group based in Alexandria, Virginia, that is active as a 
plaintiff in several checkoff challenges. The CFIF has provided financial support for 
various challenges to mandatory advertising, assisted in legal actions, filed amicus curie 
("friend of the court") briefs, joined as plaintiffs in two cases challenging beef and dairy 
checkoffs, and generally supported the position of the checkoff challengers in their First 
Amendment battles over commodity checkoff programs. The CFIF receives funding 
from the contributions of individuals, foundations and corporations. 
173 Ibid., 64-65 . 
174 The Farmers' Legal Action Group has received support through grants awarded by various foundations, 
such as: the Emma B. Howe Foundation, the Nathan Cummings Foundation, the Jessie Smith Noyes 
Foundation, and Farm Aid. 
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Another family farm group that has challenged the pork checkoffs and corporate 
concentration and vertical integration is the Campaign for Family Farms and the 
Environment (Campaign for Family Farms or CFF). This group was the plaintiff in the 
major legal action against pork checkoffs, Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for 
Family Farms. It has been represented by the Farmers' Legal Action Group in that case. 
The CFF is a coalition of member organizations, including: the Missouri Rural Crisis 
Center, Iowa Citizens for Community Improvement, Illinois Stewardship Alliance and 
Land Stewardship Project (Minnesota). 175 
The Organization for Competitive Markets (OCM) is a recognized national group 
that describes itself as dedicated to furthering the interests of independent farmers, 
ranchers and rural communities. Its activities include facilitating discourse among 
academic and economic experts. It also receives donations from member organizations, 
foundations and individuals. 
Fruit Growers Industry. Federal regulation of the fruit growing industry has 
occurred through the actions of the secretary of the USDA in promulgating regulations in 
the Code of Federal Regulations in the form of "marketing orders." The authority for 
creating and enforcing such regulations, including mandatory commodity assessments, is 
established in the Agricultural Agreement Act of 1937. The marketing orders subject 
175 The Campaign for Family Farms is funded in large part through grants from various foundations to its 
four member groups who carry out their individual missions and serve as fiscal sponsors for CFF. For 
example, in 2001,  the Nathan Cummings Foundation provided the Land Stewardship Project (Minnesota) 
with a grant to support CFF. The Missouri Rural Crisis Center and the Campaign for Family Farms were 
awarded two-year grants each from the Educational Foundation of America in 1998 for use on CFF 
activities. The Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation awarded a grant in 1999 to CFF in care of the Land 
Stewardship Project and also provided a grant to the Missouri Rural Crisis Center for its organizational 
activities. In 2000, Farm Aid contributed funding to CFF, the Illinois Stewardship Alliance, the Missouri 
Rural Crisis Center, and the Land Stewardship Project (Minnesota). 
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fruit growers to extensive federal regulation that includes measures regulating supplies 
and prices along with the checkoff requirements. 176 
California, the state with the largest group of fruit growers, has a state act, the 
California Marketing Act of 1937, that is the counterpart to the federal act. It grants 
authority to the secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture to 
implement commodity checkoff regulations. Other commodity-specific acts control 
various individual fruit growers. However, all of these acts are subject to scrutiny after 
the landmark case of Gerawan v. Lyons, decided by the California Supreme Court in 
2000. The Court held that the freedom of speech provisions of the California 
Constitution are broader than the First Amendment rights under the U.S .  Constitution. 
Therefore, the mandatory commodity assessments against plum growers at issue under 
the California Plum Marketing Program were unconstitutional. 177 
Several industry groups represent the interests of growers of fresh produce on a 
national or regional basis, however, most of the fruit growing associations are state­
based. The Western Growers Association supports growers of fresh produce in California 
and Arizona with legislative and trade programs that benefit its members collectively. 
The United Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Association and the Fresh Produce Association of 
the Americas are recognized national trade groups. Strong trade associations can be 
found in a number of states, including such groups as the California Growers 
Association, Florida Citrus Mutual, Texas Fruit Growers Association, Michigan 
Agricultural Cooperative and many others. The research for this study did not identify 
176 See Brief for the Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit,United States v. United Foods, (2001) (No. 00-276), filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on March 
8, 2001 .  
177 Gerawan, 24 Cal. 4th 468 (2000). 
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specific groups that are aligned for or against commodity checkoffs, although individual 
fruit producers have been active in challenging fruit checkoffs. 178 
Mushroom Growers Industry. Mandatory assessments on mushroom growers 
were previously imposed by the Mushroom Promotion, Research and Consumer 
Information Act of 1990. 179 This statute focused narrowly on the goal of maintaining and 
expanding markets for mushrooms rather than on supply management or stabilizing 
markets. The Act established the Mushroom Council to administer the mushroom 
checkoff program. In 2001 ,  the Supreme Court held this Act unconstitutional in United 
States v. United Foods, Inc. 1 80 
The American Mushroom Institute is the primary mushroom trade association. It 
has supported commodity checkoff programs and filed an amicus brief in the United 
States v. United Foods case supporting the government's position. 
Beef Industry. The checkoff legislation for the beef industry is the Beef 
Promotion Research Act and Order, enacted in 1986. 18 1  The beef checkoff program 
requires cattle producers to pay a one dollar fee for each head of cattle sold, which results 
in revenues of more than $80 million annually. 182 These mandatory assessments are the 
178 See Glickman v. Wileman, 521 U.S. 457, ( 1997) and Gerawan Farming v. Lyons, 42 Ca. 4th 468 (2000). 
179 The Mushroom Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6104 
( 1990). 
180 United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
181 Beef Promotion Research Act and Order, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2918;  7 C.F.R. §§ 1260. 101-1260.217 
( 1986). 
182 Geoffrey S. Becker, Congressional Research Report for Congress on "Federal Farm Promotion ("Check­
off') Programs (July 1 1 , 2002); CRS-1 ;  available from http://www.dairytrade.com/roundtable7-02/CRS95-
353.pdf; Internet; accessed 22 November 2002. This report stated that the annual assessments for beef 
checkoffs are $86 million. 
8 1  
source of funding for the "Beef. It' s  what's for dinner" generic advertising. 
Congress created the beef checkoff program as the governing legislation to 
promote beef as a commodity. The Cattlemen' s  Beef Board (CBB) is the organization 
that directs the flow of the beef checkoff money. The U.S . Secretary of Agriculture 
appoints its members, who represent the three steps in beef production-the beef 
producers, the cow-calf operators, and the feedlot operators. The National Cattlemen' s 
Beef Association (NCBA) is the largest recipient of checkoff funds and provides services 
to the CBB that support the objectives of the beef checkoff programs. Many beef 
producers expressed dissatisfaction upon the forming of the NCBA because the meat 
packing industry was allowed representation in policy-making. The packers have 
interests at odds with beef ranchers and feeders who fear and mistrust the economic 
power of the packers. 183 
Among the challengers to beef checkoffs are two organizations, the Livestock 
Marketing Association (LMA) and the W estem Organization of Resource Councils 
(WORC). The livestock markets (primary members of the LMA) must collect the 
checkoff fee of $ 1 .00 per head for every animal that is sold in their rings without any 
reimbursement for this service. The WORC is an association of six grassroots 
organizations from six western states. Its membership includes ranchers, farmers, small 
businessmen, and others who have strong environmental interests. 
183See "Concentration in the Meat Packing Industry Minority Report," USDA Advisory Committee on 
Agricultural Concentration (June 7, 1996); available from 
http://www.web-span.com/~pga/library/report.html; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002. An example of 
one way that the packers exert power is through the use of "captive supply" or contract agriculture, which 
can occur through packer-owned cattle, formula cattle, futures cattle, and custom-fed cattle. These 
methods, accounting for twenty to thirty percent of the cattle produced, remove control from the producers 
and affect the prices obtained from independent feeders. Ibid. 
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Pork Industry. The Pork Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Act1 84 
has historically governed the commodity checkoff program for hog producers. Enacted 
in 1985, this act required hog producers to pay 40 cents for each $100 in hog sales and 
specified that revenues from such checkoffs be spent solely on generic advertising, such 
as the "Pork, the Other White Meat" promotional campaign. Annual revenue from pork 
checkoffs has totaled $57 million dollars. 185 However, on October 25, 2002, a federal 
district court judge in Grand Rapids, Michigan, held that the pork checkoff program 
violates the free speech rights of hog farmers. In an opinion that expressed his overall 
disdain for the mandatory commodity assessments, Judge Richard A. Enslen declared: 
''The government has been made tyrannical by forcing men and women to pay for 
messages they detest. Such a system is at the bottom unconstitutional and rotten." 186 
The National Pork Board (NPB) administers the pork checkoff program and is 
instrumental in collecting checkoffs and channeling the revenues. In addition to the 
promotion of pork, it uses checkoff fees for research related to technology and swine 
health, consumer information projects and production improvement. The National Pork 
Producers Council (NPPC), one of the nation' s  largest livestock commodity 
organizations, is a recipient of the checkoff fees. It is affiliated with parallel state 
commodity associations that also receive checkoff fees, such as Michigan Pork 
Producers, California Pork Producers, Kentucky Pork Producers, Indiana Pork Producers, 
New York Pork Producers, and Ohio Pork Producers. 
184 Pork Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4801 et seq. (1985). 
185 Becker, CRS-1 . 
186 Michigan Pork Producers (2002) at 791 .  
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A nonprofit organization discussed earlier, the Campaign for Family Farms, 
represents family farm hog producers, the challengers in the current litigation against 
pork checkoff programs. 
Dairy Industry. Fluid milk producers began paying checkoffs with the 
enactment of the Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983. 187 In May 2002, this Act 
was amended to impose checkoffs on imported dairy products as well as milk produced 
in the United States. Annual revenues from dairy checkoffs today exceed $250 million. 
The Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983 gave authority to the National 
Dairy Promotion and Research Board (NDB) to collect mandatory assessments, to 
evaluate proposals for projects to promote the use of fluid milk and dairy products and 
carry out research and education projects. The administrative activities of this board 
were transferred in 1995 to Dairy Management, Inc. (DMI) a private non-profit 
corporation formed by merging the NDB and the United Dairy Industry Association. 
Today more than 80,000 dairy producers belong to the DMI. It has become a 
management organization, overseeing the activities of the American Dairy Association, 
the National Dairy Council and the U.S. Dairy Export Council.1 88 
The DMI has aggressively pursued programs to increase demand for U.S.­
produced dairy products, including the widely promoted "Got Milk?" campaign. It has 
most recently used its checkoff money as a means to induce one of the twenty-four small 
California towns it has targeted to change its name to "Got Milk?"as a publicity gimmick 
187 Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501 -4507 (1983). 
188 "What is Dairy Management, Inc.?" Dairy Management Inc.(undated) ; available from 
http://www.dairycheckoff.com/whatisdmi.asp; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002. 
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to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Got Milk campaign and to help the dairy industry 
combat decreasing milk sales. 189 
Influence of Changi,ng Economic, Political and Cultural Conditions 
on the Agricultural Industry 
The struggle between competing interests in the commercial and legal spheres has 
created a highly charged "zone ofconflict" with regard to compelled commercial speech 
(see Figure 2) The clash cannot be simply attributed to First Amendment zealots or 
opportunistic freeloading commodity producers. More complex developments in both 
the agricultural and legal arenas have primed the social and political environment for the 
current conflagration. This section will address major influences on the agricultural 
industry. 
Agricultural economist specialist John Crespi maintained that the generic 
advertising battle is the product of a "long, evolutionary process of economics, 
legislation, and litigation."190 Several events in the 1930s laid the foundation for 
mandatory assessments, including enactment of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement 
Act of 1937 191 and a Supreme Court opinion in 1939 in United States v. Rock Royal 
CO-OP, lnc. 192 upholding the constitutionality of the 1937 Act in the face of Fifth 
Amendment, Tenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Another 
landmark piece of legislation was introduced in 1954 when Congress amended the 1937 
189 Janet Kanters, '"Got Milk' Campaign in California Grows," AglnfoBits (November 6, 2002); available 
from http://www.aginfonet.sk.ca/news/html/news2797.html; Internet; accessed 5 July 2003. 
190 John Crespi, "Promotion Checkoffs, Why So Controversial? The Evolution of Generic Advertising 
Battles," (paper prepared for the 2001 Kansas State Agricultural Economics Risk & Profit Conference on 
August 16- 17, 2001); available from http://www.dairytrade.com/roundtable7-02/CRS95-353 .pdf; Internet; 
accessed 22 November 2002 or http://aem.cornell.edu/special_programs/commodity/nicpre/bulltoc.htm; 
Internet; accessed 28 January 2003. 
191 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of June 3, 1937, Pub. L. No. 137, 50 Stat. 246 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
192 See United States v. Rock Royal CO-OP, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). 
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Act to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to implement programs for generic 
advertising and promotion for commodities in furtherance of the goals of the Act. 193 A 
primary objective of the marketing orders promulgated under this legislation was to 
stimulate demand for farm products, thereby propping up prices for farm commodities 
and reducing the need for the government to purchase excess production. 194 
It is noteworthy that almost fifty years passed without challenges to the 
constitutionality of the 1937 Act. One possible interpretation of this phenomenon is that 
the agricultural industry had a high level of acceptance of the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court decision in Rock Royal. The judicial hiatus ended in 1985 when a cattle producer 
and auctioneer initiated the case of United States v. Frame, 195 challenging an amendment 
to the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1976196 that imposed mandatory assessments 
for generic advertising. Since 1985, there has been a steady stream of litigation 
challenging the mandatory promotional checkoffs. (See Appendix B listing compelled 
commercial speech cases.) The agricultural industry has undergone many changes, and 
the renewed interest in litigation can be seen as one manifestation of the changes. 
Several areas of influence are imposing profound changes on the agricultural 
industry as shown in Figure 1 .  Reflecting general trends in other areas of business, these 
key areas include: 1 )  globalization of agricultural markets (with attendant implications 
for all links in the chain of producing, promoting and selling goods in a competitive 
world marketplace); 2) public health and environmental concerns that lead to a tension 
193 The Agricultural Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. § 401(c). 
194 Crespi, 6-8. 
195 Frame, 888 F.2d 1 1 19 (3rd Cir. 1989). 
196 Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1976, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2918; 7 C.F.R. §§ 1260. 101-1260.2 17. 
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between advancements in technology and the organic commodities producers, 3) vertical 
integration in industry sectors; 4) contract agriculture; 5) increased concentration of 
ownership in larger firms that run agricultural operations; and 6) crisis of 
competitiveness in agriculture market because of obsolete organizational and ownership 
structures and tensions with other post-industrial business models. 197 Each of these areas 
will be briefly addressed below. 
Globalization. The term "agribusiness" has become common nomenclature for a 
commercial or industrial enterprise that manages agricultural operations such as 
production, processing, storage and distribution of farm commodities in accordance with 
profit-generating standards and criteria. A major focus of agribusiness is to source raw 
materials as cheaply as possible and then reformulate them in some manner that can be 
marketed to the consumer at the highest price the market will bear. This allows the 
agribusiness concern an edge in productivity, yields, and costs. Opening up new 
international markets has been a catalyst for "global agribusiness" and have introduced a 
new era of multinational food conglomerates engaged in import/export trade and 
transborder business strategies. 
Food producers seeking to compete against the multinational behemoths are 
concerned with their ability to advertise and distinguish their products from the heavily 
advertised brands of these giant companies. Mandatory commodity checkoffs can be 
seen as a hindrance when they limit the pool of resources available to create recognition 
197 See generally "A Food and Agriculture Policy for the 2 1 st Century," Compilation of papers presented at 
the Organization for Competitive Markets Food Policy Retreat on April 29 - May 1 ,  2000, ed., Michael C. 
Stumo, available from http://www.competitivemarkets.com/library/academic/21 stcentury; Internet; 
accessed 1 November 2002. 
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and a distinct image for a specialty or niche product. An argument also has been made 
that marketing orders with standards for the handling and quality of commodities are less 
necessary today, since the large domestic and foreign conglomerates in each major 
commodity groups have their own established criteria and systems that are often superior 
to those mandated by the marketing orders. Since they also are involved in their own 
research and public promotion efforts, the checkoff fees are not needed to bolster their 
advertising programs. 198 
On the other hand, the opposing side has strongly argued that the competitive 
nature of the global food commodity market begs for a collective response by organized 
commodity groups. The players in the global environment are now selling "food 
products" rather than "food commodities" and this difference is critical. 199 Food 
commodities can be sold without organized and aggressive marketing and maintain a 
sense of continuity in time, without major introduction of change. Food products need 
proactive marketing to create visibility and promote images that attract consumers to 
more than just the attributes of the commodity itself, i.e., that lifestyle and behavior can 
be transformed by choosing a particular food product. Professors David Padberg and 
Charles Hall outlined the need for a "functional commodity brain trust" to perform the 
serious role of identifying values and attitudes of the consumer and managing the public 
image of the food product in the same manner that aggressively branded products are 
managed in a national and global food market. 200 
198 Padberg and Hall, 82. 
199 Ibid, 82-83. 
200 Ibid., 83. 
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Health and Environmental Concerns/Organic Agriculture. The U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration's approval of a genetically altered organism for commercial 
sale on May 1 8, 1994, ushered in a new era of genetically engineered crops that are 
resistant to pests and disease. 201 They are touted as capable of repelling pests, resisting 
herbicides, and competing with weeds for water and nutrients. 202 The agricultural 
industry welcomed the opportunity to increase production and grow crops with less need 
for pesticides. However, there is a dark side to these genetically engineered crops, also 
called "transgenic crops" (or "Frankenfood" by the purists). There is a tradeoff between 
resistance and resilience. As the plants are modified, they become more resistant to 
weeds and herbs. They will have less sturdy stems, less vigorous deep roots and less 
ability to compete with weeds. Another disadvantage for farmers growing transgenic 
crops is that they must plant some fields with traditional plants to serve as "refuges" for 
nonresistant pests (to maintain a nonresistant pest population). The refuges have 
extremely low yields because the pests "swarm" in from genetically protected fields. 203 
The transgenic crops can increase productivity, but there are disadvantages as noted 
above. Not all farmers are enthusiastic about the new transgenic crops, resulting in 
further division in the agricultural community. 
Another developing area of agriculture is organic agriculture. This is the process 
of growing grains, fruits and vegetables without using synthetic pesticides. Organic 
farmers view farming as a way of sustaining an ecosystem rather than a factory for 
201 The approval was for the Flavr Savr tomato, genetically engineered with fish DNA. It was the first 
biotech food to reach the market. 




producing food. 204 The goal is "ecologically sustainable agriculture'' that will restore the 
soil and improve the efficiency of nutrient cycling in the soil. 205 Grounds for difference 
exist within the agriculture industry since many organic farmers run small operations so 
their interests may not be aligned with the large farming operations. There are also 
ideological differences since the organic farmers' goals are often heavily focused on 
environmental concerns with profit a secondary objective. 
It is clear, however, that organic farming has moved from a fringe agricultural 
initiative to a new food sector. In 1997, organic food was cited as a "$3.5 billion 
business growing at an average rate of 20 percent annually." 206 
Vertical Integration and Contract Agriculture. Vertical integration occurs 
when "integrating firms have acquired or build operations in position of their former 
buyers or sellers. The result is a network of subsidiaries conducting business rather than 
independent firms buying and selling to each other." 207 Often the network includes a 
mix of wholly owned operations and other independent entities working for the 
conglomerate under contracts. 
By the end of the Twenty-first Century, the entire poultry industry had been 
vertically integrated, and vertical integration had made large inroads in the pork 
industry. 208 The vertical structure raises issues similar to the ones outlined in the section 
below on concentration of ownership. A major outcome of vertical integration is the loss 
of autonomy. The owner will control all farming decisions, and the farmer essentially 
204 See "Wholesome Harvest," Union of Concerned Scientists (Fall 1997); available from 
http://www.ucsusa.org/publication.cfm?pub1ication1D=293; Internet; accessed 5 July 2003. 
205 See Jordan, 523-529. 
206 "Wholesome Harvest," 1 8. 
207 Padberg and Hall, 83, n. 27. 
208 Ibid., 83 . 
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becomes a paid laborer. Another serious concern is the unfair bargaining position of the 
contract farmer or the farmer/employee. With the exception of Iowa and Nebraska, 
vertical integration practices were virtually unregulated in the 1990s.209 But the most 
serious concerns are the environmental risks that accompany the large production 
facilities owned and controlled by the packers. Four states have experienced large-scale 
pollution incidents related to large hog confinement units and the number is expected to 
grow. Although some technology is available to address the odor problems, the 
conglomerate owners allege that the cost is too great. It can be argued that the social 
costs for the large integrated hog operations are being unfairly borne by others so that the 
integrated firms can profitably compete. 210 
Concentration of Ownership. Early in the Twenty-first Century, the 
agricultural industry experienced a period of increased concentration and mergers. In 
fact, in the summer of 1999, Senator Paul W ellstone, a Democrat from Minnesota, 
became so alarmed at the frenetic pace of the mergers in the agricultural community that 
he proposed a freeze on all agribusiness mergers for eighteen months. 21 1 Twenty-seven 
of his fellow senators voted for this proposal, demonstrating that the concern was 
recognized by members of Congress. 212 
Several years earlier, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman had formed a USDA 
Advisory Committee on Agricultural Concentration to investigate the concentration in the 
agricultural industry and make recommendations in February 1996. After hearing 
209 See "Concentration in the Meat Packing Industry Majority Committee Report" and "Concentration in 
the Meat Packing Industry Minority Report," Tl 33-39, USDA Advisory Committee on Agricultural 
Concentration (June 7, 1996); available from http://www.web-span.com/~pga/library/report.html; Internet; 
accessed 12 November 2002. 
210 Ibid., Minority Report, fl 33-39. 
21 1 Lauck, 5 1 .  Senator Wellstone died in an airplane crash late in 2002. 
212 Ibid. 
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testimony from more than seventy individuals representing all sectors of the agricultural 
process, representative trade associations, environmental groups, and others, the 
committee provided its report four months later in two sections, the main committee 
report and a minority report (referenced herein as the "Majority Report" and the 
"Minority Report).213 Both acknowledged that the growing level of concentration within 
the agricultural industry was accompanied by a strong level of mistrust by the producers 
toward the agribusiness conglomerates. The Minority Report forcefully pointed out that 
the larger concentrated firms are able to maintain profit margins within the profit cycle, 
while the smaller producers "become primary shock absorbers for fluctuations in the 
commodity cycle."214 
The Majority Report identified the following negative characteristics of the 
current agricultural environment in its findings: 1) producers felt an intense sense of 
powerlessness as they felt coerced into doing business with concentrated firms, especially 
in the cattle industry, where the producers compared record losses with the sizable profits 
posted by those in higher levels of the industry chain, 2) the devastating effect of 
depressed producer prices on everyone in the cattle industry; 3) evidence of severe 
mistrust in the procurement system with the most flagrant example being the cattle 
producers' mistrust of the meatpackers and their ability to use concentration to depress 
prices (some witnesses were afraid to testify for fear of reprisal by the packers}, 4) the 
potential for price manipulation and other detrimental effects on ranchers and farmers due 
to formula pricing, captive supplies, and vertical integration.215 
213 See Majority Report and Minority Report. 
214 Ibid., Minority Report, <JI 4. 
215 Ibid., Majority Report, <JI<Il 9-14. 
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Several critical paragraphs in the Minority Report directly support the thesis of 
this paper that the compelled commercial speech cases represent a hegemonic conflict 
within the agricultural industry: 
Checkoff-Financed Producer Organizations 
Extensive dissatisfaction was voiced by beef producers over the formation of the 
National Cattlemen's Beef Association because of packer representation in the 
organization's policy formation. Allowing representation of an industry segment 
with interests that may be contrary to the interest of the producer, was viewed as 
an unfair use of mandatory nonrefundable beef checkoff funds. In effect, the 
splintered cow-calf and feedlot operations were helping support the concentrated 
interests of the packing segment. 
The activities of the various checkoff programs tend to be focused on large-scale 
production, reflecting, no doubt, the wishes of the largest contributors. This 
further contributes to concentration at the production level. Those who object to 
commodity group activities or the resulting concentration have little chance to 
show their dissatisfaction since the checkoffs are not refundable. 
Findings 
The use of commodity checkoff funds to finance research and promotion of the 
interests of the largest market participants accelerates the rate of concentration in 
the industries from which the funds are withheld. The use of nonrefundable 
checkoff funds to support an organization that is viewed by contributors as not 
accountable to its members is improper. Those who disagree with a promotion 
organization's membership and policies should not be compelled to support it. 
Recommendation: All checkoff fees should be made refundable.216 
The observations and findings of the six members of Congress who signed the 
Minority Report emphasized the alliances generated by the close relationship of the 
activities of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association and the business interests of the 
concentrated packers.217 These relationships demonstrate how private enterprise is able 
to utilize a trade association to further its agenda. The two become hegemonic partners, 
both benefiting from the beef checkoff hegemony to the extreme disadvantage of the 
216 Minority Report, <Jrl[ 41-43. 
217 The following committee members signed the Minority Report: Paul Strandberg (Minnesota), Herman 
Schumacher (Vice Chair, South Dakota), Marty Strange (Vice Chair, Nebraska), Becky Edington 
(Georgia), Tyrone Moos, (South Dakota) and Lois Wales (Texas) . 
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cattle producers. In fact, in its conclusion, the Minority Report forcefully stated its belief 
that the current concentration in the livestock industry needs to be addressed by the 
Secretary of Agriculture and Congress. However, the actions of the Secretary of 
Agriculture and the USDA in the last several years with respect to the beef checkoff issue 
suggest that this agency has joined in the hegemonic alliance with the packers and the 
National Cattlemen's  Beef Association. 
In the Minority Report' s  sobering summary, the participating committee members 
expressed their grave concerns in two concluding paragraphs: 
The importance of the issues addressed by the committee cannot be overstated. 
All consumers and all producers will feel ill effects if market power grows 
without accompanying accountability. Some concentration of agriculture is, 
indeed, inevitable as farmers retire or otherwise voluntarily leave the farm, and as 
technology provides increasing economies of scale. However, as briefly 
described above, there are several anticompetitive forces at work in the livestock 
industry that are artificially accelerating the rate of concentration. 
Once concentration occurs, it is almost impossible to reverse. We have thus 
concentrated our recommendations on preventative measures in hopes of allowing 
"progress" but preserving competition. Such a strategy is not only in the interest 
of independent market participants, but is vital for the long-term protection of the 
American consumer. Without immediate and strong action by the Secretary, and 
where necessary, by the Congress, the interests of artificial concentration will 
prevail . We stand ready, individually and as a group, to lend our help in this vital 
task.21s 
A telling note at the end of the Minority Report stated that the biggest question left 
unanswered was whether the "big three beef packers" should be broken up since they 
control almost 80 percent of the fed cattle slaughter along with shares of other markets 
such as the cow/bull and pork. 
218 Minority Report, fil 44-45. 
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Author Jon Lauck used the phrase "corporate feudalism" to describe an 
agricultural environment dominated by concentration.219 The antithesis is a model of 
economic independence, a position sought by the challengers in the checkoff cases. 
Lauck pointed out the support that exists for the corporate feudalism model, particularly 
by economists who feel that the large processors offer producers an opportunity to reduce 
risk and save their farms. 220 
Crisis of Competition in Agriculture Markets. The agricultural community 
has faced various levels of economic crisis during the last century arising from 
agricultural market failure. It has not responded to market gluts like other industries are 
forced to respond, i.e. , by reducing production in order to achieve a more sustainable 
level of supply. Rather, farmers have maintained the same level of production or 
increased production in order to compensate for lower prices, which pushes prices even 
lower. This has been the perennial "farm problem" that American industry and 
government have not been able to solve. A related problem arises because the failure of a 
farm does not lead to a reduction in the number of producing facilities. Instead, a new 
owner acquires the farming interests and the aggregate size of all American farming 
resources remains static. 
A third factor in this dysfunctional economic model is a high level of government 
regulation of agricultural markets as the government has sought to ameliorate the severe 
losses and overproduction through price controls, farm subsidy programs, and the 
purchase of farm commodity surplus. 




LITERATURE REVIEW OF LEGAL THEMES 
First Amendment Standards of Review 
Turning to the legal sphere, two different First Amendment standards for 
protection of speech governed communications in the United States in 2003. A 
demanding "strict scrutiny" standard for "pure speech" or political speech coexisted with 
a less stringent intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech (referred to as the 
Central Hudson test) outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service 
Commission. 221 
In 1994, the Supreme Court determined in Roberts v. United States Jaycees that 
the strict scrutiny standard is the appropriate standard for cases narrowly focused on 
freedom from compelled association.222 Under this standard, the government can justify 
its regulation by showing that it has " . . . compelling state interests unrelated to the 
suppression of ideas" in the matter underlying the regulation and that these interests 
"cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive."223 
The Abood case, decided in 1977, and the line of cases following its analysis for 
determining cases with mixed issues of freedom from compelled speech and compelled 
association apply a standard of protection for speech that can be characterized as 
intermediate. In these cases, government-compelled speech will pass First Amendment 
scrutiny based on a showing that the government has an "important" interest in a 
collective or associational activity and that the compelled speech is germane to achieving 
221 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
222 See Roberts , 485 U.S. 609 (1984). 
223 Ibid. at 623. 
96 
that legitimate regulatory purpose. The U.S . Supreme Court established this standard in 
the following language of Abood: 
To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining agent might 
well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee' s  freedom 
to associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees 
fit. But the judgment clearly made in Hanson and Street [prior union shop cases] 
is that such interference as exists is constitutionally justified by the legislative 
assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor 
relations established by Congress. [ emphasis added] 224 
This standard was followed in the United States v. United Foods case in 2001 .  The 
Supreme Court stated : ''The features of the marketing scheme found important in 
Glickman are not present in the case now before us." [emphasis added]225 
A description of the level of scrutiny required for an Abood /Keller analysis is 
provided by the dissenting judge in the Gerawan v. Lyons case, decided by the state 
appellate court for the Fifth Appellate District upon remand. 226 The majority opinion in 
this case held that the appropriate level of scrutiny for the checkoff programs under the 
free speech clause of the California State Constitution was an intermediate level 
balancing test based on "whether the asserted governmental interests are sufficiently 
substantial to outweigh the free speech rights of dissenting plum growers. "227 Dissenting 
Judge Herbert I. Levy argued that the Abood/Keller germaneness test should be the 
appropriate standard. In clarifying the Abood/Keller standard, Judge Levy stated: 
Although generally referred to as the 'germaneness test,' it [the Abood/Keller test] 
encompasses more than a determination of whether the speech is relevant to the 
goals of the association. Rather, when a member of a compelled association 
objects to being burdened with particular expenditures, 'the guiding standard must 
be whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred' for 
224 Abood at 222. 
225 United Foods at 2339. 
226 Gerawan v. Lyons, No. F03 1 142 (5th App. Dist., State of Cal. 2001). 
227 Ibid. at 6. 
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the purpose of furthering those goals. ( citing Keller v. State Bar of California, 
496 U.S. at 14) Requiring more than a rational relationship and less than a 
na"owly tailored service of a compelling s'tate interest, this test essentially 
constitutes an intermediate level of scrutiny. Moreover, this analysis is not 
specific to a particular type of speech. Compelled contributions to commercial 
speech, as well as political or ideological speech are subject to this test. ( citing 
United States v. United Foods, 121 S.Ct. at 2339). (Levy, ff.dissenting) 
[ emphasis added] 228 
In its July 8, 2003 opinion holding the beef checkoff unconstitutional, the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the Keller and Abood analysis before applying the 
Central Hudson test. It stated: "In compelled speech cases, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally applied a balancing-of-interests test to determine whether or not the 
challenged governmental action is justified."229 The court cited language by Justice 
Stevens in his concurring opinion in United Foods that recognized compelled funding of 
speech as a subset of compelled speech cases called a "compelled subsidy."230 
The intermediate standard for protection of commercial speech set forth in 
Central Hudson requires that the government demonstrate a substantial interest in the 
subject matter of the regulation. The Supreme Court held that regulation of speech 
impacting economic transactions does not violate the First Amendment if: 
1) it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; 
2) the government interest is substantial; 
3) the regulation advances the governmental interest asserted (i.e. whether there 
is a reasonable fit between a commercial speech regulation and achievement 
of a legitimate policy goal); and 
4) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary.231 
In a subsequent case, 44 Liquorman v. Rhode Island, 232 the Supreme Court 
228 Ibid. at 13-14. 
229 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832 at 16, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13630 (8th Cir. 2003). 
230 Ibid. 
231 Central Hudson at 566. 
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justices were sharply divided over the level of protection to afford truthful commercial 
speech. The court invalidated a Rhode Island law that forbid the advertising of alcohol at 
any location other than within liquor store premises. Writing for a plurality of the 
justices, Justice Stevens expressed the view that special care was warranted in reviewing 
regulations that impose restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages: 
. . . when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading 
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair 
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that 
the First Amendment generally demands.233 
Legal scholars have concluded that this language suggests that a heightened 
degree of intermediate scrutiny be applied to commercial speech cases involving 
regulatory schemes designed to restrict the public from receiving truthful information. 
Seven of the justices agreed that the regulation on advertising failed the Central Hudson 
test, but four of the justices seemed uneasy about applying the test. In this case and later 
cases, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the Court should apply a strict scrutiny 
standard to evaluate the constitutionality of commercial speech. 
The question raised by the 44 Liquonna,rt case is "whether the government should 
be able to suppress truthful advertising in the interest of consumer protection, or whether, 
as some Justices have insisted, truthful advertising should receive exactly the same 
constitutional protection as other speech."234 
The Compelled Commercial Speech Cases 
The Supreme Court decided a case in 1939, United States v. Rock Royal CO-OP, 
232 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 5 17 U.S. 484 (1996). 
233 Ibid. at 501 .  
234 Farber, 159. Professor Farber argued that the "core values" underlying the First Amendment that are 
relevant for other categories of traditionally protected speech are not present to the same extent for 
commercial speech. 
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Inc. , 235 that was a precursor to the checkoff challenge cases that emerged in the late 
1980s. The government initiated the case to collect mandatory fees from several milk 
processors as authorized under the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Act and a subsequent 
milk order. The processors used a three-pronged defense, claiming: 1) their due process 
rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated, 2) the federal government was 
prohibited by the Tenth Amendment from fixing the price of milk prior to its entry in 
interstate commerce, and 3) that the authority given to the Secretary of Agriculture 
violated their property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary's 
authority encompassed activities such as determining market areas, implementing market 
orders based only on the consent of the producers and authorizing bloc voting by farming 
cooperatives. These arguments testing the constitutionality of the milk order garnered the 
support of the district court, but were ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Fifty years passed before the next constitutional test of mandatory commodity 
fees occured in 1989 in the case of United States v. Frame.236 This time the focus was on 
the compelled payment by cattle producers and importers of one dollar per head for use 
in a national beef promotional campaign. The challengers sought a ruling by the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals that the Beef Promotion and Research Act was unconstitutional 
because it exceeded the limits of Congressional authority granted by the Constitution, or 
violated the free speech and association clauses of the First Amendment or violated the 
takings clause or equal protection guarantee of the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. The appellate court held the act was constitutional under the Central 
Hudson test. However, it expressly rejected the government speech argument in its 
235 United States v. Rock Royal CO-OP, _Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939). 
236 Frame at 1 132. 
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decision, stating: " . . .  the underlying rationale of the right to be free from compelled speech or association leads us to conclude that the compelled expressive activities mandated by the Beef Promotion Act are not properly characterized as 'government speech., ,,231 In its first ruling on compelled commercial speech, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.238 delivered a 5-4 decision in 1997, rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a series of agricultural marketing orders imposed by the federal government requiring fruit growers in central California to pay assessments for product advertising. The Court held that the agricultural orders in Glickman (issued by the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States) did not prohibit or compel speech in a manner that raised any First Amendment concerns. Such federal regulations were, therefore, constitutional because they were part of a collective regulatory program and ancillary to a comprehensive scheme restricting marketing autonomy. The Court stated that such federal regulations stabilize commodity markets by collectivizing agricultural supplies. It observed that the mandatory assessments on fruit growers in the Glickman case had the character of economic assessments rather than speech restrictions because they were employed as an integral component of other controls on commodity supplies. In performing this analysis, the Court expressly rejected the Central Hudson analysis (which had been carefully applied by the appellate court) and dismissed the First Amendment free speech claims of the fruit growers. In an oftband statement, the Court noted: 
237 Ibid. at 1 132. 
238 Wileman Bros, 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 101 
"Although respondents have continued in this Court to argue about their 
disagreement with particular messages, those arguments, while perhaps calling 
into question the administration of �ortions of the program, have no bearing on 
the validity of the entire program." 39 
As mentioned in chapter one of this dissertation, the California compelled speech 
case of Gerawan Farming Inc. v. Lyons, 240 decided in 2000, expressed the discontent of 
the California judiciary with the Supreme Court's decision in Glickman. The case arose 
when a fruit grower, Gerawan Farming, Inc., was required to pay more than $80,000 per 
year to comply with the California Plum Marketing Program. More than 55% of these 
funds were used for generic advertising on behalf of all plum growers. This advertising 
reflected viewpoints Gerawan strongly opposed. Gerawan claimed these mandatory 
assessments used for generic advertising constituted a violation of its commercial free 
speech rights under: 1) the First Amendment, which states "Congress shall make no 
law . .. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," and 2) the California 
Constitution, Article I, Section 2, Subdivision (a) which provides "Every person may 
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." 
The fruit grower filed an action against the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture 
and others seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Relying upon the U.S. Supreme Court's 1997 determination in Glickman v. 
Wileman that compelled commercial speech does not raise a First Amendment issue, the 
California Supreme Court (in a 4-3 decision) reluctantly concluded that there was no 
violation of Gerawan's commercial free speech rights under the First Amendment. 
239 
Ibid. at 467-468. 
240 
See Gerawan, 24 Ca. 4th 468 (2000). 
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However, the majority defiantly asserted that the Glickman decision was faulty and 
delivered a scathing criticism of the U.S . Supreme Court's opinion in that case. The 
California Supreme Court found that the conclusion of the Glickman court that the First 
Amendment' s right to freedom of speech does not protect commercial speech against 
compelled funding to be "simply untenable" with respect to Article I of the California 
Constitution.241 It held that the California Plum Marketing Program implicated 
Gerawan' s right to freedom of speech under the free speech clause of the California 
Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. (This was not a finding that 
Gerawan' s rights were violated. Rather, the decision recognized that Gerawan had 
sufficient facts to argue that its rights under the California Constitution may have been 
violated.) The California Supreme Court then sent the case back to the appellate court to 
determine the appropriate standard for evaluating whether the plum checkoff program 
was unconstitutional and to decide whether Gerawan' s commercial speech rights were 
violated. 242 
The California Supreme Court was fully entitled under its state constitution to 
accord greater free speech protection to commercial speech than the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The critical language in this case was nevertheless an open challenge to the U.S .  Supreme 
241 Ibid. at 5 14. 
242 See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, No. F031 142 (5th App. Dist., State of Cal. 2001); available from 
http://www.cfac.org/Attachments/Gerawan_Farming_v_Lyons.html; Internet; accessed 5 July 2003. 
The Fifth Appellate District Court of Appeal of the State of California issued an opinion on December 17, 
2001 ,  that Gerawan's commercial free speech rights under Article I of the California Constitution were 
violated. It applied an intermediate scrutiny balancing test. Ibid. at 6. Since the fruit growers were 
empowered by vote to reject a marketing order program, the court held that, even if the government has a 
substantial interest, in this case it does not matter. It stated: 
The governmental interest in the present form of the program is tenuous and is based on findings of 
necessity that are wholly illusory, for a simple reason: under the current statute, the government is 
forbidden to enact a remedial program no matter how severe an economic crisis arises in the plum 
industry unless a majority of growers wants the program. [emphasis in original] Ibid. at 7. 
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Court to reconsider its ruling in Glickman v. Wileman should an appropriate case or 
controversy reach the court. 
The next compelled commercial speech case came before the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the summer of 2001 ,  seven months after Gerawan. The decision in United States v. 
United Foods, Inc. revealed a Supreme Court making a decided effort to retrench from its 
position in Glickman. The issue was whether mandatory assessments imposed by the 
Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 on members of 
the mushroom industry for industry advertisements violated the First Amendment. The 
Court struck down the government regulation compelling mushroom growers to submit 
mandatory assessments because the primary intent of the regulation was to solicit funds 
for advertising rather than to implement a full regulatory scheme as evidenced by the 
regulations at issue in Glickman. 
The United Foods case showed incremental movement toward broader protection 
against compelled commercial speech. However, it also showed a Supreme Court unable 
to provide clear guidance on how to incorporate the two First Amendment doctrines 
impacting compelled commercial speech - the commercial speech doctrine and the 
doctrine governing freedom from compelled speech and association. 
Many industry groups and their promotion boards who benefit from mandatory 
fees for generic advertising embedded in federal and state regulatory programs expressed 
concern that the United Foods decision would spawn multiple lawsuits that would rock 
the status quo. The groups most concerned filed amicus curie briefs with the Supreme 
Court on behalf of the USDA and the government in United Foods, namely: American 
Mushroom Institute, the American Soybean Association, the National Milk Producers 
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Federation, the Milk Industry Foundation, the United Egg Producers, the United Egg 
Association and National Cattlemen's Beef Association. 
Independent cattle producers in the cattle industry watched the outcome of the 
United Foods case with a vested interest since a favorable Supreme Court ruling on 
mandatory fees (also referred to as "commodity checkoffs") would offer new hope for 
two pending lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of beef checkoff fees imposed on 
cattle producers under the Beef Promotion Research Act and Order. The beef checkoff 
program requires cattle producers to pay a one-dollar fee for each head of cattle sold. 
Enacted in 1986, the legislation channels a huge stream of money ( over two million 
dollars a week by some estimates)243 to the National Cattlemen's Beef Association 
(NCBA), a private organization that represents only three percent of the U.S. cattle 
industry. A Congressional Research Service Report updated on July 11, 2002, reported 
that annual beef assessments are 86 million dollars (a figure less than the two million 
dollars per week). It was reported in 2002 that the NCBA used the checkoffs to fund 
almost 90 percent of its activities, including the promotion of many platforms opposed by 
cattle producers. 244 Some members of the beef industry (primarily the independent cattle 
producers) strongly object to paying the mandatory fees. 
In a show of protest, cattle producers in the year 2000 submitted petitions with 
more than 146,000 signatures (well over the minimum 108,000 signatures required) to the 
USDA demanding a referendum vote on continuing the mandatory fees. The USDA 
243 Bill Mackay, Jr., a lead intervener in the case, has used this figure in various media interviews. See, 
e.g., "Judge Allows Ranchers to Intervene in "Beef Checkoff Lawsuit," Northern Plains Resource Council 
1I 4 (December 21 ,  2001); available from http://www.nprcmt.org/media/2001/PR-AG-Checkoff-Intervenor­
Accepted- 12-20-0l .asp; Internet; accessed 14 May 2002. 244Kari Lydersen, "Farmers Fight Checkoff Rip-Off," AlterNet.org (September 16, 2002); available from 
http://www.alternet.org/story.html?Story1D=l3950; Internet; accessed 6 July 2003. 
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soundly rebuffed their demand on January 17, 2001, by disqualifying more than half of 
the signatures and announcing that no referendum would take place. In response, the 
Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC) and the Livestock Marketing 
Association (LMA) filed a lawsuit in Federal District Court in South Dakota seeking to 
force the USDA to hold a referendum. Defendants included the USDA, the Cattlemen's 
Beef Promotion and Research Board (the group that administers the program) and the 
Nebraska Cattleman, Inc., a group supporting beef checkoffs. This case, described earlier 
in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, has been a success story for the anti-checkoff groups. 
Following the United Foods decision, the District Judge Charles B. Kornmann 
requested that the USDA clarify its position regarding the beef checkoffs. In response, 
the USDA asserted that such checkoffs are constitutional and indicated that it would 
defend such mandatory fees.245 In a bold move on June 21, 2002, the Judge Kornmann 
ruled that the checkoffs and the Beef Promotion Research Act are unconstitutional and 
unenforceable and rejected the defendants' government speech arguments. 246 This 
decision was upheld by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on July 8, 2003. 
In 2002, independent dairy farmers also made a bid also to challenge mandatory 
fee-based promotion programs as violations of First Amendment free speech rights in 
reliance on the Supreme Court' s  decision in United Foods. A Pennsylvania dairy 
farming family, the Cochrans, together with the Center for Individual Freedom, filed a 
suit in U.S. District Court in Scranton, Pennsylvania on April 2, 2002, to protest dairy 
245 ACA Journal, ''Checkoff Challenges Get Complicated " (November 2001); available from 
http://www.chicattle.org/journ/November/chi_checkoff.htm; Internet, accessed 28 April 28, 2002. 246 See Livestock Marketing Association v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. S. Dakota 2002). Also 
see "History of LMA' s Campaign to Obtain a Producer Referendum on the Beef Checkoff," Livestock 
Marketing Association (July 16, 2002) available from http://www.Imaweb.com/Imapress.html; Internet, 
accessed 1 August 2002). 
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checkoffs that pay for speech they do not support, including the popular "Got Milk" 
campaign. 247 The dairy checkoff program brought in over $250,000 million in 2001 
based on an assessment of approximately two cents per gallon.248 On March 24, 2003, 
District Judge John E. Jones, III granted summary judgment to the government 
defendants. 249 He performed an analysis under the United Foods and Glickman cases and 
concluded that the level of regulatory intervention in the dairy industry required a finding 
that the dairy checkoffs were constitutional. The checkoff challengers contend that their 
position as independent milk producers who do not belong to a milk cooperative 
distinguishes them from much of the industry and the courts should evaluate their case 
accordingly. They have filed an appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The United Foods decision holding mandatory assessments for generic 
advertising in the mushroom industry unconstitutional under a finely drawn set of 
conditions created uncertainty for other agricultural programs that also impose mandatory 
assessments. The compelled speech cases on the court dockets in 2003 forced courts to 
immediately begin interpreting United Foods to determine how the distinctions made in 
that case impact commodities checkoffs in the other eleven industries that require them 
pursuant to federally controlled programs. The United Foods ruling has also had an 
impact in 2003 on state programs that assess mandatory generic advertising fees as seen 
247 Complaint, Joseph S. Cochran and Brenda S. Cochran v. USDA (Middle Dist. Penn. 2002) (No. 4:CV-
01-0529), filed April 2, 2002. 
248 A Congressional Research Service Report, updated July 1 1 , 2002, listed an annual assessment of $254 
million for dairy products. Cited in Geoffrey S. Becker, Congressional Research Report for Congress on 
"Federal Farm Promotion ("Check-off') Programs (July 1 1 , 2002) CRS-2; available from 
http://www.dairytrade.com/roundtable7-02/CRS95-353.pdf.; Internet; accessed 22 November 2002. Also 
see Center for Individual Freedom, "Dairy Farmers and Center for Individual Freedom File Suit Against 
Dairy Checkoff' (April 2, 2002) available from 
http://www.cfif.org/5_8_2001/Legal/activities/legal_challenge_file.htm; Internet; accessed 28 April 2002. 
249 See Joseph S. Cochran and Brenda S. Cochran v. USDA, No. 4:CV-01-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4361 (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003). 
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by the decision of a Circuit Court in Florida striking down a mandatory state citrus 
checkoffs. 250 
The compelled commercial speech cases arising from beef checkoffs appear to be 
good candidates for a possible hearing by the Supreme Court in 2004 to determine the 
validity of the government's  claim that commodity checkoffs constitute an extension of 
government speech and are, therefore, constitutional. This argument assumed that 
government speech is immune from First Amendment scrutiny, a position that has been 
vigorously refuted by the First Amendment challengers in two pending cases in federal 
courts in Montana and South Dakota. Compelled payments for generic advertising, the 
challengers argued, are part of programs that are industry-funded, self-directed and 
producer-driven, contrary to the claim by the Department of Justice that such programs 
are a function of the government. Moreover, they asserted that the government's  position 
fails even if the mandatory assessments are deemed to be government speech, since the 
courts must apply the same First Amendment scrutiny to a forced subsidy of speech 
whether the speech is by an industry promotion board or the government. The district 
court in Montana accepted the government speech argument while the district court in 
South Dakota rejected it (a decision upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals).25 1 
This raises the potential for conflicting decisions by the respective appellate courts of the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits . 
250 See State of Fla., Dept. of Citrus v. Graves Brothers Company, Tampa Juice Services, et al. , No. 
2DO03-2276, 2nd Dist. Ct. of App., Florida. 
251 See Livestock Marketing Association v. United States, 207 F.Supp. 2d 992 (D.S. Dakota, 2002), 
Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8th 
Cir. 2003) and Jeanne Charter and Steve Charter v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1 121 (D. Montana 
2002). 
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In 2003, the Sixth Circuit considered the constitutionality of the pork checkoffs in 
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, a case argued on March 14, 
2003. Other Federal and state courts have rendered decisions at a furious pace in the 
early months of 2003 on the constitutionality of four other agricultural commodities: 
grapes, apples, citrus and alligators. 
In Delano Farms Company, et al. v. California Table Grape Commission,252 the 
challengers, who produce and sell branded table grapes, objected to compelled payments 
for generic advertising of grapes that undermined their branded advertising. The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the fact situation hued closely to the United Foods 
case and that First Amendment rights of the grape growers were, therefore, at issue. 
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the district court' s decision granting dismissal 
of the grape growers'constitutionality claim. The case is now before the district court 
again awaiting trial. 
In the case of In Re Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 253 decided on 
March 14, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a 
preliminary injunction to apple producers who challenged the Washington state apple 
checkoff program. The court expressly rejected the government speech argument. The 
Commission, responsible for prompting this legal action as a means of confirming the 
constitutionality of its mandatory assessment program, closed down its offices after the 
ruling. 
252 Delano Farms Company et al. v. California Table Grape Commission, No. 00-16778 (9th Cir. 2003). 
253 In Re Washington Apple Advertising Commission, No. CS-01-0278-EFS (E.D. Wa. 2003). 
109 
On March 31, 2003, a citrus checkoff (called a "box tax") was held unconstitutional in a consolidated case before the Florida Tenth Judicial Circuit Court.254 The Circuit Court held that the generic advertising did not constitute government speech despite the fact that the State of Florida ran the promotional program. It struck down the box tax based on an analysis based on the United Foods and Glickman cases. The Department of Citrus for the State of Florida has filed an appeal. Lastly, the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana struck down alligator checkoffs compelling alligator farmers to fund generic promotional programs that did not recognize type, quality or brand of alligator products. In its analysis, the court distinguished the alligator checkoff program from the marketing orders in the 
Glickman case. It rejected the government speech argument because of the "close nexus between the alligator producers and the message funded."255 Judge John V. Parker closed his opinion granting summary judgment to the alligator growers with the following statements: The undersigned admits to a certain degree of difficulty in maintaining an appropriately straight judicial face while attempting to apply the Supreme Court precepts that explain the simple language of the First Amendment to the alligator advertising program at issue here. When important constitutional issues must be resolved by a determination of whether an alligator is more like a mushroom than a peach, then in the words of Justice Thomas: 'Surely we have lost our way.' (citing Glickman, 521 U.S. at 506 (Thomas J., dissenting)).256 The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
254 
State of Fla., Dept. of Citrus v. Graves Brothers Company, Tampa Juice Services, et al. , No. 2DO03-
2276, 2nd Dist. Ct. of App., Florida. 
255 
Pelts & Skins, LLC. v. James Jenkins, Jr., Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 
Fisheries,No. 02-384-A, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7014, 21-22 (Middle Dist. Louisiana 2003). 
256 Ibid. at 34. 110 
The "Government Speech" Counter-Argument 
In the pending compelled commercial speech cases, the United States government 
has advanced the argument that its mandatory assessments constitute "government 
speech" that is not subject to First Amendment challenge or scrutiny.257 The challengers 
have countered by arguing that the industry trade associations and commodity boards 
administer the commodity assessment programs; therefore, the speech involved in the 
generic advertising cannot fall within the realm of government speech. Even if the 
speech is deemed "government speech," the challengers argue that it would fail to pass 
First Amendment scrutiny under either the current Supreme Court standard for First 
Amendment protection of commercial speech (i.e., the Central Hudson standard)258 or 
under the standard for protection from compelled speech or compelled association 
(established in Abood and later cases).259 
What is government speech? In laying the groundwork for his analysis of 
government participation in communication networks, Professor Mark Yudof provided 
this comprehensive description of government expression that falls within the parameter 
of government speech: 
Government speech here will include organized (local, state, and federal) 
governments ' efforts to communicate symbols, ideas, information, perceptions, 
and values to the citizenry. Overlapping this public rhetoric, and difficult to 
disentangle from it, are the private utterances of government officials. Also 
troubling is the problem of distinguishing propaganda or indoctrination from 
information or education. The modes and types of government discourse include 
time-honored methods as well as those provided by modem technology: direct 
257 The United States Department of Agriculture raised the defense of government speech in its arguments 
before the Supreme Court in United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). The court declined to 
rule on the defense since the government had failed to assert and argue it in a timely manner in the lower 
court proceedings. In all compelled commercial speech cases since United Foods, the USDA has asserted 
the government speech defense. 
258 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
259 See Abood, 43 1 U.S. 209 (1977). 
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access to the broadcast media, mass distribution of documents, speeches and other 
activities of political leaders reported in the private media, the gathering and 
dissemination of statistics and research results, advertising, preparation and 
dissemination of official reports, activities of government public-relations offices, 
dissemination of official records of governmentiroceedings, press conferences, 
public schooling, military training, and so on."2 
The courts in an increasing number of cases involving the government speech 
doctrine are fleshing out a working legal definition of "government speech." The concept 
of government speech is based on an assumption that there is a need for a democratic 
government to inform its citizens about its business in order to accomplish its 
Constitutional purposes, including actions taken under its power to regulate. The 
Supreme Court has established the broad principle that the government generally may 
expend funds through "speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own 
policies."261 It has further held that when the government speaks through its officials or 
through the expenditure of public funds, it has the broad power to determine what 
message and viewpoint it will convey.262 A government can occupy many roles when it 
"speaks" as it relays government speech that explains, persuades and justifies policies 
and preferences. If the government is purposefully acting as a speaker with an identified 
message which is reasonably understood by those receiving it to be a government 
message, then such action should fit within the concept of government speech. 
On the other hand, if the agents purportedly representing the government have not 
been hired or formally recognized as acting on behalf of the government, there is no 
government speech. Moreover, if the government's expression of an idea is obscured 
260 Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics, Law and Government Expression in America 
(Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 13. 
261 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 ( 1995). 
262 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
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behind the veil of other actors or the decision to distribute an idea is accompanied by an 
effort to override the market's distribution system for the expression of ideas (e.g., 
traditional advertising channels or press releases by private industry), then government 
speech is suspect. Citizens can resort to collective political action to reject an 
unacceptable government idea only if they know the government is speaking. 263 
The "government speech" argument has been asserted as a defensive strategy by 
government in pending legal actions involving compelled commercial speech. In 
addition, industry trade associations and others who have aligned themselves with the 
government in these actions have directly and indirectly supported the concept. As an 
example, in March of 2002, fifteen agricultural trade associations were thwarted in their 
efforts to gain statutory recognition for "government speech" for commodity checkoffs 
when Congress failed to respond to their request to expand the 2002 Farm Bill to include 
language declaring that all checkoff-related advertising qualifies as government 
speech.264 
The USDA's position that government speech is protected is based on the 
principle that the government has a right to be a contributor to the marketplace of ideas. 
Therefore, the traditional interpretation of the First Amendment as a restraint on 
government is loosened to allow the government to exercise a voice. This is a practical 
as well as a doctrinal principle, since the government must often have the capacity to act 
as a speaker to express its policy preferences and to conduct business. However, as 
263 See Randall P. Bezanson and William G. Buss, "The Many Faces of Government Speech," Iowa Law 
Review 86 (2001): 1377-15 1 1 .  
264 Center for Individual Freedom, "Commodity Groups Attempt End Run Around Courts in Checkoff 
Battle," (May 8, 2002) available from 
http://www.cfif.org/5_8_2001/Free_line/current/backdoor_ploy.html; Internet; accessed 1 August 2002. 
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Professor Yudof noted, ''The advancement of policy objectives through communications 
activities and the provision of information almost invariably advances the interests of 
those in power."265 The inherent ris� is that the government has the resources to become 
a powerful voice that can be used to muffle or silence other voices as well as legitimately 
express its views on policy.266 
In the compelled commercial speech cases, the government has asserted that it has 
assumed the role of speaker in the mandatory commodity assessment cases due to the 
level of oversight that it exercises. It has relied upon the case of Lebron v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp.,261 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1995, to support its position. 
The case arose when Amtrak denied Michael Lebron the right to display an 
advertisement on a billboard at the main entrance to Amtrak's Pennsylvania Station in 
New York City. He sued claiming that his First Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights 
had been violated. Lebron argued that Amtrak, as a government-created corporation, 
should be deemed a government entity for purposes of First Amendment rights. The U.S .  
Supreme Court agreed with Lebron, stating that when "the Government creates a 
corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for 
itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the 
corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment. "268 The 
265 Yudof, 17 1 .  
266 See Randall P. Bezanson, ''The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech 
Selection Judgments," Iowa Law Review 83 (August 1998): 953-994, 992. 
267 Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 5 13 U.S. 374 ( 1995). 
268 Ibid. at 400. 
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Court reached this conclusion by determining that the government had created Amtrak to 
further its objectives and retained control over its operations.269 
The government has relied on Lebron to argue that the checkoff commissions and 
boards are government actors and the generic advertising they produce is government 
speech. It has advanced a three-point argument that such governing groups are created 
by Congressional acts to achieve government objects, the Secretary of Agriculture 
exercises control in appointing and removing board members, and the USDA exercises 
control over the messages in the checkoff-funded generic advertising. 270 In response, the 
anti-checkoff challengers have pointed out: 1)  Amtrak was subsidized with public funds 
in 1995 and still receives public funds today, and 2) the Lebron case was concerned with 
whether Amtrak was a government entity for purposes of addressing a restraint of speech 
claim, whereas the checkoff cases deal with claims that First Amendment rights have 
been violated by compelled support for objectionable speech. They argued that Lebron 
cannot serve as precedent since that case did not address "whether Amtrak would be 
considered government if Amtrak had tried to claim Mr. Lebron's  speech as its own, or 
had compelled Mr. Lebron to pay for a message he despise."271 
The government's claim of extensive oversight has been disputed by the 
challengers in light of the many years that the program has been characterized and 
operated as a "self-directed" industry program. The trade groups and the USDA are 
aligned within the dominant hegemony, but their interests appear to be at odds in the 
269 Ibid. at 398. 
27° Final Brief for the Federal Apr,llants at 39-40, Michigan Pork Producers, et al v. Campaign for Family 
Farms, et al. v. Ann Veneman (6 Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2337 and 02-2338), filed February 4, 2003. 
271 Final Brief for the Appellees at 5, Michigan Pork Producers, et al v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al. 
v. Ann Veneman (6th Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2337 and 02-2338), filed February 6, 2003. 
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event that the government speech defense is fully accepted by the courts. If the argument 
is recognized, centralized government control over the commodity programs would 
appear to reduce the autonomous decision-making regarding commercial messages that is 
currently enjoyed by the industry boards and associations. 
Government speech has come under increasing scrutiny as an abridgment of the 
rights of others under the First Amendment. Scholars have concluded that the 
government crosses the line in abridging such rights in several ways. A 1998 law review 
article succinctly summarized this as follows: 
When government expression seriously inhibits competing speech, 
monopolizes the opportunity for exchange of ideas, or deceives the audience as to 
its truth or its origins, government's expression functions effectively as a 
regulation of other, usually private, speech, and is thus subject to the fullest 
panoply of First Amendment limitations.272 
The evidence obtained in connection with this paper is expected to show that the 
current challenges to government speech are related to the government's expanded use of 
speech and its adoption of new forms of speech. In addition, the courts are recognizing 
new types of First Amendment claims, which creates a climate for testing doctrine. With 
respect to the hegemonic struggle over compelled commercial speech, the doctrine of 
government speech may represent a blatant effort to exercise industry control. 
What Do the Compelled Commercial Speech Cases Represent? 
The first section of this literature review presented a theoretical perspective of 
Gramsci' s hegemony and Galbraith's concept of countervailing power. Subsequent 
sections provided details that build a cultural, political, economic and social context for 
272 Ibid. 
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examining the thesis of this dissertation. The diagram identified as Figure 4 illustrates the 
various ways in which the compelled commercial speech cases represent opportunities, 
conflicts, threats, judicial actions or failure to act, trends and other meanings in the three 
spheres of importance that intersect to form the zone of conflict. 
With regard to First Amendment doctrine regarding commercial speech, the line 
of cases can be viewed as representing a consistent effort by certain individuals or groups 
to reduce or eliminate advertising regulations, Supreme Court inconsistency and struggle 
to interpret First Amendment doctrine regarding commercial speech ( characterized by 
uncertainty and missed opportunities to clarify existing standards or develop new 
standards for protection of commercial speech), a slow trend toward expanding the 
protection for commercial speech, and a judicial balancing of free speech values with 
commercial nature of speech and the need for regulation. 
Viewed from the perspective of First Amendment doctrine regarding freedom 
from compelled speech and compelled association, the cases represent an effort to stop 
mandatory payment of fees that are used for speech considered objectionable or for 
activities that force unwanted affiliation. They also represent an expansion of the 
principles found in the union dues cases and other cases to a new subject of conflict 
(compelled commercial speech) and a balancing of free speech values against the need 
for collective dues and fees. 
In the agricultural sphere, the cases represent first and foremost the extreme 
dissatisfaction of individuals and groups with commodity system programs. Such parties 
are using the courts to vent their frustration and seek judicial results consistent with their 
positions. These cases represent a conflict of interest between dominant and minority 
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First mendment 
Doctrine Re: Freedom 
From Compelled Speech and 
Compelled Association 
First Amendment compelled 
commercial speech cases represent: 
I .  Effort to stop mandatory payment of fees that 
are used for speech and/or affiliation considered 
objectionable 
2. Expansion of union dues cases and subsequent 
student fee cases by analogy to new subject of 
conflict 
3. Balancing of free speech values vs. need for 
collective dues and fees 
Hegemony in Agricultura 
Commodity Checkoff System 
First Amendment Doctrine 
Re: Commercial Speech 
First Amendment compelled commercial 
speech cases represent: 
I .  Extreme dissatisfaction of individuaV 
groups with commodity checkoffs 
2. Conflict of interests 
3. Effort to fight vertical integration and 
concentration in agriculture 
4. For the challengers· Only way to be 
heard and make impact 
For the dominant heaemony· 
Annoyance and financial drain 
First Amendment compelled 
commercial speech cases represent: 
I .  Effort to reduce or eliminate advertising 
regulations 
Supreme Court inconsistency and struggle 
to interpret Fitst Amendment doctrine re: 
commercial speech 
A. Court UOCOl1linty 
B. Missed opportunities rodarify existinJ 
.-andards or ffYefop new standard� 
Slow trend toward c.xpanding First 
Amendment commercial speech doctrine 
Balancing free speech \'alUCS VS. 
commercial nature of speech and 
need for regulations 
In the "zone of conflict," the First Amendment compelled 
commercial speech cases represent: 
1 .  Hegemonic struggle between competing interests in agricultural and legal spheres. 
A. Challen&ers: Cases represent realistic chance of success with new resources 
and favorable case law. Success is equated with protecting free speech rights 
and creating a barrier for increased vertical integration and concentration in 
the agricultural industry. 
B. Dominate Hegemony: Cases represent threat to power and status quo. 
C. Other Activist Participants: Cases represent opportunity to expand First 
Amendment rights. 
2. Judicial and doctrinal tension regarding what standards to apply in analyzing the 
constitutionality of check off programs. 
Figure 4 Representations Inherent in First Amendment Compelled 
Commercial Speech Cases 
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groups. More specifically, they represent an effort by the challengers to fight vertical 
integration and concentration in agriculture. The challengers perceive legal mechanisms 
the only way to be heard or to have an impact. Historically, the dominant hegemony was 
annoyed by the inconvenience and cost incurred by responding to the persistent 
challengers. Their response has changed as the courts have incorporated changes in First 
Amendment doctrine more favorable to the challengers and the zone of conflict has 
created a serious legal challenge for the dominant parties in the agricultural hegemony. 
In the zone of conflict, the stakes have become high and the battle fierce, primarily 
because the challengers are now brandishing new decisions in their favor and are 
receiving some help from activist and trade groups. The First Amendment compelled 
speech cases in this zone represent a genuine counter-hegemony for the challengers with 
a strong potential for success. In addition to more favorable case law, the challengers 
appear to have intellectual and moral leadership, components identified by Gramsci as 
necessary for realizing success as a counter-hegemony. On the other hand, these cases 
signify a threat to the dominant hegemony, now facing the possibility of curtailment of 
funds and, as a result, less power to act. Other legal and activist organizations and 
entities may view the cases as opportunities to expand First Amendment rights in 
commercial speech or possibly to serve as one link in a larger strategical effort to protect 




Theoretical Perspectives as Organizing Generalizations for Research 
The theoretical perspectives of hegemony and countervailing power (as 
supplemented by an overall understanding of the state theories of Marxism and Neo­
Pluralism) informed the process of gathering evidence and analysis required in this study. 
These theories facilitated an overall organization of evidence into four major subsets: 
1) information that explains the dominant hegemony of commodity checkoffs in 
the agricultural industry (including history, justifications, legislation and its 
proponents, interests of State institutions and industry monopolies or oligopolies, 
public and private policy agendas, etc.); 
2) information that clarifies the position of the minority challengers in seeking 
counter-hegemony or countervailing power to prevent exploitation (history of 
their efforts, characteristics of the challengers, nature of their platform, economic 
and political goals they are seeking to achieve, exploitation they are seeking to 
prevent, etc.); 
3) key externalities that affect the first two subsets, such as changes in the 
agricultural industry (vertical integration in industry sectors, increasing 
concentration in ownership, globalization of agricultural markets, etc.) and 
changes in First Amendment doctrine; and 
4) evidence that explores the existing case law on commercial speech and 
compelled speech and compelled association (consistency in applying standards 
and predictive value of the cases); and 
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5) evidence that pertains to legal and political consequences of various judicial 
outcomes (including implications for the public interest, the agricultural industry 
and the freedom of commercial expression). 
The analysis phase focused on identifying the relationships and the cooperation 
and/or conflicts within each individual subset and between the subsets. The investigative 
frame shown in the chart at Figure 4 was used as a tool in facilitating such analysis. The 
approach outlined in this chart guides the researcher in analyzing the relationships 
between key evidence within each of the four subsets outlined above, specifically seeking 
to discover links between the hegemonic conflicts related to political and economic 
differences and the legal manifestation of the interests at stake in the courts. 
Research Methods 
One method used in this study is a traditional legal analysis of federal cases 
relating to compelled commercial speech and government speech. However, the 
researcher breaks away from the conventional approach of studying the subject strictly 
through legal analysis of judicial opinions by seeking to collect data that will afford a 
richer analysis of the political and economic interests driving the participants in the legal 
process and defining their communication strategies in the short-term and in the future. 
The initial phase of this study is exploratory. It requires the researcher to follow 
an historiographical approach for gathering data and assimilating evidence from primary 
sources. The beginning period for collection of evidence is the date on which the 
interests of the key entities can first be publicly identified (rather than the date on which 
the first legal action arose). Obtaining evidence related to the social, political and 
economic contexts surrounding each entity's early and ongoing involvement in the 
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compelled commercial speech debate is a research goal. This includes evidence on policies and events that have formed the basis for specific legal claims. Telephone interviews serve as a viable primary source of evidence for understanding the conditions of the current hegemonic agricultural environment and the respective interests driving the current compelled speech litigation. The following research methods were employed in carrying out this study: 
1) Analysis of primary legislative documents a) Legislation and annotations (used to identify political parties and elected officials in opposition or support of beef checkoffs) b) Transcripts of hearings, committee activities c) Public comments d) Proposed bills (identify political party and elected officials in support) 
2) Analysis of primary legal and judicial documents a) U.S. Supreme Court cases and lower Federal Court cases b) State Supreme Court cases and lower state court cases c) Briefs submitted by parties to the cases d) Amicus curie briefs by other interested parties 
3) Analysis of primary federal and state agency documents: a) Regulatory rulings of United States Department of Agriculture b) Regulatory rulings of State Agencies c) Published public comments d) Reports by agency task forces or committees 
122 
4) Analysis of Reports of Agricultural Commodity Promotion Boards and 
Commissions 
5) Review of generic advertising 
6) Review of Secondary Print and Electronic Information and Evidence on 
Checkoffs 
a) Law review articles 
b) Periodical and newspaper articles (Successful Farming) 
c) Books on mandatory assessments 
d) Newsletters/electronic articles published by trade associations 
e) Newsletters/electronic articles published by activist groups (Free 
speech rights groups and environmental groups) 
f) Websites/publications of federal and state agencies 
g) Websites/publications of associations supporting checkoffs or the 
dominant hegemony 
h) Websites/publications of associations challenging checkoffs or the 
minority against the dominant hegemony 
7) Interviews 
The study sought to gather evidence from a representative group of individuals 
belonging to the categories listed below: 
a) Commodity producers who are named parties in compelled speech 
lawsuits 
b) Non-litigant commodity producers supporting checkoffs 
c) Non-litigant commodity producers opposed to checkoffs 
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d) Attorneys representing parties in compelled speech lawsuits 
e) Attorneys and representatives of legal organizations and activist groups 
t) Agricultural agency officials and representatives 
g) Recognized agribusiness experts (academic and industry specialists) 
Sample interview questions are attached as Appendix D. 
8) Review of Literature on Theoretical Ideas Included in D issertation 
a) Books 
b) Print and electronic articles 
Mode of Analysis 
Court decisions on commercial speech and communications are a visible 
representation of the political and economic interests of other entities. The thrust of this 
study was to obtain evidence and perform a descriptive analysis that would: 1 )  show the 
relationship between the law on compelled commercial speech and the underlying critical 
interests of other key entities seeking to maximize their positions (Phase I analysis); and 
2) identify the consequences, including the role of speech and communications in the 
industrial, economic and political environments, occasioned by different legal resolutions 
on compelled commercial speech (Phase II analysis). Gramsci's ideas on hegemony and 
Galbraith's theory of countervailing power were used to create a fundamental framework 
for interpreting the evidence. 
Phase I Analysis. Table 1 shows an "investigative frame" that was used as a 
guide in conducting the Phase I analysis. The information inserted in the chart was based 
on preliminary research and included for illustrative purposes. The final content of the 





Investigative Frame for Analysis of Connections Between Key 
Economic and Political Interests and Decisions of the Federal 









Principle Level Legal 
Level 
-
Federal and Legislative Dollars Mandatory fees for 1 Checkoffs are 
State granting compelled constitutional. authority Industry alliances commercial speech is 
1 Agencies I and support not a free speech Satisfied with Pattern of 
Political actions taken in Bureaucratic past structure and jobs 
Parties and 
Elected Individuals and , Government 
Officials groups playing control major roles I Interest in Stable commodities market 
Interest in expanding market for commodities 
I i 
I 
Industry Manner in Dollars 
Trade which trade organizations Government 
Organizations and boards have alliances and functioned in the support 
Agricultural past Organizational 
Commodity Actions structure and jobs 
I Boards demonstrating 
i effectiveness or Organizational weakness ' control 
I 
I Interest in stable commodities 
! market 
Interest in expanding market for commodities 
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issue (involves only economic regulation). 
Generic advertising funded by checkoff money is "government speech" not subject to First 
i Amendment scrutiny. 
Economic regulation is needed to protect public from defective products/unstable 
1 commodities market. 
Checkoffs are needed to create consumer demand for commodities and to support education I and research. 
I 
I Not a First Amendment issue 
Support claim that generic advertising is "government speech" 
Aggressive lobbying is viable option to get Congressional recognition of checkoffs as "government speech" 
Checkoffs are needed to create consumer demand for commodities and to support education and research 
Glickman v. 
Wileman (1997) which upheld the checkoffs as 
1 economic , 
1 regulation within a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
Supreme Court in 
Glickman said there was no First Amendment issue. 
Dissatisfied with 
U.S. v. United 
Foods (2001) in which the Supreme 
1 Court struck down the mushroom checkoffs. 
Checkoffs are constitutional 
Government speech is immune from First Amendment scrutiny 
Satisfied with 
Glickman decision 
Aligned with the I government in these cases 
Dissatisfied with the United Foods case striking down mushroom checkoffs 
Table 1 (Continued) 
- - -
Entities History Interests at Principle Level Legal 
Stake Level 
-
Commodity Record of Dollars to Not a Frrst Satisfied with 
1 Producers for cooperation and communicate Amendment issue Glickman decision conflicts with collective in favor of 
Mandatory other producers messages . Support "government checkoffs I 
Assessments within the speech" argument 
(Defending industry Alliances with , Aligned with the major purchasers Aggressive lobbying government in 
Hegemony) · of commodities is viable option to get these cases 
Congressional 
Interest in stable recognition of Dissatisfied with 
commodities checkoffs as the United Foods 
market "government speech" case striking down 
the mushroom 
Interest in Checkoffs are needed checkoffs I 
expanding sales of for promotion, 
commodities education, research 
; Commodity History of how Dollars to Commodity Commodity 
Producers the minority : communicate producers should not checkoffs are groups independent be compelled to fund unconstitutional 
Against developed messages commercial speech violations of the 
Mandatory awareness of the with which they First Amendment. I 
Assessments issues Interest in product disagree. I differentiation Even if generic ads 
(Opposing Past efforts by Checkoff programs are government 
Hegemony) minority groups Interest in are self-directed with speech, the 
to achieve participating in a government checkoff programs 
counter- commodities oversight, so generic do not pass First 
Activist hegemony 1 market free from advertising is not Amendment 
Groups compelled speech government speech. scrutiny. 
· (Seeking free 
Nature of regulation 
support by Industry trade United Foods case 
speech and activist groups Interest in making organizations and provides legal 
other goals) unique agricultural grounds for 
contributions and commodity 1 challenges by 
sales in the promotion boards are members of the 
commodities using checkoff fruit, mushroom, 
market moneys in ways beef, pork and 
1 detrimental to the ' milk industries. 
. Interest in fighting interest of those 
the industrial commodity producers United Foods case 
agriculture model paying the fees. recognizes First 
of agriculture I Am. right not to be 
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Development of doctrines and · principles in cases dealing with: 
1) commercial speech, 
2) freedom from compelled speech and association, 
3) government speech, and 
4) compelled commercial speech. 
Stake Level 
- - -
Implementation of In prior cases, the Glickman v. the First Supreme Court Wileman held Amendment of the indicated it was there was no need Constitution of the uncomfortable with to apply First United States the current standard Amendment for protection of 1 scrutiny to the Constitutional commercial speech checkoff programs norms so it had an incentive since they were 
, to avoid applying the economic Institutional commercial speech regulations. obligations doctrine if another approach was Programs were Cost to available. constitutional governmental because they were interests The Supreme Court part of a broader defers to legislative , regulatory scheme. Judicial 1 branch if the Court 
1 manageability and can apply a narrow Court specifically enforceability construction to a sidestepped a statutory issue to commercial speech Substantive justice avoid constitutional analysis. conflict. Democratic . U.S. Supreme acceptability given Strong criticism of Court moved away reasonable the Glickman from the Glickman disagreement decision prompted position in U.S. v. careful reassessment United Foods by of First Amendment applying a First 
I doctrine in United Amendment 
! Foods. analysis and holding mushroom California State checkoffs Supreme Court unconstitutional. disagreed with the 
Glickman case and The Court recognized distinguished 
I commodity checkoffs United Foods from as violation of free Glickman because speech rights under the mushroom the California checkoff program Constitution. was created in stand-alone . legislation. 
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Phase II Analysis. What are the consequences of legal decisions regarding 
compelled commercial speech? This phase of the analysis focused on the future role of 
speech and communications in the industrial, economic and political environments under 
four different legal resolutions: 
1) Mandatory commodity assessments are held constitutional when they 
are part of a broader regulatory scheme; 
2) Mandatory commodity assessments are held unconstitutional and a 
violation of the First Amendment regardless of the regulatory scheme 
in which they reside; 
3) Mandatory commodity assessments are constitutional regulations not 
protected by the First Amendment; and 
4) Mandatory commodity assessments are constitutional as they are 
within the "government speech" exception to the First Amendment. 
Traditional legal analysis was used (see list of criteria for analyzing compelled 
commercial speech cases attached as Appendix C) along with a critical review of relevant 
evidentiary materials listed earlier in this methodology section. In addition, a legal 
investigative frame was used as a structured means to identify and analyze key elements 
of the cases and legal proceedings that form the body of law related to First Amendment 
challenges of the checkoff programs. The five areas covered by the legal investigative 
frame included: 1) the cases, the parties and the courts that have rendered decisions on 
checkoffs; 2) the history of factual and legal developments underlying each case; 3) the 
interests at stake for the presiding federal or state judges and the legal institutions in 
which they serve; 4) the opinions and legal doctrines or principles on which such 
opinions are based; and 5) the status of each case and its relevance with regard to the line 
of cases on compelled commercial speech. A summary of the legal investigative frame is 
provided in chapter eight of this dissertation. In addition, an annotated list of the cases 
included in the investigative frame is provided in Appendix B. 
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Conclusion This study was expected to show a climate ripe for hegemonic change in the agricultural industry driven by economic and political changes that are creating a profound "season of discontent" much broader than the compelled commercial speech issue. Parallel winds of change in the development of First Amendment doctrine have coincided with changes in the agricultural industry to elevate this particular issue as a platform for the challengers. First Amendment rights is their cause, but agricultural autonomy may be their quest. The resolution of the First Amendment issue regarding the appropriate level of protection for compelled commercial speech is expected to cause ripples affecting economic, political and social institutions that are impacted by the way in which commercial speech may be regulated. Strategies for communication by private business will undergo change, and relationships and foundations for authority between government agencies and private institutions will be impacted. The public will need to assess its assumptions about the commercial messages that it receives and their legi�imacy. Change in agricultural hegemony and the First Amendment doctrine are expected to be a key theme of this study. In writing his thoughts about Justice Holmes in 193 1, Harold Laski characterized the esteemed jurist' s  approach to change as follows: The conservative believes that change is erroneous and undesirable; the radical insists that it is necessary and urgent. Mr. Justice Holmes simply urges that since change is inevitable, we must frovide for its coming and see to it that the game is played in terms of the rules. 27 
273 Harold J. Laski, "Mr. Justice Holmes," ed., Felix Frankfurter, in Mr. Justice Holmes (New York: 
Coward-McCann, 193 1), quoted in Roberta Kevelson, The Law as a System of Signs (New York: Plenum 
Press, 1988), 203. 129 
A critical question in the compelled commercial speech conflict is "Whose 
rules?" Has the hegemony created by the commodity checkoffs and other agricultural 
developments created an environment where rules of dominance prevail over traditional 
rules for processing minority dissents and respecting the autonomy of market 
participants? Is the issue of compelled commercial speech simply a representation of the 
hegemonic battle to establish new rules? This dissertation used critical research to 
examine these questions in investigating the central thesis of this paper, i.e., that the 
challengers are using the Courts and the First Amendment as a mechanism to break the 
current hegemony of commodity checkoffs and establish countervailing power. 
In view of the checkoff cases before the courts in 2003 in the Third, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits, it is certain that the U.S. Supreme Court will have the 
opportunity to address the constitutional dilemma of how to apply First Amendment 
doctrine to compelled commercial speech sometime in 2003 or 2004. The evidence, 
analysis and conclusions of this dissertation has added to the current literature by 
providing a holistic analysis of the political, social and economic elements underlying the 
compelled commercial speech cases and advancing some implications for Supreme Court 




The research method for this dissertation required the identification and study of 
primary legislative, legal and judicial documents, published cases, official reports of 
administrative boards and commissions, generic advertising, and secondary evidence in 
print and electronic format. In addition, in-depth interviews with participants 
knowledgeable and involved in commodity checkoff programs were conducted. The goal 
was to solicit the understandings and opinions of participants regarding: the impact of 
these programs; the agricultural industry environment; the political, economic, and legal 
interests of the individuals and entities involved in the legal conflicts; the relationships of 
power and control that determine the way in which commodity checkoffs are allocated 
and used; and key arguments and positions involved in the legal conflicts. 
Individuals representing divergent views and opposing philosophies generously 
gave their time and shared their observations and insights in telephone interviews that 
helped piece together the puzzle of the legal conflicts over commodity checkoff 
programs. Those who provided interviews on an attribution basis include: 
1) John Bunting - Dairy farmer in Delaware County, New York,. writer for The 
Milkweed, a dairy newspaper produced in print and on-line from Wisconsin;274 
2) Mike Callicrate - Beef producer in St. Francis, Kansas, plaintiff in three legal 
actions (one involving checkoffs and two involving antitrust actions against meat 
packing companies );275 
274 John Bunting, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 2 May 2003, transcript on file with author [hereinafter 
"Bunting interview"] . 
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3) Jeanne Charter - Cattle producer in Shepherd, Montana (plaintiff in legal action 
currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Steven and Jeanne 
Charter v. USDA);216 
4) Joseph and Brenda Cochran - Dairy farmers in Scranton, Pennsylvania (plaintiffs 
in legal action currently pending before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 
Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. USDA);277 
5) Enrique E. Figueroa, Ph.D. - Director, Roberto Hernandez Center at University 
of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; former Administrator of the United States 
Agricultural Marketing Service;278 
6) Renee Giachino, J.D - General Counsel for Center for Individual Freedom, 
Alexandria, VA (an activist organization promoting individual rights, also a 
plaintiff in a beef checkoff case and a dairy checkoff case);279 
7) Daniel Glickman - Former Secretary of U.S. Department of Agriculture, Director, 
Harvard University Institute of Politics, Cambridge, Massachusetts;280 
8) Erik Jaffe, J.D. - Constitutional lawyer in Washington, D.C., law clerk for 
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas at the time Glickman v. Wileman was 
decided, legal counsel for plaintiffs in beef checkoff case, Steven and Jeanne 
275 Mike Callicrate, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 20 March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Calli crate interview"] . 
276 Jeanne Charter, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 20 February 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Charter interview"]. 
m Joseph and Brenda Cochran, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 3 May 2003, transcript on file with 
author [hereinafter "Cochran interview"] . 
278 Enrique Figueroa, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 2 March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Figueroa interview"] .  
279 Renee Giachino, telephone interview by Retha J .  Martin, 12 February 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Giachino interview"] .  
280 Daniel Glickman, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 25 March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Glickman interview"]. 
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Charter v. USDA (currently pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals );
281 
9) Harry Kaiser, Ph.D. - Director, Cornell Commodity Promotion Research 
Program, Professor, Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell 
University, Ithaca, New York; 282 
10) Kathleen Merrigan, Ph.D.- Director, Agriculture, Food and Environment 
Program, Gerald J. and Dorothy R. Friedman School of Nutrition Science and 
Policy at Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts; former Administrator of the 
United States Agricultural Marketing Service (replacing Enrique Figueroa);283 
1 1) David Moeller, J.D. - Counsel for Farmers' Legal Action Group Incorporated, St. 
Paul, Minnesota (a coalition of groups representing the interests of family farmers 
and independent livestock producers);2
84 
12) Doug O'Brien, J.D. - Agriculture Legislative Assistant for Senator Tom Harkin, 
Washington, D.C.; former legal specialist with USDA Packer and Stockyards 
Administration, former associate legal counsel for Organization for Competitive 
Markets, clerked for Iowa Supreme Court Justice (Note: Senator Harkin is the 
ranking Democratic member of Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry, U.S .  Senate, Democrat, Iowa);285 
281 Erik Jaffe, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 4 April 2003, transcript on file with author [hereinafter 
"Jaffe interview"] . 
. 282 Harry M. Kaiser, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 28 May 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Kaiser interview"]. 
283 Kathleen Merrigan, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 27 March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Merrigan interview"] . 
284 David Moeller, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 21 March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Moeller interview"] . 
285 Doug O'Brien, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 3 1  March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "O'Brien interview"] . 
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13) Barry Richard, J.D. - Constitutional lawyer, Tallahassee, Forida, counsel for 
defendants, Florida Department of Citrus in citrus checkoff cases (represented 
President George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election litigation);286 
14) Terry Stokes - Chief Operating Officer, National Cattlemen's Beef Association, 
Denver, Colorado (the group that provides checkoff services under contract with 
the Cattlemen's Beef Board);287 
15) Steven Vetter - Editor, Western Livestock Journal, a national livestock weekly 
newspaper; Denver, Colorado; 288 and 
16) Ronald Ward, Ph.D. - Professor of econometrics and agricultural market 
structures at University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida (advisor to Cattlemen's 
Beef Research and Promotion Board, National Dairy Board, Mushroom 
Promotion Board, California Almond Board and others). 289 
Several informative interviews were also provided anonymously by individuals 
who asked to be identified as: 
► a representative of the National Cattlemen's Beef Board; 
► an executive of the Livestock Marketing Association (plaintiff in a beef 
checkoff lawsuit currently pending before the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA); 
► a pork producer and member of the Pork Board; 
286 Barry Richard, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 26 March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Richard interview"] . 
287 Terry Stokes, telephone interviews by Retha J. Martin, 17 March 2003 and 19 March 2003, transcripts on file 
with author [hereinafter "Stokes interview one" and "Stokes interview two"] . 
288 Steven Vetter, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 28 March 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Vetter interview"] . 
289 Ronald Ward, telephone interview by Retha J. Martin, 18 February 2003, transcript on file with author 
[hereinafter "Ward interview"] . 
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► a legislative assistant for a Senator serving as a member of the Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S . Senate; 
► a legislative assistant for a Congressman serving as a member of the 
House Agricultural Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. 
In addition, several others provided information strictly for background purposes 
on an anonymous basis. 
The theoretical perspectives of hegemony and countervailing power provided the 
necessary framework to gather evidence for this study. These theories guided the 
collection of evidence in four categories: 1)  information that explains the dominant 
hegemony of commodity checkoffs in the agricultural industry, 2) information that 
clarifies the position of the minority challengers in seeking counter-hegemony or 
countervailing power to prevent exploitation; 3) key externalities that affect the first two 
subsets, such as changes in the agricultural industry and changes in First Amendment 
doctrine; 4) evidence that explores the existing case law on commercial speech and 
compelled speech and compelled association; and 5) evidence that relates to the legal and 
political consequences of various outcomes and the impact on the public interest, the 
agricultural industry and freedom of commercial expression. 
Evidence That Brings Understanding to Both Sides 
The respective views of the opposing forces in the checkoff litigation are 
illuminated in number of source documents that give attention in varying degrees to both 
sides. Chief among these are transcripts of oral arguments and legal opinions of the 
courts. A sampling of such materials utilized in this study include: 
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► Transcript of oral arguments on cross summary judgment motions in Jeanne. and 
Steve Charter v. United States Department of Agriculture ( oral arguments 
occurred on April 16, 2002, in the United States District Court for the District of 
Montana, Billings Division);290 
► Transcript of oral arguments before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department of Agriculture on 
March 10, 2003, in St. Paul, Minnesota;291 
► Transcript of oral arguments before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms v. United States 
Department of Agriculture (oral arguments on March 14, 2003, in Cincinnati, 
Ohio);292 
► Decision and Order of Dismissal on December 9, 1997, in In Re: United Foods, 
Inc., Administrative Law Court, United States Department of Agriculture;293 
► Fruit Checkoffs - Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Consolidated Cases of Tampa Juice Services, Inc., et al. v. State of 
Florida, Department of Citrus, Graves Brothers Company, et al. v. State of 
Florida, Department of Citrus, and Oak Hammock Groves, Ltd., et al., v. State of 
Florida, Department of Citrus, issued March 3 1 ,  2003. 294 
290 Oral Arguments on Cross Summary Judgment Motions, Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States 
Department of Agriculture (Dist. Montana 2002) (Cause No. CV 00-198-BLG-RFC), argued 16 April 2002. 
291 Oral Arguments on Appeal, Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department of Agriculture (8th 
Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2796 and 02-2843), argued 10 March 2003. 
292 Oral Arguments on Appeal, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann 
Veneman (6th Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2337 and 02-2338), argued 14 March 2003. 
293 Decision and Order of Dismissal, In Re: United Foods, Inc. (USDA Administrative Law Court, 1997) 
(MPRCIA No. 96-0001), issued 9 Dec. 1997. 
294 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Tampa Juice Services, Inc. et al. v. 
State of Florida, Department of Citrus ( 10th Cir., Polk County, Fla., 2003) (Case Nos. GC-G-00-3488, GC­
G-00-37 18 ,  GC-G-01-0286, GC-G-01-0375, and GC-G-01-0694); Graves Brothers Company v. State of 
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► Judicial decisions in compelled commercial speech cases listed in Appendix B; 
Various reports from the United States General Accounting Office provided 
information that was useful in analyzing both the dominant hegemony and the 
challenging position. The following reports were useful in the analysis: 
► "Pork Promotion Program: Petition Validation Process Needs to be 
Strengthened," United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional 
Requesters, September 2000 (GAO/RCED-00-274);295 
► "Economic Models of Cattle Prices: How USDA Can Act to Improve Models to 
Explain Cattle Prices," United States General Accounting Office Report to the 
Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S . Senate, March 2002;296 
► "Packers and Stockyards Programs: Investigations of Competitive Practices Need 
Improvements," United States General Accounting Office Publication of 
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, September 25, 2000;297 
Florida, Department of Citrus (Case No. GC-G-02-46-4686) and Oak Hammock Groves, Ltd., et al. v. 
State of Florida, Department of Citrus (Case No. GC-G-03-028 1), order issued 3 1  March 2003. 
295 United States General Accounting Office, "Pork Promotion Program: Petition Validation Process Needs to be 
Strengthened," Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/RCED-00-274 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 
2000). 
296 United States General Accounting Office, "Economic Models of Cattle Prices: How USDA Can Act to 
Improve Models to Explain Cattle Prices," Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S. Senate, GAO-02-246 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, March 2002). 
297 United States General Accounting Office, "Packers and Stockyards Programs: Investigations of Competitive 
Practices Need Improvements," Publication of Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight 
and the Courts, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, GAO/T-RCED-00299 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
September 25, 2000). 
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► "Cattle Prices: Questions and Answers," by Geoffrey S. Becker, Congressional 
Research Service, Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division, Report 
for Congress, November 14, 1996;298 
► "Federal Farm Promotion ( 'Check-off) Programs," by Geoffrey S.  Becker, 
Congressional Research Service, Resources, Science and Industry Division 
Report for Congress, July 1 1 ,  2002;299 
► "Merger and Antitrust Issues in Agriculture: Statutes and Agencies," by Jerry 
Heykoop, Agricultural Policy Analyst, Congressional Research Service, 
Resources, Science and Industry Division, Report for Congress, May 21 ,  2002;300 
► "Consolidation in U.S. Meatpacking," by James M. MacDonald, Michael E. 
Onlinger, Kenneth E. Nelson, and Charles R. Handy, Economic Research Service 
(ERS), USDA, Food and Rural Economics Division, February 2000;301 
► "A Time to Act," report by USDA National Commission on Small Farms, January 
1998;302 and 
► "Concentration in the Meat Packing Industry," Majority and Minority Reports by 
the USDA Advisory Committee on Agricultural Concentration, June 7, 1996.303 
298 Geoffrey S. Becker, "Cattle Prices: Questions and Answers," Congressional Research Service, Environment 
and Natural Resources Policy Division, Report for Congress, 96-1 15 ENR (Wa. D.C.: GPO, November 19, 
1996). 
299 Geoffrey S. Becker, "Federal Farm Promotion ('Check-off) Programs," Congressional Research Service, 
Resources Science and Industry Division, Report for Congress, 93-353 ENR (Wa. D.C.: GPO, July 1 1 , 2002). 
300 Jerry Heykoop, "Merger and Antitrust Issues in Agriculture: Statutes and Agencies," Congressional Research 
Service, Resources, Science and Industry Division, Report for Congress, RS20562 (Wa. D.C.: GPO, May 21,  
2002). 
301 James M. MacDonald, Michael E. Onlinger, Kenneth E. Nelson, and Charles R. Handy, "Consolidation in 
U.S. Meatpacking," Economic Research Service, USDA, Food and Rural Economics Division, Agricultural 
Economics Report, ERSAER 785 (Wa. D.C.: GPO, February 2000). 
302 United States Department of Agriculture National Commission on Small Farms, "A Time to Act," Special 
Report, MP-1545 (Wa. D.C.: GPO, January 1998). 
303 United States Department of Agriculture Advisory Committee on Agricultural Concentration, "Concentration 
in the Meat Packing Industry, Majority and Minority Reports" (Wa. D.C.: GPO, June 7, 1996); available in part 
from http://www.web-span.com/~pga/library/report.html; Internet; accessed 12 November 2002. 
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Evidence That Identifies and Explains the Dominant Hegemony 
Several key sources of evidence provided understanding of the dominant 
hegemony in terms of the interests at stake, the principles, and the legal arguments. The 
following individuals provided interviews that were instructive in this regard: Terry 
Stokes, Dr. Ronald Ward, Barry Richard, Dr. Enrique Figueroa, Dr. Kathleen Merrigan, 
Dr. Harry Kaiser, Secretary Daniel Glickman, Doug O'Brien, a staffer for a Congressman 
on the House Agricultural Committee, a pork producer and member of the Pork Board, 
and a representative of the Cattlemen's  Beef Board. Advertising samples and other 
materials provided by National Cattlemen's  Beef Association were also helpful. 
Legal documents filed in various checkoff lawsuits by the United States 
Department of Agriculture, the state and federal commodity associations and individual 
producers documented the publicly stated positions of these groups and outlined their 
legal arguments. Such documents consisted of briefs, memorandums in support of 
motions for preliminary injunction or summary judgment and transcripts of testimony, 
depositions, and oral arguments. Examples of items used for analysis included: 
► Beef Checkoffs - Declaration of Barry Carpenter in Support of Defendant' s  
Motion for Summary Judgment, executed February 14, 2002; filed by the United 
States Department of Agriculture in Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States 
Department of Agriculture in the United States District Court for the District of 
Montana, Billings Di vision;304 
304 Declaration of Barry Carpenter in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jeanne and Steve 
Charter v. United States Department of Agriculture (Dist. Montana) (No. CV 00-198-BLG-RFC), executed 14 
February 2002. 
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► Beef Checkoffs - Briefs for cross summary judgment motions, filed February 15, 
2002, in Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States Department of Agriculture in 
the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division, 305 
► Beef Checkoffs - Briefs for appellate review, filed in September and October 
2002, in Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department of 
Agriculture in the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals;306 
► Beef and Pork Checkoffs - Reports and literature published by the Cattlemen's  
Beef Board and the Pork Board; 
► Pork Checkoffs - Briefs for appellate review, filed in February 2003, in Michigan 
Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms in the United States Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals,307 
► Pork Checkoffs - Deposition of Barry Carpenter, Deputy Administrator of the 
Livestock and Seed Program in the Agriculture Marketing Service, on May 13- 14, 
2002, in Michigan Pork Producers Association Inc, et al. v. Campaign for Family 
Farms, et al. v. Ann Veneman, USDA, et al. in the U.S .  District Court, Western 
District of Michigan, Southern Division;308 
► Pork Checkoffs - Deposition of Hugh Dorminy, President of the National Pork 
Board, May 10, 2002, in Michigan Pork Producers Association Inc, et al. v. 
305 Briefs for Cross Summary Judgment Motions, Jeanne and Steve Charter v. United States Department of 
�riculture (Dist. Montana 2002) (No. CV 00-198-BLG-RFC), filed 15 February 2002. 
Briefs for Appellate Review, Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department of Agriculture (8th 
Cir. 2002) (Appeal Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, filed September and October 2002. 
m Briefs for Appellate Review, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign/or Family Farms, et al. v. Ann 
Veneman (6th Cir. 2003) (Appeal Nos. 02-2337 and 02-2338) filed February 2003. 
308 Deposition of Barry Carpenter, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann 
Veneman (W. Dist. Mich. 2002) (No. 1 :01-CV-34), taken 13-14 May 2002. 
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Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann Veneman, USDA, et al. in the U.S. 
District Court, Western District of Michigan, Southern Division; 309 
► Dairy Checkoffs - Published statements and online articles by Richard T. Rossier, 
attorney representing American Dairy Council; 
► Dairy Checkoffs - Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed June 5, 2002, in Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. Veneman, United 
States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania;3 10 
► Mushroom Checkoffs - Testimony of Wade Whitfield, President and CEO of the 
Mushroom Institute, on August 15-16, 1995, in In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc. ; 
Administrative Law Hearing, United States Department of Agriculture, 3 1 1  
► Mushroom Checkoffs - Reply Brief for the Petitioner, United States Department 
of Agriculture, filed in April 2001, in the appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
United States v. United Foods; 312 
► Fruit Checkoffs - Hearing testimony of Dan Gerawan, President of Gerawan 
Fanning, Inc. on July 29, 1999 before the Subcommittee on Commercial and 
Administrative Law, Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives ;313  
30'J Deposition of Hugh Dorminy, Michigan Pork Producers, et al. v. Campaign for Family Farms, et al. v. Ann 
Veneman, (W. Dist. Mich. 2002) ( No. 1 :01-CV-34), filed 10 May 2002. 
310 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. 
Veneman, (Middle Dist. Penn. 2002) (Case No. 4:CV-01 -0529), filed 5 June 2002. 
311  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Administrative Law Hearing, before Judge S. Bernstein, San Francisco, 
CA, In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc., MPRCIA No. 95- 1 ,  Testimony of John Haltrom, 15-16 August 1995. 
312 Reply Brief for Petitioner, United States v. United Foods, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court 2000) (No. 00 276), filed 
April 2001. 3 1  U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 
Testimony of Dan Gersawan, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 29 July 1999. 
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► Fruit Checkoffs - Briefs urging support for the checkoff program submitted by 
the USDA, the Tree Fruit Agreement and other parties filing amicus curie for the 
Supreme Court review in Glickman v. Wileman; and 
► Fruit Checkoffs - Complaints filed by plaintiffs, Graves Brothers Company, et al. 
and Barron Collier Company, Ltd. in the Florida citrus checkoff challenges. 3 14 
Web sites maintained by the trade associations and primary groups involved in 
administration of the checkoff programs provided information and opinions of outlined 
the public positions of these groups. The following were included among the websites 
that provided evidence: Cattlemen's Beef Board,315 the National Pork Board,3 16 the 
National Milk Producers Federation,317 the Mushroom lnstitute318  and others. (See list 
included in bibliography.) 
Evidence That Clarifies the Position of the Anti-Checkoff Challengers 
During evidence gathering, it became apparent that analyzing what the legal 
conflict over commodity checkoffs collectively represents would not be productive, since 
the structure of each commodity industry was different and the characteristics of the 
challengers in various legal actions appeared disparate. It was, therefore, especially 
important to gather evidence that would clarify the positions of the anti-checkoff 
challengers in each of the respective industries. 
314 Complaint, Graves Brothers, et al. v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus (2nd Judicial Circuit, Leon 
County, Fla., 2002) (No. 02 CA 2207), filed September 2002; and Complaint Barron Collier Company, 
Ltd. v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus (10th Judicial Circuit, Polk County, Fla., 2003) (Case No. 53-
2003 CA-00028 1), filed January 2003. 
315 See website for Cattlemen's Beef Board at http://www.beefboard.org. 
316 See website for the National Pork Board at http://www.porkboard.org. 
317 See website for the National Milk Producers Federation at http://www.nmpf.org. 
318 See website for the Mushroom Institute at http://www.americanmushroom.org. 
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The challengers' point of view in the beef industry was articulated by Jeanne 
Charter in her interview and numerous published materials. Mike Callicrate also 
provided an additional perspective of a cattle producer and feedlot operator fighting a 
dominant hegemony on several fronts, including the checkoff challenges and other 
antitrust legal actions. An executive of the Livestock Marketing Association ("LMA") 
provided additional observations and information on the beef checkoff cases, especially 
regarding LMA's involvement in the referendum process. 
In her interview, attorney Renee Giachino provided background and articulated 
the positions of the anti-checkoff challengers in the beef, pork and dairy industries. 
David Moeller' s interview focused more on the pork industry and the views of pork 
checkoff challengers that are affiliated with his client, Campaign for Family Farms, a 
coalition of farm and rural groups opposed to the corporate takeover of the hog industry 
and supportive of family farming. 
John Bunting, (dairy farmer and writer for an agricultural newsletter, The 
Milkweed,) and Joseph and Brenda Cochran (plaintiffs in a dairy checkoff lawsuit) 
provided information and background on what the constitutional challenge to mandatory 
dairy a�sessments represented for dairy farmers. A particularly poignant glimpse of the 
position of the anti-checkoff challenger, Brenda Cochran, can be found in her on-line 
letters published under "Dispatches From Dairyland: A new voice from the raw edge of 
dairy disaster''319 on the website for The New Farm. The letters describe the economic 
319 See Brenda Cochran, "Dispatches from Dairyland," The New Farm (November 18, 2002); available from 
http://www.newfarm.org/depts/dairyland_dispatches/print/1 1 1802.shtml; Internet; accessed 4 April 2003; and 
Brenda Cochran , "Dispatches from Dairyland," The New Farm (November 26, 2002); available from 
http://www.newfarm.org/depts/dairyland_dispatches/1 12602.shtml; Internet; accessed 16 March 2003. 
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experiences of the dairy farmer today that have prompted she and her husband to engage 
in legal action. 
The challengers point of view in the mushroom challenge was obtained primarily 
through documents filed in connection with the United Foods case and a related 
predecessor administrative law case (In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc.), for which the record 
was submitted with other lower court records for the U.S .  Supreme Court review in the 
United Foods case. Documents that provided useful evidence included: 
► Testimony of John Haltom, President of Pictsweet Mushroom Farms, on August 
17, 1995, in In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc. ; Administrative Law Hearing , 
USDA;320 and 
► Affidavit of Donald Dressler, Executive Vice President of United Foods, filed on 
July 9, 1998, in United Foods v. United States Department of Agriculture, Case 
Nos. 96-1252 and 98-1082 in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Tennessee. 321 
Web sites of groups opposing checkoffs furnished information that was highly 
useful in gleaning an understanding of their underlying interests. Among these were the 
following: R-CALF,322 Livestock Marketing Association,323 Center for Individual 
Freedom324 and Erik J affo' s legal services website. 325 
320 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Administrative Law Hearing, before Judge S. Bernstein, San Francisco, 
Cal., In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc., MPRCIA No. 95- 1 ,  Testimony of John Haltrom, 17 August 1995. 
321 Affidavit of Donald Dressler, United Foods v. USDA (W. Dist. Tenn.) (Nos. 96- 1252 and 98- 1082), 
filed 9 July 1998. 
322 See website for R-CALF, available from http://www.rcalf.com. 
323 See website for Livestock Marketing Association; available from http://www.Imaweb.com. 
32
4 See website for Center for Individual Freedom; available from http://cfif.org. 
325 See website for Law Offices of Erik Jaffe; available from http://www.esjpc.com. 
144 
Evulence Relative to Key Externalities 
A wide scope of legal materials, testimony in Congressional hearings, scholarly 
articles and popular press materials were used to gain an understanding of the major 
political, economic and social influences acting upon the agricultural industry and 
contributing in some way to the checkoff conflict. Materials relating to U.S . agricultural 
policy, concentration, vertical integration, and commodity promotion and marketing were 
useful. Several key books traced with clarity, thoughtfulness and some urgency, the 
historical changes occurring in agriculture during the past few decades, including: Hard 
Tomatoes, Hard Times by Jim Hightower (1973), The Corporate Reapers: The Book of 
Agribusiness by A.V. Krebs (1992), and Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial 
Agriculture, edited by Andrew Kimbrell . The individuals interviewed for this research 
were highly knowledgeable and, in addition to their individual contributions, provided a 
wealth of information on authors, academic scholars, industry and media representatives, 
government contacts and books and articles to use as resources. 
Evulence That Provules Background for Case Law and Judicial Activity 
Three areas of doctrine were pertinent to the research required to meet the 
objectives outlined in this dissertation. The first two related to doctrinal approaches for 
evaluating compelled commercial speech rights under the First Amendment, i.e., the 
commercial speech doctrine and the doctrine on freedom from compelled speech and 
association. The third area of importance was government speech, a concept that has 
been recognized in dicta as a principle having merit, but not yet molded by the Supreme 
Court into a clear doctrine. 
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The research required that each of these threads of law be explored in the context 
of the cases addressing compelled commercial speech. In addition, the researcher was 
required to scrutinize the judicial interests at stake and possible hegemonic relationships 
between the compelled speech decisions and the interests of the dominant groups in the 
checkoff hegemony (and the larger agricultural hegemony.) Based on these 
requirements, the evidence could be roughly grouped into: 
1) case law and scholarly literature (law review articles, treatises, etc.) providing 
historical understanding of the three doctrinal areas; 
2) case law, briefs and memoranda in past and pending cases, scholarly literature, 
interviews and publications focusing on judicial applications of these First 
Amendment doctrines and the government speech principle to the cases involving 
constitutional challenges of mandatory commodity fees; and 
3) a collection of evidence providing social, political and economic context for the 
court decisions, including such things as: 
► public statements revealing background on the stated and unstated goals of the 
groups exercising hegemony; 
► evidence of underlying facts that were at odds with the reported opinions; 
► important developments related to key externalities (for example, the class 
action suit brought by cattle producers under the Packer & Stockyards Act to 
challenge the USDA failure to protect producers against the anticompetive 
business practices); 
► previous voting patterns of the U.S. Supreme Court justices on the issues in 
question; 
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► political and social environment for the time period of each case, including the 
year 2003 as the compelled commercial speech cases wind their way through 
the courts, 
► agency activities in enforcing or failing to enforce rules, 
► trends in economic policy, and 
► other influences that might impact the decision-making of the federal and 
district courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The cases shown at Appendix B serve as a basic foundation for this analysis. 
Evidence Pertaining to Consequences of Legal Outcomes 
Objective nine required that the researcher gather evidence to analyze the legal 
and political consequences of different alternatives that the U.S .  Supreme Court could 
choose in its next ruling on the constitutionality of the mandatory commodity 
assessments. The Supreme Court may hold that the checkoffs are: 1) constitutional 
when part of a broader regulatory scheme, but unconstitutional when they arise in stand­
alone legislation; 2) unconstitutional as a violation of First Amendment rights because 
they do not pass any First Amendment analysis; 3) constitutional regulations not 
protected by the First Amendment; or 4) constitutional under a First Amendment 
exception to the First Amendment. 
The interviews conducted in this study provided insight into the way each of the 
participants expected different outcomes to affect their own vested interests and the 
current environment. The researcher reviewed the consequences of each of the cases 
decided thus far to gather information on what similar or different consequences might 
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occur in future cases. A number of law review articles were helpful in identifying 
potential legal consequences. 
The framework for this dissertation required the researcher to examine the 
consequences of the legal outcomes for agriculture, First Amendment doctrine and the 
public interest. A basic assumption was made that any of the possible outcomes would 
reflect elements of the Gramscian theory of hegemony, as the judicial decision making 





A constitutional lawyer interviewed as part of this research, Erik S. Jaffe, was 
asked what is at stake for the parties in the cases dealing with challenges to mandatory 
commodity assessments. He replied, "Money. Well, both money and principle. Some 
people, like my clients, are doing this out of principle, and, in fact, likely contrary to their 
economic interests."326 When asked whether there were other things going on in 
agriculture related to this conflict, he replied, "Of course there are. On the substance, it' s 
about many things."327 
Like a magnet, the cases have drawn in participants with a range of interests to 
advance and protect. One way to gauge the scope of interested parties is to examine the 
seven amici curiae briefs filed in Glickman v. Wileman, the 1997 Supreme Court case 
addressing the First Amendment challenge to tree fruit checkoffs. These "friends of the 
court" briefs were filed by groups as disparate as the AFL-CIO and the American 
Association of Advertising Agencies. 328 
326 Jaffee interview, 2. 
321 Ibid. 
328 The following four antlcus briefs in support of Secretary Daniel Glickman were filed: 1) joint brief on behalf 
of individual states, including Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Vermont and Virginia; 2) AFL-CIO; 3) joint brief on behalf of National Association of State 
Departments of Agriculture, National Milk Producers Federation, and the National Cattlemen's  Beef 
Association, Inc.; 4) joint brief on behalf of Washington State Apple Commission, Idaho Potato Commission, 
California Kiwifruit Commission, the Almond Alliance, California Stone Fruit Coalition and the American 
Mushroom Institute. Three briefs were filed in support of Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., et al., including: 1) 
joint brief on behalf of American Advertising Federation, American Association of Advertising Agencies, 
Magazine Publishers of America, Direct Marketing Association, National Right to Work Legal Defense 
Foundation, Inc., Pacific Legal Foundation, Sun-Maid Growers of California, and Treehouse Farms, Inc.; 2) 
joint brief on behalf of United Sheep Producers and the U.S. Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel; 
and 3) joint brief on behalf of Washington Legal Foundation and the Allied Educational Foundation. For 
summary listing of briefs with names of counsel of record, see First Amendment Center, Supreme Court Files for 
the 96-97 Term, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. 95-1 184; available from 
http://www.freedomforum.org/fac/96-97 /Glic_news.htm; Internet; accessed 5 April 2003. 
149 
By mining the evidence beyond the "money and principle" level, other 
substantive areas began to emerge as factors for prompting such a large number of 
plaintiffs to launch legal challenges at this time and so many interested parties to file 
briefs of amici curiae. Among these were shifting industry structures, branding and 
product differentiation strategies, threats to status quo that could arise through a change 
in First Amendment doctrine, and threats to the current balance of power and influence. 
According to David Moeller, an attorney for the Farmer's Legal Action Group, 
Inc., in St. Paul, Minnesota, the source of the conflict is related to the interests being 
represented: 
I think, from the farmer's perspective, the conflict basically comes from whose 
interest at heart they [industry commodity groups] are representing. Are they 
representing family farmers who are trying to make a living on the land or are 
they representing the industrial model of agriculture, which includes not only 
factory farms, the short hand term, but also processors and other parts of the chain 
that don't have. the family farmer's interest at heart?329 
Secretary Daniel Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture from March 1995 to January 
2001 ,  characterized the checkoff challenges as follows: 
I think that it's true that most of these checkoff programs and the monies 
that are spent are viewed as kind of tools or pawns of the established interests 
within that community. So there's a lot of internal politics within the commodity 
communities between big and small. To some extent, these debates on the 
checkoff and promotional programs are part of a larger debate about the future of 
agriculture. 33<f 
Steven Vetter, editor of Western Livestock Journal, also viewed the checkoffs as 
pawns. He stated: " . . .  I really think the checkoff has been used as a pawn in efforts to 
get under the skin of rival factions, if you will."331 
329 Moeller interview, I. 
330 Glickman interview, I 
331 Vetter interview, 8. 
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Terry Stokes, Chief Executive Office of the National Cattlemen's Beef 
Association, identified the theme of change as an important factor for the checkoff 
dissatisfaction: " . . .  I do know that when you look at the changing industry structure that 
is occurring today as a result of many factors, I think the changes that are going on within 
the beef industry are drivers of some of the discontent as it relates to the response to 
change."332 
A similar view was expressed by a producer and member of the Pork Board who 
also attributed the source of the checkoff conflict to change: "[I]t' s about the changing 
landscape of rural America. And so farmers are lashing out wherever they can just to try 
to take some control. "333 
Another theme in the checkoff challenges is getting one's voice heard. A 
representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board noted that the Charter case arose because 
the Charters " . . .  refused to pay [checkoffs] so they could be given a forum to voice their 
opposition to NCBA on some public policy issues with which they disagree."334 Jeanne 
Charter would agree with this assessment. She summarized why she and her husband got 
involved in the checkoff challenges: "It was basically that we felt that our money was 
going to our own destruction."335 The checkoff lawsuit afforded a way for them to 
communicate their dissatisfaction with the checkoffs and the forced speech they entail .  
A Powerful Hegemony Exercised by the Industrial Agriculture Bloc 
Applying Gramsci 's  theory of hegemony, the various entities joined in social 
relation in the dominant group in agriculture may be seen as forming the "fractions" of an 
332 Stokes interview, 3. 
333 Interview with anonymous pork producer and member of the Pork Board, 3-4. 
334 Interview with anonymous representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board, 5. 
335 Charter interview, 3. 
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agricultural bloc comprised of government and civil society, similar to the historic bloc 
outlined by Gramsci. (Gramsci uses the word "fraction" to refer to an hegemonic class.) 
This bloc can be viewed as essential to exercising and maintaining a dominant hegemony 
in agriculture centered around the corporate or industrial agriculture model, a business 
model that has been widely adopted in the business community as a means to compete 
globally and serve the culture and ideology of American consumerism. This bloc will be 
referenced hereafter in this paper as the "industrial agriculture bloc" or "AgriBiz." 
The "historic bloc" described by Gramsci refers to a unified group in which the 
bourgeoisie class and its allies organize and dominate an entire social structure. In the 
case of the "industrial agriculture bloc," large agricultural commodity producers that have 
become increasingly concentrated and vertically integrated are analogous to the 
bourgeoisie class. These commodity producers serve as central organizers of the 
industrial agriculture bloc with allies from within the state (e.g., the United States 
Department of Agriculture and the Justice Department), the media, academia, etc. The 
dominant commodity producers exercise hegemony through their agents, including the 
USDA, trade associations they have organized to further their commercial and political 
interests, and the checkoff commodity boards. AgriBiz ( or the "industrial agriculture 
bloc") will continue to maintain or expand its dominant control in the current agricultural 
environment in the absence of a viable counter-hegemony or, as Galbraith would argue, 
in the absence of a legitimate countervailing economic power to prevent abuse and 
exploitation. 
The checkoff programs have become an integral part of AgriBiz. They have 
impressively served the needs of the industrial agriculture bloc in strengthening the 
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connections between the political, business, agricultural and academic communities. 
Such programs have become an ideal tool for "organic intellectuals" to legitimize the 
activities and ideology of the agricultural hegemony. As noted in the literature review, 
according to Gramsci, organic intellectuals are those in various professional occupations 
who direct the "ideas and aspirations" of the dominant social group to which they 
belong. 336 In the agricultural hegemony of AgriBiz, the organic intellectuals provide 
homogeneity through their web of ideas supporting the dominant industrial agricultural 
model. 
The checkoff programs require a wide range of organic intellectuals to be 
involved in: 1) developing economic, political and social justifications for the checkoff 
programs; 2) participating in interlocking networks of private and government 
intellectuals to administer the programs (including USDA employees, appointed boards 
and commissions, state agencies, trade associations providing services under contract, 
advertising agencies, etc.); 3) demonstrating the efficacy of the programs on an ongoing 
basis, including their relevance to other goals of the dominant hegemony (e.g. , 
importance of checkoff dollars to developing international trade); and 4) using money 
gathered from outside the government coffers to advertise and promote the programs and 
recruit new support for the programs. 
Opinions differ regarding whether commodity checkoffs in various industries 
have accomplished their stated purpose, namely increasing the demand for a commodity 
through promotion. Professor Ronald Ward expressed the strict position of an economist 
in stating during his interview : "[l]f the program [checkoff program] wasn't effective, 
336 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 3. 
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then it shouldn't exist."337 Complex models of measuring the effectiveness of the 
programs have been developed to justify the programs in the eyes of the producers who 
carry the financial burden and to meet institutional requirements for periodic evaluation. 
The conflict over checkoffs represents one prong of an effort by several fractions 
seeking to establish a new historic bloc and a counter-hegemony centered around an 
alternative agricultural model. But this group must effectively counter the value system 
of the industrial agriculture bloc that has been extensively promoted through political, 
economic and public relations efforts on a global scale. The diagram shown at Figure 5 
visually represents the major global agricultural hegemony exercised by the industrial 
agriculture bloc in the outer ring and the efforts of the counter-hegemony to break 
through. The zone of conflict is the terrain where the crisis in agriculture is occurring in 
a variety of ways. 
AgriBiz is generating themes and representations that reinforce the industrial 
agriculture model and the hegemony of the industrial agriculture bloc. Its agricultural 
ethics and goals are incorporated into trade policies, economic decisions regarding 
intervention in markets and enforcement of antitrust laws, decisions on genetically altered 
commodities, farm policy and, last but not least, USDA activities related to the checkoff 
programs. A thought-provoking 2002 book titled Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of 
Industrial Agriculture identifies seven popular themes of AgriBiz, referring to them as 
"myths" and "corporate lies." Since the industrial agriculture bloc has been enormously 
successful in winning the consensus of the American people, these themes have acquired 
a legitimacy that makes them difficult to challenge. The primary themes ( or myths) 
337 Ward interview, 3. 
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identified in Fatal Harvest include: 
► Industrial agriculture will feed the world. 
► Industrial food is safe, healthy, and nutritious. 
► Industrial food is cheap. 
► Industrial agriculture is efficient. 
► Industrial food offers more choices. 
► Industrial agriculture benefits the environment and wildlife. 
► Biotechnology will solve the problems of industrial agriculture.338 
The following additional ideas and themes advanced by the AgriBiz movement have also 
earned legitimacy: 
► Concentrated operations increase efficiency and production. 
► Globalization makes it imperative for companies to buy the best product at the 
lowest price on the global market at any given time. 
► Sustainable prosperity for farmers. 
► Investment in foreign markets is needed to export excess production and feed 
hungry populations. 
As a key element of its hegemony, AgriBiz has won the general population over 
to the acceptance of the industrial business model (as adopted on a global scale) and 
vertical integration as the preferred ideology for the success of agriculture as an industry 
today. In fact, there are signs that the cost-benefit approach is persuading fractions 
within the industrial agriculture bloc and some segments of the public to accept the 
possibility that agriculture practiced in the U.S. under the old production paradigm is a 
338 See Andrew Kimbrell, ed., Fatal Harvest: The Tragedy of Industrial Agriculture (Washington: Island Press, 
2002), 49-62. 
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"dead weight" on the economy. In other words, the only way in which the agricultural 
industry can economically justify its presence in the American economy is to demonstrate 
a major contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) through competitive 
agribusiness operating with global inputs and selling to foreign markets. Economist, 
Steven C. Blank, an economist at the University of California, Davis, explored this 
concept in his article outlining the economic threats to American farming. 339 
Blank described the profit squeeze on American farmers by noting agricultural 
producers experienced a decrease of seven percent in the USDA' s index of prices 
received for their output from 1990 to 2000 while experiencing an increase of nineteen 
percent in the USDA's  index of prices paid for inputs.340 His research supported a theory 
that American agriculture has moved up the farming food chain because "a falling world 
price ceiling and a steadily rising cost floor" have caused many farmers to shift from 
producing low-value annual crops to increasingly higher-value crops, such as annuals or 
perennials, in the quest for more profit.341 Finally, the farmer must resort to an 
alternative income source as a better investment of his resources. 
Blank concluded that all countries exhibit a pattern of climbing up the food chain 
as they develop so that the importance of agriculture in the gross domestic product 
declines. Agriculture is responsible for helping economies to grow in less-developed 
countries, but in developing nations, the economic return is greater when agricultural 
workers move to more profitable industries. However, other countries in the world must 
be able and willing to sell America a sufficient food supply in order for the country to 
339 See Steven C. Blank, "A Portfolio of Threats to American Agriculture," Contemporary Economic Policy 
(October 2002): 381-393. 
340 Ibid., 383. 
341 Ibid., 384 -385. 
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totally cease supporting agriculture as a viable industry. He outlined the following 
possible scenario for countries at the top of the food chain: 
Eventually, some developed countries will choose to leave agriculture due 
to efficiency concerns-it, too, is an investment decision. At some point, it will 
be inefficient for a country to invest resources in agricultural production when 
more profitable investments will contribute to the nation's wealth (i.e., 
deadweight losses will occur if resources remain in agricultural production.) No 
country has reached that point yet, but several small Western European countries, 
Japan and the United States are getting close enough that the idea must be 
faced . . . Much of our labor, capital, and management resources that remain in 
American atculture are there by choice but could be better invested 
elsewhere. 3 2 
In Blank' s view, American agribusiness deserves recognitions for "taking a 
global perspective" with regard to price and cost strategies. He stated: 
Numerous examples exist of how American agribusiness is maintaining its boom 
by increasingly seeking out the least-cost sources of agricultural commodities. 
That means they are using strategic alliances, foreign direct investment, and other 
methods of securing foreign sources of the commodities they use as inputs into 
their processing and distribution industries .. . (citations omitted) By doing so, 
American firms guarantee American consumers a steady supply of food and speed 
the economic development of the countries supplying us. It is part of an 
expandin:f system of mutual dependence that will ensure an uninterrupted food 
supply.34 
The United States now has only 1.3 percent of its population in the agricultural 
industry. According to Blank, government programs have kept certain segments of 
agriculture in business longer than the market would allow because the added premiums 
allow farmers to receive more than the global market price. He deemed such programs to 
be risk management tools for farms. He concluded: "An increasingly urban America 
342 
lbid., 387. 
343 Ibid., 388. 
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has tired of subsidizing farmers and ranchers. Agriculture is losing its appeal as an 
investment for our nation."344 
The Changing Face of the Checkoff Challenger 
A comparison of the plaintiffs who have sought legal redress in the First 
Amendment cases already decided and currently winding their way through the courts 
shows that they are not a homogenous group. Erik Jaffe's interview reinforced the need 
to compare the commodity checkoff challengers in each of the five industries (beef, pork, 
fruit, mushrooms and dairy) and dispelled the notion that there is a single way to frame 
the checkoff conflicts for all five industries selected for this study. Jaffe's comments 
include the following: 
If you look at the different industries that have had fights over this, different 
industries have had different players fighting it. 345 
You should try to figure out the structure of the industry and who benefits from 
the checkoff and why . . . .  You tend to have a different breakout of who's fighting 
on which side of the issue. 346 
[W]hen you're looking at these checkoff programs, you should be precise about 
who pays the checkoff. 347 
In each of the commodities, there exists an "industry commodity bloc" that 
exercises hegemony over the industry. The groups serving the role as central organizers 
(analogous to Gramsci's  concept of the bourgeoisie as central organizers of large social 
superstructures) differ for each commodity and may, in fact, be undergoing change. (For 
example, the grocery retailers are showing signs of supplanting the packers and 
processors as central organizers in the livestock industry.) Because the "industry 
344 Ibid., 392. 
345 Jaffe interview, 2. 
346 Ibid., 2-3 . 
347 Ibid., 3. 
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commodity blocs" are aligned with the USDA, the challengers have found that the courts 
offer them a new terrain to wage their "war of position" against the dominant hegemony. 
The Livestock Checkoff Challengers. The search for key externalities 
influencing the conflict over checkoffs pointed overwhelmingly in one direction for two 
of the five commodities studied, beef and pork. Without a doubt, the most dominant 
theme throughout the interviews and resource materials used to study these commodities 
was the theme of crisis occurring through the rapid rate of concentration and vertical 
integration in the agricultural industry. It defined the parameters of a major ideological 
and political conflict in which First Amendment law regarding the constitutionality of the 
checkoffs has provided an additional forum of the courts for the challengers to advance 
their struggle against the political and economic power wielded by the groups who 
control the businesses and organizations benefiting from concentration and vertical 
integration. As a contributing factor, the globalization of agricultural markets is driving 
the accelerated pace of concentration and vertical integration. 
In this hegemonic battle in the livestock industry, the face of the challenger has 
been the independent producer and small rancher who objects to his or her checkoff 
dollar being used to promote messages and interests that generate profits for the large 
processors, meat packers and retailers who control the industry farther up the food chain. 
The short-term goal of these challengers is to win the "battle for the beef bucks"348 and 
recover more of their profits being siphoned off into the checkoff programs. Their larger 
goal is to create a countervailing power that will disrupt the hegemony of the 
"commodity industry bloc," and to ideally force change in the "industrial agriculture 
348 Lee Pitts, "Gone in a Mushroom Cloud," Triple A Livestock Report (undated); available from 
http://www.aaalivestock.com/pages/issues/iss_mush.html; Internet; accessed 6 May 2003. 
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bloc" by altering the relations of power that govern the organization of the commodity 
industries and markets. 
Figure 6 illustrates the position of the small independent livestock producers (in 
the middle of the circle diagram) who are using the First Amendment legal actions in 
their counter-hegemony. They are pushing outward to break the checkoff hegemony, 
and, also, create an impact on the outer ring, the agricultural hegemony that includes the 
elements of concentration and vertical integration that are of paramount concern to this 
group. 
The critical interests at stake for this group are to recapture a greater share of the 
profit stream by eliminating mandatory checkoff payments and to close off some of the 
ways in which the check-off generated benefits are being funneled to the checkoff 
hegemony and the agricultural hegemony. The ultimate interest at stake for the 
challengers is to find a way to improve their economic future in an industry that is now 
rewarding them with paltry profits, as evidenced by a drop in the food price index for 
major commodities of almost half in the forty years between 1960 and 2000.349 
Challengers are using an argument based in principle, claiming that it is unfair that they 
cannot exercise any control over speech that they are forced to fund. At the legal level, 
the challengers claim that the mandatory checkoff fees are a violation of their First 
Amendment rights to free speech under the First Amendment that guarantees: "Congress 
shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of speech . . .  " 350 
An executive of Livestock Marketing Association identifies the structure of the 
349 Carl F. Jordan, "Genetic Engineering the Farm Crisis and World Hunger," Bioscience (June 2002): 523-529, 
523. 
350 U.S. Const., amend I. 
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beef industry as an underlying major factor in creating the environment for the checkoff 
legal actions. The LMA became active with its referendum challenge because of the 
following complaints received from its members: 
1 )  Producers should have the right under a compelled, mandatory program to have 
some say about whether the program is doing right by them. ''Those who pay 
should get a say." 
2) The beef checkoff is not headed in the right direction. 
3) The beef checkoff is not doing the producers any good. Producers are paying 
money for no return because the benefits are realized by segments of the industry 
farther upstream. 
4) The trade association, National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA), is getting 
most of the dollars, and the packers are too much in control of USDA. 
5) Producers object to the absolute control exercised by the NCBA and the 
Cattlemen's  Beef Board (CBB) over the programs. 
6) The NCBA is advocating policies with which the LMA members do not agree. 
The Mushroom and Tree Fruit Checkoff Challengers. In contrast to the 
Ii vestock industry, the First Amendment checkoff challenges arising in the mushroom 
and fruit industries resonate with branding and product differentiation themes. The 
challengers in these cases are some of the largest producers in their industries who seek 
to differentiate their products through high quality, customized service and branding. An 
example is Gerawan Farming, one of the largest tree fruit growers in the world35 1 that 
351 U.S .  Congress, House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 
Hearing on Taxpayers Defense Act, Testimony of Dan Gerawan, 106th Congress, 1st sess., 19 July 1999. 
163 
has been involved in challenging checkoff legislation for the past 15  years. 352 Gerawan 
has implemented sophisticated marketing and advertising programs to inform and 
persuade consumers to buy their unique commodity products. Strategies it has adopted to 
distinguish its fruit include quality-enhancing methods in the areas of cooling, 
transportation, and air handling (use of optimal temperatures and controlled atmospheric 
gases in storage facilities to extend the shelf life of fruits after harvest). 353 
These large fruit and mushroom growers have argued that the substantial fees 
they pay for commodity checkoffs and the generic advertising generated by these 
mandatory fees are highly detrimental in undermining their individual advertising 
because: 1)  they must still invest in their own advertising to promote their branded or 
unique products and counteract the message that all of the respective products are 
homogenous, so they pay twice for advertising, which reduces resources available for 
further promotions or business investments, and 2) the generic advertising promulgates 
an inaccurate message that all the products in their industries are homogenous, a message 
that strictly benefits competitors. 
The mushroom challengers in the United Foods case also further argued that an 
increase in demand for a homogenous mushroom product would reduce their market 
share due to the structure of the industry. Growers sell through three different channels: 
1 )  whole fresh mushrooms to wholesalers or retailers, 2) lower quality mushrooms to 
processors, such as Campbell's and Giorgio, and 3) discounted mushrooms to 
352 Dennis Pollack, "Growers Get Chance to Influence Feds," The Fresno Bee (March 28, 2003); available from 
http://www.fresnobee.corn/locaVagriculture/v-print/story/6459850p-74043 l lc.html; Internet; accessed 5 April 
2003. 
353 See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Administrative Law Hearing, before Judge S. Bernstein, San 
Francisco, Cal., In Re: Donald B. Mills, Inc., MPRCIA No. 95- 1 ,  Testimony of John Haltrom, 17 August 
1995; available from http://www.usdoj .gov/osg/briefs/2000/3mer/2mer/2000-0276.mer .ja.html; Internet; 
accessed 5 April 2003. 
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processors of last resort, which could include a company such as Monterey or 
Campbell 's. With greater demand, growers who sell to processors and processors of last 
resort would switch to selling fresh mushrooms. 354 In addition, the challengers objected 
to advertising that promoted mushrooms as aphrodisiac and associated them with wine 
drinking. Their final objection was to exemptions in the Mushroom Marketing Act that 
allowed all smaller mushroom producers who grow less than 500,000 pounds of 
mushrooms a year to avoid paying the checkoff fees.355 
As major industrial agriculture players using advanced technology and 
sophisticated strategies for branding and advertising, the challengers in the tree fruit and 
mushroom cases are aligned with the "industrial agriculture bloc." They also appear to 
be central organizers of commodity production and the structure of their respective 
industries, playing a key role in the exercise of hegemony in their "commodity industry 
blocs." However, the commodity industry blocs for these industries do not appear as 
strong as in the case of the livestock industries. The large commodity producers have not 
joined in exercising hegemony over the checkoff programs, which may explain why the 
USDA does not seem to have joined them as an ally. 
The challengers in the tree fruit and mushroom cases are not seeking to establish 
countervailing power that will change the relations of commodity production in their 
industry or create an alternative commodity industry bloc. On a broader scale, they are 
not challenging the "industrial agriculture bloc." They would simply like to break the 
checkoff hegemony for the sole reason of increasing their profits and strengthening their 




conflicts that can occur within a hegemonic group as fissures develop due to conflicting 
interests, and a fraction within a dominant bloc negotiates for power. The interests of the 
large producers selling branded products in these industries are deeply at odds with the 
interests of others in the hegemony who are supporting generic advertising and its 
economic benefits to all the players, i.e., trade associations, the commodity boards, the 
government and the academic specialists who are all pursuing goals related to generic 
product advertising. 
The diagram in Figure 7 shows that the position of challengers in the tree fruit and 
mushroom industries as part of the agricultural hegemony and their counter-hegemony 
launched through the First Amendment checkoff cases to attack the checkoff programs. 
The critical economic interest at stake for them is to try to capture more of the profit 
stream that is flowing to the small generic commodity producers. They can do this by 
successfully eliminating their checkoff payments and using the money to expand their 
advertising programs to differentiate their branded, higher-value products and services 
from the generic producers. More of the profit stream will be funneled off in the first 
ring and the amount reaching the generic producers will be significantly narrowed. A 
legal ruling that commodity checkoffs are unconstitutional would ensure that no dollars 
are diverted to support the checkoff hegemony. 
At the level of principle, the challengers in the tree fruit and mushroom industries 
would like the freedom to use their advertising dollars to engage in speech that supports 
only their branded products, the special features of those products and the quality services 
offered in connection with those products. The testimony of John Haltom, president of 
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Figure 7 
Profit Stream Generated 
by Consumer Demand 
(Enhanced by Generic Ads) 
Counter-Hegemony by Large Branded Commodity Producers 
in Tree Fruit and Mushroom Industries Seeking to Narrow 
Profit Stream Reaching Small Generic Commodity Producers 
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Pictsweet Mushroom Farms (a subsidiary of United Foods) showed that he did not 
believe the checkoff programs would work in an industry such as fresh mushrooms where 
the products are not homogenous and are sold to a regional market. Pictsweet has sought 
to increase sales through its own local advertising of its premium mushrooms, in-store 
promotions and direct distribution of products to retailers. 
The checkoff dollars in this industry are also used for regional advertising in 
direct competition with Pictsweet's branded advertising. Other than Campbell's (a 
national operation) and Monterey Mushrooms (a semi-national operation with farms in 
Tennessee and Texas), all other mushroom growers do not benefit from targeted generic 
advertising in other regions. Pictsweet stands to gain nothing when the generic 
advertising occurs in its region (thereby creating a false message that all mushrooms are 
homogenous) or when it occurs in another region (in which case it would be 
superfluous. )356 
Haltrom' s position included two other points. He asserted that processors and 
smaller mushroom growers should not be exempt from the checkoff payments since they 
also stood to benefit if the checkoff program was a success. He also disagreed with the 
message of a Valentine's promotion for mushrooms purporting mushrooms to be 
aphrodisiacs on the grounds that this was in poor taste. 357 
At the legal level, the tree fruit growers have claimed in various cases that the 
forced payment of checkoff violated their First Amendment right under the commercial 




and/or that such regulations are a violation of the First Amendment right to be free from 
compelled speech or compelled association under the Abood and Keller line of cases. 
The U.S . Supreme Court decision in the tree fruit checkoff case of Glickman v. 
Wileman in 1997 led to a much different result than the Supreme Court ruling four years 
later in the mushroom challenge case of United States v. United Foods. As discussed 
earlier in this dissertation, the Court upheld the fruit checkoff program in the Glickman 
case on the grounds that it was part of a larger regulatory scheme and struck down the 
mushroom checkoffs in the United Foods case because the government failed to show 
that the checkoffs were germane to the purpose of the Mushroom Act. 
One strong similarity in both cases is that the faces of the challengers were large 
scale growers who felt a negative impact on their branding and marketing strategies from 
the checkoffs. One difference is that the checkoffs in the Glickman case were 
implemented through marketing orders as part of a marketing scheme and the checkoffs 
in United Foods arose through stand-alone legislation. This is a critical difference, 
leading the mushroom growers to prevail in breaking the hegemony of checkoffs in their 
industry by securing a favorable ruling in United Foods, while the tree fruit growers in 
Glickman failed. 358 
Ironically, the United Foods case, which was brought by a dominant mushroom 
358 The outcome of the Glickman v. Wileman case led one plaintiff, Gerawan Farming, Inc., to file a malpractice 
suit against Mr.Thomas A. Campagne, the lawyer who argued the case before the U.S. Supreme Court. Gerawan 
had originally retained Campagne, a generalist with a small practice in Fresno, California, but asked him to defer 
to Michael W. McConnell, a Constitutional law specialist with experience before the Supreme Court. After 
Campagne refused to step aside, both he and McConnell filed counsel-of-record forms to present oral argument 
before the Supreme Court. The Clerk of the Court resolved the dispute by flipping a coin to determine who 
would deliver the argument, and Campagne won. It was the opinion of the president of Gerawan Farming, Inc. 
that Campagne woefully failed in his representation. Gerawan' s  lawsuit against Campagne under the California 
legal malpractice statute raised interesting issues. See Krista M. Enns, "Can a California Litigant Prevail in an 
Action for Legal Malpractice Based on an Attorney's Oral Argument Before the United States Supreme Court?" 
Duke Law Journal 48 (October 1998): 1 1 1-146. 
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grower (the third largest in the United States)359 to seek relief from being forced to 
subsidize advertising messages benefiting smaller growers, became the lightning rod for 
cases brought by smaller independent hog and cattle farmers and ranchers in the beef and 
cattle industry. The small producers in these cases rallied against use of the checkoffs 
they claimed provided benefits only to the large producers, the meat packers and 
processors, the retailers and agribusiness. 
The Dairy Checkoff Challengers. A close look at the checkoff challenges in the 
dairy industry reveals challengers with different faces and sharply different interests. For 
purposes of this dissertation, the focus will be on the political, economic and legal aspects 
of three key dairy cases: Gallo Cattle Company v. California Milk Advisory Board and 
Ann Veneman,360 Nature 's Dairy v. Glickman,361 and Cochran v. USDA.362 
Joseph and Brenda Cochran, plaintiffs in a pending case in Pennsylvania, are 
independent milk producers who do not belong to a farm cooperative. Instead, they 
choose to sell their milk to a dairy owned by an individual proprietor. 363 They 
differentiate their product from the homogenous ( or standard) milk promoted and sold 
nationwide because of their farming methods and they object to paying for generic 
advertising that merely competes with their individualized efforts. It is also apparent that 
certain parts of the dairy industry are experiencing a crisis of concentration and vertical 
integration. So the underlying economic and political factors inherent in the dairy 
conflict have elements found in all four of the other commodity conflicts covered by this 
359 See Testimony of John Haltrom, 17 August 1995. 
360 Gallo Cattle Company v. California Milk Advisory Board and Veneman, 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1999). 
361 Nature's Dairy v. Glickman, No. 99-439, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3547 (6th Cir. 1999). 
362 Joseph S. Cochran and Brenda S. Cochran v. Ann Veneman, No. 4:CV-01-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 436 1  
(Middle Dist. Penn. 2003). 
363 Chochran interview, 6. 
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study (beef, pork, mushroom and fruit). Evidence showed that industry structure for 
dairy differs according to the region of the country, the cooperative arrangements and the 
different dairy commodities (cheese, fluid milk and others). 
This was confirmed by Brenda Cochran ( dairy farmer and challenger in the dairy 
checkoff cases), who stated: "You are quite correct in picking up the fragmentation of 
our producers in the industry on style of production, style of management, style of 
marketing options, different regionalistic issues that seem to be continuing to divide 
us."364 
Dairy importers now must pay a promotion fee on all imported dairy products 
under the 2002 Farm Act. As a consequence, they were seen as likely in 2003 to become 
the next dairy checkoff challengers, claiming that they should be exempt from the 
checkoffs because they already pay a tariff. They will be seeking to break the checkoff 
hegemony so they can strengthen their position in the dominant "commodity industry 
bloc"controlling the U.S. dairy industry. 
Precipitating Conditions for Beef and Pork Checkoff Challenges: Industry 
Concentration and Vertical Integration 
Asked what he would do with the millions he 'd just won in the 
state lottery, Farmer Jones scratched his chin and answered, 
"Oh, I suppose I'll just keep on farming till it 's all gone. "365 
Secretary of Agriculture Daniel Glickman, delivered testimony on September 28, 
2000, at a hearing of the Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition Subcommittee of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. He stated: 
364 Cochran interview, 4. 
365 Ashton Applewhite, William R. Evans, ill, Andrew Frothingham, And I Quote (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 
1992), 227. 
171  
Consolidation and concentration in agriculture is an extraordinary critical issue 
facing agriculture because it threatens the foundation of rural America. The 
effects of concentration on family farmers and independent producers have been a 
dominant issue in agricultural policy for some time. Recently, however, rapid 
transformation in agricultural markets has generated increasing concern, and 
complaints that family farmers and independent producers, particularly in the 
livestock industry, do not have open and fair access to those markets. As a result, 
many small farmers believe they are being forced to compete at a disadvantage. 
This consolidation is taking place across broad agricultural sectors -
transportation, the •grain industry, livestock, and even biotechnology.366 
The shift to increased consolidation, coupled with declining farm profits in the 
last two decades, set the scene for a contentious relationship between the ever-expanding 
mass of those supporting the industrial model for agriculture and those feeling exploited 
and disenfranchised by their inequitable position in the production chain. The first group, 
referenced herein as the "industrial agriculture bloc" or AgriBiz, is comprised of fractions 
primarily from agribusiness, large producers, government, academia and trade 
associations. The second group, referenced herein as "AgriChoice," seeks to challenge 
the status quo by building a counter-hegemony and consensus in its own oppositional 
movements. Its goal is to construct an alternative political force (or agricultural bloc) 
founded on political and ideological positions, such as sustainable agriculture, respect for 
the environment and community and social returns. Changes in the agricultural industry 
arising from increased industry concentration and vertical integration have implications 
for smaller independent farmers and ranchers, in particular, so they are an important 
fraction in this historic bloc. 
The evidence indicated that the agricultural industry is experiencing what 
Gramsci called a crisis of hegemony: 
366 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition 
Subcommittee, Testimony of Daniel Glickman, 28 September 2000. 
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A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration 
means that uncurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves . . .  and 
that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend 
the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them without certain limits, 
and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts . . .  form the terrain of 
the conjunctural and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition 
organize. 367 
As might be expected, the people who have taken a strong stance against the 
commodity checkoff programs belong to the AgriChoice group. The pressures created by 
industry concentration and vertical integration are explicitly recognized by many as an 
overwhelming catalyst for the First Amendment checkoff challenges in the courts. 
The language used to describe the increasing level of concentration ranged from 
strident and alarmist on the part of the coalitions objecting to checkoffs to a bare whisper 
of acknowledgement in some government publications. 
At one end of the spectrum was Mike Callicrate, a beef producer in Kansas who 
viewed vertical integration as follows: 
. . .  the problem is the alliances that the NCBA [National Cattlemen's Beef 
Association] promotes take away market power from the producer and essentially 
forces them into these supply chain arrangements much like chicken farmers have 
experienced for years . . . . Complete vertical integration where the producer 
becomes usurped and a slave in the supply chain only to consume his asset and go 
bankrupt whenever he can't find a job on a farm providing enough income to 
offset his losses. It is so wrong. The NCBA has been hijacked by the big packers 
and retailers . . .  The problem is "however the packer votes, so goes the big cattle 
feeders. "368 
Callicrate denounced the role of the USDA: 
The USDA is not our friend. USDA does what the big meat packers and retailers 
ask them to do. It is the government agencies that have just castrated the United 
States government and their ability to enforce these antitrust laws . .  . I  don't know 
what the government is trying to get done. My answer to this is we just need a 
whole lot more buyers . . .  We need enough buyers so that they can't sit around the 
367 Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 179 (quoted in The Politics ofThatcherism, 23). 
368 Callicrate interview, p. 2. 
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darn table together and fix the price. We have packers right now that are just 
fixing prices and cooperating rather than competing. IBP [Iowa Beef Processor] 
opens up the market every week by shooting everybody in the foot. The other 
packers follow. It is the most anti-competitive situation you can imagine.369 
The Corporate Agribusiness Research Project (CARP) has monitored corporate 
agribusiness from a public interest perspective to "serve family farmers, farm workers 
and consumers in their struggles for economic and social justice. "370 It focused a critical 
eye on corporate agribusiness operations, claiming: 
In another erea, they would have been called 'the robber barons.' Today, the 
ADMs [Archer Daniel Midlands] , the Cargills, the ConAgras, the IBPs [Iowa 
Beef Processors], the Smithfield Foods, the Tysons, the Chiquitas and other 
corporate agribusiness behemoths which produce and manufacture our food have 
become the merchants of greed. 371 
CARP argued that corporate agribusiness has "deified the cost benefit analysis" at 
the expense of the common good.372 It raised the specter of a family farm system at the 
brink of being swallowed by agribusiness in a wave of concentration orchestrated by the 
"merchants of greed": 
Thus, we have arrived at a point where our family farm system of agriculture is 
facing its dark night of the soul, standing now on the threshold of eradication. 
Throughout the 1980s we saw an ever-mounting numbers of farm bankruptcies, 
foreclosures, and forced evictions reap a grim "human harvest" of suicides, 
alcoholism, divorce, family violence, personal stress, and loss of community. 
Continuing into the 1990s we witnessed the very economic and social fabric of 
rural America being ripped asunder as the control of our food supply was seized 
by those merchants of greed whose purpose is not to feed people, or provide jobs, 
or husband the land, but simply to increase their cash flow and reduce their 
transactional costs in order to placate their excess-profit-obsessed institutional 
investors. 373 
369 Ibid, p. 3 .  
37° Corporate Agribusiness Research Project, home page; available from http://www.electricarrow.com//CARP; 
Internet; accessed 1 April 2003. 
37
1 "The Merchants of Greed," Corporate Agribusiness Research Project; available from 




The AgriChoice viewpoint has been repeatedly voiced in Congressional hearings. Michael Stumo, a former Iowa hog and cattle buyer who is now a lawyer employed by the Organization for Competitive Markets, gave particularly ominous testimony bef ore a hearing held by Senator Richard Lugar on agriculture concentration and enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act: I come before you today with a sense of urgency. This is not just another farm crisis. This is the 'end game' of independent, family farm agriculture. The crux of the issue is industry structure. There are tremendous amounts of money being made in the food industry. The farm sector is not receiving that money because of the oligopsonistic [buyer shared monopoly] meat packers and the oligopsonistic retailers have positioned themselves to capture the bulk of that profit. Thus, high retail margins, high packer margins, and the end of the family farm . . . .  How did we get here? First the meat packers consolidated horizontally. Now they are appropriating the food chain vertically. If packers own or control livestock, there is no independent livestock agriculture. Period.374 On May 17, 2001, Peter Carstensen, George H. Young-Bascom Professor of Law at University of Wisconsin Law School, provided testimony on concentration and competition in agriculture before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies. He described the longstanding history of "frequent abuses of temporary market dominance and unacceptable efforts to exploit information or strategic advantage. "375 He emphasized that the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) was enacted to eliminate purely anticompetitive conduct in the market as well as control the unfair conduct of the packers. Suspect market structure and conduct is not being addressed by the USDA or Grain Inspection and Packers and 
374 U.S. Congress, Senate, Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee, Hearing on Agriculture Business 
Concentration, Testimony of Michael Stumo, 1 February 2000. 
375 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related 
Agencies, Hearing on Competition and Concentration in Agriculture, Testimony of Peter C. Carstensen, 17 May 
2001 1 February 2000; available from http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/120.pdf; Internet; accessed 7 July 
2003. 
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Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), however, a major failing that has been repeatedly 
brought to the public conscience. He pointed out the abuses that can occur through 
contracts of adhesion and an inoperative price reporting system: 
Left to their own devices, the large buyers will, as the Attorney General of 
Oklahoma has opined, force contracts of adhesion onto farmers and ranchers. For 
example, such contracts often deny the producer access to the courts and at the 
same time impose unfair and inequitable arbitration terms that effectively deny 
the producer all recourse. Confidentiality clauses keep farmers and ranchers from 
sharing information that would make them more concentrated. The fact would 
seem to require special regulations to ensure equitable treatment of sellers in such 
markets. Yet GIPSA has done and is apparently doing nothing to provide basic 
regulation for any market. Market facilitating legislation is long overdue and this 
committee should insist that GIP SA get on with the task. 376 
Professor Carstensen concluded: 
There is a manifest need for effective regulation of the livestock markets 
to ensure efficiency, fairness and equity in light of the high concentration and 
resulting incentives to engage in strategic conduct. The public record fully 
documents the existence of serious problems concerning both fairness and equity 
in these markets . . .  Given the dramatic changes in the ways in which livestock are 
sold, it is striking that the Department [of Agriculture] and GIPSA have totally 
failed to exercise the rule making authority that they possess to craft appropriate, 
market facilitating regulations to govern the new methods of buying and selling 
livestock. 377 
Jeanne Charter is a plaintiff in a major checkoff lawsuit and a voice for the 
independent rancher. She identifies vertical integration as an underlying issue dividing 
the agricultural industry for fifteen or twenty years. The following exchange took place 
in an interview with Jeanne Charter in February 2003: 
Interviewer: Well, the differences between your thinking and some of the more 
dominant groups' interests, are they longstanding? They go back since you've 
been involved? 
376 Ibid, 17. 
m Ibid. 
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Jeanne Charter: "Yeah, they're longstanding with us, 15 ,  20 years. The basic 
difference has been over whether the industry should stay organized in their own 
competitive markets or go into a vertically integrated structure." 378 
In a government report released in September 2001 titled Food and Agriculture 
Policy: Taking Stock/or the New Century, the government ignored these topics. The 
report set forth the Bush administration' s  farm policy principles with vague references to 
improving the infrastructure, such as: "The infrastructure that supports market growth 
and efficiency, which includes everything from border inspection services to research 
endeavors, must be renewed and reoriented to fit today's realities, with input and 
cooperation from every link in the food chain."379 The report acknowledged only briefly 
the negative implications of concentration in the industry in a single paragraph: 
While this structural change clearly is advantageous for some, it also 
prompts concerns about competition, market access, and the use of market power 
by some participants to the disadvantage of others. Moreover, reduced 
competition could limit society' s  gain from structural change by stifling 
innovation or tilting the market' s  results in favor of those with the greatest market 
power.380 
There were no negative implications noted in connection with vertical integration. 
The report merely stated: "Globalization of markets pressure firms to be more 
competitive and to 'shorten the supply chain,' streamlining the system (eliminating 
transactions and their associated costs) to efficiently meet rapidly changing consumer 
demand."381 
Other reports by the government shed light on how it is approaching the 
concentration and vertical integration issues. Incredulously, one Congressional Research 
378 Charter interview, 1 .  
379 United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New Century 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 2001), 27-28. 
380 Ibid., 21 .  
381 Ibid., 27. 
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Service Report referred to the severe impacts of anticompetitive practices as "quality-of­
life issues." The report began: 
Many issues associated with concentration and consolidation, such as job 
loss, change in ownership structure, and other quality-of-life issues, are not 
addressed by antitrust laws, but it is these quality-of-life issues that often are the 
driving force behind calls for stronger regulations and law enforcement in 
agriculture. 382 
There are clear policy implications for the government' s  continued acquiescence 
in the current tolerance for concentration in the agricultural sector. It implies a 
government facilitating the status quo. 
Moving to the pro-checkoff end of the spectrum, Terry Stokes, President of the 
National Cattlemen's  Beef Association, provided his acknowledgement of the issues 
raised by consolidation and described the situation: 
It is a philosophical divide that is occurring in the industry today as it relates to 
the free market system versus government intervention, free trade versus a 
protectionist approach . . . . 383 
I think there is concern within the entire industry about consolidation that is 
occurring at various levels. An example of that would be you have four meat 
packers that harvest about 80 percent of total production. You also have growing 
consolidation in the retail segment. There is concern by some that there is less 
return or when you look at the farm-to-retail spread, there is less of that dollar that 
is going back to the cow/calf producer. Based on that particular data, that seems 
to be a concern. 
The question becomes do you correct the situation, for example, in the packing 
segment by putting restrictions upon meat packers or do you facilitate more 
competition within that segment? Last year, we had a debate, and we will have to 
debate it again this year, over legislation that would ban meat packers from 
owning cattle and feed yards. There is a group within the industry that wants to 
have that legislation, and there are those who don't  because those who don't feel 
382 Jerry Heykoop, "Merger and Antitrust Issues in Agriculture: Statutes and Agencies," CRS Report for 
Congress (May 21 ,  2002), CRS-1 .  
383 Stokes interview one, 4. 
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like it's a restriction on the free market system and it would be detrimental to the 
industry. The other group thinks it would facilitate competition." 384 
Stokes' frank acknowledgement of the divisions existing within the various sectors of 
beef production were in contrast to a general refusal by much of the dominant industrial 
agriculture bloc to recognize the existence of serious issues related to industry 
concentration and vertical integration. 
It was the opinion of a representative from the Cattlemen's  Beef Board that the 
threat of integration should be distinguished from the checkoff issue. The representative 
clarified this position as follows: 
That's [the threat of integration] a policy issue. That' s not a checkoff issue. But 
it' s one of the changes in the industry that does lead to anxiety. And I think it 
underlies a lot of the legal challenges. But, oddly enough, the checkoff is not 
responsible for the formation of those alliances, nor has it done anything to 
encourage them. 385 
This same individual also recognized the divisions within the cattle industry in the 
following comment: "In our industry, there are a number of conflicts, the conflicts 
between producers and packers, between segments of the industry, and between 
organizations. It gets pretty complex."386 
A secondary theme, intertwined with the impact of concentration and vertical 
integration,was the shift to global food markets. Various fractions within AgriBiz have 
driven the move toward a borderless food production and distribution system with inputs 
and outputs based solely on economics and profitability. National corporations, adept at 
operating within this paradigm, have furthered this shift. This theme has implications for 
the beef industry because the small independent producers believe that imported foreign 
384 Stokes interview two, 1 1-12. 
385 Interview with anonymous representative from the Cattlemen's Beef Board, 14. 
386 Ibid., 17. 
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beef is "supplanting domestic production and acting to suppress market prices obtained 
by United States cattle producers."387 
If the move toward concentration and globalization in agriculture follows the 
trend of other industries, there is every reason to believe that, without a change in the 
balance of political and economic forces, transnational agricultural corporations will 
dominate. In describing the transnational capitalist class, Leslie Sklair, defined 
"transnational" as referring to "forces, processes and institutions that cross borders but do 
not derive authority and power from the state."388 He noted that transnational 
corporations are "owned by shareholders and controlled by Boards of Directors who can 
be citizens of any country. The prime responsibility of these Boards is to make the 
company as profitable as possible with no specific privileges extended to their states of 
origin. "389 
Sklair' s description of transnational corporations and their global role suggested 
that agricultural transnational corporations may become or already have become the 
central organizers for the "industrial agriculture bloc," a socio-political-economic bloc 
whose allies now include numerous agents of the state. Evidence suggests that fractions 
of the "industrial agriculture bloc" within the United States government are quietly 
negotiating away some of the national economic base for the various "commodity 
industry blocs" that currently exercise hegemony within their respective industries. This 
has occurred because allies of the transnational corporations who are negotiating trade 
agreements appear willing to sacrifice the economic interests of various "commodity 
387 Brief of Appellees at 16, Livestock Marketing Association, et al. v. USDA. et al. v. Nebraska Cattleman, Inc., 
et al., (8th Cir. 2002) (Appeal Nos. 02-3769 and 02-2832), filed October 7, 2002. 
388 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 2. 
389 Ibid. 
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industry blocs" (and perhaps the economic interests of the nation) to strengthen the power 
of the transnational corporations in the "industrial agriculture bloc. "390 
Sklair summarized the argument of his book, Globalization: Capitalism and its 
Alternatives, as follows: 
The argument of this book is that the most important global force at the beginning 
of the twenty�first century is the capitalist global system. Transnational 
corporations provide the material base for a transnational capitalist class that 
unquestionably dictates economic transnational practices, and is the most 
important single force in the struggle to dominate political and culture-ideology 
transnational practices. 391 
He emphasized the importance of the "culture-ideology" of consumerism: 
"[H]ow those who own and control the transnational corporations harness the 
transnational capitalist class to solidify their hegemonic control of consumerist 
culture and ideology, is the site of the many struggles for the global system. Who 
will win and who will lose these struggles is not a forgone conclusion. "392 
As noted earlier, the central organizing group in the "industrial agriculture bloc" 
is comprised of large commodity producers (agribusiness). As food markets increasingly 
become global and mergers and acquisition occur across borders, these commodity 
producers will likely become transnational with businesses that cover chemicals, 
biotechnology, food production and distribution and other related areas. (The alliances 
are referred to by William Heffernan as "food chain clusters.")393 These clusters have 
already begun to assume control as the organizing force in the industrial agriculture bloc. 
Clearly, the hegemony exercised within the agricultural industry has been and will 
continue to be influenced by the role of large transnational agribusiness organizations 
390 See generally, Leslie Sklair, Globalization: Capitalism and its Alternatives (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
391 Ibid., 9. 
392lbid. 
393 Heffernan, 3-4. 
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pursing strategies of increased concentration and vertical integration. 
The First Amendment challenges to the checkoffs represent a strategy for the beef 
and pork producers to regain the dollars that are currently being paid to fund industry 
programs that they claim fail to provide them with benefits and, in fact, are counter to 
their interests. It also represents the use of the legal system as a means for building 
counter-hegemony and gaining power in the broader agricultural conflict between 
AgriBiz and AgriChoice. The diagram shown as Figure 8 illustrates how the livestock 
industry structure does not allow benefits to flow back to producers. An indication of the 
diminished bargaining position of the producers and feeders can be seen in the lack of 
profits in the sales from the U.S. livestock sector to the U.S. beef and pork sectors, but 
growing profits at the next stage in which the processors, packers and grinders sell to 
wholesalers and retailers. The diagram also reflects the impact of imported beef and 
pork. 
Without market power, the sales made by the livestock sector to the beef and pork 
sectors allow little or no profit. The second sale made to the consumers is where the 
benefits of any generic advertising will be realized. As long as the livestock producers 
have no bargaining power, more sales at zero profit or a loss will not benefit them. The 
adage used by the dominant industrial agriculture bloc "a rising tide floats all ships" 
becomes "a rising tide floats all yachts." 
Precipitating Conditions for Fruit and Mushroom Checkoff 
Challenges: Branding and Product Differentiation 
The anti-checkoff forces in the legal battles over mandatory assessments in the 
fruit and mushroom industries are the large growers who are seeking to maximize the 
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REVIE\V OF CLAll\1IS 
Hegemony Claims: 
• Checkoffs benefit everyone in the 
industry through increased demand for 
product and research resuhs 
• '"A rising tide floats all boats" 
• Producers need to follow the industrial 
business model (use more technology. 
form alliances� etc.) if they want more 
profit 
• Generic ads are government speech 
• Voluntary program allows "free riders'• 
Independent Producers Claim: 
• Forced to sell in non-competitive market 
• Forced to sign inequitable contracts 
• Forced to fund ad messages with which 
they disagree 
• U.S. trade policy has created inequities 
• Checkoff money furthers the interests of 
those in the beef and pork sector and not 
the live livestock sector 
• Any increase in profits due to checkoffs is 
realized upstream and not by producers 
Figure 8 Key Economic and Policy Issues Underlying Livestock 
Checkoff Challenges 
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benefits of advertising their uniquely different and branded products. The diagram 
shown as Figure 9 illustrates an industry structure in which the anti-checkoff challengers 
find that mandatory fees undercut their marketing efforts. The challengers in these 
industries are sophisticated, large commercial production organizations who seek to 
increase their market shares by coaxing consumers to buy their branded products or 
recognizably high-quality products in place of generic products. Any increase in their 
market shares will likely come at the expense of the generic commodity growers or 
producers of other branded products. In either case, the net results of generic advertising 
are negative for growers of products that are notably distinguishable by superior features 
and/or a strong level of brand recognition acquired through extensive brand advertising. 
The mushroom and tree fruit industries illustrate the tension that exits between the 
goals of generic commodity producers and those promoting and selling products through 
branding and the advertising of unique product features. However, given the trend 
toward increased use of brands for all commodities, this tension may become more 
apparent in the livestock and dairy industries. Once full-scale branding occurs in those 
industries, the generic promotion of homogenous products may become an idea that has 
outlived its usefulness, even for the larger agribusiness enterprises. However, if the 
checkoff dollars can be captured by larger corporate interests for promotional efforts or 
research efforts that enhance their own brands and products, the programs may still offer 
strategic value to those entities. 
Mix of Conditions in Dairy Checkoff Challenges 
Three dairy checkoff cases will be considered in this dissertation. All are lower 
court cases since no dairy checkoff case has come before the Supreme Court. The first is 
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REVIE\V ()F Cl,, A I \ IS 
Hegemony Claims: 
• Checkoffs benefit everyone in the 
industry through increased demand 
for product and research results 
• No violation of First Amendment 
• Generic ads are government speech 
• Voluntary program allows 
"free riders" 
Anti-Checkoff Producers Claim: 
• Must still invest $ in branded product ads 
• Branded product ads are in competition 
with generic product ads 
• Generic ads give inaccurate message that 
products are homogenous 
• Small producers benefit at expense of big producers 
• Forced to pay for objectionable messages 
Figure 9 Key Economic and Policy Issues Underlying Tree Fruit and 
Mushroom Checkoff Challenges 
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a 1999 case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gallo Cattle Company v. 
California Milk Advisory Board and Veneman.394 A Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
case, Nature 's Dairy v. Glickman,395 was also decided in 1999 and a Pennsylvania 
District Court provided an opinion in Joseph P. Cochran, et al. v. Ann Veneman, et al. 396 
The chart shown as Figure 10 outlines the three cases and highlights the 
underlying issues for each. The challengers in the first two cases were unsuccessful in 
persuading the courts to strike down the dairy checkoffs. The plaintiffs in the first case, 
Gallo Cattle Co. v. Ca. Milk Advisory Board and Veneman, were large companies within 
the agricultural hegemony that have characteristics similar to the tree fruit checkoff 
challengers. They are motivated to fight the checkoff hegemony in order to achieve 
greater returns for their branding and product differentiation programs. In the case of 
Nature 's Dairy v. Glickman, the challengers are among the largest dairy producers in the 
United States and are, therefore, a major force within the agricultural hegemony. Their 
goal in challenging the checkoff programs is purely profit. 
The Cochrans, plaintiffs in the third case, Cochran v. Veneman, fit the profile of 
the small independent ranchers and farmers fighting the checkoff hegemony in the 
livestock industry. They describe themselves as committed to the goals of sustainable 
agriculture, fair pricing, the right to be free from compelled speech under the Constitution 
and the right to engage in independent farming practices not dictated by a milk 
cooperative. Hence, the checkoff lawsuit in which they are involved symbolizes a bundle 
of issues with one aim-to fight the large agricultural hegemony that they see as a 
394 Gallo, 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1999). 
395 Nature's Dairy, No. 99-439, U.S . App. LEXIS 12720 (6th Cir. 1999). 
396 Chochran, et aL , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4361 (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003). 
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Case Name/Description of Plaintiffs Underlying Issues 
- --
-Case #1 : 
Gallo Cattle Co. v. Ca. Milk Advisory Board The underlying issue is branding and product 
and Veneman, 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1999) 
I 
differentiation. 
Court upheld the checkoff program in an addendum Checkoff fees pay for a generic advertising program revising its earlier ruling that the program violated that uses "Real California Cheese" on a seal applied Gallo's First Amendment rights. to products and the slogan "It's the Cheese." 
Plaintiff is a large California dairy operation ( once the Gallo objects to the generic message because Gallo's nation's largest dairy farm) that uses 100 % of its cheeses are superior and distinguishable. milk to produce cheese. : Placing the compelled message on Gallo' s  product 
1 Gallo promotes and sells premium, award-winning falsely portrays its product as the same as others. cheese under the label "Joseph Farms." Its cheeses 
are distinguishable from other cheeses. Checkoff program hamstrings progressive agriculture. 
Case #2 
Nature's Dairy v. Glickman, No. 99-439, 1999 The underlying issue is strictly desire to 
U.S. App. LEXIS 3547 (6th Cir. 1999) increase profit. 
Court upheld the dairy checkoff program, These large dairies want to increase their profits by 
finding it similar to the regulatory scheme in avoiding any checkoff payments. 
Glickman. Large producers do not feel the checkoff promotion 
Plaintiffs include seventeen huge commercial , program is needed. 
dairy operations (the largest in the nation). Other than the legal argument that free speech rights 
All plaintiffs represented by lawyer, Ben Yale, have been violated, plaintiffs voice no other opinions regarding issues that might be related to their who represents Cochrans in case #3 . checkoff challenges. 
Case #3: 
Cochran v. Veneman, No. 4: CV-01-0529, There are multiple underlying issues: 
I 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4361 (Middle Dist. 
Penn. 2003) Generic advertising does not represent the interests of 
I the challengers. 
I Court upheld the checkoff program based on an Milk pricing system is manipulated and inequitable. analysis under Glickman. 
Plaintiffs are a N.Y. couple who run a family dairy Concentrated commercial dairy farm operations have operation of 150 head of cattle with three sons. gained industry power and favor with the government. 
Plaintiffs are part of a dairy counter-hegemony Competition from imported dairy products (e.g., movement. "milk protein concentrates" or MPCs) has eroded market for U.S. dairy products. 
Plaintiffs are represented by Ben Yale, also counsel 
for the commercial dairy farms in Case #2. USDA misrepresents data and restricts access to data. I 
Figure 10 Diverse Plaintiffs in Dairy Checkoff Challenges 
and Underlying Issues 
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crippling influence on agriculture today. The district court upheld the checkoffs, so 
Cochrans have filed an appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Brenda Cochran described the farmer's perspective on the dairy checkoff: 
I just have to say on behalf of most dairy farmers I associate with, the constant 
erosion of our economic strength through years and years and years of insane 
milk prices makes any "deduct" [for mandatory checkoffs] on a milk check a 
further stifling of our ability to reorganize and react to what we feel are unfair 
powers exerted against us in the marketplace . . .  That' s why we' re looking to the 
Constitution to level the playin� field, so to speak. The Constitution, under 
proper scrutiny, will be upheld. 97 
As can be seen by the checkoff cases, the dairy industry has several different 
types of producers functioning under different regulations depending on geographic 
location and product category. The industry also has highly sophisticated and 
concentrated cooperatives that have been perceived as a major negative force in the dairy 
farmers ' struggle for an equitable marketing environment. 
According to Brenda Cochran, the diverse characteristics of the milk producers 
create disadvantages, but the checkoff issue has prompted some unity. 
You are quite right in picking up the fragmentation of our producers in the 
industry on style of production, style of management, style of marketing options, 
different regionalistic issues that seem to be continuing to divide us. So, we are 
definitely an industry of division. And that has been one of our weaknesses at 
least in the political forum. It's often used against us in personal meetings with 
congressmen and senators. They will point to what appears to be tremendous 
disagreement between regions and dairy farmers on how to best solve these 
problems. This is something I think that we have moved into a positive zone on. 
But I do think this case [the Cochran dairy checkoff case] , this challenge, does 
speak more generally to many different type producers than say some of the other 
pricing issues. 398 
Brenda and Joseph Cochran were unable to see any benefits from the dairy 
checkoff programs. Brenda Cochran summed it up by saying: "[T]he only benefit I see to 
397 Cochran interview, 3. 
398 Ibid., 4. 
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generic dairy commodity checkoffs is to processors and ultimately retailers( (if they can 
be seen as part of the picture) because they're moving more finished product. .399 The 
Cochrans and other commodity producers interviewed in this study are keenly aware of 
the subordinate position of the producer at the bottom of the food chain in the industrial 
agriculture model. Brenda Cochran referred to a "class struggle" that she first recognized 
in the form of hostility toward farmers in the 1980s under the Reagan administration. The 
privileged class or group in commodity production is the industrial agriculture bloc 
organized by the processors and the retailers. The hegemony this bloc exercises allows it 
to dominate milk producers of all sizes, creating tension and impetus for the challengers 
to seek out new issues (the diary checkoff program) and new terrain (the courts) for 
counter-hegemony. It is noteworthy that the checkoff challengers in the Gallo Cattle and 
Nature 's Dairy cases were large milk producers dissatisfied with the checkoff system. 
399 Ibid, 8. This assessment from one of the farmers in the trenches reinforces the idea presented in this 
paper that the dominant hegemony is being organized by agribusiness to support and further its dominance. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CHASING THE CHECKOFF FEE: EXPLORING THE INTERESTS AND 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTIONS OF THE PLAYERS 
The Investigative Frame 
This analysis used the investigative frame presented earlier in this dissertation at 
Figure 4 as a tool for gathering and organizing key evidence and findings for further 
analysis. This frame required the researcher first to identify the entities involved in the 
commodity checkoff conflicts. Once the entities were identified, the investigative frame 
guided the researcher in locating evidence that provided an understanding of the general 
history of each entity and its actions, the interests at stake for such entity, the principles 
espoused by that entity and, finally, the legal positions that the entity has asserted in 
furtherance of its objectives. 
This section explores the evidence as it relates to all areas within the investigative 
frame with the exception of the Federal and State judiciaries. A separate legal 
investigation frame will be used to study the Federal and State judiciaries in chapter 
seven. 
The preliminary list of entities shown in the investigative frame proved to be 
correct, namely: 1) Federal and state agencies, 2) political parties and elected officials, 3) 
industry trade associations and agricultural commodity promotion boards, 4) commodity 
producers defending hegemony, 5) commodity producers challenging hegemony, and 6) 
activist groups seeking free speech and other goals. However, the evidence showed that 
clearly the industry trade associations referenced in item three should be acknowledged 
as falling within two groups - those supporting checkoffs and alternative organizations 
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started by those against checkoffs. In addition, the evidence established that six 
additional entities play roles in influencing (or attempting to influence) the ongoing 
conflict between pro-checkoff and anti-checkoff forces: the media, agribusiness 
(corporations whose business revolve around agriculture), advertising agency 
associations, the AFL-CIO, and academic specialists whose work and source of funding 
aligns them with either the dominant hegemony or the anti-checkoff challengers. 
The final list of entities that were relevant in this study are shown in Table 2. 
Federal and State Agencies. The primary agency with responsibility for 
administering the checkoff programs is the Unites States Department of Agriculture. 
Founded by Abraham Lincoln in 1 862 as ''The People' s Department,"400 it is an agency 
of immense size today, ranking third in the civilian departments of the U.S .  
Government401 with a host of employees throughout the United States and 60 countries 
numbering more than 100,000. Its operations are broken into the following seven 
mission areas: 1) Rural Development; 2) Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services; 3) 
Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services; 4) Food Safety; 5) Natural Resources and 
Environment; 6) Research, Education, and Economics; and 7) Marketing and Regulatory 
Programs.402 Several functional units, under the direct authority of the Secretary of 
Agriculture, provide umbrella services to all of the USDA in matters related to 
administration, communications, economics, finances and legal issues403 
USDA' s responsibilities in overseeing mandatory commodity assessments fall 
400 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Fact Book 2000, (Wa. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 





Table 2 Key Entities or "Fractions" Involved in Commodity Checkoff Conflicts 
- - - - --
Entities ( G ramsci Pro- Anti-Checkoff 




Federal and State 
Agencies X 
Political Parties and Elected 
Officials X X 
(Majority) (Minority) 
Industry Trade Associations 
Alhmed with He._gemony X 
: 
Industry Trade Associations X (A prominent 
Aligned with Counter- example is R-Calf for 
I He�emony 
cattle oroducers) I 
Agricultural Commodity 
Boards X I 
Commodity Producers 
Defending Hegemony X I 
Commodity Producers 
Opposing He_gemony X 
Activist Groups 
1) First Amendment 
I 
Free Speech Groups, 
2) Legal Coalitions, X 
3) Grass Roots Farm 
Activist Groups, and 
4) National Coalitions I 
for Amcultural Change I I 




I Associations X 
AFL-CIO 
X 
Academic Specialists Aligned 
with He.e:emony X 
Academic Specialists Aligned 
I with Counter-Hegemony X 
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within the auspices of the Marketing and Regulatory Programs. The Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) is charged with administering the research and promotion 
programs for thirteen industries, including: beef, pork, cotton, fluid milk, dairy products, 
eggs, honey, mushrooms (only mushroom research programs are carried out using 
checkoff dollars in the wake of the United Foods decision), potatoes; soybeans, 
watermelons, popcorn and peanuts. 404 
Individual authority is given to the Secretary of Agriculture to appoint members 
of the commodity boards, and the AMS interacts with the boards. Its staff facilitates the 
oversight of the commodity checkoff programs. The staff member at the Agricultural 
Marketing Service responsible for the livestock industry is Barry Carpenter. He reports to 
Kenneth Clayton, who reports to A.J. Yates, acting administrator of the Agricultural 
Marketing Service. 
The enforcement of the commodity checkoff programs and their legal defense in 
First Amendment actions challenging such programs on constitutional grounds is carried 
out by the Office of the General Counsel at USDA and the United States Justice 
Department. The activities of both agencies are funded by budget appropriations in the 
Federal budget derived from U.S . taxpayer dollars. 
Daniel Glickman offered the following opinion on the USDA's position on 
checkoff programs: " . . .  I think USDA has always been a strong supporter of the 
promotion programs. Look, most of these were created by statute, not all of them, but 
most of them. And that means Congress has gone on record in favor of them."405 
404 Ibid., 230-231. 
405 Glickman interview, 5.  
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There is evidence that the USDA is cross-pollinated with individuals who have 
been active professionally in commodity boards or associations, agribusiness, academic 
projects or consulting projects paid for and aligned with the dominant pro-checkoff 
hegemony. A closer look at the current leadership roster for USDA shows the following 
professional crossovers: 
► Ann M. Veneman, Agriculture Secretary - Secretary Veneman was sworn in to 
this top position on August 9, 2002. Her background at the USDA included 
service from 1986 to 1993 in positions at USDA's Agricultural Service (1986-
1989), Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs and Commodity 
Programs (1989-1991), and USDA Deputy Secretary (1991-1993). She served as 
Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture from 1995 to 
1999. Between her years of state and federal government service, Veneman 
worked as an attorney with a legal services and lobbying firm in Washington, 
D.C. (1993-1995) and with a firm in Sacramento, California (1999-2001.406 
International trade is a top priority for Veneman, Her interest in this area 
was enhanced by her experience as a U.S. negotiator in major trade policy 
discussions during the past decade. Veneman is widely viewed as an advocate of 
agribusiness and a "biotech absolutist," a perception that was reinforced when she 
made the following declaration at an agricultural conference at University of 
California in 1999: "We simply will not be able to feed the world without 
406 See "Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman,° United States Department of Agriculture (March 2002); 
available from http://www.usda.gov/agencies/gallery/veneman.htm; Internet; accessed 14 June 2003. 
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biotechnology."407 She served on the board of directors of Calgene Inc., the 
biotechnology company that introduced the first genetically engineered food on 
the market, the Flavr Savr tomato produced with fish genes. Later, she became a 
director at Monsanto when it aquired Calgene. She also served on the 
International Policy Council, a trade group formed and funded by agribusiness 
enterprises such as Cargill, Nestle, Kraft and Archer Daniels Midland.408 
► Dr. Charles Lambert , Deputy Under Secretary for Marketing and 
Regulatory Programs - Prior to joining USDA on December 2, 2002, Dr. 
Lambert was employed by the National Cattlemen's Beef Association for more 
than fifteen years in various capacities. His final position at the trade association 
was as chief economist.409 
► A.J. Yates, Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service - A.J. Yates 
began his service at the USDA in September 2001. His background includef a 
career in state government at the California Department of Food and Agriculture 
(CDFA). Beginning in 1991, Yates served five years as Deputy Secretary of the 
CDFA and three years as Undersecretary. He left in January 1999 for a two-year 
407 "Bush's Corporate Cabinet, Ann Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture," MultiNational Monitor (May 1 
2001); available from http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/0 lmay/may0 1 bushcc.html; Internet; 
accessed 15 June 2003. Also see John Nichols, "Meet Ann Veneman-Perhaps Bush's Most Dangersous 
Cabinet Pick," Madison Capital Times, published online at Common Dreams NewCenter , 'f 4 (January 15, 
2001); available from http ://www.commondreams.org/views01/01 l5-04.htm; Internet; accessed 15 June 
2003. 
408 Ibid. 
409 See "Biographical Sketch: Dr. Charles 'Chuck' Lambert," United States Department of Agriculture 
(November 7, 2002); available from http://www.usda.gove/agencies/gallery/lambert.htm; Internet; accessed 
21  March 2003. 
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stint in private business as a senior marketing consultant for Panagraph Marketing 
Solutions in Fresno, California, before joining the USDA.410 
► Dale Moore, Chief of Staff - In February 2001 ,  Dale Moore joined USDA as 
chief of staff to Secretary Ann Veneman. He worked for the National 
Cattlemen's Beef Association as executive director for legislative affairs for three 
years prior to beginning his job at USDA. He is the member of Secretary 
Veneman's staff cited most often in the press (and in the interviews for this 
research) as being closely aligned with the industrial agriculture bloc working in 
favor of agribusiness and against the interests of independent farmers. As 
legislative director of the Committee on Agriculture at the U.S. House of 
Representatives from 1995 to 1996, he was involved in Congressional work on 
the 1996 Farm Bill. Prior to that, he held staff positions on the House 
Agricultural Committee and performed three years as minority counsel for the 
House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Department Operations, 
Research and Foreign Agriculture (1991-1993). He began his career working six 
years from 1985 to 1991 as the agricultural legislative assistant for U.S. 
Representative Pat Roberts from Kansas, now a U.S. Senator from Kansas.41 1  
► Alison Harrison, Deputy Director of Communications and Press Secretary -
Alison Harrison was appointed to this position on October 12, 2001 ,  after fifteen 
years of employment with the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA). 
410 See "Biography: A.J. Yates, Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service," United States Department 
of Agriculture (September 2001); available from http://www.ams.usda.gov/admin/YatesBio.htm; Internet; 
accessed 21  March 2003. 
411  See "Biography, Dale Moore, Chief of Staff," United States Department of Agriculture (February 2001); 
available from http://www.usda.gov/agencies/gallery/moore.htm; Internet; accessed 21  March 2003. 
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Harrison's responsibilities as Executive Director of Public Relations for the 
NCBA included managing the organization's  media and public relations 
initiatives as part of its consumer marketing and public policy strategies.412 
► Donna Reifschneider, Adminstrator of USDA's Grain Inspection, Packers 
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) - Reifschneider joined the USDA on 
April 2, 2002. She has held various positions in the livestock industry, including: 
executive committee member of the Meat Export Federation ( 1999-2002), 
president of the National Pork Producers Council, chair of the Pork Quality 
Assurance committee (1992-1998) and chair of the Pork Food Safety committee 
(1995-1998) and member of the Pork Trade committee (1999 to present).413 
Reifschneider' s past employment with the Meat Export Federation and her 
position as president of the National Pork Producer's Council have caused critics 
to question her commitment to protect the rights of the independent pork 
producers under the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA). Anticompetitive 
practices by the meatpackers have been ignored by GIPSA during Reifschneider' s 
term (as well as during past administrations). A class action lawsuit, Pickett v. 
IBP,414 brought under the PSA was scheduled for trial in January 2004. The 
plaintiffs have challenged the captive supply arrangements of the meatpackers and 
have alleged that they have unlawfully suppressed prices. The challengers have 
publicly stated: 
412 See "Veneman Names Alisa Harrison As Deputy Director of Communications and Press Secretary," 
News Release, United States Department of Agriculture (October 12, 2001); available from 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2001/10/0197.htm; Internet; accessed 21 March 2003. 
4
13 "Veneman Selects Donna Reifschneider as Administrator of GIPSA," News Release No. 0130.02, 
United States Department of Agriculture (April 2, 2002); available from 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2002/04/0130.htm; Internet; accessed 21  March 2003. 
414 Pickett et al. v. IBP, Inc., Civil No. 96-A-1 103-N (Dist. Ct. MD Ala.). 
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The packers have succeeded in convincing USDA and the Congress that 
captive supplies are merely a natural change in the industry . . . They will 
not be able to use campaign contributions and K Street lobbyists to 
influence the decision of the jury that will hear this case. If the jury rules 
for cattlemen, it will be the most significant event in the cattle industry 
since the federal government broke up the packer-cartel in the early 
1920's.415 
Several of those interviewed for this study seriously questioned whether 
Donna Reifschneider could be an effective administrator in enforcing the PSA, 
given her alignment with the dominant hegemony in past employment. In the 
end, GIPSA' s complete failure to represent the interests of f armers in enforcing 
the PSA against abusive captive supply practices has resulted in the counter­
hegemony's choice to bypass Reifschneider's agency and use the court's for their 
war of position. Regardless of the outcome, Reifschneider' s name will be linked 
with the first class action lawsuit ever under the PSA to challenge anticompetitive 
practices of the meatpackers-primarily the result of GIPSA's failure to act in its 
enforcement capacity. 
► Dr. J.B. Penn, Under Secretary, Farm & Foreign Agricultural Services - Dr. 
J.B. Penn assumed his position at USDA in April 2002, after pursuing a career in 
the private sector for many years as an agricultural economist. He worked for 
Sparks Companies, Inc., from 1988 to 2002, serving as vice president and 
manager of their Washington office for more than twelve years before joining the 
USDA. (Sparks is an agricultural and commodity market research, analysis and 
consulting firm based in Memphis, Tennessee.) Penn had earlier experience in 
415 "OCM's Cattlemen's Competitive Market Project Applauds Favorable Decision in Cattle Price 
Manipulation Case," Organization for Competitive Markets (April 1 1 ,  2003); available from 
http://www.competitivemarkets.com/news_and_events/PR.Pickett.041 103.htm; Internet; accessed 22 May 
2003. 
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the private sector as president of Eco])omic Perspectives, Inc. from 1981 to 1988 and held several government positions early in his career as deputy administrator f or economics with the USDA Economics and Statistics Service and senior staff economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisors. Penn is the author of Agricultural and Food Policy (fourth edition) and numerous articles and other publications. Jeanne Charter, an outspoken critic of the USDA and a plaintiff in a beef checkoff case, described the connection between the National Cattlemen's Beef Association and the USDA as being: . . .  kind of like snakes mating, you can't tell where NCBA ends and the USDA begins in the beef industry. It's almost a truism with people passing back and forth, either being a government bureaucrat or an industry bureaucrat. That part of the question of the future character of the industry is how intertwined it is with public agencies. 416 The evidence suggests the existence of a loose community of agricultural elites who move between government, industry and academia performing leadership roles. The anti-checkoff challengers argue that these are crossover artists who sing the same song wherever they are professionally located. They remain mouthpieces for the pro­commodity groups rather than neutral parties seeking to serve the public interest. David Moeller stated: "I think there are industry ties in a lot of what USDA does, and I think that drives their policy."417 Mike Callcrate succinctly stated: "The USDA is industry. There is a revolving door from industry to the USDA and back again."418 
416 
Charter interview, 4. 
417 
Moeller interview, 2. 
418 
Callicrate interview, 9. 
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In short, the evidence suggest that the United States Department of Agriculture, 
the administrative organizations that carry out services under the checkoff programs and 
the industry trade groups speak with one voice (or at least sing in harmony). 
Political Parties and Elected Officials. The legislators who are in positions to 
most likely influence the commodity checkoff programs are the senators who are active 
on the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry for the Senate and the and 
members of the House of Representatives who serve on the Committee on Agriculture for 
the U.S. House of Representatives. At present, the following individuals provide 
leadership on these committees: 
► Senator Tom Harkin (Democrat, Iowa) - Former Chairman and ongoing 
ranking Democratic member of Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and 
Forestry, U.S� Senate; 
► Senator Thad Cochran (Republican, Mississippi) - Chairman, Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S. Senate; 
► Senator Richard G. Lugar (Republican, Indiana) - Foreign Relations 
Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, U.S. Senate 
(forfeited position of highest-ranking Republican on the committee when he 
became Chairman of Foreign Relations); 
► Congressman Larry Combest (Republican, Texas) - Departing Chairman, 
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives (retiring, effective 
May 2003); 
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► Congressman Bob Goodlatte (Republican, Virginia) - Incoming Chairman, 
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representative (effective May 
2003); and 
► Congressman Charles W. Stenholm (Democrat, Texas) - Ranking Democratic 
Minority member, Committee on Agriculture, U.S .  House of Representatives. 
John Kingdon offered insight into the process of decision making by 
congressional representatives in his book titled Congressmen 's Voting Decisions.419 
Especially useful is a decisional flow chart that Kingdon used to model how 
representatives make decisions regarding proposed bills or amendments based on a series 
of considerations.420 Kingdon' s  model, shown herein as Figure 1 1 , sheds light on how 
legislators and government decision makers have approached proposals for change 
related to industry concentration and the checkoff fees. Specifically, Kingdon' s model 
identifies a number of key points in the decision-making process where the industrial 
agriculture bloc can exercise hegemony to influence on the behavior of the legislator or a 
government official These are points of pressure for AgrBiz to win consent. 
The first pivotal question is whether the proposal is controversial. Issues that are 
noncontroversial are easy for the legislators to handle. They simply vote along with the 
predominant view on the issue (Kingdon calls it "voting with the environment.")421 
However, if the proposal is controversial, the congressional representative then will then 
determine whether there is conflict among actors within his or her "field of forces" 
consisting of his constituents, fellow congressmen, lobbyists, academics, industry 
419 See John W. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decision (Ann Arbor, Mich: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1989). 
420 Ibid., 244. 
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representatives and other reference groups. If this group shares the legislator' s 
viewpoint or is neutral, he or she will vote consistently with this circle of people.422 It is 
in the best interest of the various commodity industry blocs and the industrial agriculture 
bloc to ensure that key legislators on agricultural committees and subcommittees are 
surrounded by a cadre of individuals who can legitimize and support their interests. In 
the case of checkoffs, this includes providing available information on the benefits of the 
checkoffs, their historical value, evidence of the groups supporting the checkoffs, recent 
academic evaluations of their effectiveness and so on. 
At the next decision-making juncture, the legislator evaluates his or her goals 
( constituency goals, policy goals, economic goals, etc.) and determines whether there is 
conflict within those goals. If conflict does not exist, the legislator easily votes in 
accordance with his goals.423 Through lobbying and aggressive promotion of their 
positions, various individuals representing the hegemony can attempt to influence the 
goal-setting agenda of legislators. The goals of the industrial model of agriculture are 
easily aligned with the goals of the checkoff programs since increasing consumer demand 
will create more sales to take advantage of higher levels of production and efficiency. 
At the next step, if a congressional representative determines that a constituency 
goal is involved and that it is highly salient, he or she will vote with the constituency. 
Here, AgriBiz can again be extremely influential in identifying its various "fractions" (a 
word used by Gramsci to identify the component groups in a dominant bloc) as key 
constituents with demands and needs to be met. 
422 Ibid., 245. 
423 Ibid., 246-247. 
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If the matter does not involve a constituency goal that is highly salient, the next 
consideration is whether one of the legislator's own policy goals is involved. If he or she 
has no policy goals regarding this issue, he will vote consistent with the goal of intra­
Washington influence. 424 This is another juncture for the dominant industrial agriculture 
bloc to exert its hegemony over individual legislators since its agenda is part of an 
underlying mindset among the majority of Washington actors supportive �f the 
hegemony. 
The decision making then turns on whether the President of the legislator's party 
is placing a high priority on the issue and whether a policy goal is involved. The 
representative votes with the President if the top executive deems the issue to be a high 
priority, but votes with his or her own policy goal if the President has not placed a 
priority on the matter.425 
If none of the legislator' s goals passed the critical level of importance, the 
legislator immediately considers whether there are fellow congressional representatives 
of major importance voicing a position. If so, the legislator votes with these colleagues. 
While Kingdon recognized that that the model cannot explain some cases, the model does 
suggest numerous decision points at which the agricultural hegemony can attempt to 
influence and gain consensus from legislators.426 
An example of how commodity industry blocs attempted to exert hegemony on 
the legislative process in the checkoff cases can be seen in a letter that was forwarded by 
fifteen major trade groups to Tom Harkin, Chairman of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition 
424 Ibid. 
425 Ibid., 248. 
426 Ibid., 248-250. 
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and Forestry Committee during the process of finalizing the 2002 Farm Bill. As a 
strategy in their "war of position" against the checkoff challengers, the letter proposed to 
the Senate Committee that Congress could help ensure that government was able to do its 
job in collecting funds to run the checkoff programs by inserting language in the 2002 
Farm Bill recognizing that the advertising and promotion involved in the checkoff 
program was government speech. Detailed draft language was attached to the letter. 427 
This prompted letters to the same Senate Committee from the anti-checkoff groups 
pointing out that this was a "back-door" effort to circumvent the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the principle of government speech. With numerous other issues to 
resolve in finalizing the 2002 Farm Bill , the legislators chose to ignore this attempt to 
solicit their support for the controversial government speech principle, a hot potato that 
was already within the jurisdiction of the courts. 
An article written by Senator Bryon Dorgan (Democrat, North Dakota) in 2000, 
characterized the way in which legislators have not sincerely represented the interests of 
the family farmers. He writes: "We've shed crocodile tears over farmers while 
promoting their demise. "428 
Industry Trade Associations and Agricultural Commodity Promotion Boards 
Aligned with Hegemony. Each of the five industries studied has a structure for 
427 See Commodity Groups, letter from fourteen commodity groups to the Honorable Senator Tom Harkin 
(March 5, 2002); available from http://www.electricarrow.com/CARP/agbiz/149.htm; Internet; accessed 16 May 
2003. The trade groups signing the letter included: Alabama Farmers' Federation, Alabama Peanut Producers 
Association, American Beekeeping Federation, American Farm Bureau Federation, American Mushroom 
Institute, Georgia Agricultural Commodity Commission for Peanuts, National Cattlemen's Beef Association, 
National Cotton Council of America, National Milk Producers Federation, National Pork Producers Council, 
National Potato Council, The Popcorn Institute, United Egg Association, United Egg Producers, and Western 
Peanut Growers Assocation. 
428 Senator Bryon Dorgan, "Don't be Down on the Farm: How to Preserve a National Treasure," The 
Washington Monthly Online, 'I 38 (January/February 2000); available from 
http://www. washingtonmonthly .com/features/2000/000 l .dorgan.html; Internet; accessed 13 April 2003. 
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implementing checkoff programs that includes several key players. The first stopping 
place for the checkoff fees in several programs (pork and livestock) is a state council or 
board. (The beef program has certified beef councils in forty-five states.)429 The state 
entity then passes on at least fifty percent of the fees (more if it chooses) to a national 
board responsible for deciding how the money will be allocated. In the beef industry, this 
is the Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board (CBB), a board comprised of 1 10 
domestic producers and one importer. In the pork industry, this management board is the 
National Pork Board (NPB), a management group of fifteen pork producers that are 
elected. These two boards then each contract with third parties to carry out the activities 
necessary to implement the plans and goals established by the primary board. 
The CBB has a contract with the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA), 
a national trade association with open membership, and the NPB has a contract with the 
National Pork Producers Council (NPPC). The NPPC is comprised of 175 members (a 
minimum of two from each state and five importers) that are elected by producer and 
importer representatives. It collects and allocates checkoff fees and administers the 
checkoff programs. 
The NCBA and the NPPC are service providers to the primary boards. However, 
they are also major trade associations with their own agendas and a demanding 
membership that supports the industrial agriculture model. This creates an obvious 
conflict of interest. Jeanne Charter described the relationship between the NCBA and the 
CBB as follows: 
They [the NCBA] are essentially more of a checkoff contractor now than they are 
a private industry group. They're living off of it. The policy part is kind of a side 
429 Interview with anonymous representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board, 3. 
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line . . . .  their jobs are at stake. Most of their staff is part-time checkoff related and 
part-time policy related. So they're able to kind of keep more people on staff and 
a lot of their overhead is covered this way. People always do this with grant 
monies and so on. It props things up that otherwise would be much more modest. 
The other thing we heard in '96 when they got handed the program was that the 
senior staff salaries tripled. 
Livestock board managers have sought to coll:nter the conflict of interest claims 
through rhetoric describing "firewalls"and strategies designed to demonstrate that the 
checkoff programs are not sustaining the trade associations. But the anti-checkoff group 
has not been persuaded. An executive of the Livestock Marketing Association described 
the firewall between the CBB and the NCBA as a "glass wall you can see through. "430 
The executive also offered the following comments about the personnel employed by 
these groups: 
It's  all an incestuous relationship in which the NCBA board members serve on the 
Beef Board and they serve on boards of the state beef councils. They interchange, 
they intertwine. Former chairmen of the Beef Board . . .  become presidents of the 
National Cattlemen's  Beef Association or former presidents of the Cattlemen's 
Association eventually sometimes become chairmen of the Beef Board. They just 
recirculate. 431 
Although this research did not include a study of the movement of people in 
management positions between the NCBA and the CBB, it is worth noting that those 
fighting the checkoffs have the perception that this as a problem. The concern arises 
because the membership of the NCBA represents an overwhelming number from the beef 
commodity industry bloc. Although the CBB is charged with the responsibility of fairly 
deciding how funds will be spent to best represent the interests of all producers paying 
checkoffs, the hegemony in the beef industry can be exercised through the presence of 
those on the board with strong NCBA connections. However, a representative of the 
430 Interview with anonymous executive of Livestock Marketing Association, 7. 
431 Ibid. 
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Cattlemen's Beef Board interviewed for this research gave assurances that this has not 
occurred. The representative clarified the relationship between NCBA and CBB as 
follows: 
NCBA is a contractor of checkoff funded programs, and we only reimburse the 
costs they incur in those programs. We do not allow them to receive any profit 
margin, if you will. We simply reimburse the actual costs incurred. So, through a 
set of accounting practices and procedures, we've created a firewall that, we are 
confident, prevents any of the checkoff money from flowing through to any of the 
membership or public policy interests of NCBA . . . .  We have conducted a series of 
compliance audits using outside audit firms to examine the contracts and the way 
charges were billed to the beef board and the way they were analyzed and paid to 
make sure that we've achieved this cost recovery. 432 
In the following interview excerpt, the representative emphasized that NCBA is 
not allowed to use checkoff fees to further its policy agenda: 
Representative: [T]he position NCBA takes on a public policy issue is not 
relevant to their performance on managing an advertising program, for example, 
or managing a research project when, in fact, they are subcontracting with an 
advertising agency or with a university to conduct research. 
Interveiwer: Do you think there's any flow over in the choices that are made and 
the messages and so forth in those programs? 
Representative: You mean a flow over from the policy position? 
Interviewer: Right. 
Representatative: I've sure seen no evidence of that. And I really think if there 
had been evidence of that, as highly visible as both activities are and with the 
regulatory control that USDA exerts over checkoff dollars, that would have been 
exposed and stopped.433 
While the NCBA may be prevented from using checkoff funds for public policy 
purposes, it does engage in extensive public relations efforts and politically motivated 
strategies to promote the checkoff programs themselves. NCBA runs advertisements in a 
432 Interview with anonymous representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board, 6. 
433 Ibid., 6-7. 
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broad range of trade publications to gamer support for the checkoffs by extolling the 
benefits of the various initiatives funded by the checkoff programs apart from the generic 
advertising. These are advertisements promoting the checkoff program, not promoting 
beef as a commodity. The advertisements are full-page and provide messages such as 
following: 
"Checkoff dollars educate consumers about beef." 
"Your beef checkoff is focused on food safety." 
''The checkoff educates consumers about beef safety." 
''The checkoff is spreading the news of beefs nutritional value." 
A similar approach is followed by the National Pork Board. Its industry-targeted 
advertisements feature advertising messages such as the following: 
The Pork Checkoff. 
Uncovering new ways for producers to market their pork. 
The Pork Checkoff is helping U.S. pork producers of all sizes explore niche­
marketing opportunities for pork by finding new ways to work outside the 
traditional commodity chain. Opening the door to unique market opportunities 
is one way the Pork Checkoff is helping to build a better future for American 
pork producers. Find out more about what your Pork Checkoff is doing for you. 
Call 10800-456-PORK. 
These internal industry ads are part of the hegemonic strategy followed by the dominant 
industry bloc to maintain control of the checkoff program by building consensus around 
the supplemental benefits of the programs. 
Kathleen Merrigan, former administrator of the USDA Agricultural Marketing 
Service (the administrative arm responsible for the mandatory commodity assessment 
programs), pointed out the problems that existed with the close relationship between the 
Pork Board and the NPPC: 
The anti-checkoff crowd felt very angry about the allowed association 
between the Pork Board and the National Pork Producers Council . (I think that 
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could be said for beef, too.) The lobbying arms for the industry and the Board 
haven't been-there's not been enough of a firewall between them. There were 
actually staff people who had part of their time taken by the Pork Board and part 
of their time by NPPC. That's just setting you on the road for trouble.434 
It is significant that, in attempting to resolve the pork referendum issue by means· 
of a settlement agreement, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman brokered an 
agreement between the USDA and the NPPC to move all of the checkoff-funded projects 
and support staff for checkoff activities from NPPC to the National Pork Board. NPPC 
then became primarily a member-funded lobbying group struggling to maintain funding. 
As a result, efforts have been made to explore a "merger" between the National Pork 
Board and the National Pork Producers Council. (However, if the pork checkoff 
programs are ultimately held to be unconstitutional, the Pork Board and its deep pool of 
checkoff funding would disappear.) Regardless of the restrictions on the use of checkoff 
funds for political and public policy interests, the trade association and lobbying groups 
in the beef and pork industries (National Cattlemen's Beef Association and National Pork 
Producer' s Council) are loathe to be separated from these funds. 
In the dairy industry, the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board (thirty­
six representative milk producers) and the National Fluid Milk Processor Promotion 
Program (twenty fluid milk producers) bear responsibility for implementing the dairy 
checkoff programs. They contract with Dairy Management, Inc. (DMn, a domestic and 
international non-profit organization. Several groups are funded and managed by the 
dairy checkoffs, including the American Dairy Association, the National Dairy Council 
and the U.S. Dairy Export Council. 
434 Merrigan interview, 5. 
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The International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA) is an industry trade 
association that represent the interests of dairy processors and manufacturers. It claims 
that 85 percent of the dairy products consumed in the U.S. originate from its members.435 
IDFA is the leading processor lobbying group with a strong presence in Washington. It 
does not receive funding from the checkoff programs. On the other hand, a separate 
group called the National Milk Producers Federation (NMPF), with membership of 
approximately 55,000 dairy producers and cooperatives, receives checkoff money for 
services it provides under contract with DMI, including evaluations of the effectiveness 
of dairy checkoffs by economists it retains on staff. 
The United Foods decision in June 25, 2001 ,  held that the mandatory 
assessments for generic advertising and promotional programs for mushrooms under the 
Mushroom Order436 were unconstitutional. This industry' s checkoff programs had been 
managed by the Mushroom Council , comprised of nine members appointed by the 
Secretary of Agriculture, who are non-exempt producers (i .e. ,  producers required to pay 
the mandatory assessment fees because they do not meet any exemptions). After the 
landmark ruling, the Mushroom Council voted to keep itself in business by continuing 
mandatory assessments for non-promotional program initiatives and voluntary checkoff 
fees for generic advertising and promotional efforts. 
The Justice Department did not give up in the United Foods case, which moved 
back before the U.S . District Court in Jackson, Tennessee, in the form of two district 
435 U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing on U.S. Preparations for Negotiations in the World Trade Organization, 
Testimony of Janet A. Nuzum on behalf of International Dairy Foods Association,; 30 September 1999; 
available from http://agriculture.senate.gov/Hearings/Hearings_l 999/nuz99930.htm; Internet; accessed 18 
June 2003. 
436 The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Order is authorized by the Mushroom 
Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6101-61 12. 
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court actions that have been consolidated. 437 The government argued that the United 
Foods decision was only an interlocutory ruling and not a final decision disposing of the case. According to local counsel representing United Foods, this case is dormant while the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals considers the case of Michigan Pork Producers v. 
Campaign for Family Farms.438 (Even if the Sixth Circuit rules that the pork checkoff program is unconstitutional, the government will likely try to keep the United Foods case open while the Michigan Pork Producers case or a checkoff case works its way up on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.) In the meantime, the Mushroom Council has continued all activities, including its generic advertising, with volunteer contributions. The major trade association in the mushroom industry is the Mushroom Institute. It has a history of 48 years of activity on behalf of mushroom growers, processors, and marketers of cultivated mushrooms. Its stated goals sound very similar to the goals of the Mushroom Order, but it is a voluntary organization funded by membership fees. In contrast to the Mushroom Council, the Washington Apple Commission decided to close its operations when the District Court for the Eastern District of Washington held that the mandatory assessments for promotion of apples in the state of Washington were unconstitutional.439 The Washington Apple Commission had initiated the legal proceedings itself with the assumption that it would receive confirmation that its program was unconstitutional. The ruling brought an end to a commodity commission that had functioned in many ways as an industry trade group in providing support to its apple 
437 United States of America v. United Foods, No. 96-1252 and United Foods v. United States of America, 
No. 98- 1082, United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Jackson, Tennessee. 
438 Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign/or Family Farms, 174 F. Supp. 2d 772 (W.D. Mich. 2002), as 
corrected October 31 ,  2002. 
439 See In Re Washington Apple Advertising Commission, No. CS-01 -0278-EFS (E.D. Wa. 2003). 212 
growers and handlers. The Washington state apple industry is now scrambling to develop 
an alternative program that will allow it to continue funding certain activities that it 
considers relevant to its infrastructure. 440 
A state circuit court in Florida held in March 2003 that a mandatory "box tax" 
assessed on citrus for generic advertising was unconstitutional. The primary entity 
responsible for administering this program was the Florida Citrus Commission. The 
Commission has twelve members from within the industry who are appointed by the 
governor to oversee and guide activities of the Florida Department of Citrus, including 
the promotional initiatives funded by the box tax. The makeup of the Citrus Commission 
(industry members and not government employees) and its method of self-governance 
and decision-making were key in the court' s decision that this commission did not meet 
the requirements necessary to recognize the government' s  argument that the generic 
advertising funded by the "box tax" was government speech. 441 
A number of state and national trade associations represent the interests of fruit 
growers in the United States. Many of their objectives are aligned with producing fruit 
for export and foreign trade. This industry is feeling the impact of the industrial 
agriculture model along with other agricultural sectors. 
One strong theme that was noticeable throughout these interviews was that the 
440 See Tim Linden, ''Washington apple industry examines its options," The Produce News (April 18, 
2003); available from http://www.theproducenews.com/storydetail .cfm?ID=3058; Internet; accessed 10 
June 2003. 
441 See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Tampa Juice Services, Inc. et al. 
v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus, (Case Nos. GC-G-00-3488, GC-G-00-37 18, GC-G-01-0286, GC­
G-01-0375, and GC-G-01-0694); Graves Brothers Company v. State of Florida, Florida Department of 
Citrus (Case No. GC-G-02-46-4686) and Oak Hammock Groves, Ltd., et al. v. State of Florida, Florida 
Department of Citrus (Case No. GC-G-03-028 1) ( 10th Cir., Polk County, Fla., March 3 1 , 2003). 
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challengers had opportunities to engage in the organizational processes and chose not to 
avail themselves of these opportunities. They were perceived as not being willing to 
pursue organizational avenues for voicing their views and implementing change. A 
representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board stated: 
I frankly don't think the groups like the Charters or the LMA have attempted to 
influence decisions with documented logical support. For example, we have met 
with I.MA officers, we have asked them what it is you don't like about the 
checkoff, what would you like to see changed. Some of their advertising to solicit 
signatures in the referendum talked about wanting to make some changes in the 
checkoff and the only way they could do it was with a referendum. So we asked 
them, what changes do you want to make? And they either could not or would 
not identify any, kept coming back, to the concept, we just want to vote. Well, 
ok, then get ten percent of signatures. But, if there are some changes you want to 
make, let's sit down and talk about them and maybe they'd be good ideas. Maybe 
we can make them. So, it's a little difficult to assess . . .  the effectiveness of an 
organization if they won't even try. It's like the fellow who goes to the local 
coffee shop every morning and complains about the local government, but never 
bothers going to the city council meeting where something could be changed.442 
The same representative emphasized this point later by stating: 
I'd love to find a way that we could get LMA and the other oganiztions to open 
up and tell us what it is they want changed. But, when you send at least six letters 
a year to an organization asking them to attend meetings, providing them a copy 
of priorities and plans almost a year ahead of time as they're in the developmental 
stage, and ask for any input, concerns, questions, or even proposals that they 
might want to brin§ forth, and those initiatives are greeted with deafening silence, 
what can you do. 44 
A pork producer and member of the National Pork Board expressed a similar view: 
During my time on the board, we've invited them to come eat with us, gone out to 
meet with them and nobody shows up to try to get their impact. Instead of killing 
it [the checkoff program] , how would you spend the money differently? But it's 
easier to criticize than to offer new ideas. They've stuck to the strategy of just 
being critical. We try to get them involved. And we've yet to have somebody that 
got involved or really understood the programs that didn't come away being a 
pretty good supporter. 444 
442 Interview with anonymous representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board, 19. 
443 Ibid., 20. 444 Interview with anonymous pork producer and member of the National Pork Board, 4. 
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However, Mike Callicrate, beef producer and outspoken voice for the beef anti-checkoff group, identified two factors that he considered to be barriers for effective participation­intimidation and block voting. Here is an excerpt from his interview: Interviewer: Is there a process within the whole NCBA organization for your voice to be heard and for folks who share your point of view to get some leverage? Mike Callicrate: No, there is not. I have been a member of NCBA for twenty­something years. Now with the meat packers on the board of NCBA, what happens is when you go to an NCBA meeting, they ridicule you, they shout you down, and they laugh at you in front of everyone. That has a terrible intimidation effect, so people have simply refused to stand up and speak out. Then they just get their butt whipped because we have the packers now and the big cattle feeders that have put forth the proxy vote and won that decision into their policy to where . . .  I mean, these guys are holding up six cards each. They get to vote all their votes in every single committee meeting, and it is just overwhelming against the interest of the individual cattleman and for the big cattle feeders and big feed yards who are in bed together.445 Steve Vetter, editor of Western Livestock Journal, raised the possibility that those against the checkoffs might not be sufficiently aggressive: Steve Vetter: I do think there are ways that people that do have programs that aren't currently being funded by checkoff programs can go about getting their ideas heard. It just is a matter of contacting the Beef Board and harassing them, if you will, to hear their ideas. I do think that what some of the people against the checkoffs don't do-I don't think they push hard enough to try to get their ideas heard. If they've had one bad experience, they don't want to go back in and try again. And I think that is a mistake on their part. Interviewer: Do you think that they-the producers-have a certain reservation about any repercussions if they voice a lot of negative concern, that there are other parts of the industry that could fence them out, or refuse to work with them or have reason not to buy their beef? Steve Vetter: I don't think there'd be a reason as much in terms of the checkoff programs. Now, there are other issues within the industry that if you voice your opinion, I'm sure there could be some ramifications. But, just in terms of what the checkoff does, I would be hard pressed to think that about the checkoff, which 
445 Callicrate interview, 4. 
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is primarily working toward promoting the consumption and sale of beef. I really 
don't see that there would be a whole lot of repercussions.446 
These interview excerpts suggest individuals on the livestock boards, producers opposed 
to checkoffs and outside observers have decided} y different perspectives on the structural 
processes that exist for discourse and decision making about allocation of checkoff funds. 
Industry Trade Associations Aligned with Counter-Hegemony and· Activist 
Groups Seeking Free Speech and Other Goals. These two categories are presented 
together since they have formed a network of alliances to collaborate on projects, share 
resources and strengthen their political clout. 
Two trade associations in the cattle industry are recognized as being aligned with 
counter-hegemony against the beef checkoffs and against the industrial agriculture 
model. The first is Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Foundation (R-CALF), a non­
profit national organization that offers membership to cow/calf producers and 
independent stockyards and feedlots. It represents more than 6,700 cattle producers in 
aggressively advocating trade and marketing positions that are favorable to their interests. 
The cow/calf producers claim that the NCBA no longer represents their interests, since its 
decision making is now dominated by meatpackers and importers, therefore, R-CALF has 
offered these cow/calf producers an alternative. It has developed political strength in a 
very short time, having only become a national membership organization in 1999.447 
The second group aligned with counter-hegemony in the cattle industry is 
Livestock Marketing Association (LMA), a non-profit trade association that serves a 
membership of more than 800 livestock dealers, markets, order buyers and related 
446 Vetter interview, 4. 
447 See website of R-CALF at http://www.rcalf.com. 
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businesses in North America. It became the catalyst group facilitating a controversial 
pork referendum, and became a party to a lawsuit challenging the USDA' s handling of 
the referendum. When the United Foods case was decided, LMA amended its complaint 
to add an additional First Amendment claim. 
The Kansas Cattlemen's Association is another politically active and outspoken 
trade association aligned with counter-hegemony. 
Two major national agricultural coalitions have been become respected for the 
leadership in advocating change in agriculture. The first, Organization for Competitive 
Markets (OCM), is committed to restoring equitable, competitive markets for agricultural 
commodities and their end products. It was formed in March of 1998 and has a diverse 
membership of commodity producers, attorneys, professors, grass roots and public 
interest groups. Its activities include lobbying, providing a growing resource for legal 
actions and educating producers that they can become part of a movement to reclaim fair 
pricing. The Organization for Competitive Markets is concerned about looking at 
competition issues within the livestock industry from the legal and economic standpoints. 
The second coalition is the National Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture. 
Begun in 1994, it has an impressive list of partner organizations as members that 
collaborate with it to achieve change that will promote stewardship of the land. One of 
its key roles is as a lobbying group to "shape and promote U.S. farm and food policies in 
support of a food system that is environmentally sound, economically viable, socially just 
and humane."448 
448 See "Sustainable Agriculture Wins in the 2002 U.S. Farm Bill," National Campaign for Sustainable 
Agriculture (January 2003); available from 
http://www.sustainableagriculture.net/NCSAandFBJan2003.php; Internet; accessed 30 March 2003. 
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The Western Organization of Resource Councils (WORC) is a regional coalition 
with an active presence in Washington, D.C. It has engaged in lobbying efforts with 
other groups, filed amicus curie briefs, and joined Livestock Marketing Association as a 
party to a checkoff lawsuit. 
The Dakota Resource Council is a public interest group that has taken a stand 
against the checkoff systems. Another non-profit group, The Land Stewardship Project 
focuses on sustainable agriculture goals and has a broad range of policy, research and 
education programs. 
Three other groups previously mentioned in Chapter 2 have been major 
contributors to the activities of the counter-hegemony. They include The Campaign for 
Family Farms (CFF), a coalition that has served as an advocate for independent hog 
farmers, the Farmers' Legal Action Group (FLAG), a nonprofit law center that represents 
advocacy organizations, and the Center for Individual Freedom (CFIF), a First 
Amendment rights advocacy group. 
Doug O'Brien, attorney and agricultural legislative assistant for Senator Tom 
Harkin, commented during his interview that groups such as OCM, National Farmers 
Union, R-CALF, Campaign for Family Farms and even mainstream groups such as 
American Farm Bureau "fear that farmers are in a very disadvantageous position with 
spiraling consolidation and vertical integration."
449 They are interested in restoring 
competitive markets. O'Brien identified incremental changes in the 2002 Farm Bill that 
expressly occurred because of the activities and involvements of these trade associations, 
including additional protections for producers growing hogs under production contracts, a 
449 O'Brien interview, 5 .  
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recognized right of a farmer to talk with his attorney, accountant or banker about a 
contract, and country of origin labeling requirement. The ban on packer ownership was 
eliminated from the Farm Bill, but new legislative proposals have kept the issue on the 
table. O'Brien concluded: 
[T]hey [the trade association groups] are affecting the debate. Is this a freight 
train, does it have too much momentum to be able' to be stopped? It's  not going to 
be stopped. It can be steered a little bit. Before the Farm Bill, three years ago, 
those things I just listed were really almost all thinJBs observers and the industry 
would have thought were going to be impossible.4 
Commodity Producers Def ending Hegemony. In each court action, there have 
been individual commodity producers aligned with the government. They generally join 
the action as intervenors and ally themselves with the dominant commodity industry bloc. 
In the livestock industries, the commodity producers defending the checkoff 
hegemony are the large concentrated operations that engage in factory farming methods. 
They typically are owned by one of the mega agribusiness companies or contract with 
them. The checkoffs are useful in allowing these producers to have indirect bargaining 
power, even in issues that appear unrelated to the checkoffs, such as country of origin 
labeling or irradiation of meat. The ability to use checkoff funds for foreign promotions 
and for deals with large processors and reatailers is a benefit. And finally, some of the 
large commodity producers have more negotiating power to realize financial benefits 
from increased demand that do not trickle down to the small independent producers. 
Commodity producers aligned with hegemony in the dairy industry include 
cooperatives as well as private companies. In the United States milk processing industry, 
dairy cooperatives are an important link in the food chain. In 1999, it was estimated that 
4so Ibid. 
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cooperatives handled 86 percent of the milk produced by farmers. Over half serve only 
as bargaining cooperatives, marketing their members' milk, but performing no 
processing. The remaining group of approximately 43 percent process products such as 
butter, cheese, skimmed milk powder and whey powder. Dairy Farmers of America and 
Land O'Lakes are the two largest dairy cooperatives in the United States. The private 
dairy industry is dominated by the multinational companies, including Kraft (a Philip 
Morris subsidiary), Dean Foods and Suiza. (Dean Foods and Suiza merged their 
operations in 2002, creating a commercial dairy powerhouse.) 
There may be commodity producers aligned with hegemony in the mushroom 
industry and the tree fruit industry, but these are not noisy groups. They are the 
independent small producers who are getting the advantages of the checkoff payments 
paid by the large producers who sell branded products with distinctive features and 
premium quality. The large producers are fighting the checkoff programs in order to 
reduce the negative financial and marketing impact of the checkffs. They would like to 
increase their advantage in competing with the smaller producers, but nothing in the 
evidence suggested a war of position between the large producers and the small 
producers. The war of position appears to be between the large producers and the USDA. 
Commodity Producers Opposing Hegemony. The most visible commodity 
producers against checkoffs are the plaintiffs in the pending lawsuits. In the beef and 
pork industries, the evidence suggest that they represent the interests of a large group of 
anti-checkoff farmers and ranchers who are seeking ways to have a voice and develop 
counter-hegemony. 
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The Media. The media offer a public site for hegemonic discourse. Within their 
ranks are "organic intellectuals" who participate in hegemonic conflicts in agriculture at 
the macro-level by constructing consent for the industrial agriculture model and at the 
commodity level by engaging in discourse related to the hegemonic principles underlying 
the power of the respective commodity industry blocs. Mainstream media have tended to 
support the dominant industrial agriculture bloc. The large, well-funded public relations 
apparatus of the dominant group has had an influence on news, editorial content and 
advertising. 
The themes and idea ensembles presented by mainstream media are open to 
challenge by the minority voices of organic intellectuals who disagree with ( or are 
willing to report the opinions of those who disagree with) the assumptions, the methods 
and the outcomes of the dominant power blocs in agriculture. Those engaged in counter­
hegemony have tended to use alternative print and electronic media or radio. 
Since the constitutionality of generic advertising is at issue in the commodity 
checkoff challenges, media advertising as well as media content has become a part of the 
hegemonic discourse. Thousands of advertising dollars are available for media to publish 
two types of advertisements :  ads in industry trade publications aimed primarily at 
commodity producers and others in the food chain extolling the benefits of the 
commodity checkoff programs, and generic ads in national mainstream media or regional 
media outlets promoting the commodities to consumers. According to individuals 
interviewed in this study, the majority of industry trade publications are known to report 
on the checkoff challenges in a way favorable to the hegemony. A small number have 
taken open positions against checkoffs. 
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Terry Stokes, CEO of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, confirmed that 
the media has tended to focus on the positive aspects of the checkoff programs. 
However, in his view, the media has reported fairly on the legal conflicts related to 
checkoffs. 
Interviewer: Do you feel that the media has aligned itself with one side or the 
other, or are both sides in the conflict getting fair treatment -by the media?· 
Terry Stokes: I think as far as the cases go, I think they have had fair treatment. 
I think what we have seen in the media is that you see a focus of the media on the 
results that have been achieved through the beef checkoff programs, but as far as 
the case itself, I think there has been fair coverage.45 1 
He clarified the two different types of advertising used by the NCBA ( consumer ads 
directed toward the consumer and producer communications ads in trade magazines) and 
emphasized that the law prohibits the NCBA from using checkoff dollars for advocacy 
purposes in any of these ads. 
Jeanne Charter, plaintiff in a beef checkoff lawsuit, asserted that the checkoff 
money available in the beef industry does not compare to the budget for a big commercial 
product, but it is sufficient to "really propaganidize within the industry." According to 
her, that is how a lot of the checkoff money is spent. She stated: 
They [those in control of the checkoff money] do big spreads in the monthly ag 
publications. They're a big client for them. Hardly any of the monthly ag 
publications have a discouraging word to say about the checkoffs. I think 
they're compromised by the money.452 
Charter also referred to self-promotion ads that are published during the market news, 
primarily on radio. According to Charter, the primary objectives of these industry­
focused advertising programs promoting checkoff programs are twofold: 
451 
Stokes interview, 8. 
452 
Charter interview, 5. 
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I think the real purpose of the programs, at least in beef, is to, number one, try to 
influence producer thinking. But I think that's even secondary to trying to 
influence agricultural news reporting. With ag channels in Montana, I think 
probably the checkoffs are their biggest single client. That's enough to where 
they just don't report anything negative about them. Or, consequently, they're 
very loath to report anything negative about the National Cattlemen's  Beef 
Association. 453 
Charter said that the NCBA's has an "institutional core" that benefits politically 
by its control over checkoff money, including the economic relationship between the 
NCBA and the media arising out of the purchase of broadcasting time or print space for 
checkoff ads. Charter states: "It 's like 'crony capitalism. ' Their friends are always the 
ones that get the contracts. If any, say radio station, gets out of line and really is critical, 
they won't get any more ads. That is invaluable to somebody that's got an agenda. They 
do."454 
In his interview, Steven Vetter, editor of Western Livestock Journal, indicated his 
commitment to presenting both sides of the checkoff issue equally in his publication: 
I can honestly say that the key thing to a newspaper is news. With the exception 
of your publisher's or your editor's comments that might come up every once in 
awhile, news stories are there to present facts and let people come up with their 
own conclusions. And I've really worked hard to stay that way. There are other 
publications that aren't afraid to show that they are on one side of the issue or the 
other. And there have been recent showings of that.455 
He discussed the alignment of specific media with the pro-checkoff and anti-checkoff 
groups: 
. . .  I think there are definitely a couple of instances where you could say there is 
some media alignment with the various sides. I will say that I think that most of 
the alignment I have seen has been going on the side that' s against the checkoff 
for the most part. That's not to say that there aren't instances where maybe there 
is a publication out there that decides with the checkoff. But I have seen more 
453 Charter interview, 5-6. 
454 Ibid., 7. 
455 Vetter interview, 7. 
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cases where the groups that are adamantly against the checkoff have been able to 
infiltrate some media, particularly trade media, organizations more heavily.456 
Mike Callicrate, cattle producer and feedlot operator, was willing to be more 
specific about the media players and their alignment in his interview. He identified the 
following publications as being on the side of the packers, retailers and the NCBA: Beef 
Magazine, Drover's Journal, Calf Magazine, BeefToday, · Cattlebuyer 's Weekly.451 · 
According to Callicrate, radio broadcasting media is also dominated by the industrial 
agriculture bloc. He stated: 
The major radio ag stations are really controlled with the industrial message. 
They depend heavily upon Cargill and Monsanto. A lot of the chemical 
companies advertise that are connected in this new industrial model that they are 
trying to force onto us, and the radio stations in trying to keep adequate 
advertising dollars generated have really turned their back on the family farmer 
and rancher. There are some really good radio stations out there but darn 
few ... Ron Thorson with a radio station in Illinois, he is the strongest voice for the 
producer in that whole section of the country.458 
With this information as a background, Gramsci' s framework of hegemony can 
provide a means of understanding the role of the media as a source of intellectual 
discourse between: l) anti-checkoff challengers versus defenders of the checkoff 
programs, and 2) advocates for sustainable agriculture, family farming and competitive 
markets versus industrial agriculture and agribusiness. Since gaining the consent of the 
majority is a vital goal of the ruling alliance, the media can play a key role in interpreting 
the ideology and culture of the dominant group and promoting a unified view. While it 
can promote legitimacy for the dominant view, certain segments of the media can also 
choose to help explain and build the foundation for counter-hegemony. The dominant 
456 Ibid., 6. 
457 Callicrate interview, 10. 
458 Ibid., 1 1 . 
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bloc in power must win the consent of organic intellectuals within the media and 
negotiate such consent on an ongoing basis. (This Gramsci-based view of the media 
recognizes a certain level of media free will that is not found in the strict Marxist view 
that the media is an apparatus of the State that exists solely to serves the needs of the 
historic bloc centrally organized by the bourgeois.) If the dominant bloc is successful in 
getting the media to rely on "official" sources, this leads to greater consensus and 
maintaining the status quo. 
Stuart Hall, British cultural theorist and neo-Marxist researcher, collaborated with 
other researchers in 1978 to analyze the way in which the British media portrayed 
violence and the coercive government response to dissidents in Policing the Crisis: 
Mugging, the State and Law and Order.459 Hall described the media as "a key terrain 
where 'consent' is won or lost' and "a field of ideological struggle."46° Consistent with 
Gramsci ' s  ideas, the media is not bound to a deterministic role (as a communication tool 
of the Marxist bourgeoisie) but instead reproduces "the interpretations of the crisis 
subscribed to by the ruling-class alliance" in a manner that reflects the media' s own 
"constructions and inflections."461 
Janet Woollacott examined the arguments of Policing the Crisis in the chapter 
she contributed to the 1982 overview of the Marx and liberal pluralist views of mass 
media, Culture, Society and the Media. W oollacott emphasized that Hall, et al. had 
assigned to the media "a crucial transformative but secondary role in defining social 
459 Stuart Hall, Charles Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: 
Mugging the State and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978). 
460 Ibid., 220. 
461 Ibid. Also see Janet Woollacott, "Messages and meanings," in Culture, society and the media, eds., 
Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (New York: Methuen, 1982) : 91-
1 1 1 , 109. 
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events."462 This relegated the media to a subordinate position lacking autonomy since 
"(T]he primary definers are those to whom the media tum, their accredited sources in 
government and other institutions.',463 She questioned how the media can serve as a 
field of ideological struggle when their work (the news) only serves "to reproduce and 
reinforce 'primary definitions'. They are assumed thereby to signify a crisis which 
already exists for the primary definers, a crisis already in operation in the realm of 
politics and economics."464 (The primary definers are politicians, the courts, the police 
and other institutional entities.) 
Woollacott concluded that the struggle to construct consent described in Policing 
the Crisis would, therefore, be outside the terrain of the media and "in the areas of class 
experience and the cultural forms through which men and women live that 
experience."465 In chapter one of Culture, Society and the Media, Woollacott, James 
Curran and Michael Gurevitch state that researchers in the Marxist tradition in Britain 
portray the media's role as that of "renewing, amplifying and extending the existing 
predispositions that constitute the dominant culture, not in creating them."466 
• Woollacott's conclusions rested on the assumption that the media can be viewed 
in a collective manner. However, the evidence in this study suggested that the 
mainstream media that amplifies and extends the idealogy ensemble of the dominant bloc 
has its counterpoint in the alternative print and electronic media of those engaged in 
counter-hegemony. Such media may be merely sympathetic to the challengers or may 




5 Ibid., 1 10. 
466 James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott, "The study of the media: theoretical 
approaches," in Culture, Society and theMmedia, eds., Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran and 
Janet Woollacott (New York: Methuen, 1982) : 1 1-29, 14. 
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be fully aligned with the ideology ensemble of those seeking to build counter-hegemony. 
The checkoff challengers and the industrial agriculture critics are able to interject their 
counter-hegemony movement into the media and use the media as a terrain for struggle. 
They do so in a systematic way by funding alternative news outlets, issuing press 
releases, engaging in publicized debates covered by the media, providing media 
workshops and other support for groups involved in counter-hegemony who wish to have 
their voices heard.467 The Internet and new technologies allow publishing by activist 
groups and create more opportunities for.the counter-hegemony to move the hegemonic 
struggle to the terrain of the media. 
In their interview, Brenda and Joseph Cochran, dairy checkoff challengers, 
pointed out the value of the local press in supporting counter-hegemony: 
"I always noticed that if you have a farmer, a motivated farmer in this community and he 
develops a good relationship with the local press, the local media, they will pull very 
related issues off the AP. They will put it in the local paper. And you eventually have 
your power base in that town or that county more educated about the broader issues. "468 
Media reporting on the checkoff challenges has been primarily in industry trade 
publications. It is the conclusion of some individuals (including several interviewed in 
this study) that money for advertising has been the glue that keeps many of these media 
outlets closely aligned with the dominant industry blocs defending the checkoffs. They 
have suggested that publications accepting advertising promoting the benefits of the 
checkoff programs have less incentive to probe stories identifying the broader economic 
467 See, e.g., "Media Skills & Strategy Workshop for Sustainable Agriculture," The Land Stewardship 
Newsletter 15, no. 5 (October/November 1997); available from 
http://www.landstewardshipproject.org/lsV1spvl5n5 .html; Internet; accessed 3 June 2003 . 
468 Cochran interview, 10. 
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and political issues behind the checkoff challenges. The scope of this study does not 
include a content analysis to explore this issue, but the evidence does show that all 
participants in the checkoff conflicts have delivered messages to the media in various 
forms in an effort to win consent to their legal, economic and political positions. In the 
lawsuits challenging the commodity checkoffs, it is likely that the steady influx of 
advertising dollars for checkoff advertisements targeting producers in trade publications 
and consumers in mainstream media has created a media climate receptive to the 
ideological principles of the commodity industry blocs. 
The evidence shows that various media have become strategic tools to be used in 
a field of ideological struggle between the dominant group and those launching counter­
hegemony. But the involvement of the media has not been entirely formulaic. Stuart 
Hall claimed that media operated within the Gramscian framework by reproducing the 
"primary definitions" of the dominant bloc subject to the media's own "constructions and 
inflections."469 However, there are pressures on modem media that require a greater 
degree of "constructions and inflections" than Hall may have been prepared to recognize 
within a strict Gramscian framework. First, there are institutional demands on the press, 
such as the need to show profits to corporate media owners and the need to select stories 
with titillating news or "infotainment" value. Second, there are societal and cultural 
expectations that the press will perform a "watchdog" role on government to critically 
report on activities that are contrary to the public interest. 470 Third, media are also 
469 Hall, et al., 220. 
470 There is a consensus that the "watchdog" role of the press in monitoring government agencies has 
waned because of limited media resources and the demand for more provocative stories. See Lucinda 
Fleeson, ''Where are the watchdogs?" American Journalism Review 23, no. 6 (July/ August 2001): 36-46. 
This article stated: 
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influenced by how a topic, an issue, a group or an industry have been characterized or 
framed by the press in earlier stories. 471 
The "primary definitions" of the dominant bloc are powerful, but they exist 
alongside institutional constraints and societal realities that create an operating 
environment in which the media may on occasion find itself giving priority to some 
factor apart from the hegemonic struggles taking place in its terrain. However, the 
industrial agriculture bloc has been highly successful in winning the media' s consent to 
its economic, moral, political and cultural values. 
While the voice of counter-hegemony seeking to publicize its views has 
traditionally had an uphill battle, it has still been able to engage alternative media aligned 
with the counter-hegemony (and occasionally mainstream media) in discourse about 
alternatives such as sustainable agriculture, competitive commodity markets and family 
farming. The research in this study indicated that, while the dominant power bloc has an 
advantage in its ability to access and control the media, is still subject to the media' s 
decision-making process regarding the newsworthiness of material and the internal 
structures and demands that influence the media. These are the factors that each side of 
the hegemonic conflict must consider as they pursue their objectives in the media terrain. 
An instructive example of a hegemonic struggle in the media is a legal conflict 
arising out of the decision of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A) to build the Tellico 
In its last piece on Washington beat reporting, in April 1999, AJR found that many newspapers and 
wire services had walked away from covering federal agencies and departments long regarded as the 
meat of good reporting in Washington. Much of the media simply abandoned departments like 
transportation or housing or agriculture. In the last two years, there has been further decline. Ibid. ,  35. 
471 Framing in journalism refers to the process of assimilating the news in a manner that contextualizes it 
and gives it an interpretation or frame of reference, so it is not received as random facts. It involves media 
choices with regard to selection and salience. See Denis McQuail, McQuail 's Mass Communication 
Theory, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000), 343 and 495. 
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Dam. This case also bears closer examination because the plaintiffs strategically used the 
courts in an effort to break the hegemony that was exercised by a dominant bloc centrally 
organized around the TV A. It is analogous to the efforts of the checkoff challengers to 
use the First Amendment to create change in the agricultural industry. 
In 1959, the TVA lacked a significant mission. With an increase in coal and 
nuclear power sources, there were no new justifiable dam projects on the horizon. The 
TV A settled on a land-development project to build a new dam, the Tellico Dam, that 
would create a reservoir, flooding over thirty-three miles of the Tennessee River and over 
three hundred forty farms containing some of the most fertile land in the state of 
Tennessee. The facts showed that the project was not economically sound or 
environmentally necessary. 472 
In the 1970s, farmers and local citizens launched a lengthy battle to fight the 
government's  push forward on this project by challenging it on the basis of the 
Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs argued that the Tellico Dam project would endanger 
a small, three-inch perch called the snail darter. 473 The lawsuit was not brought by 
extreme environmentalists, but rather citizens who were seeking economic review of 
governmental action in spending millions of dollars to support an agency cause that could 
not be justified on economic, environmental or public policy grounds. The legal action 
represents an attempt to break the TVA hegemony. 
472 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, ''Law and the Fourth Estate: Endangered Nature, the Press, and the Dicey 
Game of Democratic Governance," Environmental Law 32 (Winter 2002): 1-36, 7-8. 
473 Ibid., 13- 14. 
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In a law review article, Zygmunt J.B . Plater, lead counsel in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hilr'74 discussed the manner in which the case was used by the citizens as a 
public action tool: 
Where in this country's modem industrial democracy is there an operative forum 
to which stupendous mistakes can be brought for effective public interest review? 
Apparently the answer is "nowhere," unless citizens have money, power, or press 
enough to get traction ·and crack into the political process. There is ·nothing 
within the process itself that goes out looking for ongoing major agency or 
economic initiatives that need review, and courts for their part do not willingly 
take on the function of project and program scrutiny. 
But it may be different where citizens can find and prove a substantive statutory 
violation in court, forcing the other branches of government to take account of the 
larger questions.475 
The courts became the terrain for the battle. The small coalition of farms and 
concerned citizens ultimately convinced the courts to enjoin the dam project, but by then 
the project was 95 percent completed. It was a $150 billion project that was unnecessary 
and could not be economically justified. Plater's journal article identified ways in which 
the press failed to report the complete story (and still fails to do so today as evidenced by 
Rush Limbaugh's use of the snail darter lawsuit as an example of environmentalism run 
amok).476 In the press, the story was presented as a cliche about "economic progress 
versus environmental protectionism" and "little fish versus big dam. "477 
The hegemonic struggle was between the powerful, government-backed TV A and 
the challengers, a group of f armers and others acting on behalf of the public interest. 
Each sought to use the media, but the dominant power bloc was more successful in 
getting the press to present its position. Plater identifies several reasons, including the 
414 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
475 Plater, 1 1 . 
476 Ibid., 4, also see n. 6. 
477 Ibid., 25 . 
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ingrained perceptions of the press and the public that the TVA was a progressive agency 
offering opportunities to bring social progress to backward rural areas rather than a 
bureaucratic giant misusing its agency powers to initiate a pork barrel project. The 
hegemonic political efforts of the TV A, seeing its project at risk, were also a huge factor. 
For example, National Geographic had agreed to print an article about the Tellico Dam 
project written by Supreme Court Justice William O Douglas, but reconsidered after the 
TVA persuaded its editor not to run the story.478 The TV A engaged in other political 
activities to influence the media' s reporting on the project. (The TV A's actions 
undertaken to protect its authority and continue to exercise hegemony can be analogized 
to the efforts of the USDA in the commodity checkoff cases.) 
Another factor Plater identified that might explain why the dominant power bloc 
was more successful in getting the media to frame the story in its favor was the manner in 
which the press functions in choosing and presenting its stories to the public. Editors 
demand stories with a hook or a simple, easily understood metaphor or catchy summary. 
Factors that the media considers when deciding whether a story is newsworthy include: 
conflict, impact, audience interest, novelty, prominence of people and institutions, 
proximity and timeliness. 479 Plater stated: 
It was hard to understand how persistent the little-fish-big-dam perceptual 
frame would be. Reporters' and legislators' eyes glazed over when the citizens 
rolled out maps, reports, and documents showing the weaknesses of the dam and 
the beneficial role of the endangered species in facilitating altemati ve 
development of the valley. The fish/dam rubric is quick, easy, funny, and 
comforting. It is discomfiting and hard, on the other hand, for reporters and their 
audiences to devote energetic attention to a complex and disruptively contrary 
image that is not so familiar and crisp.480 
478 Ibid., 28, n. 69. 
479 Ibid., 29. 
480 Ibid., 25 . 
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Plater ruefully observed that being correct on the merits of an argument is not enough if 
the political process does not integrate the key principle at stake. A court victory does 
not guarantee a political change. He concluded: 
It is not enough that the citizens were correct on the merits of their argument that 
Tellico Dam was a mistake. · The merits of challenged projects and programs are 
irrelevant unless they can be authoritatively established and (even more 
important) forced into the mechanics of the political structures that support those 
initiatives. And, as so often happens in public interest cases, the citizens' 
arguments on the merits missed the point of the players in the political process. 481 
The snail darter lawsuit sharply illustrates that those engaged in a war of position 
simultaneously in the terrain of the media and the courts must be mindful of the media 
environment and its requirements as they seek to create a "court of public interest" that 
will enhance their battle in the courts. 
On National Ag Day, March 25, 2002, Dupont and the Agriculture Council of 
America sponsored a one-day seminar with the theme ''The Growing Gap Between 
Farmers and the Media." Farmers expressed concerns with the way the media had 
portrayed them in stories dealing with the environment, international trade and farm 
subsidies. The media responded by providing tips to the farmers on how to avoid 
becoming "media road kill." Their suggestions included "stop being defensive, tell their 
stories in consumer friendly sound bites and be more accessible to the media."482 
However, when the hegemony of the dominant power bloc has captured the major media 
481 Ibid., 10. 
482 "Ag industry seeks to improve public image," Resource 9, no. 5 (May 2002) : 17. Also see "DuPont 
Sponsors National Ag Day Event for U.S. Farmers, Media," DuPont Daily News (March 25, 2002); 
available from http://www.dupont.com/corp/news/daily/2002/dn03_25_02c.html; Internet; accessed 7 June 
2003. 
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outlets, it may be impossible for the farmers to shift the way in which the media portrays 
a topic, regardless of tactics. 
The press may simply grow weary of an issue. In The Corporate Reapers, A.V. 
Krebs reported that this was the case in the early 1990s when the press got tired of 
reporting on agricultural woes. He quoted Brian Ahlberg, former communications 
director for the National Family Farm Coalition: 
The real reason papers and broadcasters no longer run the kind of stories they did 
in the 1980s is that they consider family farmers history, not news. The media, 
once a proponent of the family farm idea, has largely abandoned it, perhaps in 
fatalistic surrender to the forces which are eradicating independence, personality 
and community responsibility from its own industry. Such is the predicament of 
today's family farmers and their supporters.483 
Another factor that may have a bearing on how media report agricultural conflicts 
and issues is that fewer media outlets in the early Twenty-first Century are family owned. 
Corporate media owners and publishers may be less able or less willing to identify with 
non-corporate interests. They identify with the idea that "big is better" and that 
consolidated, larger agricultural enterprises will make more efficient use of resources. 
Discourse about issues and ideologies important to hegemonic conflicts can occur 
in the terrain of mediated communications in many ways, all contributing to the war of 
position. Such discourse may arise in exchanges between different media outlets 
expressing conflicting views or between the media and outside organizations. It may 
feature the opinions of individuals, activist groups, officials speaking on behalf of the 
USDA, legal representatives, agribusiness and other "organic intellectuals" aligned with 
483 A.V. Krebs, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of Agribusiness (Wa., D.C.: Essential Books, 1992), 
440, quoting Brian Ahlberg, former communications director for National Family Farm Coalition. 
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the hegemony or the counter-hegemony. It may simply be a single article or series of 
articles published by a media outlet pursuant to the editorial choices of the editor. 
Agribusiness. A network of giant corporate agribusiness enterprises serve as the 
central organizers within the agricultural hegemony. The annual revenue for the farming 
business in the United States is estimated at $80 billion.484 One land-grant university 
proclaims on its website: ''The agribusiness industry accounts for nearly one-fifth of the 
U.S . gross national product and employs close to one-fourth of the U.S . labor force."485 
Many of these companies are multinational and have business goals focused on 
strengthening their presence in the world market. The Agribusiness Counci1486 describes 
the challenge for U.S .  agribusiness as follows: 
As the world's largest and most efficient supplier of agro-food products, the 
United States faces fierce competition from and ever-increasing number of world 
"breadbaskets." Maintaining U.S .  agribusiness global leadership requires a forum 
capable of embracing our nation' s  agricultural constituents; and a mechanism for 
action on broad, complex issues requiring multi-sectoral coordination and 
representation at the highest national and international levels.487 
A wide range of companies can be identified with agribusiness. A 1979 dictionary 
definition of "agribusiness" limits the term to "a combination of the producing 
484 See Mary Hillebrand, "Agriculture Giants Join B2B E-Commerce Arena," E-Commerce Times, ']l 12 
(March 2, 2000); available from http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perVstory/2641 .html; Internet; accessed 
24 May 2003. 
485 "Agribusiness Fact Sheet," College of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Natural Resources, North Dakota 
State University (undated); available from http://www.ndsu.edu/ndsu/academic/factsheets/ag/agbus.shtml; 
Internet; accessed 24 May 2003. 
486 The Agribusiness Council describes its organization as follows: '1:'he Agribusiness Council (ABC) is a 
private, nonprofit/tax-exempt, membership organization dedicated to strengthening U.S. agro-industrial 
competitiveness through programs which highlight international trade and development potentials as well 
as broad issues which encompass several individual agribusiness sectors and require a 'food systems' 
approach. Examples of such issues are commercialization of new technology/crops, environmental 
impacts, human resource development, trade and investment policy, natural resource management, and 
rural development." The Agribusiness Counsel Home Page (undated); available from 
http://www.agribusinesscouncil.org; Internet; accessed 24 May 2003. 
487 "Challenge for U.S. Agribusiness," The Agribusiness Council Home Page; available from 
http://www.agribusinesscouncil.org/#def; Internet; accessed 1 April 2003. 
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operations of a farm, the manufacture and distribution of farm equipment and supplies, 
and the processing, storage, and distribution of farm commodities."488 While the term 
"agribusiness" still encompasses traditional activities related to agricultural production, 
processing and distribution, the research for this project show that it also includes other 
businesses involved in supporting agriculture and the food chain in areas such as: 
biotechnology, precision farming (global positioning tools), farm and financial 
management, agricultural trade, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, land development, 
agricultural e-commerce, environmental impact management, risk management, 
utilization of agricultural byproducts and agricultural systems management. (The 
process of trying to precisely define the term is like trying to put socks on an octopus.) 
The important concept of "food chain clusters" introduced by Dr. William 
Heffernan in his report to the National Farmers Union in 1999489 has been mentioned 
several times in this dissertation. It was included in Figure 3 to show that the central 
organizers of the industrial agriculture bloc will soon be the powerful "food chain 
clusters." Heffernan used the concept of "food chain clusters" to refer to the manner in 
which agribusiness entities are aligning and grouping themselves to exercise control over 
the food system in a seamless, vertically integrated manner.49° Clusters of firms are 
formed through joint ventures, subsidiaries, partnerships, mergers, part ownership, or 
contractual commitments. These clusters enjoy the economic, political and social 
benefits of dominating a food process from seed to packaged product. The chain of 
control includes owning intellectual property rights in genetically modified seeds, animal 
488 
Websters New Collegiate Dictionary (1979), s.v. "agribusiness" 
489 See Heffernan, "Report to the National Farmer's Union: Consolidation in the Food and Agriculture 
System" (February 5, 2000). 
490 Ibid., 3. 
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semen, etc. ;  interim stages of applying fertilizers or chemicals, feeding livestock or poultry; and final stages of processing or meatpacking commodities into forms ready to sell to retailers. The seamless system is the ultimate goal of the industrial agriculture model.491 Heffernan argued that the "emerging clusters of firms" will define the future of the global food system. He stated: "Within this emerging system, there will be no markets and thus no 'price discovery' from the gene, fertilizer processing and chemical production to the supermarket shelf." 492 His work strongly supports the framework of this dissertation study regarding the Gramscian theory of power blocs. It is estimated that the processing/food manufacturing stage of the food chain handles more than eighty percent of the raw domestic food products. According to Professor Richard T. Rogers of University of Massachusetts-Amhurst, Department of Resource Economics, ''The processing stage has the fewest number of establishments in the vertical food system, but the processor/food manufacturer is often considered the most powerful, influential firm in the system-the marketing channel leader."493 Rogers' paper on structural changes in U.S. food manufacturing provides the following listing of the top twenty-five food processing companies for the year 1998: 1) Philip Morris Companies, Inc. 2) Conagra, Inc. ; 3) Cargill, Inc. ; 4) Pepsico, Inc.; 5) The Coca-Cola Company; 
491 Ibid., 3-4 . .  
492 Ibid., 3. 
493 Richard T. Rogers, "Structural Change in U.S. Food Manufacturing, 1958 to 1997,"Agribusiness: An 
International Journal 17, no. 1 (2000): 3-32, 3; posted on website of Economic Research Service, USDA, 3 
(May 4, 2000); available from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/foodmarketstructures/conferencepapers/rogers.pdf; Internet; accessed 16 
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6) Archer Daniels Midland Company; 
7) Mars, Inc.; 
8) IBP, Inc. ; 
9) Anheiser-Busch Companies, Inc.; 
10) Sara Lee Corporation; 
1 1) HJ. Heinz Company; 
12) Nabisco, Inc.; 
13) Bestfoods; 
14) Nestle USA, Inc.; 
15) Dairy Farmers of America; 
16) Kellogg Company; 
17) Campbell Soup Company; 
1 8) The Pillsbury Company; 
19) Tyson Foods, Inc. ; 
20) General Mills, Inc. ; 
21) Quaker Oats Company; 
22) The Procter & Gamble Company; 
23) Dole Food Co., Inc.; 
24) Hershey Foods Coproation; and 
25) Land O' Lakes, Inc. 494 
These processors form a fraction within the industrial agriculture bloc. Their 
ability to exercise hegemony is enhanced by well financed lobbying efforts, connections 
with the USDA, relationships with academic institutions and mammoth advertising 
budgets. Farmers sell their raw products to the processors and manufactures either on the 
basis of a market price or a contract price. 
In some industries such as livestock, the concentration at the processor/meat 
packer level has arguably created inequitable market pricing for farmers who are unable 
to receive price signals because of the large number of captive supply contracts imposed 
by the meatpackers. Meatpackers are able to refrain from trading for several days due to 
the large number of supply contracts and thus drive down the prices of the livestock 
commodities. Rogers states that "as more product volume moves through non-market 
methods, the less is known about true product values as key economic information 
494 Ibid., 4, data sourced from ''The 1998 Top 100 Food Companies," Food Processing (December 1998). 
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summarized by price becomes more difficult to discover."495 As another strategy, 
processors are entering into long-term strategic alliances with commodity producers 
which require the producers to enter into contracts to grow their products pursuant to 
defined specifications. 496 
The nation' s  four largest meatpackers have been key players in the agribusiness 
environment. They include IBP (now owned by Tyson Foods Inc.), Swift & Co. 
(ConAgra is 46 percent owner), Excel Corp., (the slaughterhouse subsidiary of Cargill, 
Inc.), and Farmland. Referred to as ''The Big Four," these meatpacking enterprises 
control an estimated 75 to 80 percent of the beef cattle slaughtered in the United States 
each year.497 
The Tyson/IBP conglomerate is a powerful "fraction" (as the term is used by 
Gramsci) in the industrial agriculture bloc exercising hegemony in agribusiness. Formed 
in late 2000 when Tyson Foods, the world's largest poultry producer and processor, 
acquired controlling stock in IBP, the conglomerate became the nation's largest 
meatpacking company. Two corporations, each powerhouses in their industries, merged 
to create a $20 billion behemoth poised to "concentrate market power, reduce raw 
material and labor expenditures and eliminate competition" across a broad swath of the 
agric�ltural industry.498 IBP is the largest beef meatpacker in the United States and the 
second largest pork meatpacker.499 To the extent that IBP and its parent company, 
Tyson, use this concentration of ownership to exercise control over prices and goods, the 
495 Ibid., 2. 
496 Ibid. 
497 See Steven D. Vetter, "Audit of 'Big 4' requested," Western Livestock Journal 32, no. 21 ,  10 March 
2003, 1 and 7. 
498 A.V. Krebs, "Merchants of Greed," Corporate Agribusiness Research Project (undated); available from 
http://www.organicconsumers.org/corp/greed.cfm; Internet; accessed 10 July 2003. 
499 Heffernan, 10. 
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losers in this union could be consumers and independent cattle and poultry producers. A 
lawsuit filed by cattle producers in 1996, alleging that IPB engaged in illegal price 
control practices, has been certified a class action for cash sellers of fed cattle to IBP and 
is scheduled for trial on January 12, 2004.500 
Another major agribusiness player, Cargill Corp., has the distinction of being the 
nation's largest private corporation with operations in seventy countries.501 In addition 
to its Excel meat processing business, Cargill is a major grain processor and one of the 
largest seed companies in the world. Its agribusiness portfolio demonstrates vertical 
integration with business enterprises in the areas of seed operation, animal feed, feeding 
cattle operations, and processing plants. By entering into a joint venture with 
Monsanto502 (one of the world's leading biotechnology companies), Cargill gained 
access to the biotechnology that would allow it to create new genetic products. The 
Cargill/Monsanto alliance is aggressively involved in application of the "terminator 
gene" to create sterile seeds that can only be used one season.503 
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) calls itself the "Supermarket to the World." Its 
operations include a global network of processing facilities for the processing of grains 
for the food and animal feed markets. ADM has entered into joint ventures with 
numerous agricultural companies and cooperatives that will give it access to farmers and 
the flood of raw materials that it needs, including: joint ventures with Countrymark, 
500 See Official Court Website, Pickett v. IBP, Inc.; available from 
http://www.endcaptivesupply.com/schedule.html; Internet; accessed 23 May 2003. 
501 Heffernan, 3 .  
502 Monsanto's product line also includes pest and weed killing chemicals and fertilizers. 
503 Heffernan, 4. 
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Riceland and United Grain Growers. 504 It is also involved in a joint venture with 
Growmark, a company producing grains for energy products, and two feed cooperatives, 
Goldkist and Ag Processing, Inc. (AGP). It has aggressively expanded into foreign 
markets with commodity processing and feed operations in South America and oilseed 
refining, feed and broiler processing in China. Its presence in the production and 
processing of livestock has been felt through its joint venture with AGP and its continued 
purchase of shares in IBP. 505 
Smithfield Foods is an unmistakable major agribusiness player as the largest pork 
producer in the United States and the world, with annual sales in 2000 of $5.2 billion. It 
slaughters more than 12 million hogs annually, raised on hog farms it owns or sourced 
through contracts with farmers. Known for its growing number of factory farms and 
processing facilities, it is has come to the attention of public interest groups for 
controversial corporate behavior related to the despoiling of land and water.506 The 
confinement facilities used by Smithfield produce large amounts of swine waste that are 
kept in lagoons. They are difficult to disperse into the surrounding environment, and 
have created environmental damage, especially in North Carolina, which is the number 
two hog producing state in the United States. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and other lawyers 
have brought legal actions against Smithfield, claiming that it illegally dumped untreated 
hog waste and contaminants into the waterways of North Carolina. 507 
504 Ibid., 9. 
505 Ibid. 
506 See A.V. Krebs, "Merchants of Greed," Corporate Agribusiness Research Project (undated); available from 
hrn,://www .organicconsumers.org/corp/greed.cfm; Internet; accessed 10 July 2003. 
507 See "Lawsuits Charge Smithfield Foods-Biggest U.S. Factory Farmed Hog Producer-Illegally 
Dumping Millions of Pounds of Untreated Pig Waste, Other Toxins in North Carolina, Polluting Rivers, 
Causing Fish Kills, Shellfish Disease," Earth Crash Earth Spirit (February 17, 2001); available from 
http:/leces.org/articles/static/98238960099021 .shtml; Internet; accessed 17 June 2003. 
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In the U.S. dairy industry, a recent merger between Suiza Foods Corp, the largest 
fluid milk producer in the U.S., and Dean Foods Co., the second largest, has created a 
mega operation poised to exert a dominant influence. As part of the merger, the Justice 
Department required the two companies to sell dairy processing plants in eight different 
states to avoid reduced competition. The plants were acquired by a new entity, National 
Dairy Holdings, L.P., that is fifty percent owned by a dairy cooperative, Dairy Farmers of 
America Inc. 508 
Companies that supply farmers with seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and machinery 
comprise another major group within agribusiness. Those involved in biotechnology have 
acquired increasing commercial power as they have amassed patents and propriety 
intellectual property assets in agricultural products such as genetically engineered seeds 
and plants. Many of these assets are quietly being funneled out of land-grant institutions 
as the universities agree to transfer rights in research to biotechnology companies.509 
The roster of prominent biotechnology companies operating in the United States 
includes: Monsanto, American Cyanamid, Dow, Pioneer-Hybred, Rhone-Poulenc, 
DuPont, Inc. and United Agri5 Products, (a subsidiary of Con Agra). 
Novartis, a Swiss producer of genetically engineered crops, pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, was formed in 1996 when CIBA-Geigy and Sandoz merged. The company 
became the number one agrochemical company in the world after it aquired Merck in 
508 See ''The Family Tree of Texas Dairies," Dairy Foods (August 2002); available from 
http://www.diaryfoods.com/articles/2002/0802/0802_dairyl00.htm; Internet; accessed 10 July 2003. 
509 See Joshua A. Newberg and Richard L. Dunn, "Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Values and 
Rules of Engagement for Industry-University R&D Partnerships," American Business Law Journal 39 
(Winter 2002): 1 87-240. 
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1997.510 Novartis has a business connection with ADM through its part ownership of 
Land-O-Lakes, an ADM business. This alliance could prove useful to Novartis over time 
since its holdings do not include grain or food processing companies. 
Another leader the chemical and industrial products is DuPont, Inc. It is also 
involved in biotechnology. DuPont has entered into joint ventures with ConAgra's 
United Agri Products business, thus joining the agrochemical and biotechnology interests 
of DuPont with the array of businesses under the ConAgra umbrella. 
Food retailers form another powerful fraction within the industrial agriculture. In 
2001 ,  the U.S . food industry ranked fifth in the ranking of most profitable industries 
measured by percentage of return on assets."5 1 1  One reason for the impressive success of 
this industry has been its strategy of forcing down the prices of raw materials from 
producers and farmers while increasing the costs of food to consumers to ensure high 
margins of profitability. 
The fast pace of concentration in the retail grocery sector during the past decade is 
changing the face of the supermarket business. The catalyst that has shaken up the 
grocery business is Wal-Mart. The Arkansas-based company first began selling food in 
1988. In 2002, it edged out Kroger (a national chain located in Cincinnati, Ohio) to 
become the nation's number one grocer based on annual sales of more than $53 billion. 
510 As noted earlier in this dissertation, Novartis is known in the United States for its controversial 
arrangement with the University of California-Berkley to conduct research on genomics under a $25 
million contract. 
51 1 See "Fortune 500: Drug Industry Most Profitable Again," Families USA (April 2002); available from 
http://www.tilrc.org/docs/0402drug$.htm; Internet; accessed 25 May 2003. 
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The third largest grocer is Albertson's (based in Boise, Idaho) and the fourth major 
supermarket chain is Safeway (headquartered in Pleasanton, California). 5 12 
Wal-Mart targeted the grocery business as being ripe for entry in the late 1980s 
when it noticed that concentration in the grocery business had resulted in higher food 
prices by grocers seeking to expand their profit margins. The industry was vulnerable to 
Wal-Mart's price cutting strategies, and Wal-Mart could still make a profit while 
undercutting competitors by ten to fifteen percent. Competition is fierce between the four 
top grocers and industry watchers predict that at least one of the supermarket chains will 
not survive.5 13  
Wal-Mart's food business success is the result of many strategies, but clearly its 
ability to exercise enormous pressure on entities farther down the food chain gives it an 
edge. Suppliers are pressured to source raw materials at lowest costs and provide them in 
uniform packaging with uniform weights. No Wal-Mart stores offer meat cutting or 
butcher services. The industrial agriculture business model meshes perfectly with the 
Wal-Mart business model. Wal-Mart's move toward vertical integration can be seen in 
its ownership of food distributors, AmeriService and McLane's.5 14 
The competitors, Kroger, Albertson's and Safeway, have adopted new strategies 
to compete, including cost cutting, expansion of their house brands and providing 
consumers with meat butchering services. These supermarket chains also must shoulder 
512 See Patricia Callahan, "Wal-Mart supercenters top grocery listt The Wall Street Journal (June 9, 2003); 
republished online at Sunspot.net Business website; available from http://www.sunspot.net/business/bal­
wlmart060903,0,5949846.story?coll=bal-business-headlines; Internet; accessed 16 June 2003. 
513 Ibid., 'I'll 1 1-15. 
514 Brendan Coffey, "Revenge Of The Big-Box Stores," Forbes Online, CJ( 4 (March 12, 2003); available 
from http://www.forbes.com/2003/03/l2/cz_bc_03 12sf.html; Internet; accessed 16 June 2003. 
244 
additional costs incurred because their labor force is mostly unionized. In contrast, Wal­
Mart has aggressively fought off all attempts to introduce unions.515  
Consultants with the Boston Consulting Group offer the following summary of 
Wal-Mart 's powerful presence in the grocery industry: 
Wal-Mart' s  U.S .  grocery sales have skyrocketed from $10 billion to more 
than $45· billion in little over a decade-a 14.6 percent real annual growth rate. 
We project these sales to reach nearly $70 billion by 2005 . . . .  If Wal-Mart can find 
the right entry vehicles, it aspires to expand in Japan, Western Europe, and many 
developing countries. To be sure, its march across the United States-and the rest 
of the world-shows no signs of slowing down. In its wake, Wal-Mart has left a 
trail of shuttered grocery stores. Surviving retailers in the United States face 
squeezed margins, diminished traffic, and a reduced share of grocery 
purchases.516 
So the newest fraction to ally itself with the industrial agriculture bloc is Wal­
Mart. As the largest retailer in the world, the potential for this company to exercise 
hegemony in the production of agricultural commodities is enormous. This research has 
identified large concentrated agribusiness enterprises as organizers within the industrial 
agricultural bloc. Wal-Mart's dominance in the food chain will allow it to wield power 
within this group and ally itself with a multinational industrial agriculture bloc as it 
expands internationally. A superstructure of economic, political and social relationships 
may be defined by the modes of agricultural production generated by Wal-Mart as it 
exercises hegemony over the agricultural industry. 
Since 1962, agribusiness has operated under the prevailing influence of The 
Committee for Economic Development (CED). The web site for CED describes itself as 
515 See Wendy Zellner, "How Wal-Mart Keeps Unions at Bay," Business Week (Oct. 28, 2002); 
republished on Labor Research Association website; available from 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_ 43/b3805095.htm; Internet; accessed 16 June 2003 . 
516 Marin Gjaja, Alexander Lintner and Henry M. Vogel, ''Dancing with the 800-Pound Gorilla," Boston 
Consulting Group, 1 2  (2003); available from 
http://www.bettermanagement.com/Library/Library .aspx?a=8&libraryid=4892; Internet, accessed 16 June 
2003.  
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"an independent, nonpartisan organization of business and education leaders dedicated to 
policy research on the major economic and social issues of our time and the 
implementation of its recommendations by the public and private sectors."517 Launched 
by business leaders in the World War II years, this organization turned its full attention 
to agriculture in 1962 when it released a report titled "An Adaptive Program for 
Agriculture." The panel responsible for this report, two hundred businessmen, academics 
and educators (many of them agricultural economists), began with the pronouncement: 
"The movement of people from agriculture has not been fast enough to take full 
advantage of the opportunities that improving farm technologies, thus increasing capital, 
[will] create."5 1 8  In order to remove the excess resources (people) from farming, the 
CED report outlined a program that was based in large part on changing the price system 
to generate financial hardship. 
The growing power of agribusiness in the food supply chain from farmer to the 
consumer has been accompanied by the dwindling market power of the commodity 
producer. The preferred use of contractual arrangements, alliances, joint ventures and 
direct ownership by Agribusiness has all but eliminated open competitive markets and 
hastened this result. These preferred means of controlling production are designed to 
serve the industrial agriculture bloc and minimize the power of the subordinate producer 
and the consumer at opposite ends of the food chain. 
In early 2003, Hal Hamilton, founding co-chair of the National Campaign for 
Sustainable Agriculture, attended a Harvard Business School Agribusiness Executive 
517 Committee for Economic Development Mission, available from http://www.ced.org/about/mission.shtml; 
Internet; accessed 27 April 2003. 
518 A.V. Krebs, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of Agribusiness (Wa. D.C.: Essential Books, 1992), 289, 
quoting "An Adaptive Program for Agriculture," report by the Committee for Economic Development, 1962. 
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Seminar. Given his alignment with the counter-hegemony against the industrial 
agriculture model, he reported that he "felt a bit like a fish out of water" at the seminar 
with 160 top managers of large agribusiness companies.519 His observations on the 
agribusiness "mindset" are as follows: 
Not only do incentives and rules of the competitive market stand in the way of a 
'greener' business climate, but there's also an internal culture in the business 
world that lulls its leaders into a cozy complacency . . .  There's  a 'school spirit' 
among these executives that makes it difficult for any of them to question the 
wisdom of transgenetic crops, even in the face of consumer resistance. 
Technology equals progress which ensures the common good. They like to 
believe that they have science on their side. 520 
Hamilton succinctly summarizes the business objectives of the agribusiness 
companies represented by those attending the conference: 
These companies have two powerful motivators: the drive for efficiency and the 
search for unique values that increase market return. The whole system is 
constructed on squeezing inefficiencies out, procuring and moving commodities 
very cheaply, adding unique value at the lowest possible cost to the next customer 
up the chain, or f etting a premium by adding some desired attribute that the 
customer wants. 21 
This describes the industrial agriculture model. It is the guiding force for 
agribusiness. 
Advertising Agency Associations. One group caught in an awkward position by 
the changing face of the challenger in these cases was the advertising associations. While 
advertising agencies are clearly the recipients of the checkoff funds, the associations 
represent their interests. Needless to say, advertisers have a keen interest in keeping the 
millions of dollars flowing their direction for national campaigns such as "Got Milk," 
519 Hal Hamilton, "Agribusiness Executives Tune -Up at Harvard," Sustainability Institute, '1 1  1-2 (January 
27, 2003); available from http://sustainer.org/pubs/columns/01 .27.03Hamilton.html; Internet; 
Internet; accessed 25 May 2003. 
520 Ibid., TI 6-8. 
521 Ibid., 1 9. 
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California Raisins, "Beef, it's what' s for Dinner." In the Glickman case, the American 
Advertising Federation and several other advertising groups filed an amicus curie brief 
in favor of the challenger, Gerawan Farming. Their brief argued that: 
[T]ruthful commercial messages regarding lawful products and services are 
entitled to full Constitutional protection .. . Assessed under the level of scrutiny 
accorded fully protected speech, this becomes an extremely easy case. The 
government obviously cannot compel a speaker to endorse or propound a 
particular view. Moreover, whether assessed under Central Hudson or Abood, the 
Secretary's program is clearly unconstitutional.522 
While their primary objective in this brief may have been to argue for an 
expanded level of protection for commercial speech, the advertising associations clearly 
staked a position on the side of the challengers and argued that the checkoffs are 
unconstitutional. In the Glickman case, this aligned them with the large producers 
investing major marketing dollars in campaigns for their branded products. In an odd 
twist, control of the checkoff advertising dollars in the cattle, beef and dairy cases, is 
exercised by the USDA, state governments, commodity boards and those appointed and 
hired by them to administer the checkoff programs. The challengers are the little guys 
seeking a ruling that the checkoff programs are unconstitutional while the government 
and other fractions in the dominant hegemony claim that the government can compel a 
speaker to endorse a particular view when the message constitutes government speech. 
The dominant hegemony argues that the government speech doctrine applies, so First 
Amendment protection is not afforded to the individual producers. 
It would appear that this puts the advertising associations at odds with their clients 
in the beef, pork and dairy cases who are arguing for reduced First Amendment 
522 Richard T. Rossier and Wayne R. Watkinson, "Glickman v. Wileman: On the Doorstep of The Supreme 
Court," NICPRE Quarterly 2, no. 3 (Third Quarter 1996); available from 
http://commodity.aem.comell.edu/nicpre/newslet/vol2no3/index.htm; Internet, accessed 5 April 2003. 
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protection of generic advertising under the government speech doctrine. However, the 
Supreme Court has largely ignored the commercial speech doctrine in Glickman and 
United Foods, preferring to decide the cases under a freedom from compelled speech 
analysis based on the Abood and Keller cases. Given this direction of the court, 
advertising agencies and their associations who are interested in expanding the 
commercial speech doctrine may have little to gain (and everything to lose in terms of 
client goodwill) by filing an amicus curie brief case before the Supreme Court on this 
point when the next checkoff case is heard. 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO). The AFL-CIO filed an amicus curiae brief in Glickman v. Wileman in order 
to state its views on the agency shop cases (the line of cases based on Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education governing freedom from compelled speech) and to clarify for the 
court how these cases should properly be applied. The AFL-CIO foresaw that the 
challenges to compelled speech in the form of checkoffs created the potential for new 
application and possibly a new interpretation of the Abood principles. Abood held that 
employees who chose not to belong to a union could be forced to pay service fees to a 
union, provided that such fees were used strictly for purposes germane to the reason why 
the unions were established, i .e., to serve the purpose of collective bargaining. 
Clearly, it was in the manifest interest of the AFL-CIO to ensure that the Supreme 
Court did not alter the Abood analysis to disturb the status quo vis-a-vis the manner in 
which service fees have been collected from non-union members for more than twenty 
years. The AFL-CIO' s brief characterized the free speech claim of the fruit growers and 
handlers challenging the checkoffs in Wileman as a "negative First Amendment right" to 
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abstain from making financial contributions to generic advertising or speech. (The 
nomenclature of "negative First Amendment right," which refers to the constitutional 
right to refrain from speaking, has been used at times to identify the corollary to the 
affirmative First Amendment right to speak or express oneself.) An interpretation of the 
Abood line of cases most favorable to maintaining the status quo was offered by the AFL­
CIO in its amicus brief: 
. . .  the fruit handler's claims are like other claims this Court has considered 
by members of regulated groups urging that their compelled association with 
expressive activity contemplated by a legislative regulatory scheme violates their 
constitutional right of non-association. Most closely analogous are claims of this 
nature that have been brought by employees challenging union expenditures in 
agency shop cases, and attorneys challenging bar expenditures in unified bar 
cases. 
In these cases, the Court has repeatedly rejected these claims so long as 
the positive group speech activity serves the overall goals of the regulatory 
scheme. And, unless the challenged speech activity is political or ideological 
speech at the core of protected First Amendment values, the Court has taken a 
generous view in considering whether the expenditures are rationally related to 
the overall legislative purpose. [emphasis added]523 
The goal of the AFL-CIO was to persuade the Supreme Court to take a "generous 
view" in concluding that the checkoff fees are rationally related to the overall legislative 
purpose of the marketing orders governing the tree fruit industry. The AFL-CIO brief 
makes a broad assertion that a regulated party's ability to exercise "a broad constitutional 
right to opt out of the affirmative portion of an overall system for regulating a facet of the 
economy" will threaten "important economic and social programs." In other words, it 
will threaten the First Amendment principle that allows unions to collect service fees 
from non-union members. 
523 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Glickman v. Wileman (1997) (No 95- 1 184), 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1996, 4-5. 
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Academic Specialists Aligned With Hegemony or Aligned With Counter­
Hegemony. The history of the academic community's involvement in agriculture sheds 
light on the role played in the early Twenty-first Century by academic specialists in the 
industrial agriculture bloc and their counterparts engaged in research and activities 
supporting counter-hegemony. 
The agricultural research establishment traces its roots to the passage of the 
Morrill Act in 1862,524 legislation that provided public land for universities in each state 
charged with responsibility for establishing and supporting agriculture and mechanical 
arts. This was followed by the Hatch Act in 1887,525 authorizing federal funds for 
experiment stations that would function in conjunction with the land grant universities. 
Congress passed a second Morrill Act in 1890526 that granted funds to any state that 
wished to secure them for "separate but equal" land grant colleges for black students. 
(Seventeen states elected to establish black colleges, now referred to as "1890 colleges or 
universities.") A final prong of this agricultural research system was the Extension 
Service. Created by the 1914 Smith-Lever Act,527 this was a system for using county 
agricultural extension agents to provide rural America with information and farming 
practices developed by the land grant universities and research stations.528 
In his critical overview of agribusiness, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of 
Agribusiness, agricultural analyst, A.V. Krebs, traced the relationship between land grant 
524 Morrill Act of 1862, 7 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. 
525 Hatch Act of 1887, 7 U.S.C. §§ 36la-36li. 
526 Morrill Act of 1890, 7 U.S.C. §§ 32 1 et seq. 
527 Smith Lever Act of 1914, 7 U.S.C. §§ 341 et seq. 
528See David L. Howell, William I. Lindley, Raymond H. Morton, Glenn Z. Stevens, Edgar Paul Yoder, 
Elements of the structure of agricultural education in the United States of America (Paris, France: United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1983), 53-55 . Also see A.V. Krebs, The 
Corporate Reapers: The Book of Agribusiness (Washington, D.C.: Essential Books, 1992), 263-264. 
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universities and industry. He asserted that the connection between business and 
agriculture arose during the early years of the land grant colleges. Krebs stated: 
After gaining a certain measure of self-respect, these colleges began to ally 
themselves with the movement for scientific agriculture, which had begun in the 
1 8th century, and went on to build an educational foundation on which a new 
organization of agriculture could take place. 529 
In Krebs' opinion, the new organization of agriculture created inequitable conditions for 
farmers. Rural farmers and the public have not been served well by an educational 
system that has favored industrial interests. 
Krebs is not alone in his assessment. This same view has been advanced by 
various strong voices during the last five decades. In 1972, a particularly critical and 
powerful report was issued by the Agribusiness Accountability Project, a public interest 
project that was founded by Jim Hightower and a former Nader's Raider, Susan 
DeMarco. 530 The Agribusiness Accountability Project formed a Task Force on the Land 
Grant College Complex that documented how government and agribusiness dominated 
the research agendas of the land grant institutions to the disadvantage of family farmers. 
The resulting report, titled Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times, created a major stir in 
government and agribusiness circles. It identified pervasive ties between business and 
529 Krebs, 264. 
530 Prior to his leadership on the Agribusiness Accountability Project, Jim Hightower served as a 
congressional aide. While working on the project, he became an advocate for consumers and farm workers. 
He later served two controversial terms as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Agriculture from 
1982 to 1990. He carried his activism into this position, promoting organic farming, regulation of 
pesticides, small-farm cooperatives and consumer causes. In the early Twenty-first Century, he worked as 
an author and host of a radio show with a progressive, populist outlook. See "Politician Turned Political 
Sparkplug Jim Hightower is Keeping the Grassroots Connected and Radio Active," Horizon Magazine 
(1999); available from http://www.horizonmag.com/7/Jim-Hightower.asp; Internet; accessed 1 1  July 2003. 
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the land grant colleges.53 1 The report claimed that the participants were a "close-knit 
bunch" that were "inbred and rather tightly drawn."532 The group is described as follows: 
The land grant college community includes more than those who are on campus: 
administrators, faculty, researchers and extension agents. In addition, the 
community also includes officials of the national Association of State Universities 
and Land Grant Colleges (NASULGC), the Cooperative State Research Service 
and other USDA officials, various local and national advisory structures, private 
agricultural and research foundations and agribusiness clients of the system. 533 
The one external element that became integrated into the land grant community 
was agribusiness. The report asserted that "agribusiness ingratiates itself."534 By 
offering money for grants and research, agribusiness secured a place for itself in the land 
grant community. However, in addition to the wellspring of financial support offered by 
corporate agriculture, Hard Times, Hard Tomatoes alleges that agribusiness was 
welcomed as a partner because its "attitudes and objectives were shared by the land grant 
communities."535 This suggests that organic intellectuals in academia and agribusiness 
were building an "ideology ensemble" that would provide agribusiness and land grant 
institutions with a foundation for sharing power within the industrial agriculture bloc. 
The report also argued that "the community serves itself' by the movement of 
people among three spheres of society-the land grant college community, government 
and agribusiness. It questioned the integrity of the land grant officials and staffs: 
Corporations make a sizeable investment in teaching, research and extension 
work, and they are repaid amply in ( 1 )  research products, (2) graduates prepared 
to work in agribusiness, and (3) legitimacy for their commercial products. Land 
grant officials and staffs, on the other hand, work hard to meet the requests of 
531 See Jim Hightower, Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times: A Report of the Agribusiness Accountability Project 
on the Failure of America 's Land Grant College Complex (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing 
Company, 1973). 
532 Ibid., 87. 
533 Ibid., 86. 
534 Ibid., 90. 
535 Ibid., 90-91 .  
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agribusiness, while many are on corporate retainers and a few actually hold seats 
on corporate boards of directors. It is a sharing process that raises serious 
questions of conflict of interest and of intellectual and scientific integrity.536 
The concluding chapter of the Hard Times, Hard Tomatoes report presents a 
picture of an industrial agriculture bloc with two important fractions (agribusiness and 
land grant institutions) that exercise hegemony. The report states: 
America's land grant college complex has wedded itself to an agribusiness vision 
of automated, vertically-integrated and corporatized agriculture. It has accepted 
corporate agribusiness as an integral part of its community, applying some three­
quarters of a billion tax dollars a year to help big business work its will in rural 
America . .. .It has been a deliberate choice-corporations over people.537 
Hightower' s report described the effect of this hegemony by concluding that "the 
colleges have mistaken corporate need as 'the changing needs of a changing nation.' That 
is proving to be a fatal mistake-not fatal for the corporations or for the colleges, but for 
the people of America."538 The Task Force emphasized the need for others to get 
involved in challenging the dominant position of the land grant college-agribusiness 
power bloc by stating: 
Today, the complex [land grant complex] serves only one constituency: 
corporate agribusiness. Others must get into this public complex, and they must 
get in on an equal footing with corporate executives. But the land grant 
community will not break off it monogamous relationship with agribusiness 
simply because it ought to do so. Significant change will come only under 
pressure. 
The recommendations of the Task Force, therefore, are directed toward 
opening this closed world to public view and to participation by constituencies 
that today are locked out. 539 
This was a call for counter-hegemony, made in 1972 by a public interest 
organization that promoted a movement to break the hegemony exercised by two primary 
536 Ibid., 9 1 .  
537 Ibid., 138. 
538 Ibid., 139. 
539 Ibid., 139-140. 
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players in the dominant industrial agricultural bloc, the land grant colleges and 
agribusiness. Their ally was the U.S. government. The three entities are intertwined 
because: ''The bow on the agribusiness-agrigovemment relationship is tied on the land 
grant campuses. "540 The Task Force issued a challenge for changes that would increase 
the power of "consumers, environmentalists, independent family farmers, farm workers, 
minorities, small town businessmen, rural public officials and other interests directly 
affected by the work of the land grand complex."541 
The same challenge could have been issued thirty years later, since the same 
relationships between land grant institutions and agribusiness are prevalent in 2003. (In 
fact, the author of Hard Times, Hard Tomatoes, Jim Hightower, has continued to speak 
out against the corporatization of agriculture and other public interest issues in books, a 
monthly newsletter, the Hightower Lowdown, radio commentaries and a column in the 
Nation magazine.) 
Legislation passed in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act, 542 proved to be revolutionary in 
spurring academic-corporate partnering. It permitted universities to patent research 
discoveries resulting from federal funding. The legislation was the result of intense 
lobbying by a coalition of business and educational leaders seeking to create new 
opportunities for collaboration between business and academia. It was controversial, 
raising the question of whether the university' s role as a center of learning engaged in 
research for the public good should be expanded to allow the university to become a 
source of viable commercial ideas. Academia saw the chance to earn royalties for its 
540 Ibid., 96. 
541 
Ibid., 141 .  
542 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200 et seq. 
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scientific endeavors, and industry saw a way to vacuum valuable ideas out of the ivory 
tower. The timing was right with pressure for innovation resulting from declines in 
United States productivity and foreign competition and the need for universities to mine 
new sources of revenue from grants and royalties as costs rose and tax support fell. 54� 
Congress enacted other statues since 1980 to create incentives for academic­
industry alliances, but the Bayh-Dole Act remains a turning point. Through this Act, 
Congress provided legitimacy for the notion that a university should develop and own 
intellectual property for its own financial gain. The Act provided an incentive for 
universities to accept a stronger corporate presence and set the scene for the invasion of 
the biotechnology firms in the 1980s and 1990s. 
At issue in the new millennium are the rights of universities to retain ownership 
over seed lines developed during decades of research. Private corporations seek access to 
the seed lines to develop genetically modified plant varieties over which they then wish 
to exercise proprietary ownership. If this happens, a university loses control over its 
scientific resources-it is unable to share them with other universities or make them 
available to the public. There is a huge loss to those who share in the benefits of these 
resources. 
Land grant universities are increasingly choosing to sacrifice their resources for 
the research dollars that will serve the narrow purpose of building corporate profits. In a 
significant move, North Dakota State University decided in 2001 to reject a 
biotechnology contract proposed by Monsanto that would have required a portion of the 
543 See Eval Press and Jennifer Washburn, "The Kept University," The Atlantic Online, <JN{ 12-13 (March 
2000); available from http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/03/press.htrn; Internet; accessed 15 June 
2003. 
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universitfs genetic plant resources to fall under the control of Monsanto. This was 
heralded as a special act of public service. 544 
One of the most stunning examples of the opposite approach by a university is a 
$25 million deal signed in November of 1998 between University of California-Berkeley 
and the Swiss agribusiness powerhouse, Novartis, a global biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical company interested in research to develop genetically engineered crops. 
As noted earlier in this dissertation, the arrangement gives Novartis unprecedented 
control. It allows Novartis to fill two seats (out of five) on the research committee for the 
Department of Plant and Microbial Biology and grants Novartis the first right to negotiate 
licenses for approximately a third of any research discoveries resulting in proprietary 
intellectual property arising from any projects within the department, however funded. 545 
These are astounding concessions to private business. The deal struck by this 
department (one of four within the College of Natural Sciences), was met with opposition 
from other faculty, public interest groups and students. There were sharp divisions over 
whether the agreement diminished Berkeley' s commitment to conduct research for the 
public good and whether it would be possible for members of the department to freely 
exchange ideas with Novartis waiting in the wings to capture intellectual property rights. 
(The ability to patent genetically engineered organisms has provided a powerful 
hegemonic tool to the agribusiness organizers in the industrial agriculture bloc. )546 
544 Brian DeVoire, ''When Opportunity Knocks," The Land Stewardship Letter 19, no. 1 ,  fll-2 
(Jan/Feb/Mar 2001); available from http://www.landstewardshipproject.org/Isl/lspv19nl .html; Internet; 
accessed 19 May 2003. 
545 See Press and Washburn, ''The Kept University," '1'1 3-4. 
546 Ibid., TI 5-6. 
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Dean Gordon Rausser, dean of the College of Natural Resources and proponent of 
alliances between universities and private business, claimed "Without modem laboratory 
facilities and access to commercially developed proprietary databases . . .  we can neither 
provide first-rate graduate education nor perform the fundamental research that is part of 
the University' s  mission."547 
An article in The lAnd Stewardship online newsletter ( an electronic publication 
aligned with counter-hegemony against the industrial agriculture bloc) emphasized that 
the goals of the biotechnology sector have played an important role. The article stated: 
[I]n recent years various agreements between universities and private industry 
have locked up the fruits of land grant science at a dizzying pace. Ties between 
private industry and public institutions have always been a part of U.S . 
agricultural research. However, biotechnology has accelerated and deepened 
those ties considerably in recent years. Its incredible expense and insatiable 
appetite for resources has sent 'life sciences' corporations and universities rushing 
into each other's arms ( citation omitted). 
This trend is raising concerns among advocates of public research that land grant 
institutions are becoming little more than field stations for private corporations.548 
The troubling manner in which universities today are serving the profit needs of 
corporate America rather than undertaking research and programs to advance the public 
good has come to the attention of the American Association of University Professors. 
This organization issued a "Statement on Corporate Funding of Academic Research"549 
in 2001 that outlined certain standards and actions that should be followed by faculty to 
help reduce conflicts of interest that arise due to the university-industry relationship. In 
its online and print publications, this association has expressed the need to preserve 
547 Ibid., 'I 8, quote from Rausser article in Berkeley alumni magazine. 
548 DeVoire, <Jr}[ 4-5. 
549 "Statement on Corporate Funding of Academic Research," American Association of University 
Professors (2001), available from http://www.aaup.org/statemst/Redbook/repcorf.htm; Internet; accessed 
29 May 2003. 
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academic freedom and independence in a world of corporate influence and power. 
However, the evidence in this study suggests that, in the agricultural communities of the 
land grant institutions, the effort to "preserve independence" is largely a hollow goal, 
since academic independence may already have been sacrificed at the alter of the 
industrial agricultural model several decades ago. In an effort to achieve some degree of 
transparency, American biological journals in the latter part of the 1990s began requiring 
authors submitting papers to identify any personal or family interests in biotechnology 
firms and specify the source of their funding. 550 
The quest for academic autonomy by agricultural specialists in modern times may 
be pursued by the few assertive voices willing to: 1 )  publish scientific results that may 
not be favored by corporate America, and 2) speak out on behalf of the need to direct 
research and resources toward furthering the public good. These activities are viewed as 
a threat to the entrenched and dominant industrial agricultural bloc. Instances of 
retaliation by university administrations and by corporations targeting researchers in legal 
battles are examples of the war of position the dominant bloc and those attempting to 
engage in counter-hegemony. Evidence that the industrial agricultural bloc has 
"captured" the university administration of universities can be seen in instances where 
professors have been stripped of duties and prohibited from speaking as well as in 
academic environments where researchers are discouraged from criticizing large 
corporate donors. The legal actions are coercive attempts to not only silence an 
individual researcher, but to exercise an intimidating effect on the publication of any 
550 Jean-Pierre Berlan and Richard C. Lewontin, The Genetic-Industrial Complex: CASIIlNG IN ON 
LIFE," Norfolk Genetic Information Network, 1 6  (December 1998); available from 
http://ngin.tripod.com/pblinks2.htm; Internet; accessed 15 June 2003. 
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future scientific research that would disclose negative information about corporations or 
their products.55 1 
This historical overview provides a framework for understanding the role of 
various agricultural specialists involved in the commodity checkoff programs and the 
legal conflicts related to these programs. The specialists supporting the agricultural 
business model are aligned with the commodity industry blocs exercising control in the 
checkoff hegemony. 
The most visible professors in the group aligned with the checkoff hegemony are 
those that publicly extol the benefits of the checkoffs or those that appear as witnesses on 
behalf of the government and testify that the checkoff programs are overwhelmingly 
beneficial to particular industries and producers. They typically provide econometric 
testimony attesting to the success of a specific commodity program in generating an 
increased demand for the commodity. Examples include Dr. Ron Ward of the University 
of Florida and Dr. Wayne Purcell of the Virginia Polytechnical Institute, who has written 
a paper titled A Primer on Beef Demancf52 for the American National Cattleman's Beef 
Industry Planning Group. Dr. Purcell has published numerous articles and other 
publications that address issues of profitability and growth in the cattle industry. His 
research and writings revealed a fundamental alignment with the industrial agricultural 
bloc. In his view, the middleman and the beef packing plants are exonerated from 
responsibility in contributing to the low prices experienced by cattle producers. This 
551 See Donna R. Euben, "Academic Freedom of Individual Professors and Higher Education Institutions: 
The Current Legal Landscape," American Association of University Professors (May 2002); available from 
http://www.aaup.org/Com-a/aeuben.HTM; Internet; accessed 79 May 2003. 
552 See Wayne Purcell, A Primer on Beef Demand, RILP Publications (April 1998); available from 
http://www.aaec.vt.edu/rilp/publications.html; Internet; accessed 19 June 2003. 
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perspective can be seen in the following excerpt from his publication "The Source of 
Better Prices for Cattle Producers": 
Like it or not, producers have to recognize that regulating the marketplace 
or controlling how packers can do business is not going to push calf prices up in 
any significant way . . .  The facts simply do not support the claims that producers 
are being robbed by middlemen. What the facts do show are price spreads being 
extracted by retailers that are growing dollar for dollar with their possible 
increases in costs. At the packer level, the facts show spreads that are growing · 
slower than general price inflation, perhaps testimony to the low-cost operations 
of the huge beef packing plants of the 1990s.553 
It was Purcell 's opinion that an expansion of consumer demand is the secret to 
increasing producers' profitability. He stated: 
The facts show another hard truth: Any increase in middlemen's  spreads, 
even increases economically justified by rising costs, will push producers' prices 
down if retail prices are stagnant because of weak demand for beef. In expanding 
on this now-obvious point, we come to a better understanding of where the 
needed dollars are: They are in the pockets of the modem affluent consumer. If 
we will support and push the emerging programs that are finally starting to move 
to a high-quality, consistent, and consumer-friendly (read "convenient") beef 
product offering, we will save some of the cattle-producing families that will 
otherwise be pushed out of business by a marketplace that has no conscience. To 
get that done, we will need investments in new technology and in new product 
offerings by the big packers. 554 
The National Institute for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation 
(NICPRE) at Cornell University is a formalized way in which the hegemony has given 
legitimacy to checkoff programs through its research to determine whether the 
commodity promotion programs are effective. The institute, funded by a special grant 
from Congress, engages in research on commodity promotion economics. Dr. Harry 
Kaiser is director of the NICPRE and, also, serves as director of an affiliated 
553 Wayne Purcell, ''The Source of Better Prices for Cattle Producers," RILP Publications (June 1999); 




organization, the Cornell Commodity Promotion Research Program (CCPRP). The stated 
purpose of CCPRP is: 
(1)  to provide the public with information to judge the appropriateness of 
continuing authorization for commodity checkoff programs and continuing 
support of export promotion programs, and (2) to collaborate with and provide 
information to boards of directors and managers of commodity promotion 
checkoff programs to help them better utilize promotion funds. The CCPRP 
serves as a central source of knowledge on the economics ·of commodity · 
promotion checkoff programs. 555 
In their interviews for this study, Dr. Ward and Dr. Kaiser both indicated that 
their work as economists was necessary to provide the commodity research boards and 
the government with the independent research necessary for policy decisions related to 
whether to continue the programs and how to spend checkoff money. They asserted that 
their research unequivocally demonstrated the economic benefits of the checkoff 
programs.556 The following is an excerpt from Dr. Ward's interview: 
Interviewer: And does your research show that the goals for enhancing the 
market demand for these products .. . that the goals are achieved by the checkoff 
programs? 
Ron Ward: Well, the ones I've looked at have. I think you could find a lot of 
exceptions and you could find problems with any of them. But the big ones 
we've looked at, you can measure the impact on demand. You absolutely can. 
It's just not my work-it's a lot of people's work. And you can determine 
whether or not it had an impact in terms of shifting the demand for the product. 
Then, you have to figure out was it worth the cost. Some of the commodities 
have done a better job than others in terms of doing that evaluation. 557 
Dr. Kaiser had the following comments about the benefits of the programs: 
And all of the economic research-well, that may be a little bit of an 
overstatement-but most of the economic research, probably at least 90 percent 
555 Harry M. Kaiser and Jennifer L. Ferrero, "Cornell Commodity Promotion Research Program: Objectives 
and Progress to Date," Institute for Commodity Promotion Research and Evaluation (undated); available 
from http://www.commodity.aem.cornell.edu/object.htm; Internet; accessed 16 March 2003. 
556 Ward interview, 4 and Kaiser interview, 6. 
557 Ward interview, 3. 
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plus, has indicated that these programs have benefits and the benefits exceed the 
costs.558 
He described the extent of the benefits as follows: 
For most commodities, what we find is that there are benefits to the people that 
pay for these programs in the aggregate. So, let's say you have a commodity and 
it' s got 100,000 producers in the United States, and they're in the mandatory 
program. What we tend to find is that the aggregate net income, net revenue of 
that industry at the farm level goes up by more than the cost of the· program. And 
typically we see that in the magnitude of like four-fold so that if the program costs 
$ 1  million, we see that the industry benefits by infusing another $4 million in 
terms of farm net revenue into the industry . . .  
We don't know how that money is distributed. Do large producers get more of 
the benefits than small producers? I have done a little bit of research on that, 
some theoretical research, that actually indicates that, in fact, the smaller farmers 
may be benefiting more than the large farmers on a per unit basis. 
Kaiser emphasized that the large benefit ratios are often hard to detect, because the level 
of investment overall is so small: 
Harry Kaiser: Most of these programs are yielding very good benefit cost ratios 
for the benefits that they're getting from the advertising, the promotion, or 
whatever they're doing. And the typical rate of return is usually 4, 5 or 6, 
something like that. So that if you invest $1 ,  you get $4 or $5 back in the 
aggregate to the industry . . . .  
Interview: And at what point would the producers start seeing a return? The 
profits for producers have been increasing going down, so there must be some 
point where if it gets high enough, those people on the end would see a return. 
Harry Kaiser: Yeah. They're getting a return. They just don't see it, because it' s 
so small . . .  My point is that the returns on a percentage basis are humongous, 400 
percent or 500 percent. But they're putting such a small amount in, you can 
barely distinguish it from other factors. 559 
He also pointed out that, while the processors and retailers are free riders, the farmer still 
realizes benefits: 
558 Kaiser interview, 2. 
559 Ibid., 7. 
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So there are benefits, there are positive benefits to the farmers. They outweigh 
the costs in general. But, having said that, there are huge free rider benefits to the 
processors and to retailers of these programs because they don't pay for them, but 
they get benefits from the programs. Processors see higher prices because of 
these programs and higher demand. And with the exception of food milk 
processors, most processors don't pay a penny for these programs . . .  so when 
farmers say, "this is unfair because we're paying for these programs and other 
people are getting benefits" it' s tiue . . . . But what is not true is when they imply 
"when the processors and retailers are better off, we are worse off." That is not 
true.560 
The benefits of generic advertising have been strongly asserted by a host of other 
researchers who have performed various economic analyses, including a team from Texas 
A&M University, led by Dr. John Nichols, director of the Texas A&M Center for 
Consumer and Food Marketing Issues. Nichols and his team of agricultural economists 
(Dr. George Carroll Davis, Dr. Oral Capps, Jr. and Dr. David A. Bessler) were 
commissioned by the National Pork Board (NPB) to conduct a study to investigate the 
returns to pork producers as a result of the pork checkoffs. They delivered a report titled 
"An Economic Evaluation of the Pork Checkoff Program, Texas A&M Department of 
Agriculture Economics, 2001 Departmental Technical Report No. 01-1 ," dated January 
2001 .561 
In deposition testimony Dr. Capps provided in the case of Michigan Pork 
Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms, he outlined details of the pork study. Capps 
identified two different economic models that were used by the researchers to conclude 
that pork producers were realizing returns based on the pork checkoffs. 562 In fact, their 
560 Ibid., 9. 
561 See Deposition of Oral Capps, Jr. at 1 8, Michigan Pork Producers Association, Inc. v. Campaign for 
Family Farms (W. Dist. Mich. 2002) (No. 1 :01 CV-34), taken on 15 May 2002. 
562 Capps referred to the two models used in the study as the "structural model" and the "time series 
model." Both models showed that the pork checkoff delivered a positive benefit. (The time series model 
was more conservative, but still showed benefits.) Ibid. at 50, 55, 64-65. 
264 
report stated: "Unequivocally all producers benefit from the demand enhancing 
expenditures of the checkoff program."563 Capps testified that Technical Report No. 01 - 1  
was "peer reviewed" by another faculty member in the same department as the research 
team at Texas A&M. It was also reviewed at a preliminary stage by two outside 
academics, Dr. Marvin Hayenga of Iowa State and Dr. Harry Kaiser of Cornell who 
received financial reimbursement for their services. It did not receive a traditional "blind 
peer review" as required for published journal articles. 564 
The groups challenging the checkoffs are quick to point out that the majority of 
the research showing positive benefits of checkoffs was performed by academic 
specialists with funding from the government and various commodity promotion boards, 
who openly admit to "collaborative" goals. While academic specialists give assurances 
of their autonomy in perf onning independent, scientific research, a reasonable 
assumption can be made that an academic specialist who is paid by the government or a 
commodity promotion board may be predisposed to support the viewpoint ( or 
"ideological ensemble" in the language of Laclau and Mouffe) of the industrial 
commodity bloc exercising hegemony. 
Agriculture specialists aligned with the counter-hegemony against the industrial 
agriculture bloc are in the minority. John Bunting, a New York dairy farmer, activist and 
writer for the online farm newsletter, The Milkweed, attributes this to the fact that the 
land grant university system is a major player in supporting the industrialized system of 
agriculture. 565 He expressed concern in his interview about the close relationship 
563 Ibid., 55. 
564 Ibid., 26-29. 
565 Bunting interview, 7. 
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between agribusiness and the land grant universities, and stated that he was not aware of 
a single "dairy economist" that was critical of the industrialized agriculture model566 
However, he ·commended one food marketing economist, Dr. Ron Cotterill, for his work. 
Cotterill, director of the Food Marketing Policy Center at the University of 
Connecticut, has a record of clashing with corporate giants when his studies have 
disclosed monopoly pricing practices in the food industry. He ·recently published a study 
that showed supermarkets and milk processors in New England had gouged consumers 
by significantly overcharging for milk under the guise of meeting federal requirements of 
the Northeast Dairy Compact (a federal program that ran from 1997 to 2001 and 
guaranteed New England farmers a minimum price for milk). The research agenda 
followed by Cotterill aligns him with the counter-hegemony against the industrial 
agriculture model as evident by his own admission: 
Most of the economists in my subject area of industrial organization and 
anti-trust economics work for the big guys. Only a very small fraction work for 
the little guy and the public interest. As the trend continues toward economic 
concentration and fewer big firms, our research becomes all the more 
important. 567 
John Bunting reported on a face-off between Cotterill and another economist, Dr. 
Ken Baily, associate professor of dairy markets and policy economist at Penn State 
University, who has attempted to discredit Cotterill 's study on the milk pricing in the 
Northeast Dairy Compact. Bailey's work is clearly aligned with dominant corporate 
interests. (Bunting referred to Bailey' s work as "defending the status of corporate 
566Ibid. 
567 Elizabeth Omara-Otunnu, "Cotterill Analyzes Competition, Monopoly in Food Industry," Advance on 
the Web (March 3, 2003); available from http://www.advance.uconn.edu/03030307.htm; Internet; accessed 
30 May 2003. 
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truth.")568 
Dr. Neil Harl, agricultural economist, lawyer, and director of the Center for 
International Agricultural Finance at Iowa State University, has been another academic 
voice for the agricultural counter-hegemony. His writing, speaking and leadership 
suggests that he may be a central organizer for organic intellectuals within academia and 
in other sectors seeking to build a power bloc against the dominant hegemony. His 
assertion that the "the greatest economic threat to farmers as independent entrepreneurs is 
the deadly combination of concentration and vertical integration" 569 has appeared in his 
various public talks and papers, providing the counter-hegemony with a phrase from an 
academic specialist to identify the practices it strongly opposes. 
The Organization for Competitive Markets (formed in 1998 to increase accuracy 
and fairness in the food chain market}570 hosted a debate at its annual meeting between 
Dr. Harl and an advocate for the industrial agricultural model from Texas A&M, Dr. Ron 
Knudtson. Harl argued for a diverse industry structure that would replace the "deadly 
combination of horizontal concentration and vertical integration" and Knudson responded 
by arguing "bigger is more efficient" so consolidation is the answer for the future. 
568 John Bunting, "Dueling Economists: PSU's Bailey vs. Uconn' s  Cotterill," The Milkweed, 1 (August 
2001); available from http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~cotteriVbunting.html; Internet; accessed 30 May 2003. 
569 Neil E. Harl, ''Economic Impact and Impacts of Continuing to Proceed as We Are Now," presented at 
conference, "Concentrations in Agriculture: How Much, How Serious, and Why Worry?" (February 4, 
2003); available from http://www.ag.iastate.edu/centers/leopold/teams/policy/harl.pdf; Internet; accessed 6 
July 2003. 
570 The Organization for Competitive Markets has stated that it was created because: "Dominant voices in 
agricultural policy ignored issues of industry structure, power and monopoly concerns." The organization 
hopes ''to play a part in creating a newly profitable, diverse, and decentralized food production structure for 
the benefit of independent farmers, ranchers and rural communities." "OCM's Place in the World," 
Organization for Competitive Markets (August 2000); available from 
http://www.competitivemarkets.com/news_and_events/newsletter/OCM-N-15 .htm; Internet; accessed 30 
May 2003. 
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In another head-to-head in the academic "war of position" between hegemony and 
counter-hegemony, Harl took on the economist, Steven C. Blank. As noted earlier in this 
dissertation, Blank predicted that food production in the United States will disappear and 
agribusiness will flourish as raw products are provided from foreign sources. Harl wrote 
a review of Blank' s book, The End of Agriculture in the American Portfolio that disputes 
many of Blank' s conclusions and questions the factual basis for many statements. Harl 
acknowledged the accuracy of Blank's observation that economic forces will determine 
the direction of the agricultural sector, but objected to Blank' s "extrapolation of trends at 
the margin" to predict the future for American agriculture. 571 
Harl has joined other academic colleagues in research and publications relating to 
monopoly by the meatpackers in the livestock industry, including: John Connor, 
agricultural economist and professor of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University; Peter 
C. Carstensen, agricultural law expert and Young-Bascom Professor of Law, University 
of Wisconsin School of Law; and Roger A. McEowen, agricultural law expert and 
associate professor of Agricultural Economics and Extension Specialist, Agricultural Law 
and Policy, Kansas State University. 
The four scholars released a report in 2002 titled "The Ban on Packer Ownership 
and Feeding of Livestock: Legal and Economic Implications."572 The report discussed 
legislative efforts to balance the economic power between producers and processors in a 
highly concentrated and vertically integrated meatpacking industry. The authors 
571 Neil Harl, "Review of The End of Agriculture in the American Portfolio (Steven C. Blank)," Iowa State 
· University faculty website ( 1998); available from 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/har/Book_Review.html; Internet; accessed 30 May 2003. 
572 See John Connor, Peter C. Carstensen, Roger A. McEowen and Neil E. Harl, ''The Ban on Packer 
Ownership and Feeding of Livestock: Legal and Economic Implications," Iowa State University faculty 
website (2002); available from http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/har/PackerOwnership. pdf; Internet; 
accessed 6 June 2003. 
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criticized captive supply arrangements and disputed claims by the meatpacking industry 
and its supporters that it alleged were misleading, e.g., the legislation curbing ownership 
of livestock would have a severe detrimental impact, that shared risk arrangements would 
become illegal, etc. 
This economic report became a banner document for the counter-hegemony in the 
war of position, especially when a contrary report was released by the Sparks Company, 
Inc., a commodity market research firm hired by the National Cattlemen's Beef 
Association and the National Pork Producer's  Council to study the impact of the 
proposed law banning packer ownership and feeding of livestock fourteen days prior to 
slaughter. The Sparks report concluded that the proposed would have a severe negative 
impact on the beef and pork industries that a Sparks executive outlined as follows: 
The end result likely would be lower producer prices, higher costs, smaller 
markets and diminished returns for the foreseeable future. Losses for cattle and 
hogs could be as hip as $10.9 billion and $3 .5 billion of that cost would be on 
the beef industry.57 
A similar war of position between the experts occurred on May 8, 2003, when a 
report was published by an academic team challenging the USDA' s published 
conclusions regarding costs for country of origin labeling. Such labeling has been 
strongly opposed by agribusiness (the industrial agricultural bloc) that seeks to avoid 
informing consumers about the source of food products. The May 2003 report carefully 
evaluated the numbers and methods used by USDA economists and found that such 
numbers were "excessively high" and based on numerous inaccurate assumptions. This 
team included: Dr. Harl, Dr. McEowen, Dr. Connor and two other agricultural 
573 "New Report Concludes Packer Ownership Proposal Could Cost Cattle Industry $3.5 Billion," site 
affiliated with beef.org, website of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, 'I 2 (March 1 8, 2002); 
available from http://policy.dnsalias.net/sparks; Internet; accessed 9 July 2003. 
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economists, Dr. John V anSickle of the University of Florida and C. Robert Taylor of Auburn University.574 The 1996 Farm Act required all commodity programs to demonstrate the effectiveness of their generic advertising on a periodic basis as a condition for maintaining such programs. The agriculture economists performing this research have played an important role in maintaining the checkoff hegemony. This was evident from the interviews conducted with Dr. Ron Ward and Dr. Harry Kaiser for this study. A significant number of agricultural economists have built their careers around performing research relating to the mandatory commodity promotion programs. Although agricultural economists and law experts aligned with the agricultural counter-hegemony may agree with using First Amendment strategies as another means to wage a war of position against the industrial agriculture bloc, they have not been outspoken in challenging the commodity checkoffs. They have not launched a counter­challenge to the research demonstrating that the commodity checkoff programs have achieved the goal established by the legislature, namely, "to increase the primary demand (i.e., size of the pie) of a product."575 In the conflict over commodity checkoffs, the agricultural specialists on the side of counter-hegemony seem willing to concede the issue of the effectiveness of the generic advertising and let the free speech argument be the primary f ocus of the hegemonic battle. (However, Erik Jaffe, a constitutional lawyer representing checkoff challengers emphasized in his interview that the formulas and 
574 Alan Guebert, ''Cooking the Books on COOL [County of Origin Labeling]," Farmers Advance, 21  May 
2003, 16-A. 
575 Arnitav Chakravarti and Chris Janiszewski, ''The Influence of Generic Advertising on Brand Preferences 
(October 2002); available from http://www.cba.ufl.edu/mkt/facstaff/chrisworking/paperl l .pdf; Internet; 
accessed 3 March 2003. 
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procedures used to support the findings that the commodity programs were effective had 
never been subjected to a rigorous examination in a legal challenge.)576 
In a study on ''The Influence of Generic Advertising on Brand Preferences," two 
marketing professors (Amitav Chakravarti, assistant professor of marketing, Leonard N. 
Stem School of Business, New York University, New York, and Chris Janiszewski, Jack 
Farley professor of marketing, Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, 
Gainesville, Florida) asserted that "the concern of these commodity producers [filing 
lawsuits in the checkoff cases] is not that generic advertising is ineffective at increasing 
primary demand but that it is also redistributing 'shares of the pie, ' especially in markets 
that have become differentiated."577 Markets can become differentiated by branding or 
by advertising unique product attributes. The agricultural economists have touted the 
effectiveness of the programs, but Chakravarti and Janiszewski argued that the issue 
driving the checkoff lawsuits is the potential for generic advertising to: 1 )  influence the 
distribution of market shares among brands in differentiated markets, and 2) cause 
consumers to become more responsive to price. They stated: 
Generic advertising is designed to increase primary demand, or the 'size of 
the pie,' without affecting selective demand, or the 'share of the pie' . We find 
evidence to the contrary-generic advertising increases the consumer' s sensitivity 
to changes in price and systematically alters brand preferences. These effects of 
generic advertising can be attributed to the tendency of generic ads to change the 
relative importance of the attributes used to evaluate the brands. The results have 
implications for the public policy issue of how to effectively implement generic 
advertising without differentially benefiting certain brands and the managerial 
issue of how to integrate generic and brand advertising in order to achieve product 
category and brand differentiation goals. 578 
576 Jaffe intervew, 1 .  
577 Chakravarti and Janiszewski, 8 .  
578 Ibid., 3. 
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Chakravarti and Janiszewski' s study was the only research identified during this 
dissertation project that explored the interrelationship between generic and branded 
advertising. This is clearly a key issue in the tree fruit and mushroom checkoff lawsuits 
and may also be an issue for livestock and dairy commodities as the trend toward 
branding becomes more prevalent in those industries . 
. The researchers questioned the positive or negative effect that generic 
advertising has on the whether "generic advertising may mitigate or amplify the 
advertising efforts of individual brands."579 They noted the concerns exemplified in 
recent challenges to generic advertising and stated: 
In each case, the plaintiff argued that generic advertising was not achieving its 
legislatively mandated goal of increasing primary demand for all of the sellers in 
the commodity market. In this article, we will demonstrate that the concerns of 
United Foods and small cattle producers are legitimate. 
In study 1 ,  we show some generic ad campaigns increase, and others decrease, 
brand differentiation in a product category. These changes in brand 
differentiation result in changes in brand choice. In studies 2 and 3, we show that 
generic advertising influences the competitive structure of a market because it 
increases the importance of an advertised product attribute by decreasing access 
to information about non-advertised product attributes. We also show that 
decreasing access to information about non-advertised product attributes results in 
an increased sensitivity to price, a consequence unique to generic advertising .. . 580 
The researchers reached the following two conclusions based on a series of four 
experiments conducted with generic and branded advertisements. "First generic 
advertising has the potential to redistribute market shares among brands. Second, generic 
advertising has the potential to make people more responsive to price."581 
579 Ibid., 4. 
580 Ibid., 4-5. 
581 Ibid., 33. 
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The two academic specialists involved in this study are marketing professors who appear 
to be in a neutral position with regard to the checkoff hegemony. 
Several former government agricultural officials that have moved into academia 
were interviewed in this study, including: Daniel Glickman, Enrique Figueroa and 
Kathleen Merrigan. While they may retain loyalties toward political parties and powerful 
private business contacts that are aligned with the dominant industrial agricultural model, 
they were willing to acknowledge both the negative and positive aspects of the checkoff 
programs and to assess ways in which the USDA could have done a better job handling 
checkoff matters arising during their tenures. One explanation for why they may feel 
more freedom to admit weaknesses of the checkoff system than other agriculture 
economists and academic specialists is because they hold academic posts that are not 
politically or financially beholden to the checkoff system.582 
The Government's Position (or Lack of a Position) 
"There is a near universal frustration at the inactivity of the USDA. " 
~ Doug O,  Brien ( commenting on the government, s 
failure to address concentration in agriculture) 
The Government and Change in Agriculture. A children' s  fairy tale spins the 
yarn of a royal leader who hired tailors to weave cloth and sew a new set of clothes for 
him. In furtherance of a self-serving scheme, they kept the gold the emperor gave them 
for their services and spread the message that "stupid people and those not good at their 
582 Daniel Glickman, former Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture, currently holds the position of Director, 
Harvard University Institute of Politics. Dr. Kathleen Merrigan, former Administrator, Agriculture Marketing 
Service, U.S . Department of Agriculture is currently the Director of the Agriculture, Food and Environment 
Program at Tufts University and Dr. Enrique Figueroa, former Administrator, Agriculture Marketing Service, 
USDA, is serving as Director of the Roberto Hernandez Center and Special Assistant to the Provost for Latino 
Affairs at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin. 
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jobs are unable to see the fabric and the new clothes. "583 Time passed and no one in the 
emperor's  entourage acknowledged the obvious-that the tailors produced no clothes. 
Finally, the tailors pocketed the last of the gold and the king modeled his nonexistent new 
clothes in a parade. A young child finally spoke the truth, "He hasn't got anything 
on !"s84 
Like the emperor and his entourage, the United States Department of Agriculture, 
legislators and politicians have watched the disappearing rural farm population, the major 
shift in agriculture represented by growing concentration and the glaring structural 
inequality in the agricultural economy with a singular failure to acknowledge and address 
these developments. A member of Senator Harkin's staff, Doug O'Brien, succinctly 
summarized this by noting that there is a "near universal frustration at the inactivity of 
the USDA" in responding to the higher degree of concentration in the agricultural 
industry. 585 In the face of inescapable evidence of change (reports by advisory panels 
and commissions, testimony before Senate and House committees and subcommittees) 
and numerous efforts by to raise the consciousness of the State, the legislators and 
political actors have been sluggish in acting. 
The Farm Bill of 2002 provided for a shift back to a farm dependency paradigm 
with significant farm subsidies, but did nothing to address the inequitable economic 
structures that have arisen through concentration and continue to become more extreme. 
Many scholars believe that this legislation, in fact, reinforces the interests of corporate 
agriculture since almost half of the farms receiving assistance are commercial farms with 
583 Hans Christian Anderson, The Emperor's New Clothes (New York: Scholastic, Ind., 1977), 8. 
584 Ibid., 29. 
585O'Brien interview, 3. 
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annual income of $250,000 and higher.586 Activist agricultural organizations and 
individuals continue to push legislation that will seek to limit ownership of cattle by meat 
packing operations and to seek better enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act by 
GIPSA. The issues surrounding the increased importation of foreign beef and its impact 
on the demand and price of domestic beef do not appear to be on the radar. 
A number of special advisory councils and hearings have put the issue of 
concentration before legislators and the USDA. Likewise, objections to the checkoff 
challenges have been communicated through referendums (clearly an indication that a 
certain percentage of the industry population disagrees with paying the checkoff fees). 
But the government and politicians have chosen to let the tailors continue to collect the 
gold and ignore the reality that the emperor has no clothes. 
Gramsci 's theory suggests that this is an example of AgriBiz hegemony - a 
dominant group seeking to avoid a "crisis of hegemony" by quietly reinforcing its power 
bloc and refusing to recognize or address the agricultural crisis. The ideology of AgriBiz 
can be seen in their vision of an industry that "shuns a commodity system and embraces 
value-added production"587 and in the Federal government's approach to farm policy. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the government's policies fell heavily under the influence 
of commercial business leaders and economists at the Committee for Economic 
Development (CED). In his 1992 book, The Corporate Reapers, A.V. Krebs argued that 
the government became more than an observer in the structural changes required. In a 
1974 report by the CED, it concluded: 
586 See United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New 
Century (September 2001), 49, 1 12. 
587 Troy Marshall, "Saving Rural America," Florida Farmers Inc., ')l 5 (2003); available from 
http://www.floridafarmers.org/news/articles/saving.htm; Internet; accessed 12 July 2003. 
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''The diagnosis [previously made by the CED in 1962] was that agriculture 
was using too many resources; fewer farms and farmers could produce all the 
output then required or even more than could be marketed. As a result of these 
findings, we prescribed programs 'for the better use of our resources in 
agriculture [that], vigorously prosecuted, would enable the people involved in 
farming to receive higher incomes without government controls or subsidy. ' 
In general, policies of this nature have been pursued by the U.S. 
government, with the result described in the present statement; namely, that U.S. 
agriculture today is far more efficient, a far more productive industry."588 
While it has not expressly endorsed the industrial agricultural model and its 
attendant commercial values and ideology, the USDA almost thirty years later has 
provided full tacit support for this approach as the preferred means for the future of 
agriculture within the American economy. This is implicit throughout the language 
found in the USDA publication titled Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the 
New Century published by the USDA in 2001 as a comprehensive report on American 
agriculture. A close reading of the USDA's leading publication shows language such as: 
"Globalization makes it imperative for companies to diversify their 
sources of raw materials and buy from the farmer, wholesaler, or food processing 
company that provides the best product for the lowest price at any given time. 
All of our experience and evidence points to increasingly fierce 
competition in the agricultural system, suggesting that the innovative, cost­
effective producers will prosper. Mergers, acquisitions, and further globalization 
of the food system can be expected to continue. Helping consumers eventually 
get what they want can be good business, and businesses that can do this quickly 
and efficiently tend to succeed while those who are slow to understand key trends 
face rapid erosion of competitive position."589 
This report embraced "mergers, acquisitions and further globalization of the food 
system," and the benefits of increased contractual arrangements, size economies and 
reduced transaction costs occurring as the result of structural changes (i.e., vertical 
588 A.V. Krebs, The Corporate Reapers (Washington, D.C.: Essential Books, 1992), 292, quoting "1974 Report 
bl the Committee for Economic Development." 58 United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Agricultural Policy: Taking Stock for the New Century 
(September 2001), 27-28. 
276 
integration).590 It made only passing reference to the potential antitrust concerns with 
regard to monopolies created by structural change in the following paragraph: 
While this structural change is advantageous for some, it also prompts 
concerns about competition, market access, and the use of market power by some 
participants to the disadvantage of others. Moreover, reduced competition could 
limit society' s  gain from structural change by stifling innovation or tilting the 
market' s result in favor of those with the greatest market power. 59 1 
In this publication, the USDA discussed the diverse farm sector in terms of 
commercial farms, intermediate farms, and rural farms. Woven throughout is a message 
of encouragement to intermediate farmers and rural farmers to move toward "off-farm" 
income. The executive summary glibly noted: ''Today, fewer farmers are full time, 
choosing to merge farm and nonfarm employment opportunities. "592 The publication at 
no point acknowledged the reality of the forced exodus of thousands of farmers or their 
painful efforts to work second and third jobs to maintain a subsistence level of income. 
The USDA does point out the disparity in farm program benefits intended to bolster the 
farm industry. In regard to the most financially disadvantaged segment of farmers, the 
USDA report noted: 
This limited-resource group comprised about 6 percent of f arms, had 
average household income of $9,500, but received less than 1 percent of direct 
government payments in 1999. In contrast, 47 percent of payments went to large 
commercial farms, which contributed nearly half of program commodity 
production and had average household income of $135,000 . . . . Even though many 
intermediate farms and rural-residence farms receive some program benefits, only 
one in four generated enough revenue to cover economic costs. Even more 
problematic is the inability of these farms to improve their cost efficiency at the 
same pace as larger commercial operations, whose investment in new 
technologies and ability to expand are aided by program benefits.593 
590 Ibid., 21 .  
591lbid., 21 .  
592 Ibid., 4. 
593 Ibid., 49. 
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Intermediate farmers are encouraged to consider direct marketing and value-enhanced 
products, but the commitment of the USDA to this group is questionable when this 
suggestion is followed by: "Moreover, the importance of off-farm earnings clearly 
suggests that large benefits accrue to these farmers from efforts to expand off-farm 
employment opportunities and strengthen rural communities."594 At the same time it has 
minimized the importance of the intermediate farmers, the USDA is forced to solicit their 
participation in addressing environmental issues. It stated: " . . .  this group of farms 
controls a significant portion of the farmland (45 percent), and supporting their 
compliance with environmental regulations is important to the quality of the Nation's 
resources. "595 
The USDA dismissed economics as unimportant to rural-residence farms with the 
observation that "(O]bjectives other than farm profitability, such as enjoyment of a rural 
lifestyle and farm work, keep them in agriculture. "596 It further minimized their role as a 
non-participant in the economics agricultural game by noting: 
Not surprisingly, traditional agricultural policy has very little influence on 
the financial well-being of these households. They are very little connected to 
commodity prices but much more so to wage rates, interest rates, employment 
levels and tax policies. Their needs obviously are more effectively addressed by 
rural development and other policies that most affect them. 597 
Again, an annoying reality for the USDA is that, while the rural farmers fail to 
contribute economic value, they own a great deal of farmland. The USDA report sought 
to find a redeeming role for the rural farmers in conservation and environmental 
programs: 
594 Ibid .• 54. 




These farms are small individually, and they account for only a small 
proportion of total output, but collectively they control a large proportion (29 
percent) of the farmland, suggesting that their participation in appropriately 
designed conservation and environmental programs potentially could make 
important contributions to national objectives in those areas. 
It is telling that only one of the USDA' s target initiatives for rural farming are 
related to any future role in agriculture. The three new policy initiatives include: 
" . . .  expanding value-added agricultural production, finding alternative methods to 
increase rural income from the natural resource asset base, and providing leadership in 
education, specifically entrepreneurial skills."598 In the absence of an economic 
contribution that can increase Gross National Production (GNP), there is no other role for 
rural farmers so they need to retrained and moved to other industries, consistent with 
Steven Blank' s assertion that agriculture is a "dead loss" to the nation if it cannot 
contribute to the global agribusiness movement. While mentioning environmental and 
health concerns, the promise of biotechnology and other scientific advances, the report 
makes no reference to the larger issue of "sustainable agriculture" that has begun to 
capture the attention and concern of activist groups and the public who are interested in a 
longer-range vision of how the current industrial model with allow the earth to sustain its 
resources in the face of practices of commercial farming and depletion of agricultural 
assets. Sustainable agriculture and an expanded range of values relative to environment 
and quality of life are absent from the discussion. 
In addition, the USDA has quietly refused to address in this report and elsewhere 
the growing economic inequities inherent in the agricultural industry dominated by 
commercial agriculture (i .e., the industrial model and vertical integration). For example, 
598 Ibid., 92. 
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although concerns have been growing among the public and legislators regarding the 
dominance of a small number of meatpackers and the level of their profits accrued 
through a variety of practices such as captive supply arrangements, this issue and the role 
of the Grain Inspection and Packers and Stockyards Administration in protecting the 
interests of farmers and the public is noticeably ignored in Food and Agricultural Policy: 
Taking Stock/or the New Century. 
The USDA' s vision of American agriculture is through the eyes of the industrial 
agriculture bloc. Alternative agricultural models based on any conceptual foundation 
other than the economic cost-benefit of the industrial model are literally off the USDA' s 
radar. Even organic farming and smaller operations with value-added crop features 
appear to be tolerated as enterprises operating at the fringes of the dominant model, but 
not as opportunities for developing legitimate alternative models. As organic food 
products have gained consumer popularity, some organic farming operations have begun 
to operate more fully within the industrial agriculture model, and the USDA has slowly 
begun to give greater recognition to organic farming. 
The favored treatment that the USDA has given to the ideology of commercial 
agriculture and the global industrial agriculture model and its implicit acceptance of the 
ideology for the future of agriculture can be seen in this USDA report. The USDA 
summarized its position as: "Foremost, our strongly held view is that agricultural policy 
must recognize that the marketplace is the best guide for allocating resources and 
provides the most objective reward for efficiency and good management."599 However, 
5
99 Ibid., 61 .  
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this is a hollow statement if competition in the marketplace no longer exists due to 
concentration and vertical integration. 
In addition, the report asserted that the globalization of markets and culture and 
other fundamental changes in society and agriculture are trends that are "positive and 
unstoppable."600 This is a huge challenge for those seeking to build an historic bloc 
capable of counter-hegemony that is sufficiently powerful to break the current hegemony 
in agriculture. They must first generate a public consciousness and then win consent to a 
set of beliefs and values based on the platform that the trends are negative and can be 
stopped or changed. 
The Government and the Checkoff Programs. Dr. Ron Ward emphasized 
during his interview that the USDA and the AMS must support the current checkoff 
program because the law requires this role. According to Ward, they must carry out their 
responsibilities in four areas: 1 )  administration of the program, 2) message and delivery, 
3) monitoring and evaluation, and 4) equity and legal challenges.601 The commodity 
checkoff statutes require evidence that the programs are effective so this becomes a 
threshold requirement for an ongoing program. Ward stated: "I don't think they would 
defend one [checkoff program] if they felt like it was totally not effective."602 He 
suggests that the government should be expected to stand behind the checkoffs as part of 
its agency function: 
The USDA has a responsibility in every one of those [areas of oversight] 
by law. So, they're supporting them legally. Part of it is because they think it's a 
600 Ibid., 2. 
601 Ward interview, 5. 
602 It should be noted that the government vigorously defended the mushroom checkoff program in the United 
Foods case, despite the absence of evidence by the mushroom commodity board, the Mushroom Council, that the 
generic advertising for mushrooms was effective. 
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good program maybe, but part of it is just the fact that it is a piece of legislation 
that' s in place. So, they just couldn't say, well, we're walking away fro� it.603 
It can be argued that the USDA has reluctantly stepped up to its role in handling 
the commodity referendums for livestock. The government's role in responsibly carrying 
out the mandates of the checkoff legislation requiring referendums have been seriously 
scrutinized by many, including the courts. However, during the interviews for this study, 
the views on the referendums and how they were handled varied widely, depending upon 
whether the interviewee was aligned with the commodity industry bloc or the group 
challenging checkoffs. 
A representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board thought the USDA should have 
moved more quickly in handling the beef referendum, but was satisfied with the USDA's 
actions in conducting a signature verification process, providing the following comments: 
[l]t was clear in the manner in which LMA gathered signatures, there had to be 
some kind of verfication process in order to comply with the law, which says that 
if 10 percent of America' s beef producers want to petition for a referendum, then 
the secretary can call one. So the question becomes, "Are these beef producers?" 
And as you probably know . . .  USDA, yeah, I would have liked them to move a 
little faster. But USDA hired Price Waterhouse to conduct a verification process, 
and LMA fell way short of the number of bona fide cattle producers necessary to 
hold a referendum . . .  So it's unfortunate that LMA didn't conduct a factually 
sound-or just didn't go about gathering the signatures in a manner that would 
have assured that they were cattle producers, that they really knew what they were 
signing. 604 
Daniel Glickman had the following response when asked whether he was satisfied 
with the way the USDA handled the pork matter: 
No, because I think that first of all, we were not election officers, and we were in 
the midst of conducting a hotly contested election and, frankly, not very capable 
of doing that. And we did not do it very well. It's  one of the things we talked 
about at the end, I mean, we did the best we could, and I think that my 
603 Ward interview. 5 .  
604 Interview with anonymous representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board, 15 .  
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certification was in good faith as close as it probably was. But the whole process 
of ballot counting and verifying signatures, it was just a monumental mess. And 
it was not one the government was really set up to do. 605 
A pork producer and member of the Pork Board strongly agreed with Secretary 
Glickman' s assessment: 
[T]he referendum, in my view, was a flawed process from the beginning. When 
USDA set it up under Secretary Glickman, they did a number of things that we 
challenged that were wrong. Primarily, that you didn't have to verify eligibility to 
vote . . .  You could challenge someone's elibigility if you wanted to. It was on the 
different sides to challenge each other. But then they made it really burdensome 
to challenge because when you challenge somebody, you had to do it in writing, 
and that letter could only challenge one vote. If you wanted to challenge 1 ,000 
people, you'd have to send 1 ,000 letters. So, it wasn't done to really have a fair 
election, in my view. We challenged in the beginning, and I think the next time 
it's done, USDA learned from that.606 
Several of those interviewed in this study expressed the viewpoint that the 
position of the government in the checkoff challenge has not been one of neutrality 
because of the government's stake in using the checkoff programs to create and enhance 
its authority. Enrique Figueroa, former administrator of the Agricultural Marketing 
Service (AMS), the group within the USDA responsible for overseeing the checkoff 
programs, pointed out how close the ties are between the AMS and the commodity 
industries. In order to generate a more arms-length relationship, he wanted to remove 
administrative oversight of the commodity promotion programs to a group that was not 
involved in the certification products in exchange for use fees. He noted: 
One idea that I had that I was not successful in implementing that I wanted -
AMS is organized by commodity, the avocado program, the poultry program-I 
wanted to reorganize where I would have a di vision of research and promotion 
oversight so that the people there strictly did that, whether it was pork or beef or 
cotton. The reason I wanted to do that is because historically, the divisions­
tobacco or whatever it is-their livelihoods are a direct function of how well 
605 Glickman interview, 3 .  
606 Interview with anonymous pork producer and member of the Pork Board, 5. 
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those industries are willing to pay AMS in user fees. The Agricultural Marketing 
Service is probably the one agency within the entire federal government that has 
the largest proportion of its operational budget coming from user fees."607 
User fees are the payments made by the commodity producers for the government's 
testing, certification and grading of the commodities. A satisfactory relationship between 
the dominant industry blocs and the USDA with respect to checkoff programs will 
strengthen the relationships needed for a steady flow of user fees. Expecting the 
government to take any take steps that would jeopardize the checkoff programs without a 
statutory directive from Congress or a legal mandate frqm the courts is tantamount to 
asking the foxes to lock the door on the henhouse. 
The Challenger's Story 
The hegemony is quick to emphasize that the origin of many of the stand-alone 
checkoffs occurred through the initiatives of producers themselves as they hopefully 
voted for self-directed programs that would be administered by the government to assist 
them in addressing the severe conditions they were experiencing in the deteriorating farm 
markets in the 1970s and 1980s. 608 This is a painful irony to the producers who feel 
betrayed by the promise of enhanced returns through checkoff programs. In a poignant 
commentary, George Naylor (an Iowa farmer elected president of the National Family 
Farm Coalition, a coalition of 34 grassroots farm and rural groups) reflected on how 
naive he and others were initially about the goals of checkoffs, voting for the com 
checkoffs in the 1970s with faith that promotions would be good for farmers. Now he 
believes differently. He concluded that a primary goal of checkoffs is to generate 
fH7 Figueroa interview, pp. 3-4. 
608 The foundation for the checkoff programs seems deeply at odds with the argument of "government speech" 
used by the USDA and the trade associations to defend against the First Amendment claim violations alleged by 
the challengers. 
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higher production to get more cheap commodities for export. Naylor implicates the 
media along with the corporations: 
" .. [t]he only beneficiaries of checkoffs are the big corporations who can increase 
their volume and margins. If the American people really knew how they and 
farmers have been lied to, they would wonder what has really happened to our 
country. Unfortunately today' s  campaign tactics and shallow, misleading news 
reporting leaves the average citizen bewildered or numb."609 
There was a consensus among the individuals interviewed that the lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of mandatory commodity fees were prompted partially 
by the lack of a guaranteed vote on a periodic basis. Several individuals expressed their 
opinion that the conflicts could have been avoided if regular elections or referendums 
were in place. A Livestock Marketing Association executive stated: 
Personally, I think the largest mistake that was made by the proponents of the 
checkoffs when they drafted the legislation-and I know why they didn't do it, 
but I think it was a very large mistake on their part-was that they didn't establish 
a period vote in the law. I think they did it because they didn't want to take the 
chance that this thing would come back to a vote and would end the 
program . . .  And when they took away their right to get a vote other than through 
the ridiculously difficult, almost impossible petition drive, that said to producers 
as they became unhappy, well, how dare they force me to pay when I can't have 
any right then to say at any point whether I think the program ought to continue to 
exist or not. They can't tell me on one end it's directed by me, I have a free right 
to make a decision whether it should continue or not when they don't have any 
means within the law to make that happen.610 
This same individual emphasized the importance of a periodic vote several more 
times during the interview: 
I do think that, again, if NCBA or NBBC and others of these commodity 
checkoffs had permitted periodic votes after some of the issues came up, they 
would be in existence today and there probably would be no lawsuits . . .  .I still 
think that most of these checkoffs have shot themselves in the foot by not 
600 "Iowa Farmer Details Experiences with Checkoff Programs Hails Recent Court Pork Decision," The 
Agribusiness Examiner (November 4, 2002); Internet; available from 
http://www.electricarrow.com/CARP/agbi:z/200.htm; Internet; accessed 1 April 2003. 
610 Interview with anonymous executive of Livestock Marketing Association, 4. 
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allowing producers to have a periodic referendum in which they could tell these 
guys, I agree with how you've done it or I don't.611  
The editor of the Western Livestock Journal, Steven Vetter, voiced his opinion in 
favor of periodic referendums: 
I do think that there probably are better alternatives in terms of language to allow 
for referendums automatically every seven, eight, ten years, five years, whatever 
would be deemed appropriate. And I sure think it would help take things to a 
better level in terms of having all interested parties involved in the system.612 
Daniel Glickman expressed a similar view several times during his interview: 
I would say the larger more established interests have kind of viewed this as very 
proprietary. These are their deals. The larger guys are contributing most of the 
money into it, and they haven't viewed it as a very democratic process for small 
producers. 
If you'll notice, in many of these programs, there's no automatic requirement for 
a revote after a certain number of years. It's only if a certain number of people 
ask for a vote is there a vote. So, to the small guy, that's always looked like a 
ruse to keep elections from happening. In my judgment, I think the small guys 
are right on that. I think all these checkoff programs would be a lot better and 
there would be a lot less political activity associated with their demise or 
attempted demise if the processes appeared to _be more open and transparent and 
there were automatic referendums every three years or five years, the same way 
we have elections on everything else. But the promoters of these programs have 
tended to resist that. 61 3 
He emphasized the need for a democratic process to maintain industry confidence: 
I believe there ought to be a structured process, whether it's part of the 
existing government operation or maybe as a self-regulatory body that would do 
this [handle elections for continuing checkoffs] . But there needs to be a body, a 
formal body that could be conducting these elections. I don't see how these 
promotion and marketing programs can stay in effect for the longer term without 
people having confidence in them that they're being run in a democratic way and 
that the election process is democratic. I think if you did that, then you would 
have a little less of a tendency to run to the courts and use interesting and novel 
theories to probably kill them.614 
61 1 Ibid., 20. 
612 Vetter interview, 3-4. 
613 Glickman interview, 2. 
614 Ibid., 3. 
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The litigation challenging checkoffs in the beef and pork industries attests to the 
lack of confidence in a democratic process. Doug O'Brien, staff member for Senator 
Tom Harkin, observed that the pork checkoff conflict was fueled by the perceptions of 
the hog farmers that the USDA had not followed a democratic process because the 
referendum process -"resulted in the fact that 53 percent of the· people did not have their -
wishes abided by. And the USDA was the one that made that happen."615 He stated: 
I think it [the checkoff conflict] started out. . .  as a release valve for the frustrations 
created by the development of a more industrialized model of livestock 
production. But how it grew into something bigger than it was because of the 
process, because of the sort of painful process that the referendum went through 
and how the settlement seemed to take away the democratic voice for a lot of 
folks who voted in that thing.616 
Counter-Hegemony 
"We only admit to the truth when we recognize 
that our economic problems are moral problems."617 
~ M. L. Wilson 
AgriChoice, the group engaged in counter-hegemony against the industrial 
agriculture bloc, is attempting to construct elements into a moral-political force that will 
shift the terms of the agricultural debate. The checkoff challenge is in the "zone of 
conflict" and contributes to this counter-hegemony movement in four ways. 
The first is by establishing a moral ground in the First Amendment right to be free 
from compelled speech. This is a much more powerful platform than an argument that the 
mandatory assessments amount to commercial speech and, therefore, should be afforded 
First Amendment protection. It is true that legal counsel may be persuaded that the 
615 O,Brien interview, 9. 
616 ff Brien interview, 6. 617 M. L. Wilson, "Beyond Economics," in Farmers in a Changing World: Yearbook of Agriculture 1940 
(Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940): 922-927, 928. 
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Abood standard is a stricter test and a better fit in legally analyzing the First Amendment 
checkoff challenges than the commercial speech doctrine, but the Abood approach is also 
valuable in offering a more recognizable moral ground for the checkoff challengers in 
their efforts to build counter-hegemony. They can argue "my First Amendment rights are 
violated by being forced to pay for speech I do not approve" or "those who pay should 
have a say" with greater moral indignation than "forced payment of checkoff fees 
violates the commercial speech doctrine." In order to solicit support from a wider public 
for the second argument, they must explain why the mandatory payment of fees amounts 
to commercial speech (i.e., advertising) and what the standard is for protecting 
commercial speech and so on. Using this argument to build an "ideological ensemble" 
for a counter-hegemony movement would not be an easy task. 
The second and third contributions of the checkoff challenge arise only through 
the efforts of the anti-checkoff challengers in the livestock and dairy industries. 
However, these are important ways in which the checkoff challenges benefit the efforts to 
build counter-hegemony. 
The second contribution is to generate political outrage at the inequitable 
distribution of checkoff benefits (and profits) in the agricultural chain. The dollars are 
extracted from the producers at the bottom of the chain, but the beneficiaries of the 
generic advertising are entities higher in the chain. The statistics bear this out: the 
producer's share of the total beef dollar has sunk to the lowest point in American history 
and, between the years 1995 to 2000, the spread between wholesale meat prices and the 
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price producers are paid has increased by 54 percent for beef and 24 percent for pork.618  
The challengers in the tree fruit and mushroom industries are not involved in making this 
contribution, because they are not motivated by a goal of more equitable distribution of 
profits in their industries. Instead, these checkoff challengers are the major players in 
their commodity industry blocs seeking to increase their market shares. 
The third way in which the checkoff challenge helps build a moral-political 
foundation is by characterizing the checkoff program as an integral part of an 
irresponsible system that interferes with efficient and accessible competitive markets and 
inflicts damage on the environment. Again, this argumentative platform resonates in the 
challengers' rhetoric in the livestock and dairy industries, but does not apply to the 
mushroom and tree fruit industries where the producers and handlers have challenged the 
checkoffs for profit reasons. They have not engaged in any public rhetoric or actions that 
indicate that the checkoff lawsuits are part of a larger strategy to attack current market 
practices or the industrial agriculture model and its impact on the environment. Indeed, 
this is logical since the current economic and agricultural paradigm has generated success 
for them. 
The fourth way in which the checkoff challenges may contribute to a moral­
political force in the broader counter-hegemony movement against the industrial 
agriculture bloc is by delivering a message through a judicial victory. A win for the 
checkoff challengers would communicate to the agricultural industry and the public that 
the courts offer a means for correcting injustice when other parts of the State apparatus 
618 For a discussion on the significance of trends in "farm-to-wholesale" and "wholesale-to-retail" price 
spreads for beef, see C. Robert Taylor, "Where's the Beef? Monopoly and Monopsony Power in the Beef 
Industry," Agricultural & Resource Policy Forum (March 2002); available from 
http://www.agpolicy.org/weekpdf/087a.pdf; Internet; accessed 1 1  July 2003. 
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have joined the dominant group in creating and maintaining unjust agricultural 
conditions. It would demonstrate that the courts are a favorable terrain for fighting a 
"war of position." 
Mike Callicrate, beef producer and plaintiff in a beef checkoff case, stated: ''The 
courts are our last resort, and we just hope we can find fair judges that will let us 
prevail."619 Similar statements were expressed by other anti-checkoff challengers, such 
as Joseph and Brenda Cochran, plaintiffs in a dairy checkoff case. Brenda Cochran 
explained their decision to become involved in legal action as follows: 
[F]or awhile, it appeared that Congressmen and Senators weren't always 
cooperating with what appeared to be an agenda that was coming out of USDA. 
Then after awhile, we noticed a peculiar change, and they were deaf, certainly 
they were dumb. They weren't listening, they weren't doing. We slowly had to 
give up on the executive branch, the legislative branch. And our last hope was the 
judicial system . . .  We still have hope, more hope in the judicial system than 
executive or legislative branches right now. They've been co-opted.620 
Ultimately, the challengers are seeking a shift in power. Jeanne Charter, a 
producer of a ranch with 250 cattle, described this objective as follows: 
Jeanne Charter: By far, the huge investment in our industry is in people our size 
because of the conditions under which you've got to raise cows and 
calves . . .  Then, you get all the power going to the centralized, organized end. It's 
bad enough anyway, and then this checkoff arrangement's made it worse. Our 
industry goal is to cut them down to size because they really are the less important 
part of the industry. But the tail's wagging the dog. This is one place where 
strategically they could be cut down to size. And USDA, too. Like I say, I'm 
increasingly appalled at how they think they should run things. 
Interviewer: When you say "them," to cut "them" down to size that are less 
important, who is that? 
Jeanne Charter: The processing sector. The feeding and processing sectors have 
power out of proportion to their investment, basically. It doesn't come near the 
investment people like us collectively have . . . . The processing and feeding sector 
always wins the policy debates. 
619 Callicrate interview, 14. 
620 Cochran interview, 15-16. 
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Interviewer: And those that don't win the policy debates are who? 
Jeanne Charter: The smaller producers that need competitive marketing. 
Interviewer: So when you say the processing sectors and the National 
Cattlemen's  Beef Association, are you talking about the same group? 
Jeanne Charter: Yeah. They're members, but they're more than that. They're 
kind of an inner circle that runs things. ·They're dominant players.621 
Ms. Charter and other challengers were frank in identifying the way in which they are 
using checkoffs to further their battle against the hegemony of centralization: 
That' s what the fight is over, kind of that the checkoff is aiding and abetting 
further centralization, both in terms of the programs and in terms of empowering 
National Cattlemen's. Both those ways. What they've relied on for the most part 
was . . .  most people in agriculture are pretty private. They kind of hope things will 
tum out. That's about as far as it goes. But, it [the checkoff legal battle] is a 
major result against the idea that the powers that be will look out for us. An awful 
lot of people decided, well, that' s not going to happen.622 
She clarified that the challengers were motivated by a realization that the beef 
commodity industry bloc (referenced as the "powers that be") is not looking out for the 
best interest of a lot of people in agriculture. This view is echoed by another rancher and 
feedlot operator, Mike Callicrate, who viewed the NCBA as a major player in the 
dominant industry group that is using checkoff funds contrary to the best interests of the 
beef producers. He focused on ways in which he felt the National Cattlemen's Beef 
Association (NCBA) had followed a wrong path: ''The NCBA has hijacked the checkoff. 
The NCBA has failed to represent the cattle producer who pays the checkoff on any of 
the most critical issues affecting them, those being competitive markets, open markets, 
621 Charter interview, 14. 
622 Ibid. 
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free markets as well as unfair imports."623 He explained the importance of the increas�d 
representation in NCBA by the importers of foreign beef: 
[T]he importers hold the second largest voting block of anyone on the checkoff 
right behind Texas, which has the largest inventory of cattle of any state. That is 
scary. In fact, when we saw the reorganization the last time, U.S. producers lost 
three seats because of the cattle herd liquidation going on in the United 
States . . .  So we are forcing cattle herd liquidation in a market that is the highest 
and best market in the world for beef, and we do not have access to it as U.S. 
producers. In fact, importers of foreign beef have preferential access, and, of 
course, it is not the Australian producer we import from. It is Con-Agra. It is 
IBP. It is the big processors, and those guys are buying it in Australia below its 
cost of production. 
That is what angers the U.S. cattlemen so much, that they have now decided to 
just simply "defund" NCBA by calling for an end to the checkoff. That is what 
it's about. It's about taking the money away from an organization that has lost its 
way and essentially turned against U.S. cattlemen. 624 
Dan Alberts, a Nebraska lawyer, concluded that the checkoff assessment 
programs are a "cozy method to tie the agribusiness system together and to minimize 
counter speech." 625 
To maximize its influence and become the representative voice of a significant 
mass of people, the AgriChoice group must find a philosophical position that will allow a 
new historic bloc to form and infuse the debate with new elements of ideological 
discourse that will be meaningful for a broader scope of consumers, producers, 
legislators, government officials and academic representatives. One of the tasks for the 
challengers is to find a way to express their alternative ideology in a populist idiom.626 
623 Callicrate interview, 1 .  
624 Callicrate interview, 1-2. 
625 Robert Schuber, "Federal Judge Grounds Beef Checkoff," Cropchoice.com (June 26, 2002), available from 
http://www.cropchoice.com/leadstry.asp?RecID=756; Internet; accessed 20 March 2003 . 
626 See Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Right Show," in The Politics o/Thatcherism, eds. Stuart Hall and Martin 
Jacques, 20-39.(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1983), 28. 
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Comments provided by Doug O'Brien, attorney and staff member for Senator 
Tom Harkin, suggested that the success of the counter-hegemony would only be realized 
if the public gets involved. He observed: "Some would argue that this tide will not tum 
until the consumers start to feel this. You're just not going to reach those legislators from 
more urban districts until consumers begin to understand the implications of this food 
system. "627 
Stuart Hall, in his analysis of ''Thatcherism" and the emergence of the hegemony 
of the radical right in Britain, pointed out the importance of capturing the commitment of 
the people in determining the success of a political movement. His paragraph describing 
how the underlying theoretical ideologies (Keynesianism and monetarism) must be 
translated into populist language that can be understood and assimilated by the citizens is 
particularly instructive: 
Neither Keynesiansim nor monetarism, however, win votes as such in the 
electoral marketplace. But, in the discourse of 'social market values, ' 
Thatcherism discovered a powerful means of translating economic doctrine into 
the language of experience, moral imperative and common sense, thus providing a 
'philosophy' in the broader sense-an alternative ethic to that of the 'caring 
society' . [referring to the ideology of the left] This translation of a theoretical 
ideology into a populist idiom was a major political achievement: and the 
conversion of hard-faced economics into the language of compulsive moralism 
was, in many ways, the centerpiece of this transformation. 'Being British' 
became once again identified with the restoration of competition and profitability: 
with tight money and sound finance . . .  628 
While the AgriChoice counter-hegemony has begun to consolidate its fractions 
and define its ideological base, it has not advanced an idiom yet that fully engages the 
public. Several themes or phrases that are being used with some degree of success 
m O'Brien interview, 6. 
628 Stuart Hall, "The Great Moving Right Show," in The Poltics of Thatcherism, eds., Stuart Hall and Martin 
Jacques (London: Lawrrence and Wishart, 1983), 28-29. 
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include: sustainable agriculture, competitive markets, environmentalism, market 
transparency. The checkoff challengers have introduced freedom from compelled speech 
as one theme for counter-hegemony and have used the phrase ''Those who pay should 
have a say." However, this theme has not translated into a popular symbol or phrase or 
idiom that would allow the counter-hegemony to leverage this legal conflict fully to its 
benefit outside the beef industry. 
Several groups involved in delivering the messages of the counter-hegemony 
serve as "umbrella or facilitation groups" for organizing and focusing the philosophies 
and resources of the counter-hegemony. The most prominent among these (and the most 
successful thus far in influencing agricultural legislation and the dominant hegemony) are 
the Organization for Competitive Markets, the National Campaign for Sustainable 
Agriculture and the Western Organization of Resource Councils. It is worth noting, 
however, that these organizations have clearly defined missions and are sensitive to 
"mission creep." 
For example, the Organization for Competitive Markets (OCM) is highly focused 
on creating change that will influence the industrial model by creating more competitive 
market conditions to benefit farmers who are victims of industry concentration and 
vertical integration. The organization debated the issue of whether to get involved in the 
legal challenges to checkoffs. However, as this research has pointed out, concentration 
and vertical integration do not appear to be issues in the fruit and mushroom checkoff 
cases (which are driven by branding and product differentiation concerns). Furthermore, 
the organization would have to make the assumption that the commodity checkoff 
programs are improperly used by agribusiness and the large corporate players to the 
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disadvantage of the producers paying the checkoffs. The nexus to the mission of OCM 
was tenuous and the group decided not to use its resources to weigh in on the issue. 
Doug O'Brien, who was associate legal counsel for OCM for fifteen months, described 
the OCM consideration of the checkoff issue as follows: 
OCM is one of those groups that' s very cognizant about mission and tries 
to stay on consolidation: It was a debate within the organization all the time, 
whether this [the checkoff challenge] was really a competition/consolidation issue 
or not. . . .  I think most people probably agreed with the proposition that the 
checkoff is a consolidation issue. But they had so much on their plate, they never 
got directly involved.629 
In the beef industry, the counter-hegemony related to the beef checkoffs is 
occurring simultaneously with another separate, but parallel, counter-hegemony against 
the beef commodity industry bloc launched by beef producers who are alleging violations 
of the Packers & Stockyards Act (PSA)630 by the meat packers in three different legal 
actions. The three lawsuits include: Pickett v. IBP,631 Republican Valley Feeders, Inc., 
et al. v. ConAGra,632 and Murdoch v. Excel.633 
The lawsuit that has captured the attention of the beef industry most dramatically 
is Pickett v. IBP because it is the first class action lawsuit to be brought under the PSA, a 
629 O'Brien interview, 4. 
630 Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§  181  et seq. The PSA was enacted in 1921 to address meat 
packer concentration problems when the "Big Five" meat packers controlled 55 percent of the beef 
slaughtered. It has provisions that ban price discrimination and manipulation of price, livestock and 
carcasses. The act also prohibits commercial bribery and misrepresentation of livestock source, condition 
or quality. The goal of the legislation was to ensure competition in the livestock industry. It remains an 
important (but largely ineffective) enforcement tool at a time when the packer concentration in livestock 
has exceeded 80 percent. Its enforcement agency, the federal Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA) has failed to respond to complaints and petitions and is understaffed. It was 
criticized by a 2000 report of the U.S. General Accounting Office for failing to carry out its responsibilities, 
despite the fact that it has anti-trust authority that exceeds that granted to the Justice Department in the 
Sherman Act. See United States General Accounting Office, Packers and Stockyards Programs: Investigations 
of Competitive Practices Need Improvements, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight 
and the Courts, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, GAO/RCED-00-299 (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, September 2000). 
631 Picket et al. v. IBP, Inc. , No. 96-A-1 103-N (Middle Dist. Ala). 
632 Republican Valley Feeders, Inc. et al v. ConAgra, No. 8 :CV02-3124 (Dist. Neb.). 
633 Murdoch Enterprises, Inc. v. Excel Corporation, No. 8:CV02-3123 (Dist. Neb.). 
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statute that has been on the books for more than eighty years. It was filed in a federal 
district court in Alabama in 1996 by a small group of cattle producers: Henry Pickett 
from Alabama, Mike Callicrate from Kansas, Pat Googins from Montana, Chris Abbot 
from Nebraska, Johnny Smith from South Dakota and Robert Rothwell ' s family 
corporation from Nebraska. The District Court Judge for the Middle District of Alabama, 
Judge Lyle Strom, certified the case as an anti-trust class action suit against IBP on April 
30, 1999, despite extensive maneuvering by IBP to avoid this result. It is one of the 
largest antitrust cases in the United States in the early years of the Twenty-first Century 
and represents the first success by cattlemen in reaching trial in an antitrust class action 
lawsuit against meatpackers. 
The beef producers in the Pickett case claim that IBP, Inc. has engaged in abusive 
market practices by using "captive supplies" of cattle. Captive supply arrangements can 
occur through IBP' s ownership of cattle or through its use of forward contracts, 
marketing agreements or joint-venture arrangements. The case is scheduled for trial in 
January 2004. It is an example of counter-hegemony occurring in the same terrain with 
different parties and different causes of action (First Amendment issues and anti-trust 
issues) but with the same industrial agriculture bloc being the target. 
Countervailing Power 
In advancing his theory of countervailing power, John Kenneth Galbraith 
recognized that one outcome of modem capitalistic society was monopolistic power 
wielded by centers of concentration. However, this was not necessarily a negative 
phenomenon if the concentrated power triggered strong economic and business strategies 
by countervailing institutions that would serve as a check on the monopolistic systems 
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and prevent economic exploitation of consumers, smaller players and subordinate 
enterprises. In the agricultural context, the question is whether such countervailing 
power has emerged or can emerge in the future. 
Terry Stokes, CEO of the National Cattlemen's  Beef Association, described 
examples of livestock producers forming alliances and creating economically successful 
production units. This suggests the possibility of developing countervailing economic 
power as conceptualized by Galbraith. Stokes stated: 
[T]oday within the industry you have producers who are wanting to get into the 
meat packing business to capture more of that value. For example, we have a 
quality beef project, which an Iowan cattleman put together a co-op and bought 
the Tama Packing Company. There was establishment a few years ago of the 
U.S . Premium Beef Co-op. Raleigh Beef in Southern California is a group of 
cattlemen who went together and built a packing company . . .  The same thing was 
done with certified Angus Beef. I could name you a dozen different types of 
arrangements where people have come together and looked at ways in which they 
want to market their cattle. 634 
He described the concept of beef producers and industry partners working together to 
produce high quality beef products that satisfy consumer needs as follows: 
Well, you will have participants from different segments of the industry coming 
together to produce a branded product. For example, if you go to King Super' s 
here in Denver, they have Cattlemen's Collection. That is the brand of beef that 
they sell there. In Cattlemen's Collection, there is cow-calf producers, feeders, a 
packer and a retailer that are participating in that to produce a value added product 
for consumers.635 
Stokes identified branding as another way in which the cattle industry is getting 
more value from products. He cited the Cattlemen's Collection alliance and the Certified 
Angus cooperative as examples of this.636 
634 Stokes interview, 12. 
635 Ibid., 14- 15. 
636 Ibid., 15. 
297 
However, several hurdles emerge when considering whether independent 
Ii vestock producers ( or dairy producers) can launch a successful countervailing power 
structure as suggested by Stokes. 
First, the group launching the countervailing power must have capital and 
resources. At this time, the smaller independent producers are universally strapped for 
cash. This also translates into a shortage of time as fewer farmers struggle to farm 
operations with reduced farmhands and have less time for developing relationships and 
exploring new collaborative efforts. 
Second, the producers in this group are generally highly opposed to the industrial 
business model so it is illogical to assume that this group will generate a legitimate 
countervailing power within the framework of the agribusiness corporate model. Apart 
from the philosophical differences over commercial commodity production, the 
independent producers, by nature, also prefer a business model that offers privacy and 
autonomy. This was mentioned by several farmers interviewed in this study as a 
drawback in generating collective action to develop countervailing power. 
Third, the bargaining power of the producers is woefully diminished. Without 
aggressive strategies to change their bargaining position, the producers will continue to 
operate from a severely disabled position in seeking to form a viable countervailing 
power. Producers are cautiously optimistic that the class action antitrust lawsuit by the 
beef producers against IBP, ConAgra and Excel Corporation may improve the bargaining 
position of livestock producers sufficiently for them to consider new possibilities for 
countervailing power. Producers hope that the First Amendment cases holding 
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commodity checkoffs unconstitutional will provide a shift in the bargaining position of 
the producer as well. 
A fourth hurdle relates to the hegemony's  control over information and its access. 
Dairy farmer John Bunting has experienced lack of cooperation by the USDA in 
providing him with information that should be readily available to the public without this 
filing a Freedom of Information request. 637 It is his opinion that the small, independent 
American farmer is highly disadvantaged in business decision-making by his or her 
inability to access information controlled by government agencies. To the extent that an 
effort to build countervailing power requires up-to-date information that the government 
can delay in providing or even refuse to provide, the counter-hegemony will be 
disadvantage. 
Possibilities do exist, however, for countervailing power. In every instance, 
though, the producers need to address the need for a new business model outside the 
industrial business model that has garnered acceptance. Given the long-term critical 
importance of adopting new agricultural practices more attuned to maintaining the 
resources needed for a healthy agricultural industry, a successful countervailing power 
may likely be founded on sustainable agriculture principles. The values and ideology 
behind these principles are aligned with the predominant viewpoints of the smaller, 
637 Bunting interview, 13. Bunting gave an example of his efforts to confirm how the milk produced on his 
farm was priced. He sought this information to better understand "dairy numbers and diary policy and 
everything about the politics of it." He knew that some groups were selling milk to the government, which 
then depressed the support price milk of the producers. Several months later after numerous phone calls to 
the USDA, he was able to determine that the milk was being sold to the government by four milk 
cooperatives and Kraft. During the process of seeking the information, he contacted an individual at 
Cornell University (the academic institution that performs academic research for the USDA related to 
commodity checkoffs and milk programs) and was deliberately misled. Ibid., 19-20. 
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independent farmers, so it makes sense that this commitment to natural resources could 
be leveraged to build countervailing power. 
Retired University of Missouri professor of agricultural economics Dr. John Ikerd 
has written extensively about sustainable agriculture. He is a visionary who sees a post­
industrial paradigm for agriculture already starting to emerge consistent with the shift 
from the industrial society to the know ledge society. In a 1997 article, Ikerd wrote: 
The conventional wisdom among those in the agricultural establishment is that 
trends toward industrial production for mass markets are trends of future for 
American agriculture. Agriculture is becoming just another industrial sector of 
our industrial economy. But the world is continually changing. A growing 
number of people who make their Ii ving forecasting the future, the futurist, see a 
new post-industrial era where there is room for more than one model or paradigm 
for economic and human progress. ( citations omitted)638 
Industrial work requires large scale operations and bigger outputs. On the other 
hand, " .. . the smallest effective size is best for enterprises based on information and 
knowledge work."639 Alvin Toffler, recognized for his futurist writings, offered the view 
that efficiency and productivity are losing credibility as the guiding standard for business 
success.640 The progressive business model is no longer identified with mass production, 
but instead with the ability to "produce customized goods and services aimed at niche 
markets, to constantly innovate, to focus on value-added products and tailored 
production. ''641 
638 John E. Ikerd, ''The Role of Marketing in Sustainable Agriculture," presented at the 87th Annual Meeting of 
American Society of Agronomy in Oct.lNov. 1995, online article on University of Missouri faculty website; 1 35 
(1996); available from http://www.ssu.missouri.edu/faculty/jikerd/papers/stl-mkt.htm; Internet; accessed 13  April 
2003. The author cites the following sources at the end of this paragraph: Alvin Toffler, Power Shifts (N.Y.: 
Bantam Books, 1990); Peter Drucker, The New Realities (New York: : Harper and Row, 1989); Peter Drucker, 
The Post Capitalist Society (New York: Harper Business, Harper Collins, 1989); John Naisbitt and Patricia 
Aburdene, Megatrends (New York: Hearst Corporation, 1990); and Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New 
York: Random House, 1992). 
639 Ibid., 1 41 .  
640 Ibid., C)l 36, referencing Toffler, Power Shifts (1990). 
641 Ibid. 
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It is Ikerd' s prediction that "[D]ifferences in organizing principles may be 
critically important in determining the future size and ownership structure of economic 
enterprises, including farms.642 The flexible, dynamic possibilities inherent in the 
philosophy and practice of sustainable agriculture make it highly compatible with the 
emerging paradigm of knowledge work. 
Ikerd proposed that building a new agricultural model around the economics and 
marketing strategies of niche marketing will be an effective way of competing with the 
industrial model. However, he draws a clear distinction between farmers competing in 
markets for value-added products and farmers producing and selling agricultural products 
in niche markets: 
Farmers who attempt to add value through processing, transportation, or storage 
must be willing and able to perform those functions better or at a lower costs than 
can existing marketing firms, if they expect to make a profit. Even if such 
farmers are successful, they are not engaging in niche marketinf Instead, they 
have become successful players in the mass marketing game.64 
As pointed out above, there are real and substantial financial and organization hurdles 
that smaller, independent farmers must overcome to effectively launch countervailing 
power by playing the mass marketing game. Ikerd suggested that their success lies in 
using the niche marketing model as a viable alternative, and concluded: 
"If the road to agricultural sustainability leads toward larger numbers of smaller, 
more diversified farms, then niche marketing represents an opportunity for 
smaller, diversified farms to expand vertically and to compete commercially with 
larger, specialized agricultural enterprises . . .  In the post industrial era of human 
progress, niche markets may well become the norm rather than exception. "644 
642 Ibid., 1 41. 
643 Ibid. 1 34. 
644 Ibid., 1 48. 
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The countervailing power in niche marketing may be enhanced and perhaps 
depend upon acquiring the ability to adopt sophisticated branding techniques that will 
serve to support the goals of the producers. This nod toward consumerism recognizes the 
strong role and power that resides in branding programs and commercial 
communications. In addition to serving as a critical selling tool, a branding program for a 
niche market can expand the assets of an agricultural producer and build goodwill in its 
intellectual property. 
Another aspect of building a new model that can emerge as a countervailing 
power is the need to market directly to the consumer or to build an alternative system of 
processing and/or distribution to the consumer that bypasses the concentrated areas of 
control that exist within commodities. In the tree fruit and mushroom industries, this has 
taken place as small producers have generated direct marketing relationships with 
retailers and developed their own distribution systems. 
An alliance between producers and consumers could become the pivotal point in 
building countervailing power. It could afford the relationships to bypass corporate 
agribusiness or could promote new attitudes and demands by consumers that will force 
change in the industrial agriculture model. Jeanne Charter emphasized the importance of 
the relationship with the consumer in creating change: 
There's a growing network of active family farm groups basically that has been 
holidng on and, in the beef industry, has been actually growing in the last five 
years just because people are seeing they better do something or get out . . .  They're 
starting to be rival groups . . .  I think the thing that's happening with the family 
farm groups, the challenge farm groups, is we're beginning to talk to consumers 
more. That kind of alliance could be potent. 645 
645 Charter interview, 17. 
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Farm cooperatives organized under the Capper-Volstead Act seem to offer some 
possibility for countervailing power. Cooperative are exempted from anti-trust laws 
under the Capper-Volstead Act.646 Enacted in 1922, this statute provides that agricultural 
producers may: " . . .  act together in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without 
capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling, and marketing in 
interstate and foreign commerce, such products of persons so engaged."647 Such 
enterprises may enter into agreements, but must be "operated for the mutual benefit of the 
members thereof' and meet certain other requirements. 648 Farmer cooperatives are not 
permitted to enhance their product prices and members are not permitted to be vertically 
integrated in their operations.649 
In a 2003 conference paper on the structure of the agricultural sector, Neil Harl 
discussed the possibility of f armers building alliances among producers to establish 
countervailing power. He suggested collective action under the Capper-Volstead Act as 
a strategy for farmers seeking countervailing power, but pointed out one of the drawbacks 
already mentioned in this section: "Historically, however, farmers have been unwilling 
to accept such a disciplined approach to achieving bargaining power. "650 Professor Harl 
stated: 
The key question is whether producers will be willing to sacrifice 
independence of action in order to bargain collectively for access to inputs and for 
greater market power in marketing their products. The most likely avenue for 
such collective action is through organizations specifically created for that 
646 Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 et seq. 
647 7 u.s.c. § 291 .  
648 Ibid. 
649 Vertical integration occurs when one entity controls one or more steps in production from the raw 
materials to the consumer, reducing business transactions and their associated costs and creating a 
shortened supply chain. 
650 Neil E. Harl, "Economic Impact and Impacts of Continuing to Proceed as We Are Now, 1 1- 12. 
303 
purpose. The time may be near when that will be the only practical alternative to 
vulnerability and serfdom.65 1  
Countervailing power by producers seems unavoidably linked to collective 
activity. In American Capitalism: The Theory of Countervailing Power, John Kenneth 
Galbraith said: ''The development of countervailing power requires a certain minimum 
opportunity and capacity for organization, corporate or otherwise."652 The challenge for 
independent farmers is to find the minimum opportunity and capacity for organization, 
whether through use of the Capper-Volstead Act or other means. 
A number of legal commentators have expressed the opinion that the Capper­
Volstead Act falls short of the potential it could off er to commodity producers as an 
effective tool for economic competition because the judiciary has failed to clarify issues 
related to member qualification, specifically what should be the boundaries of 
permissible integration by cooperative members. 653 In an increasingly integrated and 
industrialized agricultural environment, this has become an issue for producers since one 
integrated member in a cooperative could taint its immunity status. Rather than focusing 
on the goals of cooperative ventures, producers participating in cooperatives are 
distracted by concerns related to losing their anti-trust statutory immunity. The USDA is 
also unduly burdened with assisting farmers in setting up cooperatives rather than 
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Because the protections Congress envisioned [for farmers through Capper­
Volstead] have been hampered, and the text of the Capper-Volstead Act has been 
ignored at times, farmers and cooperatives have a renewed fear that they will be 
subject to prosecution under antitrust laws . . .  In order to alleviate these concerns 
and fulfill the wishes of Congress, the courts must engage in a renewed and 
refreshed reading of the Capper-Volstead Act and apply its language in a manner 
consistent with the Congress's  desires. Such an application must involve a 
definitive interpretation of the terms "producer" and "farmer." The proper 
interpretation would focus on risk assumption by the individual, as well as 
personal involvement in the farming operation. Going one step further, Congress 
should consider a certification program administered by the USDA for 
cooperatives that would provide prima facie evident of their Capper-Volstead 
status. Addressing this issue is critical to agriculture in the United States. 
Farmers must be permitted to integrate their operations and engage in cooperative 
action. The future of agriculture depends on it. 654 
While cooperatives have continued to offer an alternative means of establishing 
countervailing power and success stories are recognized, cooperatives have not mustered 
the economic strength to become a countervailing power against the powerful 
concentrated agribusiness enterprises. It should be noted that cooperatives in dairy are 
the exception, having gained more power and control than cooperatives in other 
industries. Several individuals interviewed for this study have suggested that they have 
become a key player in the dairy commodity industry bloc aligned with business 
conglomerates such as Kraft, Inc. 
Professor Neil Harl emphasized that there is critical need for legislatures to enact 
legislation to improve the diminished market power of producers. He declared: 
It is unlikely that countervailing power can be achieved in one grand move to get 
large numbers of producers to bargain collectively for inputs and for the sale of 
commodities. Rather, greater market power is likely to be achieved, if at all, by 
bargaining groups of relatively modest size and comprised of producers 
committed to collective marketing and committed to producing commodities at a 
quality level desired by processors and on a schedule consistent with the 
purchaser' s capacity. 
654 Claiborne, 3 19. 
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To facilitate the formation and operation of such collective marketing (and input 
supply) groups, enabling legislation at the state (or federal) level is needed to 
assure that-(1) agribusiness firms would be required to bargain in good faith; (2) 
would assure that recriminatory behavior would not be allowed by agribusiness 
firms; (3) members of the unit would be required to be producers (to bring the 
group within the exemption from antitrust strictures found in the Capper-Volstead 
Act. 
Professor Harl' s position is consistent with John Kenneth Galbraith's concept of 
how the government can play a role in facilitating countervailing power. Galbraith 
stated: "In light of the difficulty in organizing countervailing power, it is not surprising 
that the assistance of government has repeatedly been sought in this task."655 He 
described the difficulties faced by government in responding: 
The role of countervailing power in the economy marks out two broad problems 
in policy for the government. In all but conditions of inflationary demand, 
countervailing power performs a valuable-indeed an indispensable-regulatory 
function in the modern economy. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon government 
to give it freedom to develop and to determine how it may best do so. The 
government also faces the question of where and how it will affirmatively support 
the development of countervailing power. 656 
Again, the importance of connecting with the consumer can be seen in the process 
of laying the groundwork for countervailing power through legislative action. It is a 
prerequisite for generating support among legislators for new laws along the lines 
proposed by Neil Harl-support that must be substantial to overcome strong resistance by 
those in the dominant power blocs. Doug O'Brien's statement (quoted earlier in this 
dissertation) succinctly summarized this: "Some would argue that this tide will not turn 
until consumers start to feel this."657 
655 Galbraith, 1 33 .  
656 Galbraith, 143. 
657 O'Brien interview, 1 1 . 
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Commodity checkoff programs for generic advertising would not appear to play 
any role in a post-industrial economic model based on a paradigm of diversity and 
smaller scale farming. The idea of creating a demand for homogenous products is 
inconsistent with a model for countervailing power based on tailoring agricultural 
resources with specific tastes and preferences of consumers. This alternative model 
would suggest a strong focus on branding, the antithesis of commodity checkoff 
programs based on promoting like commodities. It is possible that checkoff programs 
might be imposed for collecting voluntary or mandatory fees for other uses, such as 
education and research, which might contribute toward the goals of countervailing power, 
if the objectives and goals of the producers could be unified in these areas. 
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CHAPTER S 
IN THE LEGAL ARENA 
"There is hardly a political question in the United States 
h . h d l . . d
. 
. l ,,658 w zc oes not sooner or ater tum znto a JU zcza one. 
~ Alex de Tocqueville 
The Legal Investigative Frame 
The federal and state judiciaries have created a growing body of controversial law 
addressing the constitutionality of mandatory commodity assessments. The use of a legal 
investigative frame guided the researcher in a structured analysis of this legal activity by 
focusing on five areas: 1) the cases, parties and courts that have rendered decisions on 
checkoffs; 2) the history of factual and legal developments underlying each case; 3) the 
interests at stake for the presiding federal or state judges and the legal institutions in 
which they serve; 4) the opinions and legal doctrines or principles on which such 
opinions are based; and 5) the status of each case and its relevance with regard to the line 
of cases on compelled commercial speech. The legal investigative frame used for this 
analysis is shown at Table 3. The cases included in the legal investigative frame also 
appear along with others in the annotated list of cases in Appendix B. 
The legal investigative frame begins with the case of U.S. v. Rock Royal CO-OP, 
Inc. , 659 a case brought by milk processors in 1939 challenging the constitutionality of a 
milk order under the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. 660 In the face of a 
distinctly unreceptive U.S. Supreme Court, no constitutional challenges were raised for 
almost fifty years. 
658 Alex de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), 75. 
659 U.S. v. Rock Royal CO-OP, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 ( 1939) . 
660 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of June 3, 1937, Pub.L.No. 137, 50 Stat. 246 ( codified as 
amended as scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
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Table 3 Legal Investigative Frame 
- - - -
Characteristics Interests at Stake Legal Opinion Status of 
Case of Checkoff History for Judiciary and Doctrinal Lawsuit and 
U.S. v. Rock 
Royal 
CO-OP, Inc., 





Mille processors Mille Order No. Respect for 
who refused to 27 governed milk Constitutional 
pay assessments produced for sale separation of powers 
under Mille Order in a defined 
No. 27 were metropolitan area Scope of 
defendants in a of New York. 1 Congressional 
lawsuit filed by 
1 
authority to authorize 
I the U.S. All cooperatives regulatory powers 
government to paid money into 
collect the a milk pool Scope of the 
mandatory fees. called the Commerce Clause 
"Producers 
Mille processors Settlement Consistency with 
alleged they were Fund." earlier cases finding 
aggrieved parties Withdrawals , Agricultural 
on the grounds were made Adjustment Act of 
that Mille Order primarily by a 1935 was 
No. 27 violated large, favored unconstitutional 
I 
their 5lh cooperative, the because powers given 
Amendment, 1 Odl Dairymen's to the Secretary were 
Amendment and League. overbroad 
14111 Amendment 
rights. District court Legitimacy of the 
struck down the institution of the 
milk order, Supreme Court in 
finding the order upholding one 
discriminatory portion of the New 
and based on Deal legislation 
property taken while striking down 
without others 
compensation 
and transferred to Recognizing the 
another. scope of state rights. 
Balancing equities 
when facts showed a 
abuse of a regulatory 
scheme (Sec. of 
Agriculture colluded 
in misinforming 





validity of the 
programs developed 
under the marketing 
orders. (5-4) 
Congress is entitled 
to regulate economic 
sectors 
Statutory language 
narrowly defines the 
delegation of 




producers of milk 
have a vital interest 
in the establishment 
of an efficient 
marketing system . . .  If 
the Act and Order are 
otherwise valid, the 
fact that their effect 
would be to give 
cooperatives a 
monopoly of the 
market would not 
violate the Sherman 
Act." At 559-560. 
Dissent: "As the 
order is drawn and 
administered, it 
inevitably tends to 
destroy the business 
of smaller handlers 
by placing them at 
the mercy of their 
larger competitors . . .  
i t  operates to deny 
the appellees due 













control shared by 
the Secretary of 
Agriculture and 
dominant groups. 
It clarified that 
marketing orders 










constitutionality of . 
the 1937 Act was 
not challenged 
again until two 
cases arose in the 
1980s, U.S. v. 
Frame, 888 F.2d 
1 1 19 (3rd Cir. 
1989) and Cal-
Almond v. USDA, 




U.S. v. Frame, 
888 F. 2d 1 1 19 










Inc., v. USDA, 
67 F. 3d 874 















Frame objected to 
paying $1 .00 per 
head of cattle as 
producer and 
collecting the fee 
as auction 
operator under the 
Beef Promotion 
: and Research Act. 
I 
I 
. He made a 111 
Amendment claim 
arguing that the 
Act violated his 
rights of free 
association and 
· free speech under 





statutory claims as 
well.) 
In Cal-Alm nd I, 
i three almond 
handlers 
, challenged federal 
marketing orders 
administered by 
the Almond Board 
of California. 
In the 1995 case, 
the 9th Circuit 
reviewed a district 
court ruling 
ordering the 
USDA to pay 




objected to a 
checkoff system 
designed to favor 
the almond 
producers who 
sell to the end 






Toe Act of 1937 
was amended in 
1954 to allow 
mandatory fees 






was passed in 
1976 and 
amended in 1985 
Government 
brought suit 
against Frame to 
collect fees. 
District court 











over 90 % of the 





unable to recoup 
ad costs incurred 
in helping fund 
ads for cereals, 

















separation of powers 
Respect for precedent 
in choosing which 1st 
Amendment doctrine 
to apply (Central 




" . . .  there is no 
. precedent for the 
kind of compelled 
commercial speech at 
issue here." At 1 146. 
Maintaining 
legitimacy of the 
institution in 




Legitimacy ,of the 
institution in 
reaching position 
contrary to the 3rc1 
Circuit in the Frame 
case. 
Ability of the 
judiciary to enforce 
its decisions against 
the Secretary of 
Agriculture. 




Should the court 
privilege the 







Court rejected the 
constitutional 
challenges to the 
Beef Act. (2-1 )  
Held no infringement 






Any infringement of 
freedoms is slight. 
Majority: Court held 
Central Hudson test 
applied to the free 
speech claim and 
Abood analysis 
applied to the free 
association claims. 
So it applied the 
stricter scrutiny of 
Abood. 
Dissent: Argued that 
the checkoff program 
did not even pass the 
lesser Central 
Hudson standard. 
In Cal·Almond I, the 
9th Circuit held that 
the Almond 
Marketing Order 
forced the almond 
handlers to engage in 
compelled speech in 
violation of their l 11 
Amendment rights in 
free speech and free 
association. 
Toe 9th Circuit 
remanded the case to 
the district court. It 
ordered the USDA to 
refund several 
million dollars owed 




advertising, etc.) Toe 
USDA appealed. 
In the 1995 case, the 
9th Cir. upheld part 
of the order for 
reimbursement. 
Status of 




because the court 
chose the Abood 
analysis as its 








Text from the 
opinion has been 






muster under the 
non-delegation 
doctrine, it does 
not transform this 
self-help program 
1 for the beef ' industry into 
'government 
speech."' At 1 1 33. 
Toe conflict 
continued in Cal-
Almond II, III and 
N. (see below). 
In the 1996 legal 
squabble, the 
USDA appealed 
the district court's 
order to put 
assessments into 
escrow and the 
district court's 
stay of an 
, enforcement 
1 action against the 
I 
almond handlers. 
Toe 9th Cir. ruled 











Case of Checkoff 
Chal lengers 
Wileman Bros. Tree fruit 
&: Elliott, Inc. growers, handlers 
v. Espy, 58 and processors in 
F.3d 1 367 (91b California. 
Cir. 1995) 
Glickman v. Tree fruit and 
Wileman Bros. citrus packing 
&: Elliott, Inc., companies and 









Order 916 for 
nectarines and 
Marketing Order 
917 for peaches, 
pears and plums. 
At issue were $3. 1  
million in 
contributions held 



















analyses in the 
Frame case and 
upheld the beef 
checkoffs. 
The 91b Circuit in 
Cal-Almond I 






analyses to hold 
the mandatory 
fees for almond 
and tree fruit 
unconstitutional. 
The Congress 
responded to the 
91b Circuit cases 
with language in 











Interests at Stake 
for Judiciary 
Respect for 91b 
Circuit precedent. 
Legitimacy as a 
judicial institution 
when taking a 
position contrary to 
the 3"' Circuit. 
Respect for 
Constitutional 
separation of powers. 
(Is there a 
sufficiently strong 
basis for overriding 
Congress? Is this a 
constitutional 
question or an 
economic policy 
issue for Congress 
and the Executive to 
resolve?) 
Macro issues are at 
stake relating to 
which principles 
should be privileged. 
Should the Court 
privilege free market 
or government 
regulation? 111 
Amendment or the 
Commerce Clause? 
Beliefs regarding 
economic and social 
realities and values in 










and freedom from 
compelled speech. 
(Court's credibility in 
choosing proper 11t 
Amendment doctrine 
for future cases.) 
Cost to governmental 
interests if mandatory 





Legal Opinion Status of 
and Doctrinal La\\ suit and 
Basis Relernnce 
Struck down generic The government 
advertising program sought Supreme 
for Calif. nectarines Court review. 
and peaches. 
Congress tried to 
Cited its earlier nullify the Espy 
decision in Cal- case and Cal-
Almond l as Almond n in the 
precedent. FAIR Act of 1996. 
Supreme Court This decision 
upheld checkoffs and served as 
reversed Espy. (5-4) precedent for 
checkoff cases 
"Doubts concerning during four 
the policy judgments subsequent years 
that underlie many impacting six 
features of this decisions noted 
legislation do below before the 
not. . .  justify reliance Supreme Court 
on the First decided U.S. v. 
Amendment as a United Foods, 
basis for reviewing which represented 
economic a change in 
regulations." At approach. 
2141 . 
The case of 
, Court created a three- Glickman v. 
part test for whether a Wileman Bros. &: 
111 Amendment Elliott, Inc. was 
analysis is required: highly criticized 
1) Does the by commentators 
advertising program for its failure to 
impose a restraint on apply 11t 
the producer's Amendment 
freedom to principles. 
communicate a 
message to the The dissent by 
audience? 2) Does Justice Souter was 
the ad program considered by 
compel producer to many to be the 
engage in any actual correct analysis. 
or symbolic speech, 
and 3) Does the ad Dan Gerawan filed 
program compel a new "lSA 
producer to endorse Petition" 
or finance any challenging the 
political or legality of the tree 
ideological views fruit marketing 
that are not germane order on the 
to the purposes for grounds that the 
which the compelled industry no longer 
association is regulates fruit out 
justified? of marketing 
channels, so such 
The court held that regulatory scheme 
the generic ads did is moot. A loss in 
not warrant scrutiny the administrative 
under Central proceeding will 
Hudson and applied allow him to argue 
the Abood this in a new court 
"gennaneness test." challenge. 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Characteristics Interests at Stake Legal Opinion Status of 
Case of Checkoff Ilistory for Judiciary and Doctrinal Lawsuit and 
Challen�l'rs Basis Relevance 
USDA v. Cal- Almond handlers The 9th Circuit Conformance in all After granting The case was sent 
Almond, Inc., were subject to an took a firm jurisdictions. Need certiorari, the back to the district 
521 U.S. 1 1 13 almond marketing stance against the to impose new Supreme Court in court for a 
(1997) order. compelled approach on the 9th Cal-Almond II decision under the 
(Cal-Almond payment of Circuit immediately vacated the Cal- Glickman v. 
II) After early checkoff fees in to change the Almond I decision Wileman 
success before the the 1993 case direction of the Cal- and remanded to the precedent. 
Cal-Almond, 9th Circuit, the and in its other Almond case and the 9th Circuit for 
Inc. v. Dept. of challengers decisions in 1995 decision-making of reconsideration one 
Agriculture, experienced a and 1996 related the 9th Circuit. day after its decision 
No. 94-17160 reversal after the to remedies and in Glickman v. 
(9th Cir. Sept Glickman v. enforcement of Need to extend the Wileman. 
4, 1997) Wileman decision. its 1993 decision. analysis in the tree 
(Cal-Almond fruit case to other In Cal-Almond III, 
III) The 9th Circuit commodities to the 9th Circuit 
was engaged in a reinforce the choice remanded case to the 
struggle with the made to privilege district court to 
USDA over the government dismiss the 11t 
repayment of regulation over free Amendment claims, 
money in escrow markets and citing the Wileman 
and resolution of Commerce clause case. 
administrative over 11t Amendment. 
proceedings. 
Goetz v. Kansas cattle The district court Judicial deference to The I om Circuit Supreme Court 
Glickman, producer, buyer decision in 1996 U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district denied certiorari, 
149 F.3d 1 13 1  and trader. relied solely on court decision so the 10th Circuit 
(H>°' Cir. the Frame case Judicial restraint in holding that the Beef decision was final. 
1998) Joined by others in holding for the restricting decision to Act does not infringe 
in contesting government and scope of this case. the 11t Amendment Relying on 
mandatory beef did not even (A voiding a nding rights of the Glickman, the 10th 
assessments under reference the 9th on the government challengers. Circuit found that 
Beef Promotion Circuit cases. speech argument.) the district court 
and Research Act The court held that erred in applying 
of 1985. The government Maintaining the 111 Amendment the Central 
asserted the legitimacy of the challenge was Hudson test. 
Intervenors were "government institution foreclosed by 
Kansas Livestock speech" Glikcman v. 
Ass'n, National argument. Beliefs regarding Wileman. 
Cattlemen's Ass'n economic and social 
and National realities and values in 
Livestock and this doctrinal area. 
Meat Board. 
Gallo Cattle, Cheese producer The Glickman Judicial deference to The 9m Circuit In its Jan. 2003 
Inc. v. Ca. and one of the decision involved U.S. Supreme Court. affirmed the district Delano Farms 
Milk Advisory nation's largest tree fruit, a court's grant of opinion, the 9th 
Board, 185 dairy farms generic Maintaining summary judgment Circuit addressed 
F.3d 969 (9th objected to commodity. legitimacy of the in favor of Ann the soundness of 
Cir. 1999) mandatory institution when Veneman in her this decision (and 
assessments under This case required by the U.S. official capacity as its 1999 Cal-
the California introduced issues Supreme Court. the Secretary of the Almond decision) 
Milk Promotion of branding and to change positions. California in light of United 
Marketing Order. product Department of Food Foods. 
distinctiveness. Proper interpretation and Agriculture. 
Gallo Cheese is (Generic of Glickman to It held both 
sold under the commodity v. indicate compliance The court found that opinions were not 
'Joseph Farms' premium branded with the position of the Milk Marketing undermined by 
label and is product.) the U.S. Supreme Order was a "species United Foods, 
distinguished as a Court regarding 11t of economic because both 
premium cheese. Amendment regulation" that did involved 
challenges to not violate l't marketing orders 
checkoffs. Amendment rights like Glickman. 
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Nature 's Large milk 
Dairy v. producers. 
Glickman, No. 
99-439, 1999 Claimed that the 
U.S. App. Dariy Production 
LEXIS 3547 Stabili1.ation Act 






of Agriculture and 
National Dairy 
Promotion Board. 
Cal-Almond v. Almond handlers 
USDA, 192 who objected to 
F.3d 1272 (91h an Almond 
Cir. 1999) Marketing Order 




ways to receive 















that these credit 
schemes related to 
the checkoff 
programs violated 





judgment to the 
government and 
the board. 
This case was . . 
decided 
chronologically 
in time after the 












law judge (AU) 
relied on the 9lh 
Cir. decision in 





sides appealed . 
The USDA 
judicial officer 
stayed the case 
while Glickman 
was pending. 
After the 91h 
Circuit remanded 
the case for 
dismissal in Cal-
Almond IIL the 
USDA judicial 
officer reversed 
the decision of 
the AU, holding 
that Glickman 
foreclosed the l 11 
Amendment 
claims. 
The district court 
a eed. 
(Continued) 
Deference to U.S. 1 Upheld checkoffs Final decision. 
Supreme Court and Petition for writ of 
deference to 91h Court rejected the certiorari was 
Circuit. argument of Nature's denied by the U.S. 
Dairy that the Supreme Court. 
Respect for contested provisions 
Constitutional . .  of the Dairy Act Example of . 
separation of powers. create a stand-alone another appellate 
(Constitutional program unlike the jurisdiction 
question versus comprehensive following 
eonomic policy issue marketing order in Glickman. 
for Congress and the Glickman. 
Executive) The court made 
The court recognized clear that it was 
that "federal deferring to the 
regulation has judgment of 
permeated the milk Congress. 
industry for more 
than fifty years." At 
1 1 .  
Judicial deference to The court affirmed The 9 Circuit 
U.S. Supreme Court. the decision of the confirmed that 
district court that Cal-mond I was 
Consistency in Cal-Almond's claims implicitly 
applying Glickman. were foreclosed by overruled. 
the decision in the 
Interest in providing Glickman case. 
finality to the Cal-
Almond litigation. The court held that 
Cal-Almond's 
objections called 
into question the 
administration of the 
almond checkoff 
program, but were 







Case of Checkoff History 
( 'ha!h:n�t•rs 
-- - - I Gerawan Tree fruit growers Gerawan 
I Farming, Inc. and handlers claimed that the 
, v. Lyons, 24 Cal. Plum 
Ca. 4111 468 Gerawan is a large Marketing 
(2000). enterprise using Program, 
advanced violated his 111 Gerawan technology and Amendment · Farming, Inc. sophisticated rights and his v. Lyons, No. marketing '1 free speech rights 
F031 142 practices. under the Cal. 
(Court of Constituition. 
Appeal, Fifth 
Appellate The district court 
District, Dec. granted the 
17, 2001). secretary's 
motion for 
judgment on the 




appealed to the 
Cal. State 
! Supreme Court. U.S. v. United Fresh mushroom The district court Foods, 533 handler required held that 
U.S. 405 to pay a Glickman was 
(2001) mandatory controlling and 
assessment under granted the 
Consolidated the Mushroom government 
administrative Promotion, summary 
proceeding Research, and judgment. 
' and Consumer 
enforcement Information Act. The 61h Circuit 
proceeding reversed, holding 
pending before The assessments that the 
the district were used mushroom 
court in primarily for checkoff 
Jackson, generic program was a 
Tennessee: advertising violation of the U.S. v. United promoting free speech rights Foods, No. 96- mushrooms. of the mushroom 
1252 and U.S. handlers. 






are on hold 
pending the 
outcome of the 
6111 Circuit Michigan Pork I Producers I case. 
I i 
(Continued) 
Interests at Stake 
for Judiciary 
Respect for free 
speech rights in 
California State 
Constitution 
Judicial deference for 
U.S. Supreme Court · 
decision in Glickman 





and freedom from 
compelled speech. 
Respect for Cal. State 
Constitution. 
Judicial consistency 
between state and 
federal judiciary 
Maintain legitimacy 




changed beliefs about 
social and economic 
realities. (Criticism 
of Glickman.) 
Concessions to the 
swing voters 
(Kennedy and 
Stevens) by not 
, overruling Glickman 
1 Respect for 
I Constitutional 
separation of powers. 
I 
Macro issues are at 
stake relating to 
I which principles to I privilege. Free 
market or govern-
ment regulation? 1st 
Amendment or the 
Commerce Clause? 
. Choice of 111 
Amendment doctrine 
I Principal of judicial 
restraint in deciding 






The Cal. Supreme 
Court held that the 




speech rights under 
the Cal. Constitution, 
article I, sec. 2, 
subdivision (a), but 
not under the 111 
Amendment. 
It remanded to the 
appellate court to 
decide the level of 
protection article I 
offered commercial 
speech and what test 
should be used. 
Appellate court held 
for Gerawan based 
on an intermedialte 
level balancing test. 
U.S. Supreme Court 
affirmed the 6111 
Circuit and struck 
down the mushroom 
checkoff program. 
It distinguished the 
stand-alone program 
for mushrooms from 
the comprehensive 
regulatory scheme in Glickman. 
Justices Kennedy and 
Stevens switched to 
the free speech side. 
The court applied the Abood compelled 
speech analysis and 
declined to apply the Central Hudson test. 
(The decision states 
that there would be 
no basis to sustain 
the checkoffs even if 
commercial speech 
was afforded lesser 
protection.) 
Court did not address 
the government 
speech argument 
since it was not 
raised in lower court 
proceedings. 
Status of 
La" suit and 
Relevance 
The Cal. Supreme 
Court 
characterized the 
mandatory fees for 
generic advertising 
as "commercial 
speech" that was 
protected by the 
State Constitution. 
After United Foods, the 9111 Cir. 






So both state and 
federal courts in 
Cal. have applied 
an intermediate 




argued that the 
Supreme Court 
only disposed of 
the summary 
judgment motion, 
so it can raise the 
government 
speech argument 




change in the 
Supreme Court 
approach within a 
span of four years. 









i privileging free I 
market over 
government 




Table 3 (Continued) 
Characteristics Interests at Stakr Legal Opinion Status of' 
Case of Checkoff Ilistor} for Judiciary and Doctrinal Lan suit and 
Chalkngt.'r-, Basis Relevance 
Livestock An association of The district court Respect for glh Circuit Court of This decision 
Marketing livestock struck down the constitutional Appeals found the makes a statement 
Association producers (I.MA), beef checkoff principles. beef checkoff was that the Central 
v. USDA,, 207 an association of and enjoined unconstitutional Hudson test is a 
F.Supp.2d 992 organizations for collection of fees Deference to based on a Central viable approach 
(D.S. Dakota, family farms and on the basis of precedent, i.e., Hudson commercial for compelled 
2002) natural resources United Foods. Supreme Court speech analysis. commercial 
(WORC) and rulings of Glickman speech cases. 
Livestock individual beef The court also and United Foods. Court "inferred" that 
Marketing producers. rejected the the Supreme Court It shows doctrinal 
Association v. government Beliefs about social would have used the tension that exists 
USDA. Nos. Plaintiffs sought: speech defense, and economic Central Hudson test as the judiciary 
02-2769 and 1) declaration that calling it an realities. in United Foods if must address the 
02-2832 (9111 Beef Act and the "evolving the government had intersection of the 
Cir. 2003) Secretary's failure concept'' rather Judicial consistency argued it compelled speech 
to act on a than a doctrine. (or independence) and commercial 
referendum At 2003. with decisions in The glh Cir. rejected speech doctrines. 
violated equal other jurisdictions. government speech (Both may be seen 
protection and due 11t Amendment (Dist. court in defense and found as intermediate 
process rights, and claim was added Montana upheld beef government speech tests, but require 
2) an injunction to after United checkoffs using same does not create total different proof.) 
stop collection of Foods decision. evidentiary record.) immunity from 1st 
checkoff fees. Amendment scrutiny. Appeal expected. 
Jean and Steve Small independent Producers Respect for The district court Appeal pending 
Charter v. beef producers refused to pay constitutional declared the Beef Act before the 9lh 
USDA, 230 seeking a beef checkoffs. principles. constitutional since Circuit Court of 
F.Supp.2d declaration that Administra tive the speech compelled Appeals. 
1 121 (D. the Beef Act is law judge Deference to by the Act is 
Montana unconstitutional, ordered payment; precedent, i.e., government speech. The district court 
2002) an order barring they appealed. rulings of Glickman held the Beef Act 
assessments and and United Foods. The court declared constitutionally 
refund of past USDA argued the judicial reasoning sound as "non-
assessments. that the govern- Beliefs about social rejecting the ideological, 
ment speech and economic government speech content-oriented 
The Charters defense applied realities. defense in the Goetz government 
produce grass-fed or, in the and Livestock speech which does 
beef and object to alternative, the Judicial consistency Marketing cases was not violate free 
paying for ads that checkoff ( or independence) faulty because it speech or free 
tteat all beef the program was with decisions in incorrectly applied association." At 
same. constitutional. other jurisdictions. Frame as precedent. 63. 
Michigan Pork Challengers are Case began as a Respect for The court decided in Appeal pending 
Producers v. individual pork controversy over constitutional favor of CFF, et al. before the 61h 
Campaign for producers and the outcome of a principles. It granted their Circuit Court of 
Family Farms, four advocacy referendum to Motion for Summary Appeals. Oral 
229 F.Supp.2d groups within The determine Deference to Judgment, Motion to argument occurred 
772 (W.D. Campaign for whether the pork precedent, i.e., Dismiss Affirmative Mar. 14, 2003. 
Mich. 2002), Family Farms checkoff Supreme Court Defenses and an 
as corrected (CFF). program should rulings of Glickman injunction prohibiting Opinion has been 
October 31 ,  continue. and United Foods. the collection of fees. widely quoted: 
2002. Challengers ''The government 
objected to the The parties filed Beliefs about social Judge Richard Alan has been made 
mandatory various and economic Enslen held the pork tyrannical by 
assessments in the dispositive realities. checkoff program forcing men and 
Pork Production, motions to resembled United women to pay for 
Research and dispose of the Judicial consistency Foods more than messages they 
Consumer case and strike with decisions in Glickman. detest. Such a 
Education Act of certain evidence. other jurisdictions. system is at the 
1985 on 1st 1 The court rejected the bottom 
Amendment government speech unconstitutional 
grounds. defense. and rotten." At 
791 .  
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Characteristics Interests at Stake Legal Opinion Status of 
Case of Checkoff History for Judiciary and Doctrinal Lawsuit and 
Chal lengers Basis Relernnce 
Delano Farms Three table grape Dist. court Judicial deference to The 9lh Circuit ruled The Grape v. Ca. Table growers objected upheld grape U.S. Supreme Court that the grape Commssion Grape to mandatory fees checkoffs based growers were entitled declined to appeal Commission, required by the on Glickman. Maintaining the to First Amendment and the case is 
No. 00-16778 Cal. Table Grape legitimacy of the protection and now before the 
(glh Cir. 2003) Commission. Parties stipulated institution in view of reversed the district court. 
to dismissal of all its changed position · dismissal. 
The growers sell claims except the that checkoffs can The 9lh Cir. held 
grapes under the constitutional violate free speech Case could then that its rulings in 
brand names of claim after rights. (Court must return to the dist. Gallo and Cal-
Delano Farms, United Foods. either distinguish its Court for trial. Almond were 
Silver King and Gallo and Cal- ''plainly 
Grape Royale. Dist. court held Almond decisions The court found the distinguishable" 
for Commission from United Foods or i grape checkoff since the checkoff 
Challengers paid on that claim. concede that they are program was aligned schemes in those 
fees into escrow Grape growers no longer good law.) with United Foods. cases were similar 
since 1996. appealed. to Glickman. Joseph and Milk producers Producers sought Respect for District court upheld Producers have Brenda . who run a family a declaration that constitutional the dairy checkoffs filed an ap�l Cochran v. dairy operation of the Dairy principles. because the facts with the 3 Circuit Ann Veneman, 150 head of cattle Promotion and were consistent with Court of Appeals. 
No. 4:CV-01- with three sons, Research Deference to Glickman. 
0529, using traditional Program was precedent, i.e., 
2003 U.S. farming methods. unconstitutional Supreme Court It held that the dairy 
Dist. LEXIS and sought to rulings of Glickman checkoff program 
4361 ,  (Middle Producers claimed enjoin further and United Foods. was part of a larger 
Dist. Penn. that payment of fee collection. regulatory scheme 
2003) dairy checkoffs Beliefs about social and that the statute 
violated their free and economic passed the Glickman 
speech rights. realities. 3-part test. In Re The Washington The Commission Respect for The district court The Commission Washington Apple selected two constitutional struck down the shut down its Apple Commission growers as principles. apple checkoff offices. It is in Advertising initiated this proxies for the program by applying settlement Commission, lawsuit as a class class action. Deference to United Foods. discussions with 
No. CS-01- action suit against Supreme Court growers to allow 
0278-EFS itself to clarify 7 organic precedent. The court found no the Commission to 
(E.D. Wa. whether its growers and 3 government speech collect small 
2003) mandatory warehouses that Choice of 1st and rejected Central assessments for 
commodity sell branded Amendment doctrine Hudson as an export promotions 
assessments were apples joined as ( compelled speech or inappropriate test. and to support 
constitutional. interveners. commercial speech). industry groups. State of Fla., Large citrus Cases of five Deference to Court granted the Declaratory Dept. of Citrus growers claimed original plaintiffs Supreme Court growers partial judgment for v. Graves that a tax on fruit joined by other precedent. summary judgment growers granted Bros. Co.,, that was used to growers were and held the box tax May 14, 2003. Tampa Juice fund generic ads consolidated with Consistency between was unconstitutional State of F1a. has Services, et al. , ("box tax") a case by foreign federal and state appealed rulings. 
Case No. violated their 1 11 citrus processors judiciary. It applied Glickman 
2D003-2276, Amendment rights who objected to a and United Foods Court recognized 
(2nd Dist. Ct. and filed a tax on imported Beliefs about social and rejected the 1st Amendment 
of Appeal, declaratory juices equivalent and economic government speech immunity for 
Fla.) judgment action. to the box tax. realities. defense. government 
speech. Pelts &: Skins, Alligator farmer The Dept. of Respect for Court held fees were The Dept. of LLC. v. who sells Wildlife and constitutional unconstitutional Wildlife and Jenkins, Jr. , premium alligator Fisheries used principles. violations of free Fisheries has filed 
No. 02-384-A hides under its mandatory fees speech. It rejected an appeal with the 
(Middle Dist own brand as a for alligator hide Deference to Sup. the government 5lh Cir. Court of 
La. 2003) high-end item. promotions. Court precedent. speech defense. Appeals. 
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The next case included is U.S. v. Frame, 661 decided by the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 1989. It ushered in a busy era of commodity checkoff litigation. 
The investigative frame traces this line of cases, including two somewhat contradictory 
U.S. Supreme Court cases, Glickman v. Wileman662 and United States v. United Foods.663 
In these cases, the Court interpreted the First Amendment rights of tree fruit growers and 
handlers compelled to pay mandatory assessments for generic advertising differently 
than such mandatory fees imposed on mushroom growers. Three district court decisions 
in 2002 resulted in appeals before appellate courts in the Sixth Circuit, Eighth Circuit and 
Ninth Circuit. Oral argument occurred in March 2003 for the cases in the Sixth Circuit 
and the Eight Circuit. In a decision issued on July 8, 2003, the Eighth Circuit held that 
the beef checkoff program was unconstitutional. The Sixth Circuit decision should be 
forthcoming soon. The legal investigative frame concludes with four district court 
decisions and one state court decision issued in the year 2003 on the constitutionality of 
compelled checkoff programs for generic advertising of table grapes, milk, apples, citrus 
fruit and alligator hides. Legal battles are continuing all but one of these cases. The legal 
investigative frame presented in Table 3 is a snapshot in time that will be expanded and 
modified as the courts move forward in addressing the key issues in these cases, creating 
new legal, social, economic and political realities for the parties involved. 
Favored Doctrine: First Amendment Doctrine 
Based on Freedom from Compelled Speech 
The evidence clearly indicated that the Supreme Court has chosen to analyze the 
cases challenging mandatory commodity fees by applying the First Amendment doctrine 
66 1 U.S. v. Frame, 888 F.2d 1 1 19 (3nt Cir. 1989). 
662 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 52 1 U.S. 457 ( 1997). 
663 United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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relating to freedom from compelled speech and compelled association rather than the 
commercial speech doctrine. 
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,664 the U.S .  Supreme Court held that a strict 
scrutiny standard was appropriate in cases involving freedom from compelled 
association.665 Such explicit language has not been stated in cases involving freedom 
from compelled speech. Accordingly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was at a 
crossroads when it considered the most appropriate First Amendment doctrine to apply in 
interpreting the constitutionality of the mandatory assessments under the Beef Act in 
United States v. Frame. It concluded that the appropriate standard for evaluating 
challengers ' right to free speech was the Central Hudson test and the proper test for 
determining infringement of their right of association was a strict scrutiny test (as 
required by the Roberts case). However, since one of the claims in the case was a 
freedom from compelled association claim, the Frame court decided that it was bound to 
apply the strict scrutiny standard as established in Roberts rather than the lesser standard 
established in Central Hudson, even though the speech involved was commercial 
speech.666 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test in reaching its 1993 
decision in Cal-Almond v. USDA. 667 Even though the Central Hudson test is an 
intermediate test, the government did not fare well under the Ninth Circuit application. 
In order to establish that a regulation on commercial speech is constitutional, the 
government had to show: 1) the commercial speech in question was not false or 
664 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
665 See Roberts at 623. 
666 See Frame at 1 134. 
667 See Cal-Almond v. USDA, 14 R.3d 429, 437 (9th Cir. 1993) (Cal-Almond I). 
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misleading, 2) the asserted government interest necessitating the commodity program 
was "substantial," 3) the program directly advanced that interest, and 4) the program was 
no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.668 The appellate court found that 
the first and second prongs of the test were met, but the government failed to meet the 
third and fourth prongs of the test. It fell short in convincing the court that the generic 
advertising was more effective than advertising by individual producers and that the tree 
fruit program was narrowly tailored.669 
Under the third prong, it faced the impossible task of showing that the checkoff 
program directly advanced the government' s  interests, because it had no data to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the program. Furthermore, the dominant almond 
grower, Blue Diamond, commanded a whopping share of the almonds sold in retail 
grocery stores (over ninety percent in the year 1987).670 This meant that, in order for the 
checkoff program to be deemed effective, the government would need to show that the 
program had given Blue Diamond an incentive to advertise more. This it could not do. 
In addition, the evidence showed that the almond checkoff program served to "hinder the 
efforts of the challengers to increase sales and returns to growers [ emphasis in 
original]"671 because the program denied credits to growers that advertised products that 
contained less than fifty percent almonds. Advertisements by the plaintiff almond 
growers were for products not meeting the fifty percent standard because they sold their 
almonds as ingredients for use in cereal and ice cream. 
668 Central Hudson at 566. 
669 See Cal-Almond, Inc. (Cal-Almond I) at 437-440. 
670 Ibid. at 438, n. 9. 
671 Ibid. at 438. 
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Under the fourth prong, the government was again at a disadvantage in showing 
the fit between the goal of the legislation and the means chosen to implement such 
legislation, because it submitted no evidence to show that the Almond Board was making 
better use of the checkoff money than other forms of advertising. The government did 
argue that "the regulations reflect the reasonable judgment that the Board will make 
better use of these monies in its market promotion programs."672 The court was not 
impressed with the many restrictions in the program that prevented credits to the almond 
growers who sold their crops as ingredients while providing advantages to Blue 
Diamond. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
" . . .  USDA offers no justifications for the restrictions that deny credit for certain 
advertisements: ads promoting more than two complementary branded products 
(§ 981.441 (c)(5)(i)), ads promoting a product that also has "competing nuts" 
(§ 981.441 (c)(5)(ii)), or ads promoting retail stores not owned by handlers 
(§ 981.441 (c)(5)(iii)). It is true that the fit between means and ends need not be 
perfect, but there seems to be no logical justification for these types of restrictions 
other than the restrictions are designed to benefit Blue Diamond, who 
overwhelmingly dominates the retail almond market, at the expense of smaller 
handlers such as appellants, who sell primarily to ingredient manufacturers. 673 
By applying the Central Hudson test, the Ninth Circuit had fleshed out the 
hegemonic structure of the almond industry and revealed an inequitable program 
administered by the dominant industry bloc with the collaboration of the USDA. Any 
pretense that the program was enhancing market share was stripped away by this 
analysis. During the.following two years, the USDA failed to cooperate in paying money 
owed to the almond handlers and the Ninth Circuit ruled on the Cal-Almond case again in 
672 Ibid. at 440. 
673 Ibid. 
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1995 to enforce an order requiring the USDA to make such payments.674 The Ninth 
Circuit denied a motion filed by the USDA to reconsider the opinion in Cal-Almond I. 
Demonstrating its continued willingness to apply First Amendment scrutiny to 
checkoff programs, the Ninth Circuit in 1995 struck down marketing orders for collection 
of mandatory assessment for nectarines, peaches and plums in the case of Wileman Bros. 
& Elliott, Inc. v. Espy 615 (the case was renamed Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 
Inc. when it was argued before the U.S . Supreme Court). The Ninth Circuit based its 
finding of unconstitutionality on a Central Hudson analysis. It concluded that the 
checkoff programs did not "directly advance" the government' s  interest because the 
generic advertising did not increase consumption more effectively than what might be 
accomplished by individual growers conducting their own targeted marketing campaigns. 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit determined that the mandatory checkoff programs for the 
tree fruits were not narrowly tailored by comparing them with the less restrictive almond 
marketing program in Cal-Almond I that the Court previously held was not narrowly 
tailored. 676 
Alarm bells went off all over the United States when the Ninth Circuit struck 
down these two checkoff programs within the space of two years and began to establish a 
line of cases based on its interpretation of the commodity checkoff cases under the 
Central Hudson test. Dominant industry blocs in numerous industries got involved in a 
legislative initiative to add language to the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform 
Act of 1996 (FAIR Act of 1996) to attempt to clarify the intentions behind the 
674 Cal-Almond v. USDA, 61 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 1995). 
675 See Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1376 (9th Cir. 1995). 
676 Ibid. at 1379-1380. 
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commodity promotion laws, hoping to avoid certain death of a commodity program at the 
hands of a court diligently applying the Central Hudson test. A report on this can be 
found in the January/ April 1996 online Agricultural Law Letter published by McLeod, 
Watkinson & Miller, a pro-checkoff law firm aligned with the checkoff hegemony that 
has been involved at times in drafting legislation for mandatory assessment programs for 
promotion of commodities. Under the subheading "Congress Steps In," the newsletter 
stated the following about ne� language contained in the FAIR Act of 1996677 that 
supported checkoff programs: "Because the position taken by the Ninth Circuit raised 
serious concerns about the future of commodity checkoff programs that provide for 
generic advertising of agricultural products, Congress felt compelled to address this issue 
in the Farm Bill . . .  "678 
The FAIR Act sought to counter the Ninth Circuit' s requirements that the 
government must show that generic advertising programs sell products more effectively 
than the advertising conducted by independent producers and that the programs are not 
narrowly tailored. For example, it carefully distinguished between the purpose of the 
advertising of individual producers or processors (to increase individual market share) 
and the purpose of the generic advertising for commodities (to increase overall demand 
for an agricultural commodity). Other legislative language attempted to clarify what the 
Congress intended in setting up the legislative framework for the mandatory assessment 
677 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 127, 1 10 Stat. 888 (codified 
as amended at 7 U.S.C. 7201). 
678 Richard Rossier, "Congress Addresses Confusion Over Commodity Promotion Programs," The 
Agriculture Law Letter, McLeod, Watkinson & Miller (January/April 1996); available from 
http://www.mwmlaw.com/janapr96.htm; Internet; accessed 6 June 2003. 
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programs. 679 Some of these were self-serving proclamations, but one significant change required that all commodity checkoff programs conduct periodic studies to evaluate their effectiveness. This would generate the necessary data to perhaps withstand scrutiny under the Central Hudson test. The Congress ( or certain dominant fractions within Congress allied with the USDA and major commodity checkoff supporters) had delivered a message that it supported commodity promotion programs that imposed mandatory assessments and disapproved of the First Amendment scrutiny of such programs An amicus brief filed by the AFL-CIO with the Supreme Court in the Glickman case contended that the lower court (the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) erred "in mechanically reaching the conclusion that the Central Hudson analysis applies to every form of regulation touching upon commercial speech."680 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island held that such an error could result in "concluding that all commercial speech regulations are subject to a similar form of constitutional review simply because they target a similar category of expression." [emphasis in original]681 In February of 1996, a district court in the District of Kansas decided Goetz v. 
Glickman,682 a case brought by a cattle producer, buyer and trader challenging the 
679 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 1 10 Stat. 888 (codified 
as amended at 7 U.S.C. 7201). 
680 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Glickman v. Wileman (1997) (No 95- 1 184), 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1996, 7. 
681 Ibid., quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). The 44 Liquormart opinion authored 
by Justice John Paul Stevens suggests that some State regulation of commercial speech warrants a stricter 
First Amendment review than the intermediate Central Hudson standard. He described the basis for stricter 
review in 44 Liquormart as follows: "[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, 
nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, 
there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands." 
44 Liquormart at 501 . 
682 Goetz v. Glickman, 149 F.3d 1 13 1  ( 10th Cir. 1998). 323 
mandatory beef assessments under the Beef Promotion Research Act of 1985.683 The 
court upheld the checkoff program based squarely on the precedent of the Frame case. It 
expressed its disapproval of the two Ninth Circuit cases that had relied on the Central 
Hudson test to strike down the almond and tree fruit checkoffs by omitting any reference 
to these cases in its opinion. The Goetz case was significant in demonstrating the 
alliances between various industry associations and the USDA. Intervenors on behalf of 
the government included: Kansas Livestock Association, the National Cattlemen's 
Association, the National Live Stock and Meat Board and four Kansas cattle ranchers. 
The U.S. Supreme Court issued the Glickman v. Wileman decision in 1997, one 
year after Congress demonstrated its support for the producer funded generic commodity 
promotion programs. The Court chose to ignore the protected status of commercial 
speech under Central Hudson and applied an analysis tenuously based on the Abood line 
of cases in determining that no First Amendment issues were raised. The Glickman 
decision diminished First Amendment values relating to the protection of commercial 
speech by declaring that no free speech issues were involved because producers were not 
prohibited from communicating any message, compelled to engage in actual or symbolic 
speech, or compelled to endorse or finance political or ideological views. 684 
Commentators expressed the view that the Court' s analysis was flawed because it 
relied on the assumption that First Amendment issues were raised only if the compelled 
fees for commercial speech were germane to the purpose of the overall regulatory scheme 
683 Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-29 18;  7 C.F.R. §§ 1260. 101-1260.217. 
684 Glickman at 469. 
324 
and the objectionable speech was ideological in nature.685 The Abood court expressly 
stated that "nothing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes 
the question of whether the adjective political can properly be attached to these beliefs 
the critical inquiry."686 (This flaw in interpretation was acknowledged in the United 
Foods case four years later when the Court declared the mushroom checkoffs 
unconstitutional.) In addition to the misinterpretation of the case law in Abood, the court 
appears to have mischaracterized the facts set forth in the record. Commentators have 
criticized the court' s failure to recognize that the fruit growers and handlers had, in fact, 
voiced speech-related objections and were not all interested in marketing the fruit 
advertised as claimed by the Glickman court. 687 
It has been said that the Supreme Court in Glickman v. Wileman allowed "a 
governmental regulatory scheme to bootstrap a commercial speech restriction. "688 One 
reason this occurred was because the Central Hudson test was ignored. This legal 
analysis suggests that the Court was able to achieve the following by avoiding application 
of the Central Hudson test and introducing the Abood test as an alternative in Glickman: 
1) The Court avoided a First Amendment analysis of the checkoff programs by 
characterizing marketing orders as purely economic in nature. This gave the 
Court the freedom to ignore the manner in which the third and fourth prongs of 
the Central Hudson test presented problems for the government. It also 
privileged the position of government over free speech rights in commercial 
685 Edward J. Schoen, Margaret M. Hogan and Joseph S. Falchek, "United Foods and Wileman Bros.: 
Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech-Now You See It, Now You Don't," American Business 
Law Journal 39 (Spring 2002): 467-520, 502. 
686 Abood at 326. 
687 Schoen, Hogan and Falchek, 499. 
688 Ibid., 5 14. 
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speech by not requiring that the government show that the marketing orders were 
more effective than other independent advertising and were narrowly tailored. 
2) By avoiding the Central Hudson analysis, the Court avoided addressing two 
thorny issues, namely: 
► Does commercial speech warrant the same level of protection as political 
and ideological speech? 
► How should the Central Hudson test be applied to a marketing order such 
as the one at issue in Glickman v. Wileman? Did the Ninth Circuit apply it 
properly? 
3) The Court avoided overriding the actions of Congress in the FAIR Act of 1996. 
4) The Court avoided a conflict with the United States Department of Agriculture. 
The majority in the Glickman v. Wileman decision consisted of Justices John Paul 
Stevens (author of the majority opinion), Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer. Those in the minority 
were Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justices David Souter (author of the minority 
opinon), Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. In his dissent, Justice Souter declared 
that the majority erred in not applying the Central Hudson test. 
United States v. United Foods689 presented the U.S. Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to remedy its failure in Glickman to recognize the First Amendment 
principles for protection of commercial speech. In particular, it offered the Supreme 
Court a chance to clarify the level of protection that should be afforded to commercial 
speech and a chance to demonstrate the proper application of the Central Hudson test 
689 United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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which imposes a heightened level of scrutiny that does not exist under the Abood 
germaneness test. (Abood held that a union could compel the payment of dues to further 
the State's interest in collective bargaining, but could not use the funds for ideological 
communications or activities not germane to the purpose of the compelled association, 
i.e., collective bargaining.)690 
The Supreme Court in United Foods did not frame the case broadly as a 
commercial speech issue. That would have likely forced the Court to overrule Glickman. 
Instead, it chose to frame the issue narrowly as follows: "whether the government may 
underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted 
from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced. "691 
This approach allowed it room to distinguish the United Foods case from Glickman and 
still incorporate certain portions of the Glickman ruling that appeared consistent ( or 
salvageable) in view of the modified direction of the Court in United Foods. The Court 
did this by initially establishing that the government was prohibited from compelling 
individuals to express speech with a certain viewpoint, citing Wooley v. Maynartf92 
(establishing that the government does not have the right to compel a citizen to purchase 
and display a license plate with the motto "Live or Let Die") and W. Va. State Board of 
Educ. v. Bamette693 ( establishing that a public school cannot compel a student to salute 
the flag). The Court then acknowledged the case law defining the principle that the 
government likewise cannot compel citizens to fund speech that is objectionable to them. 
690 See Abood at 235-236. 
691 United Foods at 2338. Also see Schoen, Hogan and Falcheck, 506. 
692 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 ( 1977). 
693 See Va. State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 3 19 U.S. 624 ( 1943). 
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It cited Abood v. Detroit Board of Education and Keller v. State Bar of California for this 
proposition. 694 
The next step the Supreme Court took was to apply these First Amendment 
principles to the commercial speech at issue, i.e. , the funding of generic mushroom 
advertising from mandatory checkoff fees. This was the first time that the Supreme 
Court had connected these principles to commercial speech. In spite of the Court's lack 
of emphasis on this expansion of Abood to commercial speech, the step was 
significant.695 It was not an anomaly, however, since the Abood analysis had been 
extended to other diverse fact situations involving compelled speech.696 The Court found 
that First Amendment issues were involved in the compelled funding of generic 
mushroom advertising. 
It then relied upon its Glickman decision to hold that programs with mandatory 
commodity assessments may avoid First Amendment scrutiny if they are part of a 
broader regulatory scheme and if the compelled funding of commercial speech is 
germane to the purpose for which the regulatory scheme was organized. The Court in 
Glickman held that the tree fruit marketing order fell within the parameters of these 
limitations on First Amendment protection since "the mandated assessments for speech 
were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy." 697 
The commodity promotion program for mushrooms fell outside these exceptions, hence 
the Court found it was unconstitutional. 
694 United Foods at 212, citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 43 1 U.S. 209 ( 1977) and Keller v. 
State Bar o/Cal. , 496 U.S. 1 ( 1990). 
695See Schoen, Hogan and Falchk, 508. 
696 See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) and Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
691 United Foods at 2338. 
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By recognizing that issues of First Amendment rights were raised by the 
mushroom mandatory commodity assessments in the mushroom checkoffs, the Supreme 
Court repaired some of the damage that it inflicted by denigrating First Amendment 
rights in the Glickman case. However, by clinging to its characterization of certain 
checkoff programs as economic regulations, it created a source of ongoing confusion. 
The Supreme Court in United Foods tried to distance itself from the three-part test 
it established in Glickman for determining whether a First Amendment analysis is 
required. 698 The Court referenced the government' s attempt to avoid First Amendment 
scrutiny by claiming that the mushroom checkoffs met the requirement of this test. It 
then stated: 'These points were noted in Glickman in the context of a different 
regulatory scheme and are not controlling of the outcome."699 It is noteworthy, 
however, that one lower court (Middle District of Pennsylvania) performed a detailed 
analysis under this test in its effort to apply the precedents of both Glickman and United 
Foods in its decision making.700 The dissent in United Foods also defended the use of 
this three-point test.701 
The Glickman decision admonished the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for using 
the Central Hudson test to evaluate the constitutionality of mandatory assessments by 
stating: 
698 The three-part test set forth in Glickman for determining whether a First Amendment issue is raised is as 
follows: 1) Does the compelled funding of speech impose a restraint on the freedom of the objecting 
commodity producer to communicate its own advertising messages? 2) Is the objecting commodity 
producer compelled to express any actual or symbolic speech to which the producer objects? 3) Does the 
mandatory promotion program compel the producer to endorse or fund political or ideological views that it 
disfavors? 
699United Foods at 2338. 
700 See Joseph and Brenda Cochran v. Ann Veneman, No. 4:CV-01-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4361 ,  
(Middle Dist. Penn. 2003). 
701 Untied Foods at 2343-2344, J. Breyer dissenting. 
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The Court of Appeals fails to explain why the Central Hudson test, which 
involved a restriction on commercial speech, should govern a case involving the 
compelled funding of speech. Given the fact that the Court of Appeals relied on 
Abood for the proposition that the program implicates the First Amendment, it is 
difficult to understand why the Court of Appeals did not apply Abood's 
'germaneness 'test. 702 
Some commentators have assumed that, in the wake of Glickman, the United 
Foods decision also specifically rejected the Central Hudson test as being inappropriate 
for compelled commercial speech cases. This has been argued in briefs filed in several of 
the pending checkoff cases. However, a close reading of the opinion does not bear this 
out. 
The majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy simply indicated that 
the Court was refraining from a Central Hudson analysis since it found that the 
compelled funding of commercial speech was unconstitutional under lesser standards. It 
also noted that the government had not relied upon Central Hudson in its appeal. 703 (This 
is not surprising, since it would not be in its best interest to invite a heightened Central 
Hudson review similar to the Ninth Circuit reviews in Cal-Almond I and Espy.) 
The fact that the government did not rely on Central Hudson in its appeal would 
not have prohibited the Court from analyzing the case under Central Hudson. It appeared 
that the Court may have cited this fact to bolster its position in choosing to narrowly 
frame the issue for review in such a way that it did not have to scrutinize the 
government's action under Central Hudson. (As noted earlier, its chosen framing of the 
issue was "whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain 
viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of persons, some of 
702 Glickman at 474, no. 1 8. 
703 United Foods at 2337-2338. 
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whom object to the idea being advanced.")704 In short, the majority opinion of the Court 
sidestepped applying the Central Hudson test rather than expressly holding that it did not 
apply. 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer held fast to the concept that the disputed speech is a 
species of economic regulations. He reached a conclusion opposite to that of Justice 
Kennedy regarding the outcome of a Central Hudson analysis: 
Even if I were to classify the speech at issue here as 'commercial speech' and 
apply the somewhat more stringent standard set forth in the Court' s commercial 
speech cases, I would reach the same result [that the First Amendment does not 
seek to limit the Government' s  regulatory choices in the manner supported by the 
majority] . 705 
Justice Breyer than performed a brief Central Hudson anlaysis, arguing that: 1) the 
government interest was substantial, 2) the compelled funding for speech directly 
advanced a substantial government interest in maintaining a collective advertising 
program and avoiding free riders, and 3) the government's program is effective as shown 
by the data introduced in the record. 706 
The manner in which Central Hudson was referenced in both the majority and 
minority opinions indicated that the Court was aware of its relevance to compelled 
commercial speech. While the majority in United Foods clearly preferred using the 
Abood standard, it did not summarily dismiss the Central Hudson test or foreclose future 
application of the test to cases involving compelled funding for generic advertising. 
Why have the anti-checkoff plaintiffs so easily accepted the Abood test over the 
Central Hudson test when the cases decided by the Ninth Circuit under Central Hudson 
704 Ibid. at 2339. 
705 United Foods at 2348. 
706 Ibid. 
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favored the challengers? Even though commentators have questioned the Supreme 
Court's decision not to incorporate a Central Hudson commercial speech analysis in its 
United Foods opinion, all five lawyers interviewed for this study (four with attribution 
and one anonymously) unanimously concurred that the Abood analysis is a better fit for 
the checkoff lawsuits. They pointed out that the Central Hudson test involves a 
government restriction on commercial speech as opposed to the checkoff cases which 
involve compelled funding of speech through mandatory commodity assessments. In 
addition, several of the attorneys are unwilling to characterize the speech in question as 
strictly commercial, taking the position that the advertising to which their clients object is 
political and ideological. In their opinions, the checkoff cases are thus more akin to the 
Abood line of cases. Moreover, the germaneness test under Abood may offer the courts a 
simpler analysis than the four-step test in Central Hudson. Clearly, courts in several 
cases, including United Foods, have indicated that they prefer not applying the Central 
Hudson standard if another doctrinal basis for First Amendment analysis can be 
employed. 
An exception is the July 8, 2003 decision by the Eighth Circuit in Livestock 
Marketing Association v. USDA. The appellate court "inferred" that the U.S. Supreme 
Court would have used the Central Hudson test if the government had relied upon it in 
presenting its case. Accordingly, it applied the Central Hudson test to analyze the 
constitutionality of the beef checkoff program: 
[W]e conclude that Glickman does not provide a complete answer to this 
commercial speech issue. We infer that, had the government relied upon Central 
Hudson in United Foods, the Supreme Court would have adapted the Central 
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Hudson test to the circumstances of that case, but would nevertheless have held 
that the Mushroom Act unconstitutionally regulated commercial speech.707 
The court expressly weighed use of the commercial speech doctrine and use of the 
compelled speech doctrine and concluded that the commercial speech context should 
control. The Court stated: 
We reach this conclusion [to use Central Hudson] recognizing that Central · 
Hudson involved a restriction on speech while the present case involves 
compelled speech. In our view it is more significant that Central Hudson and the 
case at bar both involve government interference with private speech in a 
commercial context.708 
The appellate court then applied the four-prong Central Hudson test and found 
[T]he government' s  interest in protecting the welfare of the beef industry by 
compelling all beef producers and importers to pay for generic beef advertising is 
not sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement on appellees' First 
Amendment free speech right. 709 
The "inference" made by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the Supreme 
Court' s willingness to use the Central Hudson test if the government had relied upon it 
provided the means for the appellate court to apply a commercial speech analysis and still 
reconcile its decision with United Foods. The inference also invites the Supreme Court 
to take another look at applying the Central Hudson test to the compelled commercial 
speech cases and creates an expectation that the Supreme Court will either confirm or 
deny the Eighth Circuit' s  inference in another checkoff case. 
Renee Giachino, attorney for Center for Individual Freedom, questioned whether 
the Central Hudson case will continue to set the proper standard for protection of 
commercial speech since the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated its discomfort with the 
707 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832 at 18, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13630 (8th Cir. 2003). 
10s Ibid. 
709 Ibid. at 23. 
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test in several of its recent cases. 710 The case of Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 11 1 which was 
argued before the Supreme Court during the 2002-2003 term was expected to shed light 
on whether the Court was ready to reassess the Central Hudson standard. The Court's 
dismissal of the case for procedural reasons provided an indication that i t  was not 
prepared to reevaluate Central Hudson or that the Nike case did not off er the fact 
situation the Court may be seeking for a reassessment of the commercial speech doctrine. 
Barry Richard, constitutional attorney and counsel for the State of Florida Citrus 
Commission in the challenge to the citrus "box tax" in Florida expressed his view that the 
Central Hudson and Abood analyses are, in fact, linked: 
Central Hudson is kind of the granddaddy of these commercial speech cases, and 
it sort of sits at the base of the body of case law. I think people [in the checkoff 
cases] don't talk about Central Hudson so much because Central Hudson stood for 
the kind of seminal principles that don't really give us much guidance when you 
get to the more specific issues in these cases. Central Hudson laid out the 
methodology and so forth. But that really doesn't do much to help us here. 
That's why I think they turned to Abood and Keller. The other thing, by the way 
is that Central Hudson wasn't a case that involved financing. The current cases 
are a step away. Central Hudson was a direct regulation of speech . . . .. here you're 
dealing with a cases in which the government isn't  saying "you can't do 
something" or "you must say something." They're saying "you must provide 
money that we will use to give a message." So, it 's kind of a step away from 
Central Hudson.712  
Richard explained that the Abood decision held that the government could force the 
contribution of money and the only question at issue was what to do with such money. 
He stated: 
The answer was, you can only do the stuff that was related to the governmental 
interest. So if you look back at Central Hudson, that really was the same 
question. But they [the court in Abood] were saying "once you get it, how can 
you use it? If you use it for something beyond collective bargaining, then you're 
710 Giachino interview, 1-2. 
7 1 1  Nike, lnc.v. Kasky, 539 U.S. _ (2003), U.S. LEXIS 5015, No. 02-575 (2003). 
712 Richard interview, 4-5. 
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no longer serving the substantial governmental interest Central Hudson said you 
had to have in order to regulate speech. So that's how the two are tied together . 
. . . I  don't think it' s an either/or between the Central Hudson and the Abood/Keller 
analyis. I think Abood and Keller was another step-maybe it' s better to say a 
more specific step-after Central Hudson.713 
David Moeller, attorney with Farmers Action Group, Inc. and counsel for 
independent pork producers and the Campaign for Family Farms in the Michigan Pork 
Producers case, draws a distinction between "commercial speech" and "compelled 
speech." He deemed this to be an important difference since his clients claim that the 
generic advertising for pork is political and ideological in nature. Here is an excerpt from 
Moeller' s interview: 
Interviewer: Do you think it ' s  correct for Central Hudson not to be a part of the 
analysis? 
David Moeller: That' s what we argue in our brief. We argue that, basically the 
Supreme Court foreclosed that in the United Foods decision. Plus, we argue that 
Central Hudson does not apply because Central Hudson talks about regulation of 
advertising or commercial speech. This is compelled, forced speech. And the 
standard in Central Hudson is not applicable to compelled speech. And, as we 
said in our brief, USDA even said that this doesn't apply in both the Glickman 
and the United Foods decisions in their United Foods arguments. 
Interviewer: If the court recognizes the First Amendment doctrine for freedom 
from compelled speech in a case where the speech involved is commercial 
speech, it sort of comes in the back door, or at least it appears that way . . . do you 
think that' s a possible result? 
David Moeller: In a way that's what United Foods did where they didn't have 
ideological objections like what we have in our case. In our case, it' s more than 
just commercial objections. It' s  also ideological and political objections, which is 
another reason, going back to your last question, why Central Hudson doe not 
apply.114 
Another attorney involved in representing checkoff challengers, Renee Giachino, 
shared the view that the Central Hudson analysis is inappropriate for the commodity 
713 Ibid., 6. 
714 Moeller, 4-5. 
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checkoff cases involving compelled funding for generic advertising. Giachino is in­
house counsel for Center for Individual Freedom, a non-profit group that is serving as 
co-counsel representing checkoff challengers in two cases, Steven and Jeanne Charter v. 
USDA (a beef checkoff case) and Joseph and Brenda Cochran (a dairy checkoff case). 
Here is an excerpt from her interview: 
Interviewer: These cases that you're involved in revolve around First 
Amendment commercial speech issues, is that right? 
Renee Giachino: Arguably, yes, they do involve speech. I think that there is 
certainly some debate as to the level of scrutiny that is applied to that speech. I 
know that the government asserts that the speech at issue is commercial in nature. 
However, we maintain that their reasoning is wrong on several counts. 
Interviewer: Do you want to mention these, the reasons why you think their 
reasoning is wrong on that? 
Renee Giachino: Well, they are relying upon the Central Hudson test, with 
restrictions on commercial speech. As we lay out in some of our briefs . . .  most 
particularly, in one of our briefs, we walk through the numerous reasons that we 
believe that Central Hudson does not apply in this instance. First of all, the 
Supreme Court in the United Foods case recognized that the Central Hudson 
test-it was made clear in the Wileman case--does not govern a case involving 
compelled funding of speech. It think there' s a clear distinction there from the 
Central Hudson case, which some even question nowadays whether or not it' s still 
good law . . . . But, the Central Hudson case involved a restriction on commercial 
speech . . .  .I also think what's very important to note, particularly in the checkoff 
programs, is that much of the speech involved is, in fact, not even commercial 
speech. There is speech that talks about issues of nutrition, of letslation. These 
are to me political or opinion issues about an economic subject. 15  
Erik Jaffe, constitutional lawyer representing anti-checkoff challengers in the Charter 
case and the Cochran case was unequivocal about Central Hudson being an inappropriate 
test. He stated: 
The commercial speech anlaysis made no sense here. Commercial speech 
analysis was developed for attempts to squelch commercial speech, to forbid 
advertising, to stop people from doing things, which raises a whole host of 
715 Giachino interview, 1-2. 
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different questions and has potentially different balances than the notion that you 
can make people say something or make people support speech. So, at the end of 
the day, you can track back and find a macro theory that encompasses them both, 
it' s not that hard. But in terms of the "on the ground" doctrine . .  . it was a lot 
cleaner to do it the other way [under Abood] because at some point, there's a 
couple of nice clean kickouts like the germaneness inquiry that avoid having to 
jump through a hundred million hoops every time. 716 
As noted earlier in this dissertation, the Abood line of reasoning provides the 
counter-hegemony challenging the checkoffs with a strong, simple basis for presenting its 
moral argument and ideological themes to the industry and the public. Its task becomes 
far more difficult when it must explain how the commercial speech doctrine applies to the 
compelled funding of generic advertising programs. As Jaffee observed, the lawyers 
representing the anti-checkoff challengers also can present their clients' cases more easily 
and by relying on Abood principles. It is likely that this partially explains the 
willingness by various factions within the counter-hegemony (legal representatives, trade 
associations, public interest groups, etc.) to accept the Supreme Court's obvious 
preference for analyzing these case under the Abood standard and ignoring the Central 
Hudson test. 
Stretching the Limits of Government Speech 
"The so-called 'government speech ' doctrine is not so much a 
doctrine as it is an evolving concept that the government may 
compel the use of coerced .financial contributions for public purposes. "717 
~ U.S. District Judge Charles Kornmann 
District of South Dakota, Northern Division 
The dominant hegemony has advanced the theory of government speech as a 
defense to the claim of the challengers that their First Amendment free speech rights have 
been violated. Objective seven requires the researcher to critically examine the scholarly 
716 Jaffe interview, 7. 
717 Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, 107 F. Supp. 2d 992 (2002). 
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literature and federal and state cases on the "government speech doctrine" to determine 
its viability as a defense against the compelled commercial speech challenge. 
In the mandatory commodity assessment programs, the acknowledged 
governmental policy is to create and maintain a demand for agricultural commodities. 
Commodity producers endorsed the mandatory programs as industry self-help programs 
that would allow them to promote their products as a group and avoid free-riders who 
reaped benefits but were not willing to contribute. The government speech argument 
requires an assumption that the government not only has a vital interest in regulating the 
commercial speech of the producers for this purpose (either under the Abood 
germaneness test or the Central Hudson test), but that it has become the voice of the 
industry, controlling its generic advertising messages. The government has claimed that 
it is speaking whenever a generic ad appears promoting the commodities produced by the 
cattle industry, the fruit industry, the dairy industry, the grape industry and the alligator 
hide industry. 
Can the underlying government policy of promoting demand for all comities with 
checkoff programs be implemented aggressively and effectively for each industry when 
all generic advertising generated is the government speaking? The government' s claim 
of government speech is an extreme position that seems to impede competition and the 
free exchange of ideas within industries and interfere with competitive messages between 
industries. If all generic commodity advertising is government speech, how can the 
desire to increase the demand in every industry be met? Generic advertising for pork 
competes with generic advertising for beef. Generic advertising for tree fruit competes 
with generic advertising for citrus fruit. Generic advertising for homogenous products 
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competes with advertising for branded products. By successfully advertising and 
increasing the demand for one commodity, the government reduces the size of the pie for 
another commodity. The government has thus expanded its role overseeing the checkoff 
programs to become a participant in the commercial marketplace by using mandatory 
fees collected from various discrete groups to deliver messages that it claims represent 
government speech. U.S . District Court Judge Charles B .  Kornmann refers to the 
peculiar result that occurs when the government becomes the speaker for agricultural 
commodities: "Common sense tells us that the government is not 'speaking' in 
encouraging consumers to eat beef. After all, is the 'government message' therefore that 
consumers should eat no other product or at least reduce the consumption of other 
products such as pork, chicken, fish, or soy meal? The answer is obvious."718 
The government' s  justification for speaking on behalf of all citizens is abundantly 
clear when it is seeking to recruit military personnel, advising of health concerns, 
promoting political issues relevant to government business and so forth. It does not 
create a risk that its voice will displace or monopolize private speech or interfere with the 
gatekeeping function of the media and other private speakers, since U.S . citizens can tell 
that the government is speaking and its message is related to recognizable government 
functions. Public understanding and public choice is not hindered 
By attempting to stretch the government speech principle to cover the producer­
funded generic advertising in the commodity programs, the government seems woefully 
out of step with the deregulation trend that has characterized legislative activities during 
the last decade. Renee Giachino, attorney for the Center for Individual Freedom, 
718 Livestock Marketing Association (2002) at 1006. 
339 
identified additional government involvement that, in her opinion, would be needed to 
justify the claim of government speech: 
Interveiwer: Do you think that if the government speech argument was accepted, 
there would be any changes in the decision-making and the power exercised by 
the USDA and dominant groups? 
Renee Giachino: There would have to be. In order to justify it as government 
speech, they are really going to have to elevate these programs to what we see 
with our military. True government involvement, not a rubber stamping instance. 
I also think that they are going to have to go back to the individual commodities 
producers and re-vote. They sold these programs to them as self-help industry 
programs. Now, they're tryinf: to convert it to government speech. It's extremely 
misleading, it's disingenuous. 19 
The viability of the government speech defense will depend on three factors: 
1) How will the U.S. Supreme Court define "government speech"? 
2) How will the Court interpret the facts in a case involving compelled funding 
for generic advertising vis-a-vis this definition? 
3) In the event that the Court finds that the generic advertising under the 
checkoff programs constitutes government speech, will the Court recognize 
that such speech is immune from First Amendment scrutiny or will it apply 
some standard of First Amendment review? 
A definition of government speech could take into account considerations such as 
the following: whether there is government attribution, the level of government control 
and involvement, whether funding occurs through general tax revenues or mandatory 
contributions from a targeted group, whether the targeted group is a discrete or narrow 
segment of society with common interests or widely representative of the general 
population, who retains copyrights in any creative work, etc. 
719 Giachino interview, 10. 
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Possible Hegemonic Relationship Between Judicial Decisions and 
Economic/Political Interests of the Dominant Group 
Objective number eight requires the researcher to examine the court decisions and 
other evidence to explore whether there is a hegemonic relationship between the 
decisions of the judiciary on compelled commercial speech and the economic and 
political interests of the dominant groups involved· in the commodity checkoff programs. 
The following research questions are relevant to this inquiry: 
RQ 1 :  Do the existing policy goals of the respective external entities (including 
the USDA and powerful trade organizations) remain in direct conflict with First 
Amendment free speech rights for compelled commercial speech? 
RQ 2: Have the Supreme Court and other federal courts failed to recognize the 
First Amendment constitutional right not to participate in compelled commercial 
speech by privileging the economic and political interests of the dominant parties 
in the agricultural hegemony? 
Policy Goals Versus First Amendment. In analyzing Research Question 1 ,  it is 
helpful to reference Table 2, the chart that includes a listing of the entities that have been 
identified in this study. The chart also indicates each entity's affinity for or against the 
checkoffs. While it would be unfair to assume that all entities favoring checkoffs can be 
characterized as being against First Amendment free speech rights for compelled 
commercial speech, this research suggests that this may be true in many cases. 
As evidenced by their legal claims in commodity checkoff cases since 2001 ,  the 
USDA, the industry trade associations aligned with hegemony and large commodity 
producers have taken the position that generic advertising of commodities funded by 
private parties is equivalent to government speech and, therefore, enjoys full immunity 
from First Amendment scrutiny. This is in direct conflict with the First Amendment 
rights of all individuals seeking protection against compelled speech or compelled 
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association. The government speech argument indicates a desire for increased control 
over privately funded speech and the flow of checkoff money without accountability 
under the First Amendment. Rene Giachino, legal counsel for Center for Individual 
Freedom, provided the following assessment of the USDA's interests: 
I think it's a cash cow for them. I think they have put into play this incredible 
monster. At a time when our economy is already suffering, of course no one 
wants to see any program that helps support America's families be dismantled. 
But it should not happen at the expense of trampling the constitutional rights of 
other individuals."710 
The policy goals of the USDA have been to increase efficiency and production in 
the United States under the industrial agricultural model so that the United States can be 
competitive in the global marketplace. Even if generic advertising can be shown to help 
accomplish this, the goal needs to be balanced against the First Amendment rights of its 
citizens. This was the opinion of Renee Giachino, as well as others interviewed who 
were aligned with the counter-hegemony. Giachino stated: 
Even if you assume that the beef checkoff communications are characterized as 
government speech, they would still run afoul of the First Amendment. I think 
that whenever individuals are compelled to subsidize the expression of 
viewpoints with which they disagree, the First Amendment test is going to be the 
same, regardless of whether the speaker is being subsidized by a third party 
favored by the government or by the government itself.721 
A representative of the Cattlemen's Beef Board described the goals of his board: 
"I think our sole purpose for existence is to administer this program in such a way 
that will increase demand for beef and enhance profit opportunities for cattle 
producers. And, as an organization, that's what we're all about. 722 
A critical question remains unanswered. Which cattle producers is the representative 
taking about? 
720 Giachino interview, 3. 
721 Giachino interview, 1 1 . 
722 Interview with anonymous representative of Cattlemen's Beef Board, 1 1 .  
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Judicial Decision Making. Research Question 2 requires an analysis of the 
behavior of the U.S . Supreme Court and other courts in order to assess whether such 
behavior indicates a failure to "recognize the First Amendment constitutional right not to 
participate in compelled commercial speech by privileging the economic and political 
interests of the dominant parties in the agricultural hegemony." 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. ' s book titled Implementing the Constitution 723 served as a 
primary resource in providing a conceptual framework for exploring the nature of the 
judicial decisions in the checkoff cases. Fallon's book examined the Supreme Court's 
responsibilities in specifying the meanings of constitutional norms and creating doctrinal 
tests to protect or implement these norms. His perspective on how the Supreme Court 
implements the Constitution is practical, incorporating elements of two major models of 
Supreme Court decision making: the legal model and the attitudinal model The aim of 
the Supreme Court justices is to produce "coherent, workable constitutional doctrine."724 
Both of these distinct models attempt to explain the behavior of the U.S . Supreme 
court. The legal model emphasizes four factors that are used by the Justices in their 
decision making: plain meaning, intent of the framers ( or legislators), precedent and 
balancing. 725 This is the model that Supreme Court justices profess that they follow in 
applying the law. 726 In cases dealing with First Amendment issues, the considerations 
are: 1) How do the facts of the case compare with precedent? 2) What is the plain 
meaning of the First Amendment and the statutes that are being challenged as being 
723 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2001). 
724 Ibid., 37. 
725 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 33. 
726 Ibid. 
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contrary to that meaning? 3) What was the intent of the Constitutional framers and the 
legislators? and 4) How should societal and constitutional issues be balanced?727 
The attitudinal model asserts that the Supreme Court justices decide cases the way 
they do "in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological attitudes and values of 
the justices."728 Professors Jeffrey A. Segal of the State University of New York, Stony 
Brook and Harold J. Spaeth of Michigan State University are major proponents of this 
model and have been instrumental in testing and developing it. It is their opinion that the 
unique position of the U.S. Supreme Court justices as employees of the government, but 
without political or electoral accountability, allows them to make decisions based on their 
personal ideologies, attitudes and values. 729 
According to Fallon, Congress and other institutions bear the primary 
responsibility for implementing the Constitution.730 The Supreme Court becomes 
involved through the process of judicial review. The process requires the Court to 
engage in two functions: "identifying constitutional norms and specifying their meaning" 
and "crafting doctrine or developing standards of review." 731  First Amendment norms 
are often vague and must be converted into rules of law in the form of doctrines and tests. 
Fallon states: 
[E]ffective implementation requires the crafting of doctrine by courts. The 
Supreme Court has responded accordingly. By no means illegitimately, it has 
developed a complex, increasingly code-like sprawl of two-,three-, and four-part 
tests. Critics have protested that the Court's multipart tests are inappropriate 
because they do not plausibly reflect the Constitution's true meaning. The critics 
may be correct about the gap between meaning and doctrine, but their protest is 
727 Ibid., 64. 
728 Ibid., 65. 
729 Ibid., 73. 
730 See Fallon, 38-39. 
731 Ibid., 38. 
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largely beside the point. The measure of the soundness of constitutional 
doctrine-including 'prophylactic' rules as well as three- and four-part tests-is 
whether it implements the Constitution effectively. 
Once established, the Court's doctrinal formulations matter enormously, at least if 
they are successful . .  . .  a test established in one case will generally be viewed as 
thereafter binding the Justices themselves. In most cases in the Supreme Court, 
the argument among lawyers and Justices alike turns predominantly on the 
meanings of previous cases. 732 
Fallon noted a rough distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" 
adjudication of constitutional law cases. Ordinary adjudication occurs when a majority 
of the Court is satisfied that existing doctrine adequately frames the key issue for judicial 
consideration in a pending case. Extraordinary adjudication results when the Court finds 
that established doctrine falls short of providing the basis for resolving a conflict, 
prompting the Justices to reexamine the doctrine's applicability or to launch a new 
doctrinal approach.733 The new doctrine often bears the name of the case in which it was 
first introduced by the U.S. Supreme Court, such as the Central Hudson test. 
Several additional points by Fallon are useful in providing a foundation for the 
analysis of the line of cases dealing with compelled commercial speech. First, he 
maintained that "every ultimate conclusion must at least be reconcilable with the written 
constitutional text."734 Secondly, he identified "value arguments" as important in 
allowing the Supreme Court justices to decide which approach is better when they find 
that more than one reasonable meaning can arise from the language of the Constitution. 
Such value arguments can influence the manner in which all participants in the legal 
process read the text of the Constitution, interpret precedents and apply their view of 
732 Ibid., 42. 
733 Ibid., 43. 
734 Ibid., 47. 
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original understanding to current facts."735 The six categories of value arguments that 
Fallon identified are: 
1)  Ultimate ideals of constitutional justice (moral values or principles, what is 
right); 
2) Institutional concerns (need to reach a majority decision); 
3) Costs to governmental interests (costs incurred in enforcing constitutional 
values, whether interests are compelling, etc.); 
4) Judicial manageability and enforceability; 
5) Risks of error in acting versus risks of legal uncertainty; and 
6) Democratic acceptability in light of reasonable disagreement.736 
In recognizing that value arguments play an important role in constitutional 
adjudication along with considerations of established doctrine and precedent, Fallon 
infused his approach with elements of the attitudinal model of judicial decision making. 
Another key aspect of Supreme Court decision making was explored by Robert 
Kahn in the essay he authored as chapter four in Supreme Court in American Politics. He 
examined the relationship between beliefs about social, political and economic reality and 
changes in Supreme Court doctrine. Kahn suggested that Supreme Court decision 
making be analyzed in two stages: 
735 Ibid. 
The first stage is the identification of the presence and nature of constitutional 
principles at issue in a particular case. The second stage then asks how the 
recognition and definition of political, economic, and social facts change over 
time and how changes in the definition of social facts inform changes in 
constitutional law or doctrine.737 
736 Ibid., 47-52. 
737 Ronald Kahn, "Institutional Norms and the Historical Development of Supreme Court Politics: 
Changing "Social Facts" and Doctrinal Development," in The Supreme Court in American Politics: New 
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Kahn applied his concept concerning the relationship between beliefs about 
reality and doctrinal change to three sets of landmark cases in which the Supreme Court 
rendered strikingly different opinions at different periods in time.738 He also explored 
how changing conceptions of social, economic and political realities have been relevant 
in the doctrinal · changes that have evolved in cases dealing with capital punishment. 
Kahn theorized that "beliefs about social reality are built into the development of 
an area of case law or doctrine as precedents."739 However, as new facts create fresh 
constructions of reality, this puts pressure on existing beliefs, casting doubt on 
established case law or doctrine.740 Doctrinal change may be the result, but not 
necessarily. Kahn uses the following quote from a 1995 article by Michael McCann to 
illustrate the failure of some courts to respond to new circumstances: 
New facts sometimes can pose an awkward dilemma for particular policy 
arguments of normative positions . . . .  Yet more often, 'inconvenient' facts are 
simply ignored, discounted, countered by other facts, or interpreted differently by 
our adversaries. Again the key point is that facts have no meaning apart from the 
interpretive frames themselves-the beliefs, values, knowledges-in which they 
are understood; facts cannot resolve interpretive disagreements.741 
Kahn's ideas on changing social facts and doctrinal development and Fallon's 
framework for understanding Supreme Court decision making were used in this research 
Institutionalist Interpretations, eds., Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton (Lawrence, KS: University 
Press of Kansas, 1999), 43-59, 45. 
738 The three sets of cases Ronald Kahn analyzed were: 1) Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 ( 1905) and 
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 ( 1937) and other post-Lochner cases; 2) Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 ( 1896) and Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 483 ( 1954); and 3) Bradwell v. 
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 ( 1872), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1 13 (1973), and Planned Parenthood of S.E. 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 ( 1992). Ibid., 45-50. 
739 Ibid., 59. 
740 Ibid., 44. 
741 Ibid., 44, quoting Michael W. McCann, "As a Matter of ( 'Social') Fact," Law and Courts 5 (1995): 
7-9, 9. 
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project to study the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts (by analogy) in 
cases dealing with compelled commercial speech. 
The Hunt for a Hegemonic Relationship. The legal investigative frame shown 
at Table 3 offered a starting point for examining the possibility of a hegemonic 
connection between the decisions of the courts relating to compelled commercial speech 
and the economic and political interests of the power blocs in each industry. Fallon's 
approach suggested that the manner in which each case served as precedent for later cases 
is important to note as well as any "value arguments" that might be identified. The shift 
in the Supreme Court's doctrinal position in the four years between the decision in 
Glickman in 1997 and United Foods in 2001 strongly suggested that it would be useful to 
look at changing social, political and economic realities during this time period. The 
investigative frame adds another element to the hegemonic analysis by identifying 
"interests at stake" for the judiciary at the time each case was decided. 
While the research did not discl?se the positions held by the U.S. Supreme Court 
justices regarding concentration and vertical integration in agriculture, other beliefs and 
values about commerce and free speech rights were evident in the way they chose to 
interpret precedent and apply doctrine. Starting with U.S. v. Rock Royal, the Supreme 
Court in 1939 was highly responsive to the justifications given for regulation and ignored 
the inequities and abuses inherent in the structure for implementing the program. The 
opinion of the court and other materials indicate that there was an industrial agriculture 
bloc in place in New York city at this time that was exercising a strong hegemony. The 
large milk processors, specifically the Dairymen's  League, were the central organizers 
and the form of commodity production that evolved was highly supportive of their 
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interests and discriminatory of the smaller milk processors. The Secretary of Agriculture, 
Henry A. Wallace, was allied with the hegemony as evidenced by his involvement in 
allowing pamphlets to be printed misinforming the public about the facts of the program 
in order to secure a favorable vote. The small milk processors attempted to use the courts 
as a new terrain to challenge the milk hegemony, but found an unreceptive judiciary. 
Two possible conclusions can be reached. It may be that the court was wary of 
striking this part of the New Deal when it was aggressively striking down other parts of 
the New Deal in other cases. Strategically, they could defer to Congress on this 
legislation by simply recognizing its right to regulate economic sectors. On the other 
hand, the Court may have been sympathetic toward a highly regulated milk environment 
as the United States and farmers were trying to work their way out of a deep depression. 
The Court' s  very pointed statement that it would tolerate a monopoly in the market if the 
rest of the program passed muster indicated that the Court prioritized the need for an 
efficient marketing system and disfavored the rights of the small cooperatives, knowing 
that they would go out of business. It is not clear whether the intent was to deliberately 
favor the dominant industry bloc, but the justices had to be aware that this would, in fact, 
be the result. 
The decision in the Frame case in 1989 in the Third Circuit was based on a 
Central Hudson analysis. There are institutional reasons to see why this court may have 
been inclined to rule against the challenger. It was the first case of this type to be heard 
for almost forty years and the appellate court had little recent case precedent. Farmers 
were suffering a depression at the time and there would be good reason to assume that the 
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mandatory beef checkoff program (which was fairly new at that time) could provide 
relief. 
The two Ninth Circuit cases in Cal-Almond and Espy were decidedly in favor of 
the challengers and expressed a commitment to protect commercial speech, a 
commitment that was also evident in the Gerawan case. The court in both cases applied 
the Central Hudson test to strike down the almond and the tree fruit checkoffs. The 
Ninth Circuit did not have any more precedent to look at than the Third Circuit did in the 
Frame case, but its appellate judges saw a different social, economic and political reality 
than the Third Circuit. For example, the dominant almond grower, Blue Diamond, was 
receiving highly favorable treatment under the checkoff program compared to the other 
growers. The facts suggested a highly inequitable checkoff program which the Ninth 
Circuit noted in its opinion. The Ninth Circuit ruled on the remedies aspect of this case 
in 1995 when it become obvious that the USDA would not cooperate in reimbursing 
moneys dues. 
Congress reacted by passing legislation that attempted to bolster the position of 
the government in future checkoff challenges, especially when the Court applied the 
Central Hudson test. This strong reaction by Congress was not missed by the Supreme 
Court in 1997 when they decided the Glickman v. Wileman case. The dissatisfaction of 
Congress with the direction the case law had been heading with Central Hudson being 
the preferred doctrine used to determine constitutionality was no longer a problem. The 
Court deferred totally to the Commerce Clause and the regulatory justifications for the 
legislation, ignoring issues of commercial speech and the First Amendment. The Court 
in Glickman even chastised the Ninth Circuit for applying the Central Hudson test. This 
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was an odd thing for it to do since there was no Supreme Court precedent ( other than the 
early Rock Royal case, which was quite dated and not fully on point). The Court also 
interpreted the facts in a questionable way, indicating that the fruit growers were all of 
one accord with the chosen advertising messages when the record clearly indicated 
otherwise. It has been suggested by several people interviewed in this study and at least 
one law review article that the program, as implemented, did not fit the definition of a 
collective. The Court' s dismissal of the First Amendment issue without any discussion of 
the merits of the claim indicated a heavy-handed approach in deferring to Congress' 
regulatory powers and a lack of sensitivity to First Amendment issues. The possibility 
exists that the industrial agriculture hegemony with its allies at the USDA and Congress 
had given a strong message that it disapproved of any tampering with the checkoff 
programs. 
Four years later in United States v. United Foods, the Supreme Court struck down 
the mushroom checkoff program. What happened during those four years to create the 
switch? The research showed a legal community highly critical of the Supreme Court' s 
decision making in Glickman. The California Supreme Court had published a scathing 
opinion in Gerawan Fanning, Inc. v. Lyons, 742 criticizing the U. S. Supreme Court' s 
failure to recognize commercial speech rights. Lower courts were trying to apply the 
Glickman case with some confusion. In addition, the Supreme Court had decided another 
case under a modified Abood analysis during that time period, Board of Regents of the 
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth. 743 The evidence showed that the justices 
(or at least the two justices who switched sides, Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens) had 
742 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Ca. 4th 468; 12 P.3d 720, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470 (2000). 
743 See Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 520 U.S. 217 (2000). 
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developed different beliefs regarding the economic, social and political realities 
surrounding the mandatory commodity assessment programs. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL OUTCOMES 
This chapter will address objective number nine which instructs the researcher to 
assess the legal and political consequences of the various legal outcomes on compelled 
commercial speech issues, with attention to how the public interest will be served by such 
outcomes. The spheres of agriculture, First Amendment doctrine and public interest will 
be impacted by such consequences. The potential legal outcomes could include one of 
the following Supreme Court findings: 
1) the checkoffs are constitutional when they are part of a broader regulatory scheme 
(such as the regulatory framework governing the fruit growers in Glickman v. 
Wileman744), but unconstitutional when they are imposed as stand-alone orders 
like those assessed against the mushroom growers in United States v. United 
Foods; 145 or 
2) the checkoffs are unconstitutional and a violation of First Amendment rights 
regardless of the regulatory scheme in which they reside, because they do not pass 
scrutiny under First Amendment analysis (either through application of the 
Central Hudson test or an analysis based on Abood principles); or 
3) the checkoffs are constitutional regulations not protected by the First Amendment; 
or 
4) the checkoffs are constitutional under a "government speech" exception to the 
First Amendment. 
744 See Glickman, v. Wileman, 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
745 See United States v United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
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The direction chosen by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the First Amendment 
commodity checkoff cases will have consequences for agriculture, the development of 
First Amendment doctrine and the public interest. However, the degree of impact on 
each area will be directly related to which resolution the Supreme Court adopts. 
Since the government defendant in every checkoff case in the federal and state 
court systems has asserted government speech as a defense, the Supreme Court will be 
able to choose one of the first three options outlined above only if it rejects option number 
four, i.e. , the checkoff programs are constitutional under a government speech exception 
to the First Amendment. The government speech defense presents certain tollgates for 
the Court. If it determines that the generic advertising funded by compelled checkoff 
dollars does not qualify as government speech, then it can immediately consider which of 
the first three options it will choose. If it decides that the generic advertising created 
pursuant to the checkoff programs does constitute government speech, then the Court 
must decide whether to automatically exempt the compelled speech from First 
Amendment protection or whether to subject it to a First Amendment analysis resulting in 
one of the first three alternatives. 
Once the analysis moves past the government speech hurdle (by a finding of no 
government speech or a rejection of the government speech exemption to the First 
Amendment), the Court will be guided by its most recent precedents, the United Foods 
case and the Glickman case. It is important to note that alternative number three, which 
states that the checkoffs are constitutional regulations not protected by the First 
Amendment, was a much-criticized holding of the Court in the Glickman decision. It was 
considered an aberration by most First Amendment scholars, an opinion also shared by 
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the California Supreme Court in its Gerawan v. Lyons decision. The U.S . Supreme Court 
moved away from this position in United Foods by recognizing that mandatory 
commodity assessments for generic advertising raise First Amendment issues. Given the 
direction the Court has taken, any future decision that the checkoff programs are 
constitutional because they are not protected by the First Amendment is an extremely 
remote possibility. 
At this juncture, it is also less likely that the Court will choose option two (the 
checkoffs are unconstitutional and a violation of First Amendment rights regardless of the 
regulatory scheme in which they reside) because it adopted option one as its preferred 
approach in the United Foods case. Under option one, the Court found that the checkoffs 
were constitutional when they were part of a broader regulatory scheme, but 
unconstitutional when they were imposed as stand-alone orders. The United Foods 
decision clarified that the fundamental justification for treating the tree fruit program 
differently than the mushroom program for First Amendment purposes is that the 
compelled commercial speech in Glickman, which was part of a regulatory scheme set up 
by a marketing order, met the germaneness test of the Abood line of cases. In other 
words, the compelled funding for speech was sufficiently germane to the purpose of the 
marketing order to pass First Amendment scrutiny. United Foods also indicated the 
Court' s preference to avoid First Amendment analysis under the commercial speech 
doctrine in cases dealing with mandatory commodity assessments. 
The manner in which the United States Supreme Court will address the 
government speech defense ( option four) in the checkoff challenges is an open question. 
If it recognizes generic advertising as government speech that is exempt from any First 
355 
Amendment analysis, further First Amendment analysis is moot. However, if the Court 
moves on to a First Amendment analysis (by holding the generic advertising is not 
government speech or that such advertising is government speech that must meet First 
Amendment scrutiny), all three of the options outlined above are available. The Court 
embarked on a path in United Foods that recognized option one as its road map for future 
cases involving First Amendment challenges to checkoff programs. In applying the 
approach outlined in option one, the Court would have an opportunity to further clarify 
the "germaneness test" and extend the First Amendment doctrine it developed in Abood 
and its progeny of cases. 
One factor that could be a consideration for the Supreme Court is the recent 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which the appellate court "inferred" that the 
Supreme Court would have used the Central Hudson test had the government relied on 
it.746 If the Supreme Court wishes to change directions, this suggests a way for it to shift 
to the commercial speech doctrine in a future checkoff case without the change appearing 
inconsistent with United Foods. This would be an unexpected move, however, given the 
Supreme Court's past reluctance to apply the commercial speech doctrine to the First 
Amendment challenges to the forced funding of generic advertising. 
Consequences for Agriculture 
The future of agriculture in the United States in different contexts (environmental, 
social, cultural and political) and the potential role of commodity checkoff programs can 
only be envisioned within the reality of the history and current state of the relevant 
746 See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA. Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832 at 1 8, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13630 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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economic production for agricultural commodities. According to the base and 
superstructure analysis of Marx and Engels, also incorporated by Gramsci in his writings, 
the key to understanding how the agricultural apparatus functions today and how it may 
function in the future is to look at the relations involved in production. Marx and Engels 
clarified this in the Preface to a Contribution to the critique of political economy: 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations 
which are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production 
which correspond to a definite state of development of their material productive 
forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and 
intellectual life process in general. 747 
Analyzed within Gramsci 's  theory of hegemony, the relations of production have 
generated a dominant hegemony in agriculture that is aligned with the industrial 
production model. Consistent with other areas of economic development, agribusiness 
has transformed the agrarian industry and culture in accordance with industrial 
agriculture and has forever altered the relationships of farmers with other entities in the 
food chain. Agricultural journalist and analyst, A.V. Krebs, observed: 
Throughout the history of the United States corporate agribusiness has 
steadfastly sought to economically concentrate the nation' s  food delivery 
system's  means of production by seeking to totally control its source of raw 
materials through the substitution of capital for efficiency and technology for 
labor. 
At the same time corporate agribusiness has also sought to standardize the 
food supply by shifting its main source from the farm to the factory, from being 
produced by thousands of family farmers to being manufactured, marketed and 
sold by a diminishing number of large, publicly unaccountable and increasingly 
private corporations. [emphasis in original]748 
747 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1973), 262-263. 
748 Krebs, acknowledgements page. 
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Krebs noted that an "evolving economic and government farm and food policy 
has furthered such efforts."749 The outcome is a two-tier system of agriculture with 
large, profit-oriented corporate farms in one sector and a divided group in the second 
sector, including organic and niche farmers, some intermediate farms still able to make a 
profit and break even and all the remaining farmers that are increasingly dependent on 
off-farm income or whatever farm supports are available for survival These are the 
relations of production that define the agricultural industry and from which arise the 
current legal and political superstructure. 
Commodity checkoff programs have emerged as one branch in the socio­
economic superstructure of agriculture, given life through the consensual agreement of 
producers, but sustained through increasingly stronger claims of control by government 
and industry forces. These include the virtually impossible hurdles that must be 
overcome to secure a referendum vote in several commodities, the discretionary behavior 
by the Secretary of Agriculture, Ann Veneman, with respect to commodity checkoffs, 
and ultimately, the coercive argument that all generic commodity advertising is 
government speech. How can the success or failure of the checkoff challenges impact 
this situation? 
Consequences for Counter-Hegemony. A ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court 
that checkoff programs are unconstitutional can occur if the Court applies a First 
Amendment analysis upon finding that generic advertising is not government speech or 
upon rejecting the government speech immunity argument. In holding that generic 
advertising for a commodity in addition to mushrooms is unconstitutional, the Supreme 
749 Ibid. 
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Court would provide the anti-checkoff forces engaged in counter-hegemony with a model 
for strategically using the courts to effectuate change. It would be a practical model for 
utilizing one fraction of the State apparatus against another (judiciary branch against the 
executive branch) as well as a symbolic and inspirational model for those seeking to build 
a historic bloc capable of counter-hegemony. 
Brenda Cochran and her husband, Steven Cochran, are dairy farmers and 
plaintiffs in the diary checkoff case, Joseph S. Chochran and Brenda s. Cochran v. Ann 
Veneman.150 In her interview, Brenda Cochran said: "Breaking down the dairy checkoff 
would chip away at the power base of those in control."751 Joseph Cochran described the 
effect as follows: " I  kind of look at it as striking a blow for the little man."752 He noted 
that the checkoff is a "very, very miniscule part" of the overall effort to bring about 
change, but it could be important as an example. The experience of Brenda and Joseph 
Cochran is that, as farmers, they are "voiceless and powerless."753 Success in the courts 
would give the minority groups in the commodity industries a voice. 
If the Supreme Court continues its current path of distinguishing between two 
types of commodity checkoff programs-those that are constitutional because they fit the 
parameters of the regulatory scheme in the Glickman case and those that are 
unconstitutional under the United Foods case-the agricultural community could feel 
consequences if various commodity programs are restructured to withstand a 
germaneness test. 
150 Joseph S. Chochran and Brenda S. Cochran v. Ann Veneman, No. 4:CV-01-0529, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4361,  (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003). 
751 Chochran interview, 3. 
752 Cochran interview, 3. 
753 Ibid., 2. 
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Consequences for Hegemony. Regardless of which commodity is involved, a 
ruling by the Supreme Court in favor of the USDA based on recognition of the 
government speech argument would create tension among different fractions of the 
checkoff hegemony that could prompt a renegotiation among those with power and 
influence in the chec�off programs. This is because the USDA will have sacrificed some 
credibility by claiming it was the puppet-master all along controlling the commodity 
programs, when other fractions within the dominant group understood that the programs 
were designed as self-help mechanisms. 
An executive of the Livestock Marketing Association referred to the reluctant 
acquiescence to the government speech argument by the trade associations and large 
producers as "swallowing the pill."754 The same individual noted that the trade 
association representatives who were required to testify must be "choking on their 
words"755 when they assured the courts that the USDA controlled the programs and all 
messages. 
Various fractions within the checkoff hegemony may harbor nagging perceptions 
that the government speech argument is a legal fiction, and they may not truly recognize 
the government's authority. In addition, they may resent efforts by the USDA to increase 
its control of the programs to position itself more favorably with regard to its government 
speech claim. Historically, the leadership of the trade commodity groups has not 
responded well to the increased control by the USDA. Dr. Kathleen Merrigan, former 
administrator of the Agricultural Marketing Service, described the reaction of the pork 
754 Interview with anonymous executive of the Livestock Marketing Association, 19. 
755  Ibid. 
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industry when the AMS increased its oversight of communications when the pork referendum was pending: But the supporters of the checkoff argued that they should be allowed more autonomy than they were given. When it was starting to get toward the time of a referendum, we required them to submit all their materials to USDA for clearance . . . . And they accused us of micromana�ng and bureaucratic inertia would slow them down so they'd be ineffectual. 56 Gaining legal legitimization of the government speech argument as applied to commodity checkoffs is no guarantee of legitimization in the eyes of all those with political and economic power in the checkoff hegemony. Further rulings striking down checkoffs as unconstitutional would be welcomed by certain fractions within the broader agricultural hegemony, since plaintiffs in several commodity industries are large producers who sell highly differentiated, branded products. Even where this is not the case, there is some indication that some larger producers are quietly watching in the wings with the desire to see the checkoff programs curtailed. For example, some the largest dairy producers in the United States (Bos Dairy, DenDulk Dairy Farm, Rio Grande Dairy, County Line Dairy, etc.) were involved in an unsuccessful challenge of the dairy checkoffs in 1999 in Nature 's Dairy, et al. v. 
Glickman. 757 The constitutional lawyer that represented this group of large dairy challengers, Benjamin Yale, is now representing Brenda and Joseph Cochran, independent dairy farmers who do not sell to a milk cooperative and identify themselves as part of an alternative agricultural movement. Given their position, they may be more successful than the large producers that are part of the dominant hegemony. However, a success by 
756 
Merrigan interview, 3-4. 
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See Nature 's Dairy, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3547 (6
th 
Cir. 1999). 361 
the Cochrans would clearly inure to the benefit of the larger dairy farmers who would 
also like to avoid the burden of paying checkoffs. 
If the Supreme Court holds more commodity checkoff programs to be 
unconstitutional, the impact will be felt by the hegemony in several identifiable ways: 
1) Assuming that the generic advertising was successfully creating demand, some 
entity in the food chain hegemony will lose those benefits. 
2) In certain industries, the checkoff dollars have been used to promote the branded 
products of a few major producers so these producers would lose these windfalls. 
(An example is the checkoff funded advertising for HORMEL meats.) 
3) There will be a loss of money for funding research and education. This could 
mean that private industry would have to increase its investment for these 
endeavors. Corporate agribusiness might lose a lot of free product development 
and promotion for hormones and genetically engineered crops.758 
4) The United States government will lose funds that it has been using to penetrate 
foreign markets with generic advertising. 
5) The USDA will lose both a source of income from outside general revenue and a 
convenient platform for engaging in activities and rhetoric that enhances its image 
as an agency helping all farmers (i.e., a means for building hegemony). 
6) The administrative organizations supporting each commodity group will no 
longer have a purpose unless voluntary checkoffs are instituted or checkoff funds 
are used strictly for research and education. This includes boards and 
758See David Dechant, "Checkoffs, mushrooms and dominoes," Cropchoice.com (July 16, 2001); available from 
http://www.cropchoice.com/leadstry.asp?recid=373; Internet; accessed 20 March 2003. 
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commissions at the federal and state levels that handle the checkoff funds and 
direct the promotional and advertising activities. 
7) The industry trade associations will lose a structured means of support for 
ongoing activities that organize themselves around the checkoff program. 
To further expand on the last point, this means there will be an impact on the 
indirect ways in which these organizations have been able to share and wield influence 
with agribusiness, media, legislators, government and ad agencies because of the flow of 
checkoff money and the political nature of the way in which the funds are allocated for 
selected generic messages. The dominant hegemony will lose an important tool for 
furthering its various goals and this may prompt some economic and political reposturing 
to build another means of accomplishing some of the same goals. 
Consequences for First Amendment Doctrine 
Government Speech Principle. The Supreme Court could hold that the USDA's 
activities do not constitute government speech, thus refusing to recognize the 
government' s  primary defense in these cases. This would shift the court' s focus to a First 
Amendment analysis of the particular checkoff commodity program being challenged 
and leave the thornier problem of clarifying the constitutionality of government speech 
for another day. 
Such an outcome is indeed, likely, since many lower courts have already 
concluded that the USDA's government speech argument with regard to a self-directed 
commodity program is disingenuous. Moreover, given the U.S. Supreme Court' s 
preference for taking incremental steps in establishing new doctrine or expanding 
existing doctrine, it may deal with the government speech defense in its next checkoff 
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case by talcing the opportunity to outline a test for determining whether the speech in 
question is government speech. Possible prongs for such a test might be whether the 
speech has been expressly attributed to the government, whether it has been paid for by 
general federal and state revenues, the makeup of the implementing board or commission, 
and the level of autonomy and authority afforded this governing group. 759 The court 
could conclude that the generic advertising does not constitute government speech 
because it fails the newly-established test. 
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court upholds commodity checkoff programs 
by accepting the government speech argument, it will provide legitimacy for a scenario 
where commercial speech ( or art or another area of expression) implemented under the 
guise of a self-directed program with government oversight can then be commandeered 
by the government as an instrument for government expression without regard to First 
Amendment rights. Figure 12 shows a continuum of how generic advertising programs 
can be structured so that they constitute commercial speech, compelled commercial 
speech and government speech. 
The question in the compelled speech cases that have arisen since the United 
Foods decision is whether the government has created a role for itself in these programs 
sufficient to support an assertion of government speech. If the Supreme Court concludes 
759 Both of these conditions were cited as grounds for disqualifying generic advertising from the category of 
government speech in the oral arguments made before the appellate courts in Michigan Pork Producers, Inc. et 
al. v. Campaign/or Family Farms, et al. v. Veneman, 174 F.Supp.2d 637 (W.D. Mich. 2001), argued before the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 14, 2003, and Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA , 207 
F.Supp.2d 992 (D.S. Dakota, 2002), argued before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 10, 2003. 
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that this has happened, the USDA would then urge the Court to conclude that First 
Amendment scrutiny is no longer necessary by virtue of the "government speech" 
designation. However, the fact that the government is speaking does not obviate the need 
for a First Amendment analysis. 
It should be noted that the Supreme Court has never adopted a government speech 
doctrine. All of the cases that mention the government speech doctrine do so in dicta. 
Keller v. Bar of California760 expressly said the speech being litigated was not 
government speech. In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. 
Southworth, 761 the parties conceded it was not government speech. The closest the 
Supreme Court has come to outlining a government speech doctrine was in the Rust v. 
Sullivan762 case in which the Supreme Court held that the government was not obliged to 
subsidize the speech of doctors who were engaged in communications relating to 
abortion. 
As Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia observed, this was not a case of 
government speech, but rather a case about the government not subsidizing speech. The 
doctors claimed that they were entitled to speak their own messages about abortion and 
the government responded that it paid them to provide medical services and not to 
subsidize their speech on abortions. This case is, therefore, more accurately stands for 
the proposition that "government is not obliged to subsidize the speech of the doctors" 
rather than "government can speak about anything it wants." Dicta in the Southworth 
case raises the question of whether traditional political checks are enough with regard to 
760 Keller, 496 U.S. 1 ( 1990). 
761 Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). 
162 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 ( 1991). 
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government speech, but does not answer this question. 763 (Interpretations of this case 
concluding that the court affirmatively indicated that political checks on government 
speech are enough are overstating the court' s opinion.) 
Erik Jaffe, constitutional lawyer and counsel for beef checkoff plaintiffs, Jeanne 
and Steven Charter, asserted: "If you accept the government version of this [government 
speech] , it will create gaping loopholes in the First Amendment, not just here but 
everywhere."764 This is because a finding that the government' s  involvement in generic 
advertising promoting individual commodities amounts to government speech raises 
serious questions about the First Amendment distinctions between speech and conduct. 
Jaffe noted: "While the government may have a free hand to engage in all kinds of 
controversial conduct, there are limits on its ability to engage in or to compel others to 
engage in speech."765 If there is a macro principle under the U.S. Constitution that 
people cannot be compelled to support speech, then that principle would seem to also 
apply to the U.S .  government, unless the government is able to establish that compelled 
support for particular types of speech meets an appropriate standard of proof. 
This is the 800-pound gorilla that the courts have shied away from addressing in 
cases that involve government speech. If they render a decision containing a strong 
argument against government speech, will it invite an avalanche of claims by people who 
763 See Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 2 17 (2000). The 
U.S. Supreme Court made the following reference to political checks on government speech in the 
Southworth opinion: 
The University having disclaimed that the speech is its own, we do not reach the question 
whether traditional political controls to ensure responsible government action would be 
sufficient to overcome First Amendment objections and to allow the challenged program 
under the principle that the government can speak for itself. If the challenged speech here 
were financed by tuition dollars and the University and its officials were responsible for its 
content, the case might be evaluated on the premise that the government itself is the speaker. 
That is not the case before us. Ibid. at 229. 
764 Jaffe interview, 1 1 .  
765 Ibid., 24. 
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disagree with what the government is doing and demand a refund on their taxes? How 
can the government's free expression be restrained by First Amendment principles 
without causing dozens of lawsuits against government entities who are engaging in 
daily activities that require expression? The answer is that government (and the courts) 
will not become vulnerable to such an onslaught if the Supreme Court adopts a standard 
that delineates with clarity the nature of government speech that violates the First 
Amendment. The germaneness test of the Abood and Keller line of cases would afford 
such a clear-cut standard to identify unconstitutional government speech and prevent 
these types of lawsuits. 
If the Supreme Court accepts the government' s argument that the speech in 
question is government speech, it appears that it would have no choice but to address the 
constitutionality of that speech. A strong holding by the court that the government 
speech involved is unconstitutional because it does not meet the germaneness standard 
would be a doctrinally significant step, because it would recognize that speech is different 
than the non-speech activities of the government. On a theoretical level, the significance 
of this doctrinal holding would lie in the fact that government speech would now be 
recognized as having First Amendment restrictions on its speech activities. 
On a practical level, it would not have dramatic consequences, since the 
government and its representatives in all avenues would still be entitled to engage in 
speech that is germane to legislation, policies and the business of running the 
government. In his interview comments, Erik Jaffe notes that a court holding that 
government speech must be evaluated under a First Amendment standard such as Abood 
"would be taking the principle that speech is different and applying it uniformly across 
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governments and across private actors, across all forms of government conduct, whether 
it involves direct or indirect efforts to manipulate speech."766 
Government speech would need to be closely tied to substantive conduct that is 
germane to a government interest. For example, compelled support for government 
speech that furthers health and safety concerns would meet this standard (e.g., a safety 
seal that must be displayed on every product). However, a stand-alone statute that 
requires a producer to pay for generic advertising conducted by a state to promote a 
commodity would not meet this standard, unless the state had actually entered into the 
commercial business of selling the commodity or was able to show that the generic 
advertising was germane to some regulatory scheme. The gist of the United Foods case is 
that, if the government is not regulating the industry, it does not have the right to compel 
support for speech. The Supreme Court could extend this doctrine by concluding that 
government speech is also subject to this restriction. 
A decision by the Circuit Court in Florida in the consolidated Tampa Juice 
Services, Inc., et al. v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus, 767 provides an example of 
an effort by a state judiciary to tackle the government speech issue with an unpredictable 
result. The case arose when Florida citrus growers and handlers challenged a checkoff on 
citrus ( called a "box tax") that required the citrus handlers to pay mandatory fees for use 
by the Florida Citrus Commission to fund generic advertising forcitrus. 
766 Jaffe interview, 24. 
767 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Tampa Juice Services, Inc. et al. v. 
State of Florida, Department of Citrus, (Case Nos. GC-G-00-3488, GC-G-00-37 18, GC-G-01-0286, GC-G-
01-0375, and GC-G-01-0694); Graves Brothers Company v. State of Florida, Florida Department of Citrus 
(Case No. GC-G-02-46-4686) and Oak Hammock Groves, Ltd., et al. v. State of Florida, Florida 
Department of Citrus (Case No. GC-G-03-028 1) ( 10th Cir., Polk County, Fla., March 3 1 ,  2003). 
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As noted by Barry Richard, counsel for the Florida Department of Citrus, the 
rationale for this tax is to "maintain a high level of quality and wholesomeness in Florida 
citrus" and to also "bring to the attention of the general public the end result of that." He 
claimed that the two must go hand in hand since "[T]here's no sense regulating quality 
and wholesomeness if nobody knows about it."768 
On the surface, there did not appear to be ambiguities regarding the fact that the 
speech was government speech, because the program was carried out by the State of 
Florida through the Florida Citrus Commission. The state title of the Commission 
implied that it was an arm of the state government. As shown by Figure 12, the court 
would be expected to move to the analysis on the far right on that continuum. Once the 
speech was characterized as government speech, the circuit court would then have two 
choices: 1) accept the argument of the state of Florida that the government speech status 
exempts the checkoff program from First Amendment scrutiny, or 2) determine whether 
the government speech in question is constitutional by analyzing whether it meets the 
requirements of germaneness as outlined in United States v. United Foods and Glickman 
v. Wileman, i.e., whether it is part of a regulatory scheme and such speech is germane to 
the purpose of such scheme. 
Circuit Judge Dennis P. Maloney was willing to grant government speech an 
exemption from First Amendment analysis. In his opinion, he stated: "If the Box Tax is 
'Government Speech' it is immune from First Amendment analysis."769 But he 
concluded that the generic advertising was not government speech despite the appearance 
768 Richard interview, 2. 
769 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 3, Tampa Juice Services, Inc. , et al. 
v. State of Florida, Department of Citrus (10th Cir., Polk County, Fla., March 3 1 ,  2003). 
370 
that the program and its messages were those of the state of Florida. He found that the 
Citrus Commission was similar to self-help boards and commissions in other cases he 
cited as precedent and, therefore, the Citrus Commission could not be seen as a 
government agency entitled to claim the government speech exception to the First 
Amendment.770 
While the members of the Commission are appointed by the Governor for three­
year terms, they must meet eligibility requirements as growers, growers and shippers or 
growers and processors of citrus fruit. Judge Maloney reviewed heavily on his 
determination that the Commission operated with a high level of autonomy in its rule­
making and enforcement, administration of the advertising campaigns and the box tax, 
enforcement of the rules, ability to reduce the "tax rates" by vote of nine members, etc. 
As a second consideration, Judge Maloney noted that the funding for the citrus box tax 
came from compelled payments from a specified group of citizens (rather than from 
general revenue funds). Citing the Michigan Pork Producers case, he determined that 
this was a case of "an unconstitutionally coercive action by the government which is, 
therefore, not subject to the governmental speech exemption."771 
Judge Maloney' s finding that the generic citrus advertising was not government 
speech led him to apply an analysis similar to that performed by the Court in United 
Foods. The analysis thus stayed within the boundaries of the middle section of the 
continuum shown in Figure 12 . .  
The citrus decision suggests that, in the absence of guidance by the U.S . Supreme 
Court, lower courts are stepping into the vacuum to create rules for determining what is 
770 Ibid. at 4-5 . 
771 Ibid. at 5. 
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government speech, whether the speech in question meets the definition, and whether is 
exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. 
In the flurry of decisions in checkoff cases in 2003, only one court has endorsed 
the government speech argument. A ruling by District Judge Richard F. Cebull in a beef 
checkoff challenge in the Western District of Montana upheld the beef checkoffs on the 
grounds that generic advertising for beef was government speech. Judge Cebull applied a 
cursory First Amendment analysis to find that the Beef Act was "constitutionally sound" 
because it was "non-ideological, content-oriented government speech which does not 
violate free speech or free association."772 The Center for Individual Freedom, a non­
profit group that has supported checkoff challengers, notes the following on its website: 
The Montana district court's decision is the first ever to hold that an agricultural 
promotion program is the government speaking and that compelled support for 
that speech was immune from First Amendment scrutiny. The legal brief filed 
with the 9th Circuit argues that both the reasoning and the result of that decision 
are in error and, if allowed to stand, it will create a vast loophole in the First 
Amendment and render meaningless several well-established lines of First 
Amendment case law .773 
Clearly, a move by the Supreme Court to provide a test for whether speech may 
be defined as government speech would be a step forward in clarifying the questions 
surrounding the concept of government speech and possible developing a doctrine for 
government speech. In the event that the USDA loses because the generic advertising in 
a particular case fails to meet the requirements for government speech, it is highly 
predictable that the government will then modify the generic advertising to meet the 
requirements. The challengers will not overlook the importance of the unresolved First 
772 See Jeanne Charter and Steve Charter v. USDA, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1 121 ,  1 141 (Dist. Montana 2002). 
773 "Ranchers File Brief in 9th Circuit Beef Checkoff Appeal," Center for Individual Freedom (April 4, 2003); 
available from http://www.cfif.org/htdocsnegal_issues/legal_acti vi ties/litigation/ generic _advertising_appeal.htm; 
Internet; accessed 4 April 2003 . 
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Amendment issue for government speech and a new spate of lawsuits will be filed to 
prod the Supreme Court into more thorough! y addressing how the First Amendment 
impacts government speech. 
In his overview of government speech, Professor Mark G. Yudof observed: 
''The recognition of the constitutional ramifications of government expression calls 
attention to broader norms of majority rule, democracy, and consent . . .  "774 The USDA's 
claim that it is exempt from First Amendment restrictions because the generic advertising 
funded by compelled fees is government speech, indeed, raises issues of majority rule, 
democracy and consent. As part of the dominant checkoff hegemony and the broader 
agricultural hegemony, the USDA has assumed the role of speaking for the majority. The 
USDA has asserted that it has the consent of the majority, but confusing and 
controversial referendums in the pork and beef industries have rendered this claim open 
to speculation. 
Even if it can be said that the USDA has a significant level of consent, a zone of 
conflict ( or as Gramsci calls it, a "war of position") arises with respect to Yudof s final 
element of "democracy." The minority voices are looking to the courts to recognize their 
First Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution to be free from compelled speech or 
association. The manner in which the Supreme Court eventually interprets the USDA' s 
claim that it is exempt from First Amendment restrictions because the mandatory 
checkoffs are used for generic advertising that qualifies as government speech will have 
direct consequences on the individual First Amendment rights of the checkoff 
challengers. 
774 Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics, Law and Government Expression in America 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 161 .  
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By concluding that First Amendment scrutiny does not apply to government 
speech, the government will be given new authority for viewpoint discrimination. One 
area that would clearly be at risk is the public forum doctrine. If the government builds a 
facility or creates another forum over which it exercises control (such as an electronic, 
on-line forum), it can claim that its purpose is to deliver its own message. Accordingly, it 
has the right to allow only private citizens who agree with its viewpoint to speak and is 
entitled to prohibit others with contrary viewpoints from speaking. The government can 
argue that it is entirely acceptable to impose a viewpoint restriction, since the message is 
government speech. The government can analogize its situation to the government 
speech in the checkoff cases to claim that it is using private citizens to deliver its 
preferred government message in the same manner that the USDA used mandatory 
checkoff fees from private citizens to deliver its generic advertising message. In both 
cases, the viewpoint discrimination is immune from First Amendment scrutiny because it 
is the government speaking. 
First Amendment Doctrine on Compelled Speech and Association. While the 
Supreme Court' s approach to the government speech argument remains open to 
speculation, the path it has taken in the United Foods by choosing to analyze the First 
Amendment rights of the challengers under Abood and Keller has predictive value for 
how it will handle future checkoff challenges. This is an established line of cases that has 
utilized the "germaneness test" as a straightforward way of determining whether the 
compelled speech or association can withstand First At:nendment scrutiny. The Supreme 
Court might off er some refinement of this test or modify it in some manner, but the 
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Abood analysis has proved durable in its application by the Supreme Court in a broad 
range of contexts. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the Livestock Marketing case775 
suggests that the Central Hudson commercial speech analysis may not be completely 
disregarded by the Supreme Court in a future case challenging commodity checkoffs. It 
would be a major switch, however, given the Court' s reluctance to apply the Central 
Hudson test to compelled commercial speech and its history in Glickman of chastising 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for using the Central Hudson test to analyze the 
constitutionality of the tree fruit marketing orders. 
It is likely that the Glickman v. Wileman case will continue to relied upon as 
precedent in guiding the court to determine, as a threshold issue, whether the checkoff 
regulations are part of a broader regulatory scheme in which the government has an 
important interest and whether the compelled support of speech is germane to furthering 
the purpose for which the regulation has been enacted. However, the Court has distanced 
itself already from several of its questionable holdings in the Glickman case. It is 
noteworthy that two of the Justices that joined the majority in the Glickman opinion 
quickly switched sides four years later to constitute a majority in the United Foods 
decision.776 
The Supreme Court' s continued application of the Abood and Keller analysis 
should not introduce anything novel into the First Amendment doctrinal arena, provided 
775 See Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13630 (8th Cir. 2003). 
776 Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice John Paul Stevens joined Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice 
Antonin Scalia, Justice David Souter and Justice Clarence Thomas in the majority opinion in United States v. 
United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). 
375 
that the interpretation of "germane" remains consistent with the current line of cases. In 
Abood, a union could not use the union dues of a dissenting employee for activities 
outside collective bargaining, i .e., for activities not "germane" to the purpose for which 
the compelled association was justified. Likewise, in Keller v. State Bar of California, et 
al. ,  the U.S .  Supreme Court held that compulsory state bar dues by the California State 
Bar could not be used for ideological speech that was not germane to the purpose of the 
States interest "in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal 
services." 777 
While the Supreme Court's approach to the government speech argument in the 
next case dealing with a checkoff challenge is less certain, the path it has taken in relying 
on Abood and Keller in the United Foods case has predictive value for future checkoff 
challenges. 778 
First Amendment Commercial Speech Doctrine. Prior to Glickman, the lower 
courts analyzed the First Amendment aspects of compelled commercial speech cases by 
applying the four-prong Central Hudson test. In United States v. Frame, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appe�s evaluated the case under both an Abood analysis and a Central 
Hudson analysis.779 The Supreme Court in Glickman rejected the approach used by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in analyzing the case under Central Hudson. In United 
Foods, the Court merely declined to apply the Central Hudson test on the grounds that it 
would not find the compelled assessments on mushrooms sustainable under even the 
m Keller, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). 
ns Abood, 43 1 U.S. 209 ( 1977). 
n9 Frame, 885 F.2d 1 1 19 (3n1 Cir. 1989). 
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lesser standard of protection of the commercial speech standard set forth in Central 
Hudson. The Court also noted that the government does not rely on Central Hudson.180 
The USDA declined to use the Central Hudson test as an alternative argument in 
United Foods or any other cases in which it is now involved. This may be because the 
Supreme Court in Glickman expressly indicated that the Central Hudson test was an 
incorrect standard to apply or perhaps the USDA recognized that it had a weak case 
under the Central Hudson test and, therefore, concentrated on an Abood analysis 
combined with a government speech defense in its briefs. However, as already 
mentioned, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-introduced the Central Hudson test in 
it opinion in the Livestock Marketing Association case781 on July 8, 2003, and may be 
prompting the U.S . Supreme Court to begin applying the Central Hudson test or explain 
more fully why the test is inappropriate for cases on compelled funding of generic 
advertising. 
Although the Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged that members of the 
Court are not comfortable with the Central Hudson commercial speech test, the Court 
does not seem eager to clarify or modify its position. Court watchers who thought the 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky case782 argued on April 23, 2003, was the vehicle that would prompt 
the Supreme Court to clarify its position on commercial speech were disappointed when 
the court dismissed the case on June 26, 2003 on the ground that the writ of certiorari was 
"improvidently granted." The Court found that the case was not final, that the parties 
didn't have standing to sue in a federal jurisdiction and that the court should avoid 
780 See United Foods at 2337-2338. 
781  Livestock Marketing Association v. USDA, No. 02-2769and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8th 
Cir. 2003). 
782 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. _, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5015, No. 02-575 (2003). 
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deciding novel questions of constitutionality prematurely. The case is moving forward in 
the lower courts in California and is expected to come back before the U.S. Supreme 
Court again in several years. While these proceedings occur, the United States Supreme 
Court may have an opportunity to address commercial speech in the checkoff cases if it 
chooses. However, the Court may conclude that the compelled commercial speech cases 
are not the best vehicle for breaking new ground in the commercial speech area, 
especially when such cases are amenable to an Abood analysis. 
Consequences for the Public Interest 
Congress authorized the generic advertising program for mushrooms in 1990 
based on its express finding that the mushroom program was "in the public interest" 783 
"to maintain and expand existing markets for mushrooms."784 Congress made an even 
stronger statement in the FAIR Act of 1996 (an agricultural reform act) that the generic 
advertising programs for a number of commodities are "in the national public interest and 
vital to the welfare of the agricultural economy of the United States."785 
Almost all of those interviewed in this study expressly acknowledged that the 
commodity checkoff programs have provided benefits in the areas of research, education 
and food safety. These benefits, enjoyed by the public as well as the industry, will be 
diminished if additional mandatory commodity checkoff programs are deemed 
unconstitutional. Arguably, efforts can continue through voluntary checkoff programs 
strictly for these purposes, but a number of pro-checkoff interviewees in this study 
emphasized the problem with "free riders" or those in the industry who realize the 
783 7 U.S.C. 6101(b). See Brief for the Petitioners, United States v. United Foods, Supreme Court No. 00-276, 
784 7 U.S.C. 6101(a)(6) 
785 7 U.S .C. 7401(b)(l). See U.S.C. 7401{a)(10) specifying the commodity programs that are covered by the 
FAIR Act. 
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benefits without contributing their fair share. Past voluntary programs h_ave shown a 
level of participation by producers lower than what might be anticipated if the only 
abstainers are those who object to the messages and ideology of the dominant group. 
Clearly, there are producers in agreement with the dominant group who simply do not 
wish to participate for strictly financial reasons, especially if a sufficient number of other 
producers are willing to sustain the programs. 
One example of the impact of striking down a commodity checkoff system can be 
seen in the aftermath of the decision by the district court in Washington that the 
mandatory promotional program for apples was unconstitutional. The Apple 
Commission shut its offices, and a number of groups and associations that received 
funding through the Commission are now looking for alternative funding.786 The Apple 
Commission also performed certain regulatory and administrative services for 
Washington apple growers, such as administering the export program and dealing with 
the government Market Access Program (MAP) funds. Apple growers have expressed 
concern that a vacuum now exists in the absence of the organizational and service 
functions provided by the Washington Apple Commission and the termination of the 
funding to support the industry's infrastructure. 787 
A consumer activism website has characterized the checkoff conflicts as against 
the best interests of consumers, since the checkoffs are being challenged by alternative 
farmers who "raise and market fringe products that cost more to produce and appeal to a 
786 These include the Northwest Horticultural Council, the Northwest Fruit Exporters, and the Washington 
State Horticultural Association. 
787 See Kathleen Thomas, "Washington Apple Commission Ceases Operations After 66 Years," The 
Produce News" (April 15, 2003); available from 
http://www.theproducenews.com/storydetail.cfm?ID=3046; Internet; accessed 10 June 2003; and Greg 
Brown, "Washington Apple Commission Falls," The Fruit Growers News (May 2003); available from 
http://www.fruitgrowersnews.com/pages/issue03_05_wac.html; Internet; accessed 10 June 2003. 
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tiny fraction of the public."788 While there is a public interest in low-cost food, a 
definition of the consuming public would have to include a growing segment of those 
who prefer products produced by alternative farming methods. To the extent that these 
farmers are penalized in their ability to use their money for advertising purposes of their 
choosing or for sustaining farming operations that produce organic and naturally grown 
products to a public seeking such items, the public interest is not served. 
There remains a question whether the public interest is being served by answering 
public demand for cheap food by following the industrial agriculture model. Senator 
Bryon Dorgan argued: 
[l]f you think the farmer's travail has been the consumer's gain, you might check 
your local supermarket. Somehow, those Depression-level prices on the farm 
haven't shown up on the bar codes. Prices of hamburger and bread have inched 
up, even as farm prices have plummeted. 
Someone is getting the spread, and that someone is the food processing and 
packing industry, which has scored big off the misery of U.S. farmers. The big 
four cereal manufacturers have returns on equity of upwards of 29 percent even as 
farmers go bankrupt. From a loaf of bread that costs $1.59 at the store, the wheat 
farmer gets about five to six cents. In 1981 the wheat farmer got about double 
that. The processors can reap where the farmer sows, in large part because the 
industry has become so concentrated in recent years.789 
A.V. Krebs, editor and publisher of The Agribusiness Examiner, has noted the 
following about the pivotal role of agriculture and food: 
Food, next to life itself, has become our greatest common denominator. Its 
availability, quality, price, its reflection of the culture it feeds and its moral and 
religious significance make it quite literally history's 'staff of life.' Today, in the 
never-ending worldwide struggle to determine who will control its production, 
quality and accessibility, food is no longer viewed first and foremost as a 
788 "Dakota Resource Council," ActivistCash.com, available from 
http://www.consumerfreedom.com/activistcash/nanny_selector.cfm; Internet; accessed 20 May 2003. 
789 Bryon Dorgan, "Don't be Down on the Farm: How to Preserve a National Treasure," The Washington 
Monthly Online, <J[ <J[ 13-14 (January/February 2000); available from 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2000/0001 .dorgan.html; Internet; accessed 13  April 2003 . 
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sustainer of life. Rather, to those who seek to command our food supply it has 
become instead a major source of corporate cash flow, economic leverage, a form 
of currency, a tool of international politics, an instrument of power - a weapon !790 
In modem days in the United States, many political and ideological controversies 
are fought through advertising. However, the Supreme Court's standard for protection of 
commercial speech under the Central Hudson test makes it clear that speech does not 
have to be political or ideological to be protected by the First Amendment. Likewise, the 
Supreme Court' s decision in the United Foods case makes it clear that the First 
Amendment will protect commodity producers who are not governed by comprehensive 
regulatory schemes against being forced to pay for objectionable commercial advertising, 
regardless of whether such advertising is political or ideological in nature. Commercial 
communications can constitute a means of persuasion and influence with regard to 
products as well as social and cultural controversies.791 
Since money has become a key factor in determining access to modem 
communication channels, the future ability of commodity producers to participate in the 
expression of commercial messages without being compelled to fund objectionable 
speech is a notable thread in the broad fabric of a participatory democracy. A system of 
mandatory fees paid by a limited group for commercial messages that the government 
claims are its own under the government speech principle does not support democratic 
self-government. If the government speech argument is rejected, it is still equally 
troublesome to democratic principles to require a minority group in an industry to support 
790 A.V. Krebs, The Corporate Reapers: The Book of Agribusiness (Washington. D.C.: Essential Books, 1992), 
15 .  
791 The level of First Amendment protection afforded to commercial speech or a combination of 
commercial speech and political/ideological speech has been a critical issue for the courts. Further Supreme 
Court guidance was expected in the Supreme Court's decision on Nike v. Kasky in the summer of 2003, but the 
Court's dismissal of the case after hearing oral arguments forestalled that judicial opportunity. 
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the commercial speech of the dominant group and to be associated with the views of the 
dominant group unless there is a vital government interest at stake. 
The legal arguments focus on how strong the government interest must be to 
support the intrusion of the government on First Amendment rights. Does the 
government's interest in promoting the demand for commodities under any regulatory 
scheme justify the infringement of First Amendment rights? The Supreme Court in 
United Foods held that this economic goal of the government supported the violation of 
First Amendment rights when the regulations were germane to the objective of a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme (such as the marketing order in the Glickman case), 
but not when they were found in a stand-alone statute. Although the Supreme Court has 
relied on the Abood line of cases to clarify why the mandatory fees are permissible in one 
instance and not in another, from a public interest standpoint, what difference does it 
make? A legal distinction can be made, but the impact of overriding First Amendment 
rights is the same regardless of the legislative vehicle in which the regulation resides. 
Mandatory checkoff programs have afforded the dominant industrial blocs in 
each industry with opportunities to manipulate producer-funded programs to further their 
specific business goals. Examples can be seen by glancing through the legal investigative 
frame used with this research (see Table 3). In many cases, there are inequities in the 
industry that are enhanced or sustained by the checkoff programs. While the pro-checkoff 
forces have discounted the theme of inequity as legitimate concern, this research 
nevertheless showed that checkoff programs were vulnerable to manipulation by the 
dominant group in each industry, enabled and supported by the USDA. It is worthwhile 
asking the question whether the public interest is served when even some of the checkoff 
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programs are held to be constitutional (i.e. , those within the context of complex 
regulatory schemes) if the programs lead to abuse of regulatory schemes. Do the 
political, social and economic realities of the new Millennium prompt the same Supreme 
Court response as the 1937 decision in United States v. Royal Rock CO-OP, Inc.? The 
Supreme Court in Rock Royal held that the government interest in an efficient marketing 
system justified giving cooperatives a monopoly in the market. 
Another area of concern for the public interest will arise if the Supreme Court 
continues in the direction of recognizing the constitutionality of programs for producer­
funded compelled commercial speech only when they are part of comprehensive 
regulatory schemes. It can be assumed that the dominant hegemony supporting checkoffs 
in those industries where the checkoff programs are created by stand-alone legislation 
will refashion their programs to accommodate this Supreme Court requirement. So an 
incentive exists for a number of industries to create more complex regulatory schemes 
affecting other areas of economic and market control merely to achieve a constitutional 
mandatory commodity assessment program. 
The current trend toward branding agricultural commodities has been embraced 
by a public that has become highly responsive to consumer goods differentiated by 
commercial brands. There is a question whether the public interest will be served in the 
years ahead by requiring producers to fund generic advertising when the public is 
accustomed to purchasing based on brand differentiation and expects to learn about 
specific characteristics of products through branded advertising. 
A Supreme Court willing to recognize the constitutionality of the mandatory 
commodity checkoff programs will enhance the authority of the government. Such 
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authority will be enhanced even more if the Supreme Court recognizes that the speech 
compelled through mandatory advertising is government speech. It is notabl� that as 
generic advertising has become more pervasive, the government has sought a more 
invasive role as an aggressive player. This suggests that critical. consequences for the 
public interest as a result of the legal outcomes may be related to the following research 
question posed in this study: 
RQ 3 :  Does the government' s efforts to use "government speech" as a 
justification for mandatory commodity assessments create a heightened risk that 
the government may displace or monopolize private speech or interfere with the 
gatekeeping function of private speakers? 
At the producer level, there is evidence that the government' s speech will displace 
private speech, since the producers paying checkoff fees to fund the government speech 
must forfeit money' that would otherwise be available for its own advertising If an 
increase in branding for commodities follows the current trend, the government speech in 
the form of generic advertising will interfere with the private commodity producer' s 
branded advertising programs at an even greater level," since the producer will then have 
to spend money on commercial advertising to counteract the government's message, 
while still paying the mandatory fees and investing in advertising programs to build its 
brand. 
While these outcomes have already occurred within the context of the checkoff 
programs, the Supreme Court in United Foods has at least recognized First Amendment 
protection for producers compelled to fund checkoff programs created by stand-alone 
legislation. These First Amendment protections could be stripped away if the Supreme 
Court holds that generic advertising is government speech and, therefore, immune from 
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First Amendment scrutiny. The government would have complete control over the 
funding and the messages of private producers without even the less burdensome First 
Amendment requirement under Abood that the speech involved be germane to the 
purpose of the government interest underlying the regulatory program. 
The media serve as primary gatekeepers. Therefore, several Supreme Court cases 
dealing with the compelled right of reply on television or in newspapers and compelled 
access to media advertising are instructive in providing background for the considerations 
raised in this first research question. In the 1969 case of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC,792 the U.S. Supreme Court exhibited a strong bent for allowing compelled speech in 
the area of broadcasting by upholding the right of the Federal Communication 
Commissions (FCC) to impose "fairness requirements" on broadcasters, including the 
"personal attack rule." This rule required broadcasters to afford equal air time to 
individuals or groups whose character or honesty had been attacked on the air during a 
discussion related to topic of public importance. Broadcasters were finally successful in 
getting the FCC to cease enforcing the "personal attack rule" in the year 2000 ( an effort 
that required a writ of mandamus form a D.C. Circuit Court). It is noteworthy that the 
rule was upheld by the courts and enforced by the FCC for almost five decades. 
In a contrary decision five years later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tomillo 793 held that a newspaper could not be compelled to give 
political candidates the right to equal space to respond to criticism levied by the 
newspaper. A third case, Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 794decided by a 
192 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 ( 1969). 
793 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
794 Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1 100 (D.Colo. 197 1). 
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panel of three federal judges in Colorado, involved three Denver newspapers that refused 
to run the advertisement of an activist citizens group that opposed building a rendering 
plant within Denver city limits. The citizens group brought suit to compel the 
newspapers to print their ads, but the district court panel held that newspapers, as private 
entities, were entitled to refuse the advertising. 
The courts have supported their decisions providing less First Amendment 
protections to print broadcasting by different rationales, such as: spectrum scarcity 
(scarcity of frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum requires more government 
regulation), need for the government to act as a trustee for the public, the pervasive 
nature of the broadcasting medium and the need for the government to protect children 
against the impact of the medium. 
Would newspapers that are aligned with the counter-hegemony against mandatory 
commodity checkoffs (or simply in disapproval of a message in a particular 
advertisement) be free to refuse the generic advertising cloaked in the guise of 
government speech? While the Tomillo case and the Resident Participation case could 
provide the media with some ability to refuse the advertising, the power of the USDA, 
together with the power of other dominant industrial blocs allied with the USDA, could 
create opportunities for coercion against the media, especially with regard to smaller 
agricultural media outlets. In addition, the courts might align themselves with the 
government agency as evidenced by the history of the "personal attack rule." 
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An insightful law review article by Schoen, Hogan and Falchek discussed the 
topic of "government-imposed counter-advertising." 795 The authors emphasized that 
"[T]he U.S .  Supreme Court has insisted on several occasions that compulsory speech in 
the context of commercial speech should be limited to mandatory disclosure of 
information that prevents consumer deception."796 Accurate and fair information will 
assist the consumer in participating in a fair bargaining process. This constitutional 
principle, the authors contended, was overlooked by the Supreme Court in the United 
Foods case because of its focus (fixation may be a better word) on regulatory schemes. 
Funding for compelled speech in commodity programs such as those reviewed in 
Glickman and United Foods furthers an objective "to enhance consumer awareness about, 
and promote the sale of, the regulated commodities" rather than "to enhance the 
dissemination of accurate and useful information to consumers."797 It is the opinion of 
the authors that the Central Hudson test must be used to analyze these commodity 
checkoff cases because the compelled funding of commercial speech falls outside the 
permissible category of "mandatory disclosure of information that prevents consumer 
deception."798 
The rulings in Glickman and United Foods provide ammunition for advocates of 
government-imposed counter-advertising. Because United Foods was decided on such a 
narrow basis, it affords First Amendment protection to only a discrete group in a discrete 
situation. The article states: 
795 Edward J. Schoen, Margaret M. Hogan and Joseph S. Falchek, "United Foods and Wileman Bros. : 
Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech-Now You See It, Now You Don't," American 
Business Law Journal 30 (Spring 2002): 467-520, 5 15-5 16. 
796 Ibid., 5 14, citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, Inc. , 425 U.S . 748 
( 1976) and 'Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 47 1 U.S. 626 (1985). 
797 Ibid., 5 15 .  
798 Ibid., 5 14. 
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The Court appears to limit First Amendment protection against compelled 
commercial speech to situations in which membership in the association is 
required, the government regulatory scheme is less pervasive, and the government 
regulation is centrally aligned with the purpose of the message. 799 
The authors identify the alcohol and tobacco industries as completely outside the 
scope of this ruling. They suggest that no First Amendment protection will be afforded in 
cases where government programs impose counter-advertising in favor of temperance for 
alcohol or abstinence for smoking. The authors clarify this point and its implications for 
the media as follows: 
[T]here has been some pressure for advertisements warning consumers about the 
health dangers of drinking and cigarettes. In assessing the viability of mandatory 
counter-advertisements, two levels of inquiry are required: whether a business 
organization can be forced to counter-advertise and whether media can be forced 
to accept such ads. 800 
The authors argue that "forcing the disclosure of information in commercial 
speech should be limited to truthful, factual information that preserves the fair bargaining 
process."801 In their opinion, forced counter-advertising relaying health information 
would be a permissible area for government-mandated communications, but 
advertisen:;tents encouraging consumers to refrain from drinking or smoking would not. 
A number of organizations have argued otherwise, including the National Council on 
Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. These groups 
and others petitioned the FCC in 1997, seeking a ruling that broadcast licensees who air 
advertisements for alcohol must also broadcast counter-advertisements free of charge. 802 
(This was the practice when for cigarette advertising on television until these ads were 
799 Ibid., 5 15. 
800 Ibid., 5 16-617. 
801 Ibid., 5 16. 
802 Ibid, n. 259. 
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banned on broadcast media.) The government has also compelled commercial speech in a 
handful of corrective advertising situations where misleading advertising had a "residual" 
effect on consumers so that stopping the misleading ads was not sufficient to educate 
consumers. 
The courts have yet to establish whether the media will be able to refuse 
government-mandated counter-advertisements containing messages designed to 
convince the public to abstain from using alcohol and cigarettes. Some guidance is 
provided by the Tomillo case, which stuck down a Florida right of reply statute. The 
U.S .  Supreme Court held that newspaper editors are entitled to refuse to publish replies to 
articles critical of political candidates. The government can argue that Tomillo should 
be distinguished from the counter-advertisements because the speech in Tomillo is 
political rather than commercial speech. If the government can establish that its counter­
advertisements are government speech, this will distinguish the facts from Tomillo even 
further, since the courts may recognize that government speech is immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny. 
The 1969 Red Lion Broadcasting case is also of interest because the Supreme 
Court in that decision upheld the right of the FCC to require a broadcasting company to 
offer equal air time to a third party that the broadcaster or a party using a licensee's 
facility had attacked during a broadcast. This case can also be distinguished from 
government-imposed counter-advertising, because the "personal attack rule" regulated 
speech that expressed political or ideological viewpoints and not commercial speech. 
(The Court relied upon the concept of "spectrum scarcity" to justify its ruling.) 
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Further development of the government speech principle could provide guidance 
on how government-imposed counter-advertisements will be treated by the courts. In its 
next review of a case challenging a mandatory commodity promotion program, the U.S. 
Supreme Court will have an opportunity to define "government speech" since the USDA 
has argued in every pending case that generic commodity advertising constitutes 
government speech that is immune from First Amendment scrutiny. If the Supreme 
Court finds that the generic advertising funded by compelled commodity assessments 
falls outside the definition of government speech, it may be able to avoid taking the next 
step of deciding whether all government speech is immune from First Amendment 
protection. (A threshold question, in the view of Schoen, Hogan and Falchek, is whether 
the government speech in question serves to "enhance the dissemination of accurate and 
useful information to consumers. "803) 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to clarify the level of government 
involvement or control that will trigger the government speech immunity. It is expected 
that this could be one factor included in a working definition of "government speech" that 
will hopefully be established by the Court. In the absence of clear direction, the parties in 
the pending checkoff cases are presenting evidence on this point. 
The pro-checkoff parties are seeking to prove heavy involvement and control of 
the checkoff programs and the anti-checkoff parties are trying to show the opposite. The 
heightened risk to freedom of speech arises because the government has claimed control 
sufficient to establish government speech after the fact. The commodity checkoff 
programs were characterized as self-directed with oversight by the government and 
803 Schoen, Hogan and Falchek, 5 15. 
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endorsed by producers based on that understanding. The strategic move by government 
to control the programs at a level necessary to control the speech does not bode well for 
other programs in which the government is involved in an oversight capacity. All 
programs of this nature (including those in telecommunications, health and medical 
industries, etc.) would need to be on guard for a similar strategic move that would result 
in government interference in private communications. Increased regulatory oversight 
and control by a government agency would increase the chances for the government 
oversight to parlay itself into government speech. 
If the government speech activities in the commodity programs (i .e. , the generic 
advertising) is not subject to any First Amendment scrutiny, government authority and 
control is greatly enhanced in the agricultural commodity environment. This would 
suggest that the government might find similar success in other sectors. In addition, the 
government could create it own forums for the exchange of messages ( online forums or 
physical facilities) and allow only speakers whose messages are consistent with the 
government speech to participate. It is conceivable that private parties would then need 
to engage in counter-speech to respond to the government' s  message. 
The purpose of the generic advertising in the commodity programs is persuasive 
in nature. It is designed to convince consumers to buy more agricultural commodities. 
This serves as a model for authorizing government to engage in a range of other 
persuasive communications characterized as government speech without First 
Amendment limitations. (Anti-checkoff challengers argue that the generic advertising in 
several industries is outright misleading in delivering the message that the commodities 
are all alike when clear differentiations exist.) In addition, the government has never 
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identified itself as the source of the generic advertising messages. Accepting such 
disguised government speech as an acceptable standard, would require consumers to 
assume that any commercial message may be the government speaking. (How many 
citizens today would assume that the government was the source of a message urging 
them to consider "Beef, it's what's for dinner" or asking if they "Got Milk?") 
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that a primary objective of the First 
Amendment is safeguarding the public's interest in the free flow of truthful commercial 
information. 804 If the producer funded generic advertising created by the checkoff 
programs is deemed to be government speech, there is a likelihood that the free flow of 
truthful commercial information in the agricultural commodity industries (and possibly in 
other industries) will, at minimum, experience governmental interference. Given that the 
USDA is allied with a strong dominant industry bloc, the interference could rise to the 
level of monopoly or displacement of speech in some cases. 
The Battle Continues 
"People usually think this checkoff thing is a kind of side issue. 
And, in a sense, it is. We view it as one battle in a lot larger war. 
But, it 's a strategic war. They've got our money. "805 
~ Jeanne Charter 
The greatest weakness of the AgriBiz position and its major roadmap, the 
industrial agriculture model, lies in its assumption that better productivity and better 
efficiency are the primary goals for agricultural progress. Justification for AgriBiz is 
based strictly on a quantitative approach rather than a qualitative approach. The AgriBiz 
status quo reflects an overwhelming focus on achieving greater and greater returns for 
804 
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 
(1976). 
805 Charter interview, 18. 
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retailers and packers at the expense of the producer groups in a manner that seems to beg 
for antitrust enforcement scrutiny and enforcement. There is little or no flexibility within 
the structure itself for different approaches, even though some of the trade industry 
leadership may personally aspire to tolerance and industry diversity. 
The AgriChoice position' s  greatest weakness is that it is out of step with the 
current business models as illustrated most dramatically by the example of the success of 
the W alMart retail store chain replacing the mom and pop general stores. Supply chain 
management, vertical integration and concentration is the present paradigm for 
demonstrating business acumen and success. 
Is the conundrum created by two divergent agricultural models irreconcilable? 
AgriBiz and AgriChoice both involve the use of agricultural resources in combination 
with a set of management practices to generate income to support an ongoing agricultural 
industry. They seek to accomplish this through sharply differing structural industry 
models. But they could theoretically share a common foundation. That common 
foundation could be a public policy commitment to: 1)  maintain competitive market 
structures by forbidding anticompetitive conduct through antitrust laws, and 2) seek 
f aimess and equity in the marketplace by enacting industry and topic specific legislation 
to provide a balance between the interests of contending groups of economic actors. 806 
The industrial agricultural model followed by AgriBiz could function successfully 
if it were grounded in a commitment such as this, but it has no incentive to do so. 
Through inaction, short staffing and policy decisions, the USDA and GIPSA have failed 
806 U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related 
Agencies, hearing on Concentration and Competition in Agriculture, testimony of Peter C. Carstensen, 17 May 
2001 ; available from http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent/120.pdf; Internet, accessed 7 July 2003. 
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to enforce the Packer and Stockyard Act. Through limited resources and lack of judicial 
decision-making, the USDA has failed to pursue enforcement against monopolistic 
behavior of cooperatives under the Capper-Volstead Act. And through a combination of 
its weak internal processes and the USDA's strong alliance with the dominant industry 
power blocs in livestock and dairy, the USDA has failed to perform its referendum 
responsibilities in these industries. 
In short, there has been little reason for AgriBiz to adopt policies and practices 
consistent with furthering competition or ensuring fairness and equity. Instead, economic 
and political goals push the industrial agriculture bloc to use all means available to 
achieve even greater concentration and centralized ownership, exert greater control over 
the lower levels in the agricultural chain and increase their returns. Their strategies have 
included aggressive efforts to continue the checkoff programs through referendum 
challenges and through the legal argument that generic commodity advertising is 
government speech. In the livestock industry, the beef industry bloc and the pork 
industry bloc vigorously opposed legislation providing for a ban on meatpacker 
ownership of livestock, resulting in the deletion of the proposed language from the Farm 
Bill of 2002. 
However, the war of position against the industrial agriculture bloc moved to the 
courts, a terrain in which the State (acting through the U.S . Supreme Court and lower 
courts) does not appear to have aligned itself with the dominant industrial agriculture 
bloc. The struggle for hegemony in this terrain presents the potential for creating change 
in the commodity production system. The engines for change are two counter-hegemony 
movements, the checkoff cases fighting for the right to be free from compelled speech 
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and the captive supply cases attacking the anticompetitive behavior of the meatpackers. Both are moving through the courts with strong degree of success. 
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CHAPTER IO 
BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research on the broader context and meaning of a First Amendment line of 
cases was based on the assumption that legal battles over constitutional issues signify 
struggles in other arenas of American life. As an example, the civil rights cases 
referenced at the beginning of this dissertation represent past and present conflicts arising 
from deep divisions among American people with unequal power. 807 
The researcher developed an approach that, for clarity, will be identified as the 
"Gramscian/Galbraith Legal Context Analysis" and referenced informally as the "legal 
context analysis." This study successfully demonstrated that the approach provided an 
effective, structured means to explain the complex realities of the compelled commercial 
speech cases and suggested that it can be applied equally well to explain other 
constitutional political struggles that manifest themselves in the courts. 
The legal context analysis facilitated an examination of the structural organization 
and power relationships that govern the production of commodities in five industries. It 
revealed sharp political, economic, social and cultural differences between dominate 
groups exercising hegemony and subordinate groups seeking transformative change or 
counter-hegemony. These conflicts, arising from different values and ideologies, were 
807 The affirmative action cases of Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court on June 23, 2003, signified political and social conflicts over civil rights that have continued to 
divide and polarize Americans. In upholding the affirmative action practices of the University of Michigan 
Law School and striking down the affirmative action procedures followed by the University of Michigan 
undergraduate school, the U.S. Supreme Court once again expressed its constitutional values in the area of 
civil rights. See Grutter v. Bollinger, No. 02-241 ,  2003 U.S. LEXIS 4800; 71  U.S.L.W. 4498 (U.S. 
Supreme Court, decided June 23, 2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 02-5 16, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4801,  71  
U.S.L.W. 4480 (U.S. Supreme Court, decided June 23, 2003). 
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the puzzle pieces that fit together to explain how an environment and a set of political and 
economic circumstances created an issue ripe for constitutional review. 
As a threshold step in this study, the researcher selected a line of cases in which 
the courts had addressed the constitutionality of laws related to First Amendment free 
speech rights, i.e., the cases challenging the compelled funding of generic advertising 
through commodity checkoffs. This required a preliminary study to: 1) define the 
relevant cases addressing the specific constitutional issue (compelled commercial 
speech), 2) gain a general understanding of the opposing legal positions of the parties as 
presented in their official legal documents, and 3) identify the constitutional doctrines 
that the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts used in deciding the cases. (Some basic 
knowledge about broader political contests relating to the constitutional topic would 
assist a researcher at this stage, but is not required. Since all legal battles over 
constitutional issues signify underlying political, economic and cultural conflicts, the 
researcher can assume that later stages of the research will illuminate such conflicts.) 
In determining that compelled commercial speech cases were appropriate for this 
study, the researcher observed that various individuals, groups and the U.S. government 
had sought judicial intervention in their disputes over the constitutionality of commodity 
checkoffs since 1986. The legal positions of the parties were clarified in seventeen 
different cases. Finally, the constitutional doctrines applied by the U.S. Supreme Court 
and the lower courts during those years in such cases were not consistent, indicating 
judicial conflict in addition to the broader political contests that appeared to be involved. 
The next pivotal step in developing the legal context analysis involved using the 
Gramsci theory of hegemony to guide and inform the evidence gathering and analysis. 
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Gramsci' s theory explained how hegemony operated within large social formations, 
while this study focused on hegemony in agricultural commodity production. Therefore, 
the researcher extended Gramsci' s concept of hegemony to encompass "Gramscian 
power blocs" as shown in Figure 3. The Gramscian power bloc is analogous to the 
"historic bloc" that Gramsci used to describe a group comprised of civil society and the 
State allied with the central organizers, the bourgeoisie. In the same manner that the 
historic bloc exercises hegemony over the whole of society, the industrial agriculture bloc 
and the commodity industry blocs exercise hegemony over all agricultural commodity 
production. 
This expanded Gramscian theory proved to be imminently well suited as a 
framework for examining the political, economic and cultural conflicts underlying the 
First Amendment conflicts over checkoffs. It provided a perspective that directed both 
the collection and analysis of evidence. 
In gathering evidence, the theory prompted the researcher to seek out elements of 
hegemony in the agricultural industry as a whole and hegemony in the political struggles 
over commodity checkoffs in each commodity industry. This included collecting 
evidence that would pinpoint which entity was the central organizer. The theory also cued 
the researcher to look for activities showing counter-hegemony by a subordinate group 
interested in changing the laws on checkoffs-a group that might have the potential to 
wield countervailing power to curb economic exploitation by the hegemony. 
At the analysis stage, the expanded Gramscian theory ensured that the researcher 
would focus on two areas: 1) how the dominant power blocs and their allies were 
organized and how they acted to ensure continued hegemony through consensus, 
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negotiation, control or coercion, and 2) how the challengers and their allies were 
organized and how they acted to create counter-hegemony designed to disrupt the 
hegemony, establish countervailing power and alter the relations of power that govern the 
organization of the commodity industries and the markets. This focus directed the 
researcher to consider the strategies of both sides, including their choice of "terrains" to 
best serve them in their war of position. Such terrains may include the legislature, the 
media, trade association networks, the courts or agencies of the state, such as the USDA. 
The researcher recognized the need for a targeted method to uncover and analyze 
hegemonic structures within the agricultural industry and details of the political, 
economic and cultural conflicts arising from such structures. The next step, therefore, 
was to create a method for gathering and analyzing evidence through use of 
"investigative" frames (a general investigative frame and a legal investigative frame). 
The frames served as templates for the researcher to supply with contextual information. 
The categories in the frames provided meaningful ways to organize a wide variety of 
facts for effective analysis. Samples of the general investigative frame and the 
investigative frame are shown as Tables 4 and 5 .  
Table 4 Format for Investigative Frame 
Table 5 Format for Legal Investigative Frame 
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In addition to their value as an organizational tool and as a mechanism for 
gathering information critical to understanding hegemony in an industry, the investigative 
frames served three other important functions during the legal context analysis. First, as 
the general investigative frame was fertilized with interrelated and sometimes 
contradictory facts, new questions about hegemonic relationships and the issues at stake 
for the parties began to emerge. This allowed the researcher to develop meaningful, 
theoretically-informed research questions that could be used to further analyze the body 
of evidence in the general investigative frame and to collect and examine the evidence in 
the legal investigative frame from a more critical perspective. 
Second, the information in the investigative frames represented a simple 
acquisition of facts until it was interpreted within the expanded Gramscian hegemony 
theory and the Galbraith countervailing power concept. The investigative frame with its 
strategic categories served as a catalyst in infusing the facts with meaning from the 
theoretical framework. It was a link in permitting the researcher to analyze a complex set 
of actions and discourse by political players (the reality reported by the evidence) within 
the theoretical perspective created by an understanding of hegemony and countervailing 
power, dominant power blocs exercising hegemony, challengers seeking counter­
hegemony, strategic maneuvering and wars of position to further the interests of the 
respective groups (the reality revealed through theoretical enlightenment). 
Third, the investigative frames were instrumental in identifying the issues that 
were in the "zone of conflict" between dominant power blocs and the challengers, 
participants with unequal power locked in a political contest in a changing agricultural 
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industry. Issues within the "zone of conflict" arose from clashes in values over things 
such as: 
► the benefits of generic advertising to the industry and the public as balanced 
against protection of free speech values; 
► the value of a majority consolidating the resources of an industry to achieve its 
goals versus the value of recognizing the democratic voice of all participants in 
the industry (the value of large research and education advances versus the value 
of not compelling support by those who disagree with the goals of the majority); 
► the value of the industrial agriculture model versus alternative agricultural 
commodity production models; 
► the role of the USDA in favoring agribusiness over support for independent 
farmers (the value realized by the USDA in the national and international arenas 
by promoting corporate interests versus the value it would recognize by 
supporting individual farming interests); 
► the role of a government that enforces antitrust laws to ensure that all farmers and 
the public have the benefits of a competitive and fair market system (the value of 
permitting an anti-competitive status quo to continue to ensure close relations 
between corporate and government interests versus the value of breaking up 
abusive practices); 
► differences in how the contributions made by all farmers to American society 
should be measured (the value of agriculture's  gross profit margin versus a 
measure based on maintaining resources and a quality of life); 
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► the value of increased efficiency, economies of scale and uniformity arising from 
concentration and integration versus the value of maintaining crop diversity and 
long-term land preservation and stewardship; 
► the value of increased use of branding versus the value of established practices 
based on homogenous handling and sales of commodities (such as the commodity 
checkoffs) and the cost of building and promoting brands; 
► the value of foreign trade policies and sourcing low-cost raw food materials from 
the international market versus the value of policies protecting farmers; 
► the value of subsidies for f anners versus the value of an agricultural industry that 
is strictly market-driven; 
► the value to the consumer of source of origin identification for food commodities 
versus the costs and possible impact to profits if consumers choose not to buy 
foods from certain sources; 
► the value of genetically engineered commodities to consumers, the food 
production industry and the ability to feed the hungry versus unknown health or 
agricultural risks and the value of farming with seed supplies that can be saved 
from year to year; and 
► the value of irradiation of livestock and poultry for health and safety versus the 
value of avoiding an additional processing step that may reduce taste. 
The opposing values covered a range of political, economic, social and cultural 
issues. This list is representative of the range and complexity of the value dichotomies 
that may be identified when a legal context analysis is performed. Political contests that 
shift to the courts for resolution by application of the law tend to be complex battles with 
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numerous issues at the forefront in the zone of conflict. Judges must articulate their 
understanding of these conflicting values in rendering their decisions . .  
It was important in this study for the researcher to identify and discuss only those 
issues in the zone of conflict that are most meaningful to the First Amendment challenges 
to the commodity checkoffs. The evidence showed that the five industries involved had 
different issues that precipitated battles in the zone of conflict. Industry concentration 
and vertical integration were the major issues in the zone of conflict in the livestock 
industries where the challengers were the small, independent producers. The zone of 
conflict for the tree fruit and mushroom industries reflected key issues related to branding 
and product differentiation. Challengers in these industries sought to stop the use of their 
dollars for generic advertising in competition with their own branded advertising. A mix 
of plaintiffs and cases in the dairy industry showed that it was experiencing clashes in 
values that created a zone of conflict related to all of the key areas-industry 
concentration, vertical integration, branding and product differentiation. 
The "Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis" may be used to study other 
judicial battles over constitutional issues that signify a myriad of conflicts between 
political and social forces with differing ideologies, economic interests and cultural 
values. It offers a structured method for gathering and analyzing evidence to facilitate a 
broader understanding of what is at stake for parties in lawsuits engaged in intense 
hegemonic struggles over constitutional issues. The method will also assist in tracing 
the external realities and influences that surround judicial decision making on an issue. 
Finally, a clear understanding of how political and economic power is exercised between 
groups who have an interest in a constitutional conflict will assist in analyzing ways in 
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which the consequences of various legal decisions will affect the parties and society in 
the immediate and extended future. 
The Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis is comprised of nine 
components: 
1) a theoretical framework based on Antonio Gramsci's  theory of hegemony 
(expanded to encompass Gramscian power blocs) and John Kenneth Galbraith's 
concept of countervailing power; 
2) a set of objectives specific to the area of conflict being studied (reflecting a 
preliminary awareness of existing regulatory apparatus and laws of the State and 
applicable legal principles). 
3) a thorough collection of evidence, including interviews; 
4) an "investigative frame" (as shown by Table 4) to examine the elements giving 
rise to the constitutional challenge, with attention to the entities and their 
alignment for or against the hegemony; 
5) a "legal investigative frame" (as shown by Table 5) for tracing judicial decision 
making in a line of constitutional cases, and for identifying possible influences 
from the dominant hegemony or societal, legislative or judicial sources; 
6) an identification of issues in the zone of conflict based on the investigative frames 
(and a narrowing of the issues for study and analysis, if appropriate); 
7) a formulation of key research questions based on the investigative frames; 
8) an analysis of evidence under the Gramscian and Galbraith theories, and 
9) a report on the conclusions. 
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Other constitutional legal conflicts that may be suitable for analysis using the 
Gramscian/Galbraith legal contest analysis are related to the rights of parties engaged in 
hegemonic battles regarding such issues as intellectual property in a digital age, 
restricting adult access to Internet media in order to protect children, freedom of religion, 
abortion, stem cell research, privacy and other cases involving an established hegemony 
that is being challenged by a counter-hegemony on constitutional grounds. 
The line of the cases challenging the constitutionality of the anti-circumvention 
provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act808 can be used to briefly illustrate the 
broad applicability of the legal context analysis developed in this study. 
The constitutional basis for all copyright laws is the intellectual property clause in 
the U.S . Constitution: ''The Congress shall have Power . . .  to Promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."809 The area of copyright 
law was not subject to turmoil until the rapid diffusion of computers and new technology 
into homes in the United States during the 1990s generated a huge pool of Internet users 
who have aggressively engaged in "on-line piracy" or the misappropriation of creative 
material in disregard for copyrighted rights.810 On-line piracy of music and other 
materials has created a tension between those who seek to use the Internet and new 
808 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 1 12 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified as 
scattered sections in 17 U.S.C.). 
809 U.S. Const., art. I, 8, cl. 8. 
810 However, as Christopher Mays notes in his critique of intellectual property, the definition of "piracy" in 
terms of theft is not necessarily a technical term, but a rhetorical device that is used by those certain 
industries to stress the rights of the individual owner. It implies that a property right has been recognized. 
If no right exists, then there can be no piracy. By framing the debate over use of information in terms of 
theft and piracy (rather than social utility or access), the rights of copyright owners are privileged above 
social rights. Under the Gramscian theory, this suggests a strategy by the copyright power bloc to maintain 
its hegemony. See Christopher Mays, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The 
New Enclosures? (New York: Routledge, 2000), 150- 15 1 .  
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technology to sustain an "open public domain" model for free exchange of knowledge 
and those who feel compelled to impose a "closed public domain" model to exercise 
control over access and copying in reliance on their proprietary rights under copyright 
law. 
The "closed public domain model" is the preferred solution of those with a 
protectionist viewpoint because, in a digital world, complete control over copying can 
only be achieved by complete control over access. Proponents of this model successfully 
persuaded Congress to integrate their views into the current copyright law, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") passed by the legislature on October 28, 1998.81 1  
Those supporting the DMCA are producers of movies, music, boo�s, databases 
and computer software. Under the Gramscian/Galbraith legal context analysis, these 
entities form the hegemony in the sphere of society concerned with the production, 
protection and use of creative works. They rely on the copyright laws to protect their 
interests. (The fact that the current copyright laws are referred to as the current 
"copyright regime" is a clear indication of the powerful impact of these laws as a tool for 
exercising hegemony.) Two major trade associations, The Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MP AA), are clearly major players in the copyright power bloc exercising hegemony. 
The "Big Five" major record companies dominating the music recording industry 
(Universal Music Group, Sony Music, Time W amer Music Group, BMG Entertainment 
and EMI Recorded Music) have also been active in lending their support in legal actions 
and lobbying for strict copyright laws. 
8 1 1  Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L.  No. 105-304, 1 12 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified as 
scattered sections in 17 U.S.C.). 
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The challengers seeking to establish counter-hegemony against the copyright 
power bloc include computer technology industries, academics and computer hackers. 
Library associations have been outspoken against restrictive copyright laws in 
representing the needs of libraries to have continued access to materials needed to serve 
their patrons. Some artists and authors are aligned with the copyright counter-hegemony, 
while others are aligned with the copyright power bloc. (A few artists and authors 
opposed to the current model of copyright ownership and distribution of creative works 
have experimented with alternative models that may offer future potential for counter­
vailing power.) The public, especially Internet users age 35 or younger, play a role in the 
effort to establish counter-hegemony against the copyright power bloc, primarily because 
of the sheer numbers engaging in the downloading and use of copyrighted works . .  
The "heart of the DMCA"812 has been identified as the provisions that make it 
illegal to gain access to a copyrighted work by circumventing a technological measure 
that "effectively controls access"813 to such work. These anti-circumvention provisions 
are deemed by the challengers to create a conflict between property rights of the 
copyright holder and the political right of free speech. Since the right of access is a key 
component of free speech rights, it is argued that the DMCA violates these rights. 
Challengers have also argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's provision 
preventing access to materials that are subject to fair use is unconstitutional and an 
infringement of First Amendment rights. 
812 L. Ray Patterson, "Copyright in the New Millennium: Resolving the Conflict Between Property Rights 
and Political Rights," Ohio State Law Journal 62 (2001): 703-732, 703. 
813 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1998). 
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A line of cases has developed as the judicial system has begun interpreting the 
DMCA and its anti-circumvention provisions. They involve efforts by the government to 
enforce the provisions through criminal actions and efforts by the copyright dominant 
bloc to stop actions by individuals or groups engaged in decoding programs for purposes 
they claim are within the scope of the fair use doctrine. The courts have responded to 
critical issues raised by the DMCA regarding fair use and access. 
Those in the group seeking counter-hegemony assert that the DMCA virtually 
ignored the public interest as it granted sweeping new rights to major stakeholders in the 
dominant hegemony, the copyright owners, the publishers and distributors. A broad 
conflict of values centers on how U.S. copyright laws can best balance the need to create 
incentives for authors to produce while allowing the public to benefit from the increased 
body of works by maximizing public access. The value that authors have the right to 
economically benefit from their creative works is pitted against the value that access to 
information is imperative for producing the knowledge and growth of society. 
Without introducing further details, it can be seen that this preliminary sketch of a 
line of cases in which the parties are engaged in a legal struggle over the constitutionality 
of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA signifies a broad range of underlying 
conflicts related to values of proprietary ownership and control of intellectual property 
versus freedom of access and use of creative works. 
The Gramscian/Galbraith theoretical framework focuses the researcher on issues 
of hegemony and counter-hegemony at preliminary stages of the research. The 
investigative frame allows the researcher to begin organizing the evidence relating to the 
key entities and their history of involvement with the production, protection and use of 
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creative works. The interests at stake for each entity can be explored with attention to the 
public positions of the entities and the unspoken political and economic interests that 
have contributed to the political contests and prompted the legal actions. Actions of the 
legislature and the courts could be influenced by external influences, such as the U.S . 
signing of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on December 20, 1996. 814 There are indications 
that Congress is a strong ally of the copyright dominant bloc. 
The legal investigative frame should be particularly useful in this case to clarify 
the rulings on the law and legal principles (such as the fair use doctrine) and the values 
that the judges are expressing through their opinions. The Gramscian and Galbraith 
theories and the investigative frames suggest issues that are within the zones of conflict 
and help the researcher develop research questions that require a deeper analysis of the 
evidence on ownership, protection and use of creative works. 
The context legal analysis developed in this dissertation assumes that every 
constitutional legal challenge will signify underlying political conflicts that can be 
understood by exploring relationships and actions based on hegemony and 
counterhegemony. In concluding that Gramsci' s  theories remain viable in today' s  
political environment, Richard Bellamy and Darryl Schecter state: 
[T]he dialectic between State and civil society to which he [Gramsci] drew 
attention continues to be of fundamental importance for understanding the nature 
and exercise of political power within industrial societies. Existing State 
formations are currently undergoing dramatic and often contradictory 
transformations, assailed as they are by international pressures from without and 
increasingly localized national pressures from within . . .  the general problem he 
814 Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 32. 
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sought to address-namely, the construction of a viable democratic political 
culture suited to a socially and economically diverse society-is more pressing 
than ever. 815 . 
815 Richard Bellamy and Darrow Schectert Gramsci and the Italian State (New York: Manchester 
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Agribusiness - Businesses related to agriculture and the food chain, including 
agricultural production, processing and distribution, biotechnology, precision farming 
(global positioning tools), farm and financial management, agricultural trade, 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, land development, agricultural e-commerce, environmental 
impact management, risk management, utilization of agricultural byproducts and 
agricultural systems management. 
"AgriBiz" - Term used by author of this dissertation to describe a network of groups 
that form the "industrial agriculture bloc" that exercises dominant hegemony in the 
agricultural industry and is also an influence in the checkoff hegemony. The dominant 
ideology of the AgriBiz hegemony in agriculture is centered around the corporate or 
industrial agriculture model, a business model which has been widely adopted in the 
business community as a means to compete globally and serve the culture and ideology 
of American consumerism. 
"AgriChoice" - Term used by researcher writing this dissertation to identify the counter­
hegemony movement within the agricultural industry to recognize the rights of 
independent ranchers and farmers to be have access to competitive markets, to support 
sustainable agriculture as a viable alternative model to industrial agriculture, and to 
engage in farming without coercive measures to participate in vertical integration and 
concentration. 
Amicus Curiae Briefs - "Friend of the court" briefs filed by an individual or 
organization not a party to a lawsuit to present arguments on a case before the court. 
Captive Supply - The USDA defines "captive supply" as "cattle that are controlled by or 
committed to a packer more than 2 weeks prior to slaughter." See United States 
Department of Agriculture GIPSA Report, Evaluation of Agency Efforts to Monitor and 
Investigate Anticompetitive Practices in the Meat Packing Industry (Wa. D.C. :  GPO, 
February 1997). 
Agricultural Marketing Orders - Instructions issued by a Secretary of Agriculture at 
the federal or state level for regulating the marketing and distribution of commodities. 
Approximately three dozen commodities are subject to extensive federal regulation under 
"marketing orders." 
Central Hudson Test - An intermediate scrutiny test developed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in 1980 in the case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York for determining whether a statute or regulation 
restricting commercial advertising violates the First Amendment. · Under this test, 
commercial speech does not violate the First Amendment if: 1 )  it concerns lawful 
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activities and is not misleading, 2) the government interest is substantial, 3) the 
regulation advances the governmental interest asserted (i .e. , there is a reasonable fit 
between regulation and policy goal), and 4) the regulation is no more extensive than 
necessary. 
Checkoffs - Term used to describe the mandatory commodity assessments used 
primarily for generic product advertising that is intended to maintain and expand the 
market for commodities. In addition to generic advertising, checkoff money is used for 
administrative salaries, research and educational activities. Examples of generic 
advertising slogans include: "Got Milk?" "The Other White Meat" and "Beef, It' s  
What' s for Dinner." Checkoff programs are based on marketing orders that were first 
implemented in legislation dating back to 1937 or on more recent stand-alone legislation. 
Commodities - Livestock, raw milk, crops, fruits and vegetables. 
Commodity Checkoffs - Mandatory assessments levied on commodities producers to 
support generic commodities advertising. While commodity checkoffs are use primarily 
for the promotion of commodities through generic advertising, they are also often used 
for research, education and administrative purposes. 
Commodity Industry Bloc - A power bloc comprised of the dominant groups ( or 
"fractions" according to Gramsci) within a particular commodity industry who are 
aligned through alliances and ideology and exercise hegemony over the industry. 
Commodity Producers - Farmers, ranchers or growers who produce livestock, raw 
milk, crops, fruits or vegetables. 
Compelled Commercial Speech - Generic advertising of commodities resulting from 
mandatory assessments on commodity producers. 
Concentration - Decreasing the number of business units or enterprises in a business 
field while increasing the size of each. 
Contract Producers - Farmers , ranchers or growers who produces a commodity under a 
production contract. 
Counter-hegemony - Efforts by subordinate groups to effect change in the dominant 
hegemony controlling the social-political formation of society or controlling other 
domains, such as commodity production. The challengers engage in a hegemonic 
struggle with the power bloc exercising hegemony by using moral and philosophical 
arguments, economic strategies, state apparatus, the courts and other means to break the 
hegemony. In Gramsic' s writings, the counter-hegemony was directed against a 
political-economic hegemony exercised by a "historic bloc ." 
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Countervailing Power - A regulatory mechanism that occurs when strong buyers assert themselves against the market power of suppliers or producers of consumer goods. The condition of countervailing power can also occur when the buyer is a manager and the seller is a seller of labor. The group seeking countervailing power is usually a larger disadvantaged group that is facing a small, more advantaged group. 
Factory Farm - Production of animals or plants for use in the food chain using business practices of assembly line uniformity, large volumes, structured business practices and homogenous outputs. Livestock grown under this model are kept in large confinement facilities to create consistency in the processed food and take advantage ·of economies of scale. 
Family Farm - The USDA defines a family farm as: An agricultural business which 1) produces agricultural commodities for sale in such quantities so as to be recognized as a farm rather than a rural residence; 2) produces enough income (including off farm employment) to pay family and farm ·operating expenses, to pay debts, and to maintain the property; 3) is managed by the operator; 4) has a substantial amount of labor provided by the operator and family; and 5) may use seasonal labor during peak periods and a reasonable amount of full-time hired labor. See United States Department of Agriculture, 
Agriculture Fact Book 2000 (Wa. D.C. : GPO, November 2000). 
Fraction - A group within a dominant hegemony that Gramsci calls a hegemonic class. 
Globalization - The process of making something worldwide in application. In agriculture, this refers to a worldwide system of sourcing raw materials, producing, processing, selling and transporting food products and related chemicals, equipment and biotechnological in the global borderless marketplace. 
Government Speech - Communication resulting from the government's affirmative decision to express itself. Examples: Recruiting posters saying "Join the Army"; advertisements to "Buy U.S. Savings Bonds," USDA nutrition guidelines, instructions regarding taxes or Medicare, etc. The USDA has argued that generic commodities advertising is government speech while the challengers assert that such advertising is collective private speech. 
"Gramscian/Galbraith Legal Context Analysis" - A structured research method for gathering and analyzing evidence to facilitate a broader understanding of what is at stake for parties in lawsuits engaged in intense hegemonic struggles over constitutional issues. 
Hegemony - A concept developed by the Italian theorist, Antonio Gramsdas, as an expansion of Marxist theory. Hegemony exists when a provisional alliance of social and political groups is formed and gains legitimacy and dominance through political, intellectual and moral leadership. People are united through a shared world view that is reinforced by consensus between state and private institutions. 441 
Historic Bloc - Term used by Antonio Gramsci to refer to the social formation of a civil 
and political group around a hegemonic project. 
Industrial Agriculture Bloc - A power bloc of individuals in agriculture, business, 
academia, biotechnology research, chemical and pesticide development and government 
that are centrally organized around the hegemonic project of industrial agriculture. The 
central organizers are concentrated and vertically integrated commodity producers. 
Industrial Agriculture Model - A business and technological approach to agriculture 
that includes elements such as: economic growth, profit, industrial process, and 
conversion of natural foods into commercial products by using methods and systems that 
are governed by productivity and efficiency objectives. Crops grown using the industrial 
agriculture model are often characterized by monoculture (growing one crop on vast 
amounts of farmland). The industrial agriculture approach also promotes the use of 
pesticides and biotechnology to seek more homogeneity. 
Investigative Frame - Term used by author of this dissertation to identify a structured 
approach used to organize facts and study the relationship between First Amendment 
compelled speech cases and a hegemonic conflict within the agriculture industry. 
Land Grant Universities - Universities and colleges that received federal funding under 
the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890 for developing programs in the areas of agriculture 
homemaking and mechanical arts. States and territories also received land from the 
federal government for this purpose. 
Legal Investigative Frame - Term used by author of this dissertation to identify a 
structured approach used to study a line of cases, the historical facts, the interests at stake 
for the judiciary and other key elements. 
Livestock Packers and Processors - The business entities in the beef and pork food 
production chain that slaughter, process and package cattle and hogs. 
Marketing Orders - Regulatory schemes designed to achieve orderly marketing goals 
through government regulation of agricultural commodities including: 1 )  regulation of 
supply and quality, and 2) consolidation of commodity payments for promotion and 
research. They arise when an industry actively initiates the through an industry initiative, 
approval by the Secretary 
Retailers - Business organizations that sell commodities to ultimate consumers. 
Sustainable Agriculture - An approach to farming and production of food that stresses 
the long-term habitability of the world and promotes environmentally sound farming 
practices that conserve and renew the earth ' s  resources. 
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"State" - A set of organizations invested with the authority to make binding decisions 
for people and organizations located within a particular territory and to implement these 
decisions using force, if necessary. 
Transnational Corporation - A corporation that competes on a global scale with few 
or no national alliances. The business organization is accountable solely to deliver profits 
to shareholders and directors residing in different countries. The emergence of trans­
national corporations with extensive abilities to influence trade and economic policies has 
created a new global power base that has arguably supplanted nation states. The 
transnational corporation is the entity around which other groups ally themselves in the 
"industrial agriculture bloc." 
Vertical Integration - A business model that occurs when one entity controls one or 
more steps in production from the raw materials to the consumer. This reduces the 




ANNOTATED LIST OF COMPELLED 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES 
United States v. Rock Royal CO-OP, Inc., 307 U.S . 533 (1939). The government sought 
to collect mandatory fees from several milk processors in accordance with a milk order 
and the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. The milk processors agued that" 
1)  their due process rights were violated under the 5th Amendment, 2) the Tenth 
Amendment prohibited the federal government from fixing the price of milk prior to the 
commencement of interstate commerce, and 3) that the authority accorded the Secretary 
of Agriculture violated their property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This 
authority included the right of the Secretary to delineate marketing areas, to implement 
marketing orders based solely on the consent of the producers and not the processors, and 
to authorize bloc voting by farming cooperatives on behalf of their members. The 
District Court held for the challengers, but the Supreme Court overruled in favor of the 
government. 
United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1 1 19 (3rd Cir. 1989) The Third Circuit applied the 
Central Hudson test and found the Beef Promotion and Research Act was constitutional . 
However, the court was unwilling to accept the government' s  argument that the 
promotional expression of the Cattleman' s Board constituted "government speech." 
Cal-Almond v. United States, 14 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 5 19 U.S . 963 
(1996). Under the Central Hudson test, the Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment 
rights to freedom of expression and association of two groups of almond handlers were 
violated by the California Almond Marketing Order. The court found that the evidence 
on record indicated that the regulations in reality hindered the efforts of the handlers to 
increase sales and returns to growers. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367 (9th Cr. 1995), rev 'd sub nom. 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S . 457 ( 1997). In keeping with its decision 
in the Cal-Almond case, the Ninth Circuit held that federal marketing order for California 
tree fruit was unconstitutional due to its failure to meet the second and third prongs of the 
Central Hudson test. 
Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. , 521 U.S. 457 (1997). This case gave the 
Supreme Court a chance to resolve the conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits. In 
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory assessments on fruit growers 
did not raise First Amendment issues, and analyzed the case under a freedom of 
association theory. It noted that the assessments did not impose a restraint on the 
plaintiffs' freedom to communicate, did not compel them to engage in actual or symbolic 
speech and did not compel them to endorse or finance political or ideological views that 
were not germane to the purposes for which the compelled association was justified. The 
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court also emphasized that this marketing order involved a complex regulatory scheme, 
of which the generic commodity advertising was only one part. 
Goetz v. Glickman, 149 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998). Kansas cattle farmer claimed his 
First Amendment rights were violated by beef checkoffs. District Court ruled in favor of 
USDA. Tenth Circuit upheld ruling of District Court, but relied on Glickman v. 
Wileman, to conclude that the lower court incorrectly applied Central Hudson test. 
Gallo Cattle Co. v. Ca. Milk Advisory Bd., 185 F.3d 969 (9th Cr. 1999). The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the marketing order in question requiring mandatory 
assessments for generic advertising did not violate the First Amendment rights of the 
milk producer. The Court applied the three-part test from Glickman v. Wileman, but did 
not address whether a complex regulatory scheme (such as the marketing scheme in 
Wileman) was prerequisite for applying Wileman. 
Cal-Almond Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1272 (9th Cr. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 
2215 (2000). Ninth Circuit held that an almond marketing order does not violate the First 
Amendment by imposing mandatory assessments on individual almond handlers to fund 
collective generic almond promotion. 
Gerawan Farming v. Lyons, 42 Ca. 4th 468 (2000). The California Supreme Court held 
that the mandatory assessments against plum growers under the California Plum 
Marketing Program (of which 55% of the revenue was used for generic advertising) did 
not raise First Amendment free speech issues under the U.S. Constitution as interpreted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Glickman v. Wileman case. However, the California 
Supreme Court strongly criticized the Wileman ruling and reached the conclusion that the 
mandatory assessments implicated Gerawan' s free speech rights under the California 
Constitution. 
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, Super. Ct. No. F031142 (5th Appellate Dist., State of 
Cal. 2001 ). Upon remand from the California Supreme Court, the state appellate court 
adopted an intermediate scrutiny balancing test for evaluating the constitutionality of the 
plum marketing order under the free speech clause of the California State Constitution. 
It held that checkoff program was unconstitutional. 
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001). The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the mandatory assessments against mushroom growers imposed by the Mushroom 
Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act of 1990 for purposes of generic 
advertising were unconstitutional. It distinguished this case from Glickman v. Wileman 
on the grounds that the primary purpose of the assessments against the mushroom 
growers was to solicit funds for generic advertising rather than to support a complex 
regulatory scheme like the one regulating the fruit growing industry. The Supreme Court 
declined to hear the government's  argument on "government speech" on the grounds that 
it was raised for the first time after the court granted certiorari. It affirmed the 6th Circuit 
decision overturning the district court's finding of summary judgment in favor of the 
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government and sent the case back to the district court. The government has sought to 
continue the case and introduce a government speech defense on the grounds that the 
Supreme Court decision only denied summary judgment for the defendant and was not 
dispositive of the case. Two actions pending in the Western District Court of Tennessee 
are dormant while awaiting the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign for Family Farms. 
Livestock Marketing Association v. United States, Livestock Marketing Association v. 
USDA, Nos. 02-2769 and 02-2832, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13630 (8th Cir. 2003). 
District court decision rejecting the government speech argument and holding beef · 
checkoffs unconstitutional was upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 8, 
2003. 
Jean Charter and Steve Charter v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (D. Montana 
2002). District Court decision on November 1, 2002, recognizing government speech and 
holding beef checkoffs unconstitutional is currently being appealed in the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Briefing concluded in July 2003 and oral arguments are expected to be 
scheduled for fall 2003. 
Michigan Pork Producers v. Campaign /or Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772 (W.D. 
Mich. 2002), as corrected October 31, 2002. Decision holding pork checkoffs 
unconstitutional is being evaluated by the USDA and the federal Justice Department with 
regard to whether the government will file an appeal. An appeal in the Michigan case 
was argued before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 14, 2003. This is the 
court that held the mushroom checkoffs unconstitutional in the recent United Foods case. 
Joseph P. Cochran, et al. v. Ann Veneman, et al. and Fred Lovell, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4361 (Middle Dist. Penn. 2003). Joseph and Brenda Cochran and the Center for 
Individual Freedom brought suit in the U.S. District Court in Scranton, Pennsylvania. 
The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the defendents then filed a 
motion to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment. As dairy producers 
required to pay checkoffs under the Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983, plaintiffs 
claimed the commodity checkoffs violated their First Amendment rights. The District 
Court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and upheld the diary 
checkoffs on the grounds that the regulatory environment for the dairy industry (which 
consists of eleven federal marketing orders) more closely resembles the facts in Glickman 
v. Wileman that the facts in United States v. United Foods. Joseph and Brenda Cochran 
filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Delano Farms Company, et al. v. California Table Grape Commission, No. 00-16778 
(9th Cir. January 27, 2003). The challengers, Delano Farms, Susan Neill Company and 
Lucas Brothers, sells table grapes under brand names. The Ninth Circuit appellate court 
held that the facts of this case were more similar to United Foods than Wileman, 
because: "the scheme does not collectivize the industry, about 90% of the assessment 
money is spent on generic promotional activities, and there is no antitrust exemption." 
Delano Farms at 9. The court referred to its earlier 1999 decisions in Gallo Cattle 
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Company v. California Milk Advisory Board and Cal-Almond Inc. v. U.S. Department of 
Agriculture and stated that it did not need to reexamine its analyses in those cases in light 
of the United Foods case, because they are distinguishable from United Foods based on 
the fact that both involve marketing orders under the same 1937 statute that was 
controlling in Wileman. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court ruling granting the 
Grape Commission a dismissal, so the case has returned to the district court for trial . 
In Re Washington Apple Advertising Commission, No. CS-01 -0278-EFS (E.D. Wa. 
March 14, 2003). The Washington Apple Advertising Commission contacted parties and 
initiated this lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of its checkoff program. The 
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to apple producers who challenged 
the Washington state apple checkoff program. The court found that the apple checkoff 
activities did not constitute government speech, that the Apple Commission was not a 
governmental entity, and that the Apple Commission was not disseminating the 
government's message because it did not meet the prerequisite of government control of 
the entity. The Commission has shut down its offices. 
State of Fla., Dept. of Citrus v. Graves Brothers Company, Tampa Juice Services, et 
al. , No. 2DO03-2276, 2d Dist. Court of App., Florida. 
The circuit court determined that the State of Florida' s activities in collecting a "box tax" 
from citrus fruit growers and generating generic advertising to promote Florida citrus 
fruit was not government speech because if was not funded by the general revenue funds 
of the state. The court then subjected the case to a First Amendment review and found 
that the box tax was unconstitutional under United Foods and Glickman. It granted the 
plaintiff fruit growers' motion for partial summary judgment. The State of Florida has 
appealed. 
Pelts & Skins, L.L.C. v. James Jenkins, Jr., Secretary of the Louisiana Department of 
Wildlife and Fisheries, No. 02-384-A, 2003 U.S .  Dist. LEXIS 7014 (Middle Dist. 
Louisiana 2003). The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, an 
alligator farmer who objected to paying mandatory fees to the state of Louisiana for 
generic marketing of alligator products without differentiation as to type, quality or 
brand. The court rejected the government speech defense on the grounds that there is a 
"close nexus between the alligator producers and the message funded." Pelts & Skins at 
2 1 .  It found that the alligator industry resembled the facts in the United Foods case than 
the Glickman case. The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries has filed an appeal with the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Cases Addressing Freedom of Association and Compelled Funding: 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education 43 1 U.S .  209 ( 1977) Union-management agency 
shop agreements, which require that every employee pay the union a service charge equal 
to the amount of union dues, impinge on employees' right to be free from compelled 
affirmation of belief and compelled association for expressive purposes. 
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Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). State law requiring citizens to bear state 
slogan, "Live or Die," on automobile license plates implicates First Amendment rights 
because law requires individuals to participate in the dissemination of an ideological 
message. 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.  609 ( 1984). Court upheld an order of the 
Minnesota Department of Human Rights compelling the Jaycees to admit women in local 
chapters. Although the Court found that the constitutional rights of the Jaycees were not 
sufficiently violated, Justice Brennan' s  opinion contained the following points that 
provided guidance for future compelled association cases: 1) freedom of association is 
constitutionally protected, 2) freedom of association presupposes a freedom not to 
associate, and 3) the appropriate standard for analyzing an infringement on the right of 
association is whether it serves a compelling state interest. 
Keller v. State Bar of Cal. 496 U.S.  1 ( 1990). Court unanimously rejected the California 
State Bar Association' s efforts to utilize compulsory dues to finance political and 
ideological activities favored by less than the majority of its members. 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S .  507 ( 1991). Court relied on Abood and 
Chicago Teachers Union v.Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) in holding that fees used for 
lobbying activities are not sufficiently connected to collective bargaining to compel 
employees to comply. 
Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. ,  4 Cal 4th 843 (1993). Judgment of the Court of 
Appeal affirmed with respect to its ruling on collecting mandatory student activities fee. 
The Regents of the University of California may impose the fee 
Board of Regents of the Unviersity of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S . 217 
(2000). The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment was not violated when a 
public university charged students mandatory fees to fund extracurricular speech, 
provided that the university exercised viewpoint neutrality in allocating the funding to the 
student organizations engaging in such speech. Government speech is mentioned in this 
case in the following dicta: 
Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, 
its agents or employees, or--of particular importance-its faculty, are subject to 
the First Amendment analysis which controls in this case. Where the Unviersity 
speaks, either in its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other 
ways through its diverse faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether 
different . . . (citations omitted). The Court has not held, or suggested, that when 
the government speaks the rules we have discussed come into play. Southworth at 
234-235 .  
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APPENDIX C 
CRITERIA FOR ANALYZING COMPELLED 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES 
1) Does the court recognize that the compelled commercial speech case involves a 
First Amendment issue? 
2) If so, what standard of First Amendment protection does the court apply in its 
decision-making? Does the court apply the Central Hudson test for commercial 
speech and analyze the case using the established intermediate scrutiny standard 
for First Amendment protection of commercial speech? Or does the court apply 
the Abood analysis for analyzing freedom from compelled speech and compelled 
association by using the strict scrutiny standard as outlined in the Roberts case? 
3) What justification does it the court offer for selecting its First Amendment 
standard for analysis? 
4) Does the court state a rationale for treating commercial speech differently than 
private speech? 
5) Are the cases that the court relies upon as precedent sufficiently similar to be 
controlling? 
6) Is this decision consistent with earlier decisions on compelled commercial 
speech? If not, how is this case distinguished? 
7) How does this case fit within the current trend in First Amendment doctrine 
toward affording broader protection for commercial speech? 
8) How does this case fit within the current trend in First Amendment doctrine 
toward expanding the Abood concept to new fact situations? 
449 
9) Does the Court identify any underlying public policy, economic or political issues 
as factors for consideration in reaching its decision? 
10) Does the Court acknowledge any of the agricultural industry interests at stake? 
1 1) Does this case contribute to the predictive value of the current line of compelled 
commercial speech cases? 
12) Does the Court recognize the USDA's  argument for government speech as a 
legitimate defense to the First Amendment claims? Does the Court apply the 
defense in reaching its decision? 
13) Does this case serve as a "catalyst" or a "brake" in the process of generating 




SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1) Are you familiar with commodity checkoff programs? How would you describe 
them? 
2) Do you feel that commodity checkoffs have a positive impact on the industries they 
support? If so, what are the benefits? If not, why do you think they fail to add value? 
3) How do commodity checkoffs impact various agricultural producers? (large 
producers, corporate producers, independent ranchers, farmers and dairy farmers) 
4) Do you agree with the way in which the revenues from commodity checkoffs are 
being spent by respective industries? Why or why not? 
5) Do you agree with the messages and focus of today' s generic commodities 
advertising? If not, what alternative message would you like to see advertised? 
6) What specific groups do you feel represent the various interests in the agricultural 
industry with respect to commodity checkoffs? (Government, industry trade groups, 
grassroots groups, parties to lawsuits, etc.) 
a) What goals are openly expressed by each group? 
b) Are there any unstated objectives that you can also identify? 
7) What interests do you think are at stake for each of these groups in the current 
conflict over commodity checkoffs? 
a) What does each group stand to lose? 
b) Which groups have shared interests? 
8) Which groups do you think have the most power? The least power? Why? 
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9) Do you think this will change in any way if commodity checkoffs are held 
unconstitutional? Why or why not? 
10) What factions within the agricultural industry are openly in conflict over checkoffs? 
1 1) Do you see this as a recent development or are the differences longstanding? 
12) With which groups are you most closely aligned? Why? 
13) Should the groups representing the various industries do anything to accommodate 
the unhappy minorities? If so, what would be appropriate? 
14) What alternatives to the current commodity checkoff programs do you feel might be 
worth pursuing? 
15) When did you first become aware that the First Amendment free speech argument 
was a viable position in the conflict over commodity checkoffs? 
a) What was your reaction to the use of a First Amendment argument by 
challengers? 
b) Do you feel that requiring mandatory payments for generic advertising is a 
violation of First Amendment rights? 
16) Do you think that commercial speech or advertising should receive the same level of 
protection as political or private speech? Should advertisers have the same freedom 
to publicly share messages as individual speakers? 
17) How much protection do you feel should be afforded compelled commercial speech? 
Should the courts recognize the right of a commodity producer not to engage in the 
advertising of messages such producer does not support? 
18) Should commodity producers be entitled to opt out of commodity checkoff 
programs? What effect will this have on the overall results of the programs? 
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19) What kinds of changes are occurring in the agricultural industry? (Please elaborate 
based on your background and expertise.) What do you think is driving these 
changes? 
20) Which changes are positive and which are negative for . . .  
a) the future of agriculture in the U.S .? 
b) the future of the independent farmer or rancher? 
c) the future potential to sustain a desirable quality of life for commodity producers? 
d) the future of the U.S . as a global agricultural competitor? 
e) the future ability to maintain a healthy ecosystem for commodity production? 
21)  Is generic advertising useful in responding to these changes? In what ways? 
22) Do you feel the current laws adequately address the issues raised by these 
agricultural changes? What further legislation would you like to see enacted? Is such 
further legislation moderately needed or urgently needed? 
23) Do you agree with the way in which the past and present Secretaries of Agriculture 
(Daniel Glickman and Anne Veneman, respectively) have handled the referendum 
challenges to commodity checkoffs? Why or why not? 
24) Do you agree with the USDA' s aggressive efforts to fight the challenges to 
commodity checkoffs in the courts? Why do you think the USDA is fighting so hard? 
25) Are you familiar with the "government speech defense" that is being used by the 
USDA? 
26) What is your opinion of this defense? Do you agree with the argument that generic 
advertising created by commodity producers is "government speech"? Why or why 
not? 
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27) If the courts accept the government speech argument, what will be the 
consequences? 
a) Do you foresee any changes in the decision-making and power exercised by the 
groups involved in the commodity checkoff programs? 
b) If so, do you think these would be positive changes? 
28) What is your opinion about the recent Supreme Court case (United States v. United 
Foods) holding that the mushroom checkoffs assessed against the mushroom growers 
in Tennessee are unconstitutional? 
29) Do you believe that mandatory commodity checkoffs are compelled speech? 
30) What is your opinion on other pending cases filed by parties using First Amendment 
arguments to challenge checkoffs in the dairy, pork and beef industries? (Interviewer 
will mention recent status and developments in pending cases.) 
3 1) What consequences do you think will occur if the Supreme Court ultimately holds 
that mandatory assessments are unconstitutional? 
32) If you are familiar with the Central Hudson intermediate standard for protection· of 
commercial speech? What consequences do you think will arise if the Supreme Court 
switches to a stricter standard for protecting commercial speech? 
33) Who else would you suggest I contact in exploring this research subject? 
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